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Much  has  been  written  about  Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky.  His 
development  of  the  "Deep  Battle"  military  theory  in  the  late  1920s  and  1930s,  the 
attendant  mechanisation  of  the  Red  Army  and  his  role  in  the  development  of  the 
Soviet  military/industrial  complex  have  been  well-researched.  The  "Tukhachevsky 
Affair",  the  discussion  surrounding  his  execution  in  the  military  purge  of  1937, 
continues  to  attract  interest.  However,  a  detailed  analysis  of  his  early  life  and  Civil 
War  command  career  has  never  been  completed.  This  gap  is  filled  by  this  thesis. 
Tukhachevsky's  early  life  is  explored  to  provide  background,  but  also  to  provide  a 
biographical  account  and  to  illustrate  who  he  was  when  he  joined  the  Red  Army  and 
Bolshevik  Party  in  1918.  The  thesis  demonstrates  that  he  was  not  a  communist  at  this 
stage.  However,  his  command  experiences  during  the  Civil  War,  combining  military 
tactics  of  continuous  manoeuvre  warfare  with  constant  frontline  mobilisations, 
political  agitation  and  repression,  allowed  him  to  develop  a  theory  of  class  warfare 
and  saw  his  conversion  to  a  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  Marxist  principles  when  applied 
to  military  methods.  Tukhachevsky's  success  in  the  Civil  War  is  compared  to  his 
failure  in  the  Polish-Soviet  War  and  the  basis  for  the  latter  is  that  his  continuation  of 
class  warfare  methods  were  unsuitable  for  the  conflict  in  Poland. 
The  success  of  Tukhachevsky's  class  warfare  methods  is  explained  by  their 
relevance  to  the  situation  and  social  fabric  of  Russia  at  the  time.  The  retention  of 
these  principles  to  form  the  basis  of  the  operational  side  of  "Deep  Battle"  is  argued,  as 
is  Tukhachevsky's  openness  to  innovation  in  weaponry  and  tactics  gleaned  during  his 
Civil  War  command.  Tukhachevsky's  role  in  early  Red  Army  formulation  is  detailed, 
as  is  his  development  of  the  concept  of  "unified  command"  involving  the  creation  of 
Red  Commanders. 
The  Communist  Party  leadership's  use  of  Tukhachevsky  as  a  "troubleshooter"  to 
deal  with  prioritised  areas  during  the  Civil  War,  leading  to  his  service  on  every  major 
Front  at  crucial  stages  is  highlighted,  as  are  the  connections  he  made  on  the  Civil  War 
battlefields,  friendly  and  hostile.  It  is  shown  that  during  his  Civil  War  commands  he 
met  with  those  with  whom  he  would  later  work  and  that  their  collaboration  and 
experimentation  began  almost  immediately. I  hereby  certify  that  the  work  embodied  in  this  thesis  is  the  result  of 
original  research  and  has  not  been  submitted  for  a  higher  degree  to  any 
other  university  or  institution. In  memory  of  Professor  John  Erickson,  whom  I  had  the  great  privilege  to  meet 
and  get  to  know  a  little.  Without  his  help,  I  would  not  have  gained  access  to  the 
archival  sources  vital  to  my  research  and  the  originality  of  my  work  would  have 
been  considerably  lessened.  Professor  Erickson's  breadth  of  knowledge,  insight 
and  immense  enthusiasm  for  history  and  learning  was  an  inspiration  and  I  left 
meetings  with  him  full  of  ideas  and  bursting  with  energy.  I  hope  I  have  reflected 
some  of  this  in  my  thesis.  A  great  gentleman  and  unsurpassable  scholar  who  is 
missed  by  many.  Thank  you. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky  was  a  prominent  figure  in  the  history  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  Appointed  one  of  the  first  five  Marshals  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1935,  he 
served  as  Deputy  Peoples'  Commissar  of  Defence  and  Chief  of  Armaments  of  the  Red 
Army  from  1931-1937,  playing  a  major  role  in  the  formation  and  build-up  of  the  an-ned 
forces  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  military-industrial  complex  which  was  to  dominate  the 
nation  for  its  duration.  ' 
Executed  in  the  military  purge  of  1937,  he  was  written  out  of  Soviet  history  for  the 
next  twenty  years.  Only  with  Tukhachevsky's  rehabilitation  in  1957,  did  literature  begin 
to  appear  in  the  Soviet  Union  about  his  life.  A  selection  of  his  written  works  appeared  in 
1964,  accompanied  by  a  collection  of  memoirs  by  former  comrades,  biographies  and 
works  on  his  military  theory.  2  He  was  finally  credited  with  the  development  of  the 
operational  theories  by  which  the  Soviet  Union  conducted  operations  from  1943-1945  to 
defeat  Nazi  Gen-nany.  Articles  began  to  appear  in  newspapers  and  journals  throughout 
the  Soviet  Union  and  over  the  next  twenty-five  years,  ftirther  biographical  works  were 
3  published  . 
These  Soviet  biographies  reflect  the  changing  nature  of  the  Soviet  regime. 
The  1960s  works  of  Nikulin  and  Todorskii  carried  on  the  rehabilitation  process,  lauding 
Tukhachevsky's  military  achievements  and  portraying  a  loyal  communist  soldier. 
Rakovskii  and  Popov,  published  during  the  Brezhnev  era,  typically  for  that  time 
reiterated  the  earlier  works,  without  adding  anything  new.  However,  Gorelik,  Ivanov, 
Shchetinov  and  Starkov  and  Dairies  provided  a  deeper  insight,  appearing  during 
Gorbachev's  glasnost'era,  and  able  to  admit,  fitfully,  that  Tukhachevsky  was  perhaps  not 
simply  a  pure  communist  soldier. 
1  The  other  Marshals  appointed  were  Kliment  Efremovich  Voroshilov,  Semen  Mikhailovich  Budennyi, 
Aleksandr  Il'ich  Egorov  and  Vasilii  Konstantinovich  Bliukher. 
2  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Izbrannye  proizvedeniia,  Tomy  I-H,  1919-193  7,  (Moscow,  1964);  L.  Nikulin, 
Tukhachevsky,  biograficheskii  ocherk',  (Moscow,  1964);  A.  1.  Todorskii,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky, 
(Moscow,  1963);  N.  1.  Koritskii,  ed.,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  druzei  i  soratnikov, 
(Moscow,  1965);  A  seemingly  unpublished  biography  by  G.  S.  Isserson,  a  former  Professor  at  the  Red 
Anny  General  Staff  Academy  is  held  in  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  6,  pp.  1-145. 
3  L.  Rakovskii,  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky  -  Povest',  (Leningrad,  1967);  A.  S.  Popov,  Trud,  Talant,  Doblest', 
(Moscow,  1972);  Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  Marshal  M  N.  Tukhachevsky,  (Saratov,  1986);  V.  M.  Ivanov,  Marshal  M 
N.  Tukhachevsky,  2nd  Edition,  (Moscow,  1990);  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  Krasnyi  Marshal, 
(Moscow,  1990). 2 
The  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  immediately  witness  the  appearance  of 
further  biographical  works  on  Tukhachevsky,  but  towards  the  late  1990s,  several  have 
appeared,  approaching  the  subject  from  varying  angles.  Smirnov  attempts  to  turn  the 
good  communist  theory  on  its  head,  whilst  Sokolov  takes  a  more  balanced  view.  4  Other 
works  have  looked  at  Tukhachevsky  in  relation  to  wider  Red  Army  affairs  in  the  1920s 
and  1930s,  notably  Minakov.  5 
In  the  West,  several  works  appeared  from  varying  sources  during  the  Soviet  period.  A 
biography  by  Gul',  a  White  emigre  from  the  Russian  Civil  War,  predictably  presented 
Tukhachevsky  in  an  entirely  different  light  from  the  Soviet  biographies,  emphasising  his 
semi-noble  background,  but  it  is  an  interesting  early  source,  written  whilst  Tukhachevsky 
was  still  alive.  6  The  book  by  Pierre  Fervacque,  Le  Chef  de  L  Armee  Rouge,  recalled  time 
spent  by  the  author  and  Tukhachevsky  in  the  German  Ingolstadt  prisoner-of-war  camp 
and  another  memoir  source  by  Lidia  North  provides  useful  material.  7 
Research  surrounding  Tukhachevsky  after  his  rehabilitation  concentrated  predictably 
on  his  execution,  as  details  were  sought  to  explain  why  Stalin  killed  one  of  his  most 
important  commanders,  on  the  eve  of  his  clash  with  Hitler.  Alexandrov's  work  began  the 
speculation  surrounding  Tukhachevsky's  death  and  this  continues  today.  8  Much  study  has 
been  conducted  on  this  part  of  Tukhachevsky's  life. 
More  recently  however,  research  has  focused  on  Tukhachevsky's  work  in  the  late 
1920s  and  1930s.  Simpkin  and  Erickson  explored  the  development  of  "Deep  Battle"  in 
the  1920s,  whilst  Samuelson,  Stoecker  and  Stone  examined  Tukhachevsky's  role  in  the 
build-up  of  the  mi  I  itary-  industrial  complex  and  the  mechanised  Red  Army.  9  These  areas 
have  been  well-covered. 
4  G.  V.  Smimov,  Krovavyi  marshal,  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky,  1893-1937,  (St.  Petersburg,  1997);  B. 
Sokolov,  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky:  zhizn'i  smert'Krasnogo  marshala,  (Smolensk,  1999). 
5  S.  T.  Minakov,  Za  otvorotom  marshal'skoi  shineli,  (Orel,  1999)  and  Sovetskaia  voennaia  elita  20-kh 
godow  (Sostav,  evoliutsiia,  sotsiokulturnye  osobennosti  ipoliticheskaia  rolý,  (Orel,  2000). 
6  R.  Gul',  Tukhachevsky:  krasnyi  marshal,  (Berlin,  1932). 
7  P.  Fervacque,  Le  Chef  de  LArmee  Rouge,  (Paris,  1928);  L.  North,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky,  (Paris,  1978). 
8  V.  Alexandrov,  (trans.  J.  Hewish),  The  Tukhachevsky  Affair,  (London,  1962). 
9  R.  Simpkin  &  J.  Erickson,  The  Brainchild  ofMarshal  Tukhachevskii,  (London;  Washington,  1987);  S. 
Stoecker,  Forging  Stalin's  Army:  Marshal  Tukhachevsky  and  the  Politics  of  Military  Innovation,  (Oxford, 
1998);  L.  Samuelson,  Plansfor  Stalin's  War  Machine:  Tukhachevskii  and  Military-Economic  Planning, 
1925-1941,  (London,  2000);  D.  Stone,  Hammer  and  Rifle:  The  Militarization  of  the  Soviet  Union,  1926- 
1933,  (Kansas,  2000). 3 
However,  a  glaring  gap  exists  in  the  literature  on  Tukhachevsky,  which  this  thesis 
fills.  Tukhachevsky's  early  life  and  Russian  Civil  War  command  career  have  not  been 
researched  in  depth  in  either  Soviet,  Russian  or  Western  publications.  The  Soviet 
biographies  examine  these  areas,  but  only  in  a  way  designed  to  illustrate  Tukhachevsky's 
good  communist  pedigree,  and  of  the  post-Soviet  Russian  biographies,  only  Sokolov  adds 
anything  worthwhile.  Several  Western  biographical  works  have  appeared,  but  whilst 
questioning  the  loyal  communist  line,  and  variously  describing  Tukhachevsky  as  an 
"aristocratic-communist"  or  a  "noble  revolutionary",  they  have  relied  too  heavily  on  the 
Soviet  biographies  regarding  Tukhachevsky's  early  life  and  Civil  War  career.  They  have 
not  utilised  archival  or  sufficient  documentary  sources  to  produce  new  insights.  10 
Study  of  Tukhachevsky's  background  and  early  life  has  thus  far  been  neglected,  but  is 
crucial  to  draw  the  complete  picture  of  the  later  man.  In  this  thesis,  I  examine  previously 
unused  archival  sources  and  newly-available  published  documentary  collections  to 
provide  information  surrounding  Tukhachevsky's  early  life  and  Civil  War  career. 
Existing  documentary  collections  and  memoir  sources,  which  have  either  not  been  used 
or  only  cursorily,  are  also  examined  in  detail  to  give  as  detailed  an  assessment  as  possible 
of  Tukhachevsky's  early  days  and  frontline  command  career,  to  show  the  origins  of  his 
later  ideas. 
Tukhachevsky  produced  a  plethora  of  written  works  on  every  aspect  of  the  military. 
These  were  often  written  during  or  just  after  the  events  about  which  he  was  writing.  This 
thesis  has  utilised  a  wide  a  selection  of  Tukhachevsky's  works  where  relevant.  In  this 
way,  the  structure  of  Chapters  111,  IV  and  V  follow  basically  the  same  pattern. 
Tukhachevsky's  assessment  of  the  events  in  which  he  was  involved  are  presented  and 
considered  alongside  other  sources  to  detennine  his  originality,  accuracy  and 
motivations. 
Chapter  I  provides  an  examination  of  Tukhachevsky's  early  life,  civil  and  military 
education  and  Great  War  combat  and  prisoner-of-war  experiences,  concluding  with  his 
return  to  Russia  in  October  1917  and  decision  to  join  the  Red  Army  in  early  1918.  The 
10  T.  Butson,  The  Tsar's  Lieutenant.  The  Soviet  Marshal,  (New  York,  1984);  A.  F.  Kaufmann  Jr., 
Aristocratic  Communist:  The  Life  ofM.  N.  Tukhachevskii  and  the  Continuity  ofImperial  Army  Tradition  in 
the  Soviet  Military,  (PhD  diss.  University  of  Arkansas,  199  1);  W.  Spahr,  Stalin's  Lieutenants:  A  Study  of 
Command  Under  Duress,  (Novato,  Calif,  1997). 4 
character  traits  and  personality  necessary  to  succeed  during  the  Civil  War  were  evident  in 
Tukhachevsky  from  an  early  age.  Therefore,  understanding  who  Tukhachevsky  was  and 
what  his  motivations  were  in  late  1917,  is  crucial  to  determine  why  he  chose  the  path  he 
did  in  1918.  This  chapter  provides  both  a  crucial  early  biographical  account,  but  also 
essential  background  for  studying  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  career,  examining 
Tukhachevsky  as  a  Tsarist  Army  officer.  The  source  material  for  this  chapter  was 
initially  based  around  biographical  and  memoir  sources,  but  research  in  the  Russian 
archives,  particularly  RGVA  fond  37605,  Lichnyi  fond  Mikhaila  Nikolaevicha 
Tukhachevskogo  (Personal  fond  of  Tukhachevsky),  has  enabled  the  completion  of  a  more 
in-depth  early  biographical  account  than  has  previously  appeared. 
Chapter  11  covers  the  first  eight  months  of  1918,  during  which  time  Tukhachevsky 
joined  the  Bolshevik  Party.  His  motives  for  this  are  examined.  He  played  an  integral  part 
in  the  formation  of  the  Red  Army  at  this  time,  initially  working  at  the  hub  of  the 
administrative  organisational  system,  before  being  despatched  eastwards  to  help  build  the 
materialising  Eastern  Front  to  fight  the  Czechoslovak  Legion.  This  was  not  war  in  the 
conventional  sense  and  the  atmosphere  of  treachery,  amid  ad  hoc  measures  and  decision- 
making,  introduced  him  to  aspects  of  civil  warfare  about  which  he  would  begin  to 
theorise.  His  performance  under  pressure  was  pivotal  in  showing  his  worth  to  Moscow 
and  set  him  on  his  way  to  successful  Civil  War  command.  This  chapter  again  draws  on 
previously  unused  archival  sources  and  also  extensive  memoir  material  on  Tukhachevsky 
and  the  Eastern  Front  in  1918.  Published  documentary  collections  which  have  not  been 
utilised  in  the  available  literature  are  used,  as  are  others  only  partially  employed  to  date.  " 
Chapters  Ill  and  IV  study  Tukhachevsky  as  a  frontline  commander  in  the  Russian 
Civil  War.  Chapter  III  presents  Tukhachevsky's  analysis  of  the  Civil  War,  suggests  links 
between  this  and  "Deep  Battle",  and  studies  Tukhachevsky's  early  commands  from 
August  1918-March  1919.  Chapter  IV  examines  Tukhachevsky's  commands  from  April 
1919-April  1920,  during  which  time  he  emerged  as  perhaps  the  epitome  of  the  "Red 
Commander"  envisaged  by  Lenin  and  Trotsky.  These  chapters  introduce  Tukhachevsky 
11  Boevoi  put'pervoi  revoliutsionnoi  armii  Vostochnogo  i  Turkestanogofrontov,  Iiun'  1918-fevral'  1921gg. 
(Sbornik  dokumentov  i  materialov),  (Ashkhabad,  1972);  Direktivy  Glavnogo  komandovaniia  Krasnoi  Annii 
(1917-1920).  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (hereafter  DGkKA),  (Moscow,  1969);  Direktivy  komandovaniiafrontov 
Krasnoi  Arniii  (1917-1922),  Sbornik  dokumentov  v  4-kh  tomakh,  (Moscow,  1971-1978). 5 
as  an  army  commander  of  conventional  forces,  but  also  illustrate  his  development  as  a 
military  theoretician  and  an  advocate  of  revolutionary  class  warfare.  By  studying  his 
campaigns  individually  to  identify  specific  tactical  experiments  or  discoveries,  but  also 
comparatively  to  find  patterns  in  his  command  style  and  decision-making,  the  evolution 
of  Tukhachevsky  as  a  class  civil  war  commander  can  be  charted.  His  relations  with  other 
military  personnel  and  the  development  in  his  thought  and  character  this  engendered  is 
highlighted.  How  representative  this  was  of  the  developing  dynamics  of  Red  Army 
leadership  is  illustrated  by  examining  Red  Army  intra-hierarchical  relations  and 
Tukhachevsky's  place  in  them.  In  examining  both  the  military  and  political  aspects  of 
Tukhachevsky's  developing  thought  process  and  the  campaigns  which  inspired  it,  the 
origins  of  the  operational  side  of  "Deep  Battle"  can  be  traced  directly  to  Tukhachevsky's 
Civil  War  command,  both  in  the  nature  of  his  campaign  leadership  and  in  the  writings  he 
produced  at  the  time  to  explain  his  experiences.  His  success  in  this  period  is  traced  to  his 
methods,  which  were  initially  imposed  upon  him  by  an  impatient  Red  leadership, 
matching  the  nature  of  Russian  Civil  Warfare  in  a  military,  political,  social  and  economic 
sense.  The  role  of  troubleshooter  he  fulfilled  for  Moscow,  being  despatched  to  prioritised 
fronts  at  crucial  times,  is  analysed. 
The  source  base  for  Chapters  III  and  IV  is  almost  entirely  original.  A  more  detailed 
use  of  DGgK,  4  and  DkfK,  4  than  has  previously  been  attempted,  combined  with  the  use  of 
other  published  documentary  sources,  memoir  material  and  archival  material,  has 
allowed  the  compilation  of  a  comprehensive  collection  of  Tukhachevsky's  and  related 
commanders'  battle  orders  througout  the  Civil  War.  12  Using  these  alongside  a  wide  array 
of  Tukhachevsky's  written  works,  including  Voina  klassov,  has  produced  an  analysis  of 
Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  command,  its  origins,  evolvement  and  nature.  '  3 
Chapter  V  examines  Tukhachevsky  in  the  role  of  Western  Front  Commander  in  the 
Polish-Soviet  War.  This  is  analysed  in  close  comparison  to  Chapters  III  and  IV  to 
demonstrate  that  Tukhachevsky  and  the  Red  High  Command  fought  this  war  in  the  same 
manner,  but  ultimately  lost  it  because  of  this.  Tukhachevsky's  campaigns  in  Belorussia 
12  V  boiakh  rozhdeniia,  1918-1920:  boevoi  put'5  armii.  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (Irkutsk,  1985);  M.  V. 
Frunze  na  Vostochnom  Fronte,  (Kuibyshev,  1958). 
13  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Voina  klassov,  (Smolensk,  1921). 6 
and  Poland  are  analysed,  as  is  the  aftermath  of  the  Polish  counter-attack.  The  reasons  for 
the  Soviet  defeat  are  discussed  to  demonstrate  the  lessons  which  Tukhachevsky  learned 
in  defeat  and  their  contribution  to  "Deep  Battle"  operational  formulation.  This  chapter  is 
again  based  almost  wholly  on  original  sources.  A  detailed  study  of  DGgKA  and  DkJKA 
provides  a  unique  compilation  of  Tukhachevsky's  command  orders.  Analysing  these 
alongside  Tukhachevsky's  works,  Voina  klassov  once  more,  but  especially  Pokhod  za 
Vislu,  allows  an  accurate  portrayal  of  Tukhachevsky's  command  style  in  Poland  and  a 
comparison  with  Civil  War  command.  14  Some  concluding  remarks  relate  back  to 
Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  analysis  presented  in  Chapter  111. 
In  the  conclusion,  the  various  chapter  themes  and  threads  which  run  through  the 
thesis  are  drawn  together  to  sum  up  Tukhachevsky's  contribution  to  the  Red  victory  in 
the  Russian  Civil  War,  his  evolution  as  a  military  theorist  and  person  and  the  possible 
influence  his  Civil  War  career  had  on  his  later  downfall. 
14  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  Izbrannyeproizvedeniia,  Tom  1,1919-1927,  pp.  114-168. 7 
Chapter  1:  Backimound  -  1893-1918 
"My  real  life  began  with  the  October  Revolution". 
The  above  statement  was  made  by  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky  in  1935  at  the  pinnacle 
of  his  military  career  in  the  Soviet  Red  Army.  Despite  being  a  Marshal  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Deputy  Defence  Commissar,  Tukhachevsky's  position  was  not  secure  and 
he  would  be  executed  as  part  of  Stalin's  military  purge  two  years  later.  Remarks  such 
as  the  above  were  necessary  in  the  prevailing  atmosphere  of  the  1930s.  However,  this 
quote  has  been  reproduced  by  Soviet  writers  since  Tukhachevsky's  rehabilitation  as 
proof  of  his  commitment  to  communism  and  the  Revolution  in  Russia.  This  is 
convenient  as  it  allows  Tukhachevsky's  early  life  before  1917  to  be  ignored  and 
discounted  when  explaining  his  influence  on  the  Red  Army.  However,  the 
experiences  gained  and  opinions  formed  during  this  period  shaped  the  man  who 
joined  the  Red  Army  and  Communist  Party  in  1918.  Who  was  Tukhachevsky  before 
he  became  a  communist  soldier  and  when  did  he  make  the  decision  to  join  the 
Bolsheviks?  How  did  his  early  life,  education  and  experiences  lead  him  to  these 
decisions  and  could  he  have  followed  another  path?  This  first  chapter  will  outline 
who  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky  was  as  a  young  man  to  answer  the  above  questions. 
Early  Life 
Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky  was  born  on  3rd  (15th)  February  1893  in  the 
I 
village  of  Slednevo,  on  Alexandrovskii  Estate  in  Dorogobuzhskii  uezd,  Smolensk 
Province.  2  He  was  born  into  a  long  line  of  nobles,  originating  from  the  Count  Idris 
(Indris),  an  emigrant  from  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  who  served  the  Grand  Prince  of 
Kiev,  Mstislav  Vladimirovich,  in  1251.  The  family's  6th  generation  moved  to 
Moscow  to  serve  Great  Knight  Vasilii  Dmitrievich  in  1408  and  assumed  the  name 
Tukhachevsky  when  Bogdan  Grigorievich  of  the  7th  generation  was  rewarded  by 
Great  Knight  Vasilii  Vasil'evich  with  the  villages  of  Skorino  and  Tukhachevsky  in 
I  Rossiskii  Gosudarstvennyi  Voenn)yl'Arkhiv  (RGVA).  fond.  37605,  opis.  1,  delo.  3,  p.  38. 
2  Marshal  TukhachevsAy:  Vospominaniia  druzei  i  soratnikov,  (Moscow,  1965),  p.  23  1. 8 
Serpeisk  uezd.  Later  generations  gained  land  in  Smolensk,  Briansk  and  Penza 
Provinces  and  a  tradition  of  military  service  for  the  Tsars  emerged. 
On  25th  August  183  1,  Colonel  Aleksandr  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky, 
Tukhachevsky's  great-grandfather,  was  killed  in  action  at  Warsaw.  He  had  joined  the 
Semenovskii  Life-Guard  Regiment  in  1810,  commanding  the  2nd  Grenadier 
Company,  but  was  transferred  to  the  Archangelodskii  Infantry  Regiment  for 
participating  in  a  regimental  uprising.  He  fought  in  the  Fatherland  War  against 
Napoleon  and  the  Turkish  Wars  at  Tarytin,  Ultsen  and  the  fortress  of  Shumle,  before 
his  death.  Tukhachevsky's  great-great-uncle  was  a  cavalry  colonel  and  major-general 
and  his  great-uncle  served  as  a  major-general,  commanding  7th  Hussar  Belorussian 
Regiment,  falling  in  action  in  1812  against  Napoleon.  3  Military  traditions  were  strong 
in  the  family,  giving  credence  to  the  suggestion  that  as  a  child  Tukhachevsky  liked  to 
hear  war  stories,  being  especially  proud  of  his  great-grandfather  fighting  Napoleon 
4 
with  Suvorov.  Tukhachevsky  later  wore  an  engraved  silver  ring  in  memory  of  his 
great-grandfather. 
5 
Tukhachevsky's  grandfather  served  as  Smolensk  Province  Secretary,  6  but  his 
father  lived  as  a  landlord,  not  a  working  noble. 
7  However,  he  did  not  believe  in  the 
absolute  rights  of  the  autocracy  and  did  not  reinforce  them. 
8  He  did  not  participate  in 
any  governmental  or  societal  activities,  which  perhaps  contributed  to  his  family's 
impoverishment,  but  devoted  all  his  time  to  raising  his  family  and  ensuring  they  had 
the  best  possible  education,  instilling  in  them  his  beliefs  in  a  fair,  sobre  lifestyle  with 
respect  for  the  peasant  population.  Tukhachevsky's  sisters  describe  him  as  a  man 
cultured  in  art  and  literature  and  an  atheist  who  did  not  covet  wealth,  bringing  his 
family  up  this  way  and  probably  ahead  of  his  time  in  the  late  19th  Century.  9  This  was 
illustrated  most  clearly  by  his  marriage. 
3 
RGVA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  pp.  56-62. 
4 
V.  M.  Ivanov,  Marshal  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  (Moscow,  1990),  pp.  21-22. 
5  P.  Fervacque,  Le  Chef  de  LArmee  Rouge,  (Paris,  1928),  p.  33. 
RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  p.  61. 
7 
L.  Nikulin,  Tukhachevsky.  -  Biograficheskii  ocherk,  (Moscow,  1964),  p.  10. 
8  A.  1.  Todorskii,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky,  (Moscow,  1964),  p.  8. 
9  E,  N.  An,  atova-Tukhachevskaia  &  0.  N.  Tukhachevskaia,  "On  liubil  zhizn...  Marshal  Tukhachevsky: 
Vospoininaniia  druzei  i  soratnikov,  (Moscow,  1965),  pp.  10  &  12;  A.  1.  Todorskii,  pp.  9&  12. 9 
Tukhachevsky's  mother,  Mavra  Petrovna,  was  a  simple  peasant  living  on  his 
grandfather's  estate  in  the  village  of  Kniazhino.  Tukhachevsky's  father  married  her 
despite  her  position  and  the  shunning  of  high  society  which  would  have  followed. 
Mavra  Petrovna  is  described  as  an  educated  and  intelligent  woman  who  taught  her 
family  "respect  for  working  people". 
10  She  kept  close  ties  with  her  large  family,  so 
from  an  early  age  Tukhachevsky  knew  of  the  rigours  of  peasant  life.  Ivanov  suggests 
Tukhachevsky  liked  to  think  of  his  mother's  ancestors  as  being  in  the  ranks  of  the 
11  Smolensk  Partisans  in  1812,  fighting  the  French,  which  is  possible  given  his  early 
interest  in  the  Napoleonic  campaign. 
Tukhachevsky  was  one  of  a  large  family,  the  second  eldest  of  nine.  Nikolai, 
Aleksandr  and  Nadezhda  were  bom,  like  Tukhachevsky,  in  Smolensk  Province,  but 
the  five  younger  siblings  -  Igor,  Sofia,  Olga,  Elizabeth  and  Maria  -  were  born  in 
Penza  Province,  to  where  the  family  moved  in  1898.  His  father's  material  difficulties 
forced  him  to  sell  his  estate  and  move  to  the  estate  of  Tukhachevsky's  grandmother, 
12 
Sofia  Valentinovna,  near  Vrazhskoe,  in  Chembarsk  uezd. 
Tukhachevsky's  grandmother  is  described  as  a  great  influence  during  his 
upbringing.  Tukhachevsky  is  quoted  as  saying  she  was  French.  13  He  also  had  a  French 
governess, 
14 
possibly  named  Mademoiselle  Zhegy,  15 
making  it  no  surprise  that  he 
spoke  French,  from  childhood. 
16  Tukhachevsky  also  spoke  German  and  it  is  suggested 
he  had  to  devote  little  time  to  language  classes  later  in  cadet  corps. 
17  His  grandmother 
also  contributed  in  a  material  sense  to  the  family's  education,  mortgaging  her  estate 
18 
repeatedly  to  pay  for  it. 
10  L.  Nikulin,  pp.  12-13;  E.  N.  Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia  &  0.  N.  Tukhachevskaia,  p.  10. 
II  V.  M.  Ivanov,  p.  2  1. 
12  Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  Marshal  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  (Saratov,  1986),  p.  5;  V.  M.  Ivanov,  p.  20;  In  1990  a 
settlement  remained  here  named  Tukhachevsky. 
13  V.  Alexandrov,  The  Tukhachevskii  Affair,  (trans.  J.  Hewish),  (London,  1962),  p.  80.  General  de 
Goys  de  Mezeyrac,  interned  with  Tukhachevsky  later  in  Ingolstadt  commented  he  was  "...  not  a  little 
surprised  to  hear  him  speak  impeccable  French";  Nikulin  writes  that  Tukhachevsky  later  surprised 
Eduard  Herriot,  a  French  Government  Representative,  with  his  lingual  abilities,  p.  17. 
14 
P.  Fervacque,  p.  20. 
15  R.  Gul',  Krasnyi  Marshal,  (Berlin,  1932),  p.  10.  However,  Gul'  inaccurately  states  that 
Tukhachevsky's  mother  died  early  leaving  his  upbringing  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  governess. 
16  RGVA,  f,  37605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  p.  39. 
17 
Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  p.  10. 
18 
R.  Gul',  pp.  14-15. 10 
School  Life 
Tukhachevsky's  family  lived  in  Vrazhskoe  during  the  summer  and  Penza  in  the 
winter.  Penza  is  described  as  one  of  the  most  enlightened  Russian  towns  in  the  early 
20th  Century,  being  named  the  "Mordvinian  Athens".  It  contained  male  and  female 
gimnasii, 
19 
an  art  school  with  a  large  gallery,  a  good  library  named  after  Lermontov 
and  a  reading-room  named  after  Belinskii,  which  Chekov  had  helped  found.  It  was  a 
very  cultured  town,  which  Nikulin  suggests  was  probably  why  Tukhachevsky's  father 
20 
moved  the  family  there.  Monetary  difficulties  were  the  main  reason  for  the  move, 
21 
but  Tukhachevsky's  father,  a  man  who  "loved  only  music  and  art,  "  must  have  hoped 
the  cultured  surroundings  of  Penza  would  influence  his  children  in  their  careers.  They 
were  all  encouraged  to  play  musical  instruments  alongside  the  father  and 
22 
grandmother,  cementing  Tukhachevsky's  interest  in  music  from  an  early  age.  In  later 
years,  although  himself  admitting  he  was  only  an  average  violinist,  he  became  an 
accomplished  instrument  maker,  building  five  violins  and  a  cello  for  his  brother 
Aleksandr,  prompting  his  family  to  call  him  "golden  hands".  23  He  had  equipment  for 
laquer  preparation  in  his  flat  and  wrote  essays  on  techniques  of  preparing  the  best 
lacquer  for  priming  violins  to  create  the  finest  sound  quality. 
24  A  more  poignant 
postscript  to  this  musical  interest  came  in  1937,  when  Tukhachevsky,  knowing  his 
fate  was  sealed,  reminisced  to  one  of  his  sisters,  "How  I  in  childhood  asked  to  have  a 
violin  bought  for  me,  but  father  because  of  eternal  poverty  was  not  able  to  do  this. 
Perhaps  if  I  had  been  a  professonal  violinist  ...... 
25  This  may  have  been  his  father's 
wish,  but  Tukhachevsky  had  other  ideas. 
From  a  young  age,  Tukhachevsky  asked  to  attend  cadet  corps,  but  his  father 
refused  permission. 
26  As  the  son  of  a  noble  he  had  this  right,  but  his  father  again 
could  not  afford  it,  falling  outwith  the  categories  which  qualified  for  state-funding 
19 
Russian  secondary  schools. 
20 
L.  Nikulin,  pp.  16-17. 
21 
RG  VA,  f.  3  7605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  p.  5  1. 
22 
E.  N.  Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia  &  0.  N.  Tukhachevskaia,  p.  13. 
23 
Ibid.  p.  11;  One  of  these  violins  is  displayed  in  the  Central  Armed  Forces  Museum  in  Moscow. 
24  RGVA,  f,  37605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  p.  9.  These  essays  are  also  held  in  Tukhachevsky's  personal  file. 
25  E.  N.  Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia  &  0.  N.  Tukhachevskaia,  p.  18. 27 
(these  were  mainly  sons  of  military  men).  Therefore,  a  combination  of  his  father's 
wishes  and  poverty  led  to  Tukhachevsky's  initial  schooling.  He  attended  lst  Penza 
28 
Belinskii  Gimnasiia  from  1904-1  909 
. 
Varied  accounts  are  provided  of  Tukhachevsky's  Penza  school  days.  Gul'  writes 
that  he  was  nothing  like  the  Communist  Red  Army  Commander  he  would  become, 
but  an  arrogant,  unsociable  loner  who  courted  no  friendship.  Maintaining  the  distance 
and  reserve  of  an  aristocrat,  he  had  no  scientific  interests,  dismissed  learning  Latin  as 
nonsense  and  had  only  his  "noble  circle"  which  discussed  ancient  family  trees,  coats- 
of-arms  and  heraldry.  Also  his  teachers  did  not  like  this  impudent  character,  with 
Tukhachevsky  renowned  for  his  tricks  at  school  and  constantly  being  excluded  from 
29 
classes  by  the  schoolmaster  Kutuzov.  This  is  at  odds  with  other  accounts. 
V.  G.  Ukrainskii  writes  of  Tukhachevsky  as  a  decisive  leader  amongst  those  of  his 
age.  He  read  a  great  deal,  finding  study  easy,  especially  history  and  geography,  but 
was  willing  to  share  his  knowledge  with  others.  Tukhachevsky  associated  little  with 
those  of  the  aristocratic  and  landholding  class,  but  would  split  up  fights  between 
schoolfriends,  prevent  bullying  and  implore  others  to  do  the  same.  Ukrainskii  relates 
the  boys  played  wargames,  with  himself  and  Tukhachevsky  leading  one  class  against 
the  other.  They  always  won  with  Tukhachevsky  organising  an  HQ,  conducting 
reconnaissance  and  using  the  relief  of  the  gimnasiia  territory  -  alleys  etc.  -  to  carry  out 
ambushes  and  manoeuvres  for  envelopments.  Ukrainskii's  account  differs  markedly 
from  Gul's,  but  he  does  echo  this  in  one  area  -  Tukhachevsky  was  not  popular  with 
several  teachers.  However,  this  came  not  from  arrogance  or  unsociability,  but  from 
Tukhachevsky  inheriting  his  father's  atheism  and  being  repeatedly  excluded  from 
classes  for  mocking  religion. 
30 
Soviet  biographies  have  based  their  version  of  Tukhachevsky's  Penza  schooling 
31 
on  Ukrainskii  and  similar  accounts  . 
V.  Studenskii,  another  classmate  who  later 
26 
Ibid.  p.  12. 
27 
V.  M.  Ivanov,  p.  2  1. 
28  RG  VA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  d.  8,  p.  I&d.  3,  p.  23;  L.  Nikulin,  p.  19;  V.  M.  Ivanov,  p.  2  1. 
29  R.  Gul',  p.  11.  Tukhachevsky  met  Kutuzov  12  years  later  in  Penza,  where  the  latter  had  become 
Peoples'  Commissar  for  Education  of  Penza  Province.  His  four  sons  were  killed  in  street-f  ighting  with 
the  Czechoslovaks  before  the  I  st  Red  Army  under  Tukhachevsky  drove  them  out. 
30  RGVA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  d.  8,  pp.  1-3. 
31  Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  p.  7;  L.  Nikulin,  pp.  19-20. 12 
served  with  Tukhachevsky  in  the  I  st  Army  Staff  during  the  Civil  War,  remembered 
great  musical  evenings  Tukhachevsky  and  his  friends  had  at  the  Tukhachevsky's 
house  and  Studenskii's  room  at  the  gimnasiia.  He  describes  Tukhachevsky  as  honest 
and  popular  with  many  friends.  Despite  being  the  strongest  and  best  at  gymnastics, 
gaining  the  nickname  begemot  -  "hippopotamus"  or  more  likely  "behemoth"  - 
possibly  inheriting  this  strength  from  his  peasant  mother,  "...  the  weak  had  a  friend  in 
Tukhachevsky".  However,  he  did  not  study  hard,  especially  in  4th  year  when  he 
wanted  to  enroll  in  cadet  corps. 
32 
Similar  recollections  are  cited  by  Nikulin  from  Sergei  Stepanovich  Ostrovskii, 
33 
another  classmate  who  later  joined  Ist  Army  in  Penza,  under  Tukhachevsky. 
However,  Nikolai  Dimitrievich  Volkov,  a  teacher  at  the  2nd  Penza  Gimnasiia  who 
knew  and  befriended  Tukhachevsky,  spoke  of  him  as  a  champion  gymnast,  but  not  to 
the  detriment  of  his  studies. 
34 
One  of  Tukhachevsky's  reports  is  held  in  the  Penza  Gimnasiia  records,  noting 
"Despite  his  abilities,  he  studied  badly",  "Application  -  3",  "Attention  -  2",  "During 
the  year  he  missed  127  classes",  "He  had  3  tellings-off  for  talking  in  classes".  There  is 
35 
also  a  note  by  a  priest  recording,  "Tukhachevsky  is  not  devoted  to  God's  laws.  " 
The  Soviet  biographies,  despite  variations,  appear  generally  more  accurate  about 
Tukhachevsky  at  Penza  Gimnasiia,  backed  as  they  are  by  memoir  sources,  although 
these  probably  painted  a  purer  picture  than  actually  existed.  During  his  5th  Year, 
Tukhachevsky  left  Penza  Gimnasiia  with  a  certificate  for  completing  4th  Year. 
Conflicting  reasons  are  provided  for  this. 
The  family  moved  to  Moscow  in  1909.  It  is  suggested  this  was  because  the 
children  were  growing  older  and  Tukhachevsky's  father  wished  them  to  start 
attending  specialist  schools.  Penza,  although  the  Province  town,  held  narrower 
opportunities  than  Moscow.  Also,  monetary  worries  surfaced  again,  with  maintaining 
two  houses  in  Penza  and  Vrazhskoe  proving  difficult.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  was 
32  Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  pp.  6-8. 
33  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  52. 
34  L,  Nikulin,  pp.  17  &  19-20. 
35  RGTA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  73;  L.  Nikulin,  p.  19. 13 
withdrawn  from  Penza  Gimnasiia,  as  indeed  his  siblings  must  have  been,  and  he 
enrolled  at  the  I  Oth  Moscow  Gimnasiia,  completing  his  6th  Year  in  1911,  aged  18.36 
Nikulin  however,  suggests  Tukhachevsky  was  excluded  from  Penza  Gimnasiia  for 
not  once  attending  communion  or  confession  in  his  5th  Year  and  this  was  the  reason 
for  the  move  to  Moscow.  37  Given  the  remark  on  Tukhachevsky's  report  card,  it  is 
possible  he  was  excluded  from  gimnasiia  for  anti-religious  behaviour.  Tukhachevsky 
later  described  himself  as  an  atheist  from  a  young  age,  relating  how  as  children  he  and 
his  brothers  had  three  cats  whom  they  called  God  the  Father,  Jesus  and  the  Holy 
Ghost  and  when  looking  for  these,  shouted  "...  in  terrible  voices  "Where  the  devil  is 
38  God  the  Father"".  However,  it  seems  unlikely  this  would  prompt  his  father  to  move 
the  entire  family  to  Moscow.  Monetary  reasons  and  concern  over  education  are  more 
plausible. 
Tukhachevsky  appears  to  have  been  quite  popular  at  school  and,  in  common  with 
pupils  of  this  age,  applied  himself  at  subjects  he  enjoyed,  but  not  others.  Elizabeth 
recalled  he  studied  badly  at  Penza  Gimnasiia  and  it  is  suggested  he  neither  liked  the 
strict  conditions  of  male  schools  after  the  1905  Revolution  with  tight  discipline  and 
constant  observation,  nor  enjoyed  the  classical  education  of  the  former  noble 
boarding-school,  which  perhaps  explains  his  behaviour.  39  The  simple  fact  that 
Tukhachevsky's  upbringing  would  have  been  different  to  that  of  his  classmates  should 
not  be  overlooked.  This  may  have  isolated  him  from  other  pupils  in  his  early  school 
years  or  indeed  elicited  prejudiced  responses  from  teachers  who  did  not  approve  of 
his  background  or  upbringing.  Moving  from  the  provincial  surroundings  of  Penza, 
despite  its  apparent  enlightenment,  to  the  capital  Moscow,  where  opinion  would  be 
less  unforgiving,  was  possibly  a  factor  in  his  educational  transformation  which 
occurred  later. 
However,  whilst  still  in  Penza,  he  expanded  his  interest  in  military  history.  The 
first  cousin  of  Tukhachevsky's  father,  M.  N.  Balkashin,  a  former  infantry  regimental 
commander,  who  became  a  White  emigre,  wrote  of  visiting  the  Tukhachevsky 
household  as  a  junker  and  an  officer.  As  a  child,  Tukhachevsky  adored  him  in  his 
36 
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military  uniform,  stealing  his  sabre,  spurs  and  service-cap  to  play  with.  As  a  10-year- 
old,  Tukhachevsky  read  about  the  subjugation  of  the  Caucasus  under  Ermolov  and 
Paskevich,  and  as  a  youth,  about  the  marches  and  battles  of  the  great  commanders.  He 
read  Russian  history  and  knew  it  well,  reading  about  Peter  the  Great,  Suvorov  and 
Skobelev.  40  Still  in  Penza,  he  read  a  Suvorov  biography,  explaining  his  system  of 
training  and  educating  troops,  and  many  other  books  such  as  History  of  the 
Generalissimo  Prince  Suvorov  by  Fuchs  and  Generalissimo  Prince  Suvorov  by 
Petrushevskii 
.41 
This  ties  in  with  his  sister  Olga's  recollections  that  he  developed  his 
French  and  German,  but  also  picked  up  Latin,  reading  Julius  Ceasar's  Essays  on  the 
Gallic  War  in  the  original  Latin.  He  loved  literature,  but  especially  Tolstoi,  reading 
War  and  Peace,  and  persuaded  his  father  to  take  him  and  his  brothers  from  Penza  to 
42 
Tula  to  meet  Tolstoi  himself,  who  took  Tukhachevsky  for  a  ride  in  his  trap.  This 
suggests  an  early  penchant  for  self-education,  studying  the  subjects  he  liked  outwith 
the  school  environment. 
Other  recollections  of  his  early  childhood  relate  how  Tukhachevsky,  with  his 
older  brother  Nikolai,  loved  astronomy,  plotting  their  own  star  charts,  and  chess.  He 
was  apparently  a  good  gorodki  (skittles)  player  because  of  his  strength,  a  lively 
inventive  child  full  of  pranks  and  liked  horseriding,  weightlifting  and  wrestling,  in 
which  he  was  rarely  beaten.  He  showed  his  independent  streak  from  an  early  age,  but 
43  loved  especially  to  go  horseriding  with  his  favourite  sister  Nadezhda  (Nadia) 
. 
By  1911,  when  Tukhachevsky  completed  his  6th  Year  at  I  Oth  Moscow  Gimnasiia, 
he  had  already  developed  a  keen  interest  in  military  history  and  stated  an  interest  in 
following  a  military  career,  but  had  also  developed  wider  interests  incorporating  the 
arts,  literature  and  sports.  He  had  displayed  a  lack  of  tolerance  for  religion,  perhaps 
leading  to  exclusion  from  Penza  Gimnasiia  and  while  displaying  independent 
leadership  qualities,  appeared  to  be  a  well-rounded  popular  figure.  In  this  year 
however,  he  made  the  decision  which  shaped  the  path  his  life  would  follow  for  the 
next  six  years. 
39 
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Ekaterinskii  Cadet  Corps 
On  16th  August  1911,  Tukhachevsky  enrolled  in  the  7th  (final)  Year  of  the  I  st 
Muscovite  Empress  Ekaterina  II  Cadet  Corps,  in  Lefortovo.  44  It  had  existed  as  a 
military  training  institution  since  17th  February  1732  and  until  1762  was  the  only 
one. 
45  Again  various  reasons  for  this  step  are  forthcoming. 
In  1911 
,  it  would  have  been  another  two  years  until  Tukhachevsky  received  his 
school-leaving  certificate  and  could  go  to  university,  which  would  have  meant  six 
years  in  all  for  his  family  to  support  him.  Todorskii  suggests  that,  to  relieve  the  family 
burden,  Tukhachevsky  finally  convinced  his  father  to  allow  him  to  attend  cadet  corps 
and  enter  the  military  profession  for  practical,  financial  reasons,  not  because  of 
romantic  notions  of  becoming  a  soldier. 
46  Gaining  an  income  at  military  academy 
after  cadet  corps  would  remove  the  financial  responsibility  from  his  family,  which 
would  have  remained,  had  he  attended  university. 
Shchetinov  and  Starkov  note  other  biographers  of  Tukhachevsky  emphasise  him 
joining  the  Communist  Party  as  the  main  driving-force  behind  his  wish  to  join  the 
military,  but  the  Tukhachevsky  family  traditions  of  military  service  cannot  be 
ignored,  with  the  possibility  that  he  joined  the  military  to  become  famous  and 
47 
glorious,  dreaming  of  becoming  a  general,  the  latter  opinion  being  shared  by  Gul'. 
Popov  notes  this,  but  also  mentions  Tukhachevsky's  father  agreed  to  him  going  to 
cadet  corps,  despite  the  material  difficulties,  implying  that  this  was  still  a  bind  for  the 
family. 
48 
However,  the  most  likely  reason  why  he  enrolled  at  cadet  corps  was  that  of  fiscal 
reality  allowing  him  to  fulfill  his  wish  to  follow  a  military  career.  As  a  landowner's 
son,  he  was  entitled  to  attend  the  closed  military  institutions,  but  he  had  to  pass  a 
rigorous  entrance  exam  first.  His  father  only  accepted  his  career  choice  because  he 
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had  studied  so  badly  at  gimnasda,  but  passed  the  entrance  exam  and  promised  to 
49 
study  well  at  cadet  corps. 
The  Director  of  Ekaterinskii  Cadet  Corps  was  General  V.  V.  Rimskii-Korsakov,  a 
relative  of  the  composer.  He  was  an  enlightened,  forward-thinking  man  and,  because 
of  him,  the  cadet  corps  provided  a  higher  standard  of  education  than  gymnasii  or 
normal  colleges.  Situated  in  Moscow,  the  teaching  staff  contained  many  officer-tutors 
who  were  veterans  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  eager  to  teach  and  restore  pride  to  the 
Russian  Army.  50 
Alongside  military  education,  a  wide  range  of  other  subjects  were  taught  to 
develop  self-  initiative,  including  the  works  of  progressive  authors  such  as  Jean- 
51 
Jacques  Rousseau  and  Jan  Amos  Komenskii 
. 
Similar  subjects  were  taught  as  in 
gimnasda,  including  swimming,  gymnastics,  music,  singing  and  dancing,  but  not 
52 
Latin. 
Smartness  and  plainness  in  way  of  life  were  demanded  and  internal  organisation 
was  along  paramilitary  lines,  with  cadets  organized  into  companies,  divided  into 
sections.  These  were  led  by  officer-teachers.  Military  training  consisted  of  drill 
instruction,  shooting,  hikes/excursions  (called  junior  reconnaissance)  and 
manoeuvres/wargames.  Gymnastics  competitions  were  held  and  fencing  taught. 
53 
Cadets  sat  end  of  year  exams  and  an  inspection  was  conducted  by  the  Director. 
During  the  summer,  an  excursion  was  held  to  Borodino,  the  site  of  the  major  battle 
between  Russia  and  France  in  1812,  learning  reconnaissance,  signalling,  food 
54 
preparation  and  other  skills  necessary  for  mobile  military  existence. 
With  1912  marking  the  100th  Anniversary  of  the  1812  War,  cadets  studied,  "The 
Great  Fatherland  War  and  its  Heroes",  for  which  War  and  Peace  was  read,  along  with 
the  Textbook  on  Russian  History  by  S.  Soloviev  and  The  History  of  the  19th  Century 
55 
by  P.  G.  Vinogradov. 
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For  Tukhachevsky,  already  well-read  in  the  history  of  Napoleon,  Suvorov  and  the 
1812  War,  these  subjects  finally  provided  him  with  topics  of  interest  to  study  within 
the  educational  environment.  He  apparently  began  to  compile  his  own  dictionary  of 
events  of  Russian  military  history,  recording  quotes,  slogans  and  proverbs  of  famous 
Russian  Commanders  and  learning  Suvorov's  military  teachings  by  heart,  considering 
56  it  necessary  to  follow  these  in  his  later  career.  Also,  despite  finding  the  literature 
classes  hard,  Tukhachevsky  was  stimulated  by  studies  connected  with  being  out  in  the 
57 
field,  resolving  practical  matters  of  field  service  . 
This  certainly  seemed  to  be  the  case  as  Tukhachevsky  was  appointed  vice- 
sergeant-major  as  top  pupil  for  the  year.  Ivanov  suggests  this  rapid  rise  of  a  new  pupil 
was  resented  by  some,  especially  the  landed  nobility,  with  emigres  later  considering 
Tukhachevsky  a  traitor  to  his  noble  class,  fabricating  tales  of  an  unconventionally 
vain,  power-loving  "Red  General"  from  the  landed  classes.  This  was  published  in  the 
Western  press  but  reached  Russia,  where  Tukhachevsky  spent  his  later  life  refuting 
them.  Ivanov  dismisses  these  as  bitter  White  emigre  lies.  58  1  shall  return  to  this  later. 
Nikulin  describes  Tukhachevsky  as  initially  being  looked  down  upon  by  the 
monied  landowners  offspring,  but  winning  unforced  respect  with  his  extraordinary 
physical  strength.  However,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  take  part  in  "peeling"  or  Tsuk 
59 
whereby  senior  junkers  mocked  and  bullied  the  juniors 
. 
This  was  designed  to  instill 
discipline  and  demonstrate  the  role  of  rank  with  juniors  continuing  the  practice  upon 
becoming  seniors,  but  probably  added  to  the  cowed  nature  and  lack  of  self-initiative 
of  the  Russian  officer  corps.  Tukhachevsky  did  not  receive  this  due  to  his  size,  but  did 
not  partake  in  it  either,  preferring  the  freer  conditions  he  had  known  previously  at 
gimnasiia,  to  carrying  out  practices  "Imported  from  German  military  institutions".  For 
this  he  was  nicknamed  the  "Newly-enlightened  Prince  Andrei  Bolkonskii"  after  the 
character  in  "War  and  Peace" 
. 
60 
However,  Nikulin  suggests  Tukhachevsky  preferred  Moscow  to  Penza  because  he 
could  attend  concerts  and  the  cinema.  Many  cultured  people  lived  there  with  liberal 
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views,  even  amongst  the  nobility,  who  talked  of  the  Tsar  and  courtiers  sarcastically. 
61 
This  latter  assertion  matches  the  scorn  and  disdain  Tukhachevsky  held  towards  the 
Tsar  and  autocracy  from  this  period  onwards. 
62 
The  growing  revolutionary  movement  in  Russia  was  apparently  also  felt  inside  the 
cadet  corps.  Cadets  produced  a  bi-weekly  handwritten  journal  entitled  Ekaterinets, 
which  was  closed  down  for  printing  charicatures  of  disliked  tutors,  calling  for  reforms 
of  the  Moscow  Cadet  Corps  and  making  "revolutionary  pronouncements". 
63  However, 
there  is  no  indication  that  Tukhachevsky  was  involved  in  this. 
On  I  st  June  1912,  Tukhachevsky  received  his  graduation  certificate,  finishing  first 
in  the  year  with  his  name  engraved  on  a  plaque. 
64  As  a  reward,  he  had  the  choice  of 
which  military  academy  to  attend.  However,  when  he  chose  to  join  Aleksandrovskii 
Academy,  an  infantry  academy,  instead  of  the  elite  Academies  -  Mikhailovskii  for 
artillery,  Nikolaevskii  for  engineering,  or  Pavlovskii  for  infantry  -  which  did  approach 
him,  there  was  great  surprise  amongst  his  year.  Tukhachevsky  chose  Aleksandrovskii 
because  he  knew  it  gave  the  best  military  training,  rather  than  the  quick  rise  up  the 
65 
career  ladder  which  the  other  academies  provided,  suggesting  Tukhachevsky  was 
not  a  careerist  at  this  point,  but  genuinely  wished  to  gain  the  best  training  possible. 
Would  these  ambitions  change  as  he  progressed? 
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Aleksandrovskii  Military  Academy 
Tukhachevsky  studied  Military  Science  at  Aleksandrovskii  Military  Academy  in 
the  Arbat,  Moscow,  from  1912-1914.66  He  later  commented  that  the  Aleksandrovskii, 
"prepared  officers  entirely  well". 
67  The  Director  of  Aleksandrovskii  was  Lieutenant- 
General  N.  1.  Genisht,  who  later  became  Senior  Inspector  of  the  Chief  Administration 
of  Military-Training  Institutions  of  the  Red  Army,  under  Tukhachevsky.  68  The  future 
Red  Army  Supreme  Commander  Sergei  Sergeevich  Kamenev,  with  whom 
Tukhachevsky  would  work  closely,  had  earlier  studied  at  Aleksandrovskii.  69 
The  merits  of  Aleksandrovskii  Military  Academy  at  this  time  are  debated,  with 
Gorelik  suggesting  the  library  did  not  contain  a  wide  enough  selection  of  military 
literature.  The  works  of  V.  Cheremisov  were  still  popularly  used,  which  upheld  the 
old  Suvorovian  principle  of  "Bayonet  wise,  bullet  foolish"  and  attacked  and 
underestimated  the  advance  of  technology.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  read  other  books 
not  officially  listed  such  as  A.  G.  Elchaninov's,  Conduct  of  Modern  War  and  Battles, 
in  which  questions  on  the  development  of  forms  and  methods  of  military  operations 
70 
and  the  roles  different  types  of  weapon  would  play,  were  posed  . 
Nikulin  similarly 
describes  Aleksandrovskii  as  out-of-date  with  the  works  of  Leer,  Boban  and  Totleban 
used  and  the  emphasis  on  drill  steps  not  preparing  Russian  officers  for  war.  He 
mentions  a  book  published  in  1928-1932  by  Aleksandr  Ivanovich  Kuprin  entitled 
Junker,  which  describes  life  in  the  Aleksandrovskii  Academy,  from  which  Kuprin 
graduated  at  the  start  of  the  20th  Century.  Nikulin  states  it  was  much  the  same  in 
Tukhachevsky's  time, 
71 
noting  it  turned  out  junkers  imbued  with  discipline,  bravery 
and  endurance  and  was  rated  as  the  best  for  a  sound  course  of  military  training. 
Todorskii  comments  the  Aleksandrovskii  had  an  excellent  library  with  over  3,000 
books  donated  by  former  student  V.  A.  Berezovskii,  containing  especially  valuable 
critical  analyses  on  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The  book  market  was  saturated  with 
66 
Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  pp.  10-  11 
67 
A.  S.  Popov,  p.  4. 
68 
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71  L.  Nikulin,  pp.  27-29.  Unfortunately  I  have  not  been  able  to  track  down  this  book  which  would 
provide  valuable  memoir  source  material  where  scant  sources  are  available. 20 
books  on  this,  but  amongst  the  most  valuable  were  those  by  participants  such  as  A.  A. 
Svechin.  72 
This  reflected  the  Russian  military's  preoccupation  over  the  preceding  seven 
years,  searching  for  the  reasons  for  Russia's  defeat  by  Japan  in  the  1904-05  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  the  first  occasion  a  "modem"  European  Army  had  been  defeated  by  an 
Asian  foe.  This  had  encouraged  calls  for  modernisation  of  the  Russian  armed  forces, 
including  the  military  academies,  making  this  a  fertile  period  in  military  education. 
This  was  the  period  of  debates  between  the  "Young  Turks"  and  Russian  Nationalist 
schools  of  Russian  military  thought,  which  had  developed  from  the  twisting  road  of 
military  development  and  modernisation  that  the  Russian  military  establishment  had 
undergone  since  the  disastrous  Crimean  War  of  1853-55.  A  brief  glance  through  this 
process  is  useful  to  reflect  the  atmosphere  under  which  Tukhachevsky  studied  at 
military  academy. 
D.  A.  Miliutin,  an  advocate  of  Suvorov's  offensive  strategy,  had  attempted  to 
modernise  the  Russian  military  establishment  before  the  Crimean  debacle,  but  only 
the  backwards  display  of  the  Russian  forces  and  accession  to  the  throne  of  the 
progressive  Tsar  Alexander  11  in  1855,  provided  the  necessary  impetus  for  his  ideas  to 
be  implemented.  He  founded  the  military  district  system  in  1862,  made  the  first 
moves  towards  a  general  staff  and  modernised  the  army's  weaponry  in  light  of 
American  Civil  War  developments.  In  1863,  he  reformed  the  military  education 
system,  forming  twenty  new  gimnasii  with  wide  curricula,  no  longer  emphasising 
drill.  The  policy  was  introduced  whereby  the  top  half  of  graduating  years  were 
commisioned  2nd  Lieutenants  and  the  bottom  half  ensigns.  Entrance  exams  were 
introduced  to  raise  admission  standards  and  summer  field  exercises  accompanied 
theoretical  course  work  for  the  first  time.  Miliutin  also  created  a  Military  History 
Commission  in  1879  to  combine  current  military  developments  with  past  campaigns, 
but  his  advances  stagnated  or  were  reversed  after  the  assassination  of  Tsar  Alexander 
11  and  Miliutin's  resignation  in  1881. 
The  succession  of  the  conservative  Alexander  III  in  1881  and  Nicholas  11  in  1894, 
prevented  rapid  modernisation  by  Miliutin's  successors  as  War  Minister,  Vannovskii 
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A.  1.  Todorskii,  PP.  12-13;  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  PP.  22-23;  Aleksandr  Andreevich 
Svechin  (1878-1938),  a  Tsarist  Major-General. 21 
(1881-97)  and  Kuropatkin  (1897-1904).  The  Russian  victory  in  the  Russo-Turkish 
War  of  1877-78  was  never  properly  studied,  with  Napoleonic  tactics  and  those  of  von 
Moltke  in  Bismarck's  wars,  still  used  as  a  template,  not  the  Russian  Army's  recent 
experiences.  Therefore,  incorrect  lessons  were  drawn,  with  the  lack  of  technology 
used  leading  to  misconceptions  in  the  use  and  changing  roles  of  artillery,  infantry  and 
cavalry  on  the  modem  battlefield.  Instead,  the  tactics  employed  by  Dragomirov  of 
using  quick  massed  infantry  attacks  without  sufficient  artillery  support  and  no 
effective  cavalry  reconnaissance,  which  succeeded  against  the  technologically- 
deficient  Turks,  because  of  the  well-drilled  patriotism  of  the  Russian  soldier,  was 
taken  to  be  the  correct  way  forward.  The  Suvorovian  maxim  "Bayonet  wise,  bullet 
foolish"  was  thus  adopted  and  maintained  through  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  even 
into  The  Great  War.  Dragomirov,  as  Commandant  of  Nikolaevskii  General  Staff 
Academy  from  1878-89,  remained  the  battlefield  tactical  supremo  of  the  Tsarist 
Army,  whilst  his  successor  as  Commandant,  Leer  (1889-98),  dominated  theatre-level 
strategical  thinking  before  1904.  The  Young  Turks/Russian  Nationalist  debate 
Tukhachevsky  studied  under  was  preceded  by  debates  invoked  by  the  continued 
separation  of  these  two  military  fields  by  these  two  figures. 
Leer  headed  an  "academic  school",  publishing  Strategiia  (Strategy)  in  1867  and 
repeated  reproductions  to  meet  challenges  to  his  theory.  He  was  a  devotee  of 
Napoleon  and  viewed  the  latter's  role  as  proof  that  the  genius  of  the  individual 
commander  was  the  vital  component  in  warfare.  He  believed  Napoleon  should  be 
viewed  as  the  example  by  which  all  commanders  and  campaigns  should  be  measured, 
not  as  a  phenomenon  of  his  era.  The  ideas  of  Jornini  were  chosen  ahead  of 
Clausewitz,  with  the  latter's  inclusion  of  politics  in  his  military  writings 
uncomfortable  to  the  Russian  military  within  the  Tsarist  regime.  Clausewitz's  Vom 
Kriege  (On  War)  was  not  published  in  Russia  until  1899,  but  Jornini  was  more 
accessible  to  the  Russian  readership,  being  published  in  French,  which  was  more 
commonly  used  in  Russia  than  Clausewitz's  German.  The  shock  strike  advocated  by 
Jomini  was  therefore  advocated  by  Leer,  accompanied  by  the  Napoleonic  maxim  of 
every  action  leading  to  the  final  battle,  to  achieve  ultimate  victory.  Von  Moltke's 
methods  of  the  1860s-1870s,  using  technology,  new  weaponry  and  mass  forces  to 
deploy,  concentrate  and  attack  rapidly,  a  strategy  of  "annihilation",  were  viewed  as 
the  natural  progression  of  these  ideas  and  the  method  to  be  followed. 22 
This  strategy  was  challenged  in  1892  with  the  emergence  of  the  Russian 
Nationalist  school  led  by  Bloch  and  Gulevich,  an  instructor  at  the  Nikolaevskii 
Academy.  73  This  school  maintained  Russia  should  look  internally  for  military 
guidance,  espousing  Suvorov,  the  great  Russian  commander,  over  the  German  von 
Moltke.  Its  advocates  believed  all  military  eras  should  be  studied,  including  recent 
events,  not  just  the  Napoleonic  and  Bismarckian  periods  favoured  by  Leer.  The 
publication  in  1900  of  Suvorov  in  the  Studies  of  the  Professors  of  the  Nicholas 
Academy,  by  the  Academy  of  the  General  Staff,  meant  Suvorov  was  studied  alongside 
Napoleon.  However,  the  debate  continued  through  the  Russo-Japanese  War  debacle, 
which  finally  proved  Dragomirov's  ideas  outdated,  and  into  the  post-War  reflective 
period. 
Weaknesses  in  the  Russian  Army  exposed  by  Japan  had  to  be  remedied.  Partially, 
these  followed  similar  lines  to  Milititin's  reform  attempts  -  creating  an  intelligent, 
uniformly-educated  officer  corps  which  displayed  initiative  and  an  ability  to  think 
independently.  Combined  with  this  was  the  need  to  incorporate  new  technology  - 
artillery,  transport  and  communications  networks  -  to  move  large  numbers  of  troops  to 
and  from  the  battlefield  and  maintain  contact  and  control  when  in  battle.  The  need  to 
combine  historical  lessons  with  current  developments  was  emphasised  and  Leer's 
utilisation  of  Napoleon  and  Moltke  as  a  template  challenged. 
However,  the  offensive  was  still  viewed  as  the  method  to  bypass  technological 
development,  using  march-manoeuvres  and  envelopments  in  meeting  battles  to  avoid 
costly  frontal  clashes  and  reduce  modem  weaponry's  effectiveness.  However,  strategy 
and  tactics  were  still  separated  between  academic  "theorists"  and  officer 
"practitioners"  and  the  Young  Turks  seeking  modernisation  of  the  Russian  Army 
clashed  with  the  Nationalist  school,  which  still  insisted  on  Suvorovian  principles  as 
the  maxims  to  be  employed.  Amidst  this  debate,  new  instructional  programmes  were 
drawn  up  by  the  Nikolaevskii  Academy  staff  for  this  and  the  other  army  institutions, 
which  included  the  Aleksandrovskii  Academy,  although  Mikhnevich,  Commandant  of 
74 
the  Nikolaevskii  Academy,  limited  their  impact 
. 
73  Ivan  Stanislavovich  Bloch  0  83  6-190  1),  a  Russian  military  theorist  and  economist. 
74  1  have  relied  heavily  for  this  section  on  the  seminal  work  of  B.  Menning,  Bayonets  Before  Bullets: 
the  Iniperial  Russian  Army,  1861-1914,  to  illustrate  the  ideas  which  Tukhachevsky  may  have  ingested 
during  his  military  education. 23 
It  was  amidst  this  debate  and  politicking  that  Tukhachevsky  gained  his  military 
education.  Figures  such  as  Svechin,  who  published  the  first  critical  appraisal  of 
ground  operations  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1910,  emerged.  Neznamov,  an 
instructor  at  the  Nikolaevskii  Academy,  began  linking  tactics  and  operational  ideas  to 
strategic  issues  in  an  effort  to  combine  them  into  a  unified  doctrine,  but  this  was 
75 
stopped  by  Tsar  Nicholas  11  in  19  12.  Neznamov  believed  in  the  application  of 
history  to  modem  industrial  and  technological  developments  to  predict  and  plan  for 
future  wars  and  prescribed  manoeuvre  warfare,  successive  operations  and  combined 
operations  as  possible  methods  by  which  to  win  campaigns.  These  ideas  were  being 
discussed  in  military  circles  at  this  time.  How  much  of  them  Tukhachevsky  would 
have  picked  up  during  his  Academy  education  is  difficult  to  say,  but  figures  such  as 
Neznamov  and  Svechin  would  join  the  Red  Army  and  Tukhachevsky  would 
encounter  them  later.  Debates  over  strategies  of  "annihilation"  and  "attrition"  would 
continue  after  The  Great  War  within  the  Red  Army  envirom-nent  and  Tukhachevsky 
would  be  part  of  these.  As  to  the  content  of  Tukhachevsky's  studies  at 
Aleksandrovskii,  various  suggestions  are  given  and  they  are  worth  considering. 
It  is  suggested  he  spent  most  time  studying  the  new  regulations  and  directions 
revised  and  published  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  which  became  the  1912  Tsarist 
Army  Field  Regulations.  He  attempted  to  compare  these  with  previous  regulations  to 
conclude  what  the  changes  meant. 
Tukhachevsky  read  40-50  military  books  whilst  at  Aleksandrovskii,  including 
those  by  Mikhnevich,  Leer  and  Dragomirov. 
76 
He  read  works  by  A.  K.  Puzirevskii, 
the  8-volumed  Encyclopedia  of  Military  and  Naval  Science,  Atlas  of  Battles  of  the 
77 
19th  Century,  the  series  Soldiers  Library,  textbooks  and  memoirs. 
He  also  read  fiction,  for  example,  rereading  Tolstoi,  and  received  lectures  on  past 
Russian  military  campaigns  and  military  history.  Lectures  on  tactics,  artillery  and 
fortifications  were  given  by  teachers  who  had  graduated  at  various  times  from  the 
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Nikolaevskii  General  Staff  Academy  and  therefore  possessed  excellent  educational 
met  ods. 
78 
GO  writes  of  Tukhachevsky  reading  the  works  of  Clausewitz,  biographies  of 
Napoleon,  Blukher,  Suvorov  and  Moltke,  79 
while  Shchetinov  and  Starkov  note  that  he 
read  works  in  French,  German  and  Latin,  indicating  it  was  at  this  time  that  he  read 
Essays  on  the  Gallic  War  by  Julius  Ceasar.  80  Whether  he  read  this  now  or  earlier, 
knowledge  of  foreign  languages  would  have  enabled  Tukhachevsky  to  expand  his 
military  knowledge  and  possibly  progress  more  quickly  than  fellow  junkers  without 
such  linguistic  talent.  That  he  did  read  widely  and  continued  to  do  so  was  suggested 
by  N.  1.  Koritskii,  Chief-of-Staff  of  Simbirsk  Division  under  Tukhachevsky  in  1918, 
who  noted, 
On  Tukhachevsky's  writing  desk  I  noticed  a  volume  of  Pushkin  open  at 
"History  of  the  Pugachev  Rebellion".  Beside  it  lay  Campaigns  of  Gustav 
Adoýf,  Applied  Tactics  by  N.  D.  Bezrukov,  Strategy  by  Mikhnevich. 
Mikhail  Nikolaevich  caught  my  gaze. 
"Yes",  he  sighed,  "From  the  time  of  Razin  and  Pugachev  this  krai  has 
81 
not  known  war.  And  now  here  we  are.... 
A.  M.  Kavelin,  an  officer-teacher  at  Aleksandrovskii  who  later  went  on  to  serve 
under  Tukhachevsky  in  5th  Army,  described  him  as  being  well-read,  especially  in 
military  science  and  an  acknowledged  authority  amongst  his  comrades.  He  recalled 
Tukhachevsky  surprised  him  in  this  and  also  in  his  disregard  for  his  future  career  and 
place  "in  society". 
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This  confinns  the  assertion  that  Tukhachevsky  attended  Aleksandrovskii  to  gain  a 
sound  military  education  instead  of  a  rapid  rise  up  the  military  and  societal  ladder. 
The  head  start  he  had  as  a  child,  learning  military  history  and  foreign  languages,  stood 
him  in  good  stead,  and  allied  with  the  fact  he  had  finally  found  a  subject  in  which  he 
was  interested  -  military  science  -  he  applied  himself  to  his  studies  as  his  father  had 
demanded.  The  knowledge  Tukhachevsky  gained  at  Aleksandrovskii,  examining 
works  of  military  theory  and  history,  studying  tactics  and  the  strategic  decisions  of 
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soratnikov.  (Moscow,  1965),  p.  57. 25 
past  commanders,  and  analysing  these  to  gain  a  deep  theoretical  knowledge  of  tactics 
and  the  basis  of  strategy,  gave  him  a  deep  professional  military  education.  He  was  a 
product  of  the  Tsarist  military  educational  system,  attending  a  highly  rated  cadet 
corps  and  military  academy  and  his  later  success  came  from  the  study  he  carried  out 
here  and  not  just  from  some  inner  talent  or  his  wish  to  be  a  soldier.  He  learned  the 
basic  knowledge  behind  the  problems  of  military  science  and  military  art  and  the 
theory  of  tactics  and  strategy  and  developed  these  later,  commanding  in  the  Civil 
War,  still  studying  volumes  relevant  to  where  he  was  fighting  at  any  given  time. 
Theoretical  knowledge  was  accompanied  by  practical  exercises  at 
Aleksandrovskii.  In  the  summer,  in  Kholinskii  Field,  tactical  training,  shooting  and 
topographical  surveying  were  conducted.  The  junior  junkers  were  formed  into 
companies  with  the  seniors  to  give  them  experience  of  fon-nations,  marching 
procedures  and  military  operations  at  this  level,  with  the  seniors  helping  the  juniors 
with  their  knowledge. 
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On  12th  July  1914,  Tukhachevsky  graduated  first  in  his  year  and  was 
commissioned  a  2nd  Lieutenant.  84  He  scored  II  "A"  or  top  marks  in  military  subjects 
and  9  in  his  others. 
85  The  reward  as  first  graduate  was  the  choice  of  regiment. 
Tukhachevsky  chose  the  Semenovskii  Life-Guards  Regiment,  confirming  further  the 
theory  he  was  following  family  tradition  into  the  military.  Suvorov  had  also  started 
his  military  service  in  this  regiment. 
86  Again  however,  other  theories  are  suggested  for 
his  entry. 
Gul'  asserts  that  to  gain  a  commission  to  the  elite  Semenovskii  or  Preobrazhenskii 
Life-Guards  Regiments,  money  or  connections  were  required  and  it  was  necessary  to 
graduate  from  the  Pavlovskii  Military  Academy.  However,  the  advent  of  The  Great 
War  pen-nitted  Tukhachevsky  entry  as  "war  does  not  need  money,  but  bravery  and 
87 
talent".  This  however,  ignores  Tukhachevsky's  exceptional  academic  performance 
and  the  fact  he  had  the  choice  of  regiment. 
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Suggestions  are  made  that  Tukhachevsky's  political  views  were  forming  at  this 
time.  Popov  writes  that  Tukhachevsky  could  see  the  everyday  life  of  the  autocracy  in 
Moscow  and  at  this  time  began  to  analyse  it,  coming  to  the  conclusion  he  did  not  hold 
88 
the  same  beliefs  as  the  upper-classes  . 
This  is  probably  based  upon  Nikolai  Kuliabko 
who  records  that  he  met  Tukhachevsky  in  1912  and  discussed  the  1905  Revolution 
and  the  situation  in  Russia.  Kuliabko  was  sure  Tukhachevsky  did  not  hold  the  same 
beliefs  as  the  majority  of  cadets  and  junkers.  89  Tukhachevsky  would  undoubtedly 
have  discussed  and  considered  life  in  Russia  under  Tsarism,  although  it  is  unlikely  he 
formed  any  political  leanings  at  this  time.  It  has  already  been  mentioned  he  had  no 
great  respect  for  the  Tsar,  but  he  was  concentrating  on  gaining  his  military  education. 
It  is  possible  he  was  troubled  with  the  role  the  army  had  played  in  1905,  suppressing 
the  uprisings,  but  from  his  later  conduct  this  was  not  because  he  saw  this  as  a  role  the 
army  should  not  play,  but  from  the  weakness  of  the  current  regime  in  Russia. 
Tukhachevsky's  conduct  during  his  academy  education  produces  the  greatest 
divergence  in  opinion.  Ivanov  suggests  Tukhachevsky  at  this  time  possessed  the 
abilities  to  manage  people  which  were  required  in  an  officer  and  had  no  need  to  raise 
90 
his  voice  or  act  in  a  threatening  manner.  However,  the  emigre  accounts  Ivanov 
decried  so  vehemently  emerge  here.  Vladimir  Nikitich  Postoronkin  describes 
Tukhachevsky  as  detached  and  cold  towards  other  students,  making  him  the  perfect 
drill  instructor.  He  had  no  close  friends  or  relations  and  as  sergeant-major  in  the 
senior  year,  was  a  strict  disciplinarian,  even  to  juniors  who  had  just  started  at 
Aleksandrovskii  and  were  not  used  to  the  lifestyle.  He  would  hand  out  punishments 
for  errors  without  waiting  to  find  out  the  reasons  behind  them  and  his  conduct  caused 
a  trail  of  incidents  and  conflicts  with  sad  endings  -  two  junkers  transferring  away  and 
three  committing  suicide. 
91  Ivanov  dismisses  Postoronkin  as  a  Whiteguard  emigre, 
bitter  about  the  "red  general  from  the  nobility",  calling  his  reliability  as  a  source  into 
question.  However,  Postoronkin  tallies  with  Gul's  account  written  in  1932.  Gul'  was 
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91  V.  N.  Postoronkin,  "Neizvestnoe  o  Tukhachevskom"  Voenno-Istoricheskii  Zhurnal,  No.  12,  (1990), 
pp.  88-90.  V.  M.  Ivanov  introduces  the  document,  dismissing  Postoronkin  as  a  Whiteguard  dmigr6, 
jealous  of  Tukhachevsky's  status.  If  this  was  a  fabrication  about  Tukhachevsky,  it  was  by  no  means  the 
worst  by  a  "White"  6migr6,  with  the  paper  trail  leading  to  his  1937  execution  possibly  involving  more 
Russian  exiles  alongside  Stalin's  NKVD. 27 
another  emigre  and  possibly  used  Postoronkin  as  a  source.  If  Postoronkin  was 
genuine,  did  the  independent  leadership  streak  evident  in  Tukhachevsky  from  an  early 
age  manifest  itself  more  dominantly  when  he  reached  a  position  of  power  over  others 
and  did  this  give  an  indication  of  what  was  to  come? 
The  Great  War  -  First  Combat  Experiences 
Following  his  graduation  ball  in  Moscow  on  12th  July,  Tukhachevsky  began  the 
92 
summer  in  training  camp  at  Khodinskii  Field,  before  receiving  leave.  Travelling  to 
Penza,  he  spent  only  two  days  with  his  family  before  the  outbreak  of  The  Great 
93 
War. 
The  scale  of  the  Russian  Army  and  limitations  of  the  transport  and 
communications  network  had  led  Stavka  to  formulate  a  plan  of  general  mobilisation 
simultaneously  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  94  Two  Russian  Fronts  were 
formed,  the  North-West  against  Germany  in  East  Prussia  and  the  South-West  against 
Austria-Hungary  in  Poland  and  Galicia.  Despite  the  cumbersome  initial  process, 
slower  than  either  of  the  Central  Powers  they  were  facing,  the  Russians  envisaged  an 
offensive  strategy,  striking  quickly,  utilising  all  available  resources,  with  no  thoughts 
of  an  extended  conflict. 
Eastern  Front  fighting  in  1914  differed  entirely  from  the  stalemate  which  quickly 
closeted  the  Western  Front.  Poorer  reconnaissance  and  wider  space  encouraged 
manoeuvre  operations  on  a  grand  scale  with  envelopments  involving  huge  numbers. 
This  was  the  first  type  of  warfare  Tukhachevsky  experienced  and  it  would  stay  with 
him. 
The  Semenovskii  Life-Guards  Regiment  became  a  component  of  Ist  Guards 
Corps  under  Adjutant-General  Bezobrazov.  Earmarked  for  General  Rennenkampf  s 
I  st  Army  in  East  Prussia,  the  Semenovskii  began  moving  there  from  their  surnmer 
camp  with  the  Preobrazhenskii  Life-Guards  at  Krasnoe  Selo.  However,  initial 
deployment  plans  were  changed,  with  mobilisation  still  not  completed,  as  pressure 
grew  from  the  Entente  Allies  for  a  Russian  offensive  to  relieve  the  Western  Front. 
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New  9th  and  10th  An-nies  were  ordered  on  6th  August  for  an  offensive  on  Berlin,  95 
with  the  Guards  Corps  to  join  9th  Army  under  General  P.  A.  Lechitskii,  assembling  in 
the  Warsaw  Region.  Tukhachevsky,  initially  posted  to  the  Semenovskii  Reserve 
Battalion  in  Petrograd,  joined  his  regiment  on  the  march  to  Warsaw.  96 
However,  the  Berlin  Offensive  was  postponed,  with  the  Guards  transferred  to  the 
stalling  South-Western  Front,  to  aid  4th  Army  under  General  Salza,  who  was  replaced 
by  General  Evert  on  25th  August,  in  Ivangorod-Lublin  Region,  Poland.  97  The 
Semenovskii  became  involved  in  the  massive  Galician  Campaign,  involving  a  series 
of  meeting  battles  and  complex  manoeuvre  operations  of  whole  armies,  between  the 
Wisla  and  Dniestr  Rivers.  This  lasted  20  days  with  over  half  a  million  men  on  both 
sides  fighting  on  a  500  verst  front.  98  The  Russians  were  initially  successful  around 
Lublin-Kholm,  but  then  retreated  towards  Lublin.  9th  Army  arrived  at  this  point  on 
Ist  September  and  went  into  battle  with  the  Semenovskii  fighting  at  the  village  of 
99 
Sukhodoly. 
General  Mrozovskii's  detachment,  including  General  Olokhov's  Guards  Division 
of  which  the  Semenovskii  Regiment  under  General  Von  Etter  was  a  component, 
inflicted  a  crushing  blow  on  10th  Austrian  Corps,  taking  5,000  prisoners,  on  2nd 
September.  100  The  Austrian  corps  lost  two-thirds  of  its  men  and  guns. 
101  During  the 
Galician  campaign,  the  Guards  further  stood  out  in  battles  at  the  settlements  of 
Zarashevo  and  Urshulin,  south  of  Lublin  and  at  Krzheshov,  South-West  of 
102 
Sandomierz,  the  latter  being  taken  on  14th  September. 
Tukhachevsky  won  the  first  of  six  decorations  achieved  during  the  Great  War  at 
Krzeshov.  The  town  was  to  be  taken  whatever  the  cost,  but  despite  fierce  fighting 
between  the  Semenovskii  and  the  Austrians,  the  fighting  was  indecisive.  7th 
Company  of  2nd  Battalion,  in  which  Tukhachevsky  fought,  outflanked  the  Austrians, 
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appearing  in  their  rear.  Retreating  over  the  River  San,  the  Austrians  set  fire  to  the 
bridge,  defending  their  line  of  retreat.  7th  Company  Commander,  Lieutenant 
Veselago,  and  Tukhachevsky  led  a  bayonet  charge  over  the  burning  bridge  onto  the 
far  bank,  winning  the  battle  and  capturing  prisoners.  Veselago  received  the  George 
Cross  and  Tukhachevsky  the  Order  of  Vladimir,  Level  IV,  with  swords  and  bows.  103 
Both  Tukhachevsky  and  Veselago  were  missing  in  action  for  a  time.  1  04 
The  Austrians  lost  East  Galicia  and  half  the  fighting  capacity  of  their  anny,  some 
400,000  men  -  each  division  losing  around  4,500  men  and  400  guns.  Russia  lost  230- 
250,000  men,  but  the  loss  of  officers  was  never  recovered  during  the  War.  105  After  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  the  Officer  Corps  had  been  increased  from  46,000  to  80,000, 
but  the  vast  majority  of  these  were  commissioned  in  front-line  units  and  so  were  lost 
in  the  initial  fighting.  This  left  a  vastly  insufficient  number  in  reserve  to  train  new 
officer  recruits. 
106  Tukhachevsky  rose  from  platoon  to  company  commander  with  the 
107 
high  casualties. 
9th  Army,  including  Semenovskii  Regiment,  and  4th  Army  were  withdrawn  from 
the  River  San  area  and  moved  cast  of  the  River  Wisla  in  late  September/early 
October.  The  Russians  attempted  to  cross  the  Wisla  at  Ivangorod  and  Novy- 
108 
Aleksandrovo  from  Ilth-15th  October,  but  were  repelled  by  the  Germans,  who 
109 
launched  an  offensive  towards  Warsaw  and  the  fortress  of  Ivangorod.  The 
Semenovskii  again  excelled  in  battles  South-West  of  Ivangorod,  then  fought  in  the 
Czqstochowa-Krakow  operations,  north  of  Krakow  and  east  of  Oswiecim.  110  At 
Ivangorod-Warsaw,  units  from  South-Western  Front  (including  the  Guards)  marched 
over  100  kms  to  help  repel  the  German/Austrian  offensive.  lst  Austrian  and  9th 
German  An-nies  retreated  in  panic  as  the  Russians  pushed  them  back  over  100  kins, 
but  supply  shortages  and  a  lack  of  cooperation  between  North-Western  Front  of 
Danilov  and  Ruzski  and  South-Western  Front  of  Ivanov  and  Alexcev,  stopped  the 
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advance  on  8th  November.  9th  Army  had  suffered  staggering  losses  gaining  these 
victories,  with  its  numbers  reduced  from  196,000  to  93,000,  the  Guards  Corps 
suffering  14,000  casualties. 
III  These  huge  losses  began  to  affect  morale. 
In  December,  a  renewed  German  offensive  pushed  the  Russians  back  to  a 
defensive  line  along  the  Rivers  Bzura  and  Rawka,  which  despite  German 
breakthroughs,  held  until  the  freeze  of  deep  winter  ended  campaigning  until  1915, 
with  the  Russians  thirty  miles  south-west  of  Warsaw.  Russian  supply  shortages  were 
growing  critical,  with  some  800,000  recruits  without  rifles  by  21st  December  and 
shell  output  far  below  expenditure,  severely  curtailing  artillery  capabilities. 
112  The 
industrial  backwardness  of  Russia  vis-a-vis  Germany  was  beginning  to  tell.  This 
forced  a  change  in  the  nature  of  the  Eastern  Front  with  manoeuvre  warfare,  because  of 
Russian  ammunition  and  supply  shortages,  giving  way  to  smaller  offensive  operations 
and  to  static  defensive  trench  warfare. 
In  January  1915,  the  Semenovskii  were  bivouaced  at  the  settlement  of  Gostynin 
recuperating,  using  this  time  to  assess  operations,  ingest  new  tactical  knowledge  and 
carry  out  exercises.  On  24th  January  the  Guards  Corps  were  transferred  from  the 
Grodzisk  area,  25  versts  west  of  Warsaw,  in  South-Westem  Front,  to  North-Western 
Front,  joining  General  Sivers'  10th  Army,  as  part  of  Danilov's  and  Ruzski's  new 
offensive  through  the  Masurian  Marshes  into  East  Prussia.  1  13  A  simultaneous 
offensive  was  planned  by  Ivanov  and  Alexeev  through  the  Carpathians  to  Hungary, 
but  again  no  cooperation  existed  between  the  two  fronts.  1  14 
Germany  preempted  the  offensives,  launching  their  Masurian  offensive  on  7th 
February,  using  poison  gas  for  the  first  time  in  a  diversionary  attack  on  31  st  January. 
This  proved  a  disaster  with  the  wind  turning  to  blow  the  gas  back  towards  the 
Germans  and  the  severe  cold  negating  its  effectiveness. 
"  5  Significantly,  however, 
Tukhachevsky  had  encountered  poison  gas,  a  weapon  he  would  experiment  with  later. 
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Documents  taken  from  a  dead  German  officer  by  the  Russians,  indicating  the 
Germans  planned  a  giant  pincer  movement  to  envelop  Sivers'  10th  Army  around  the 
forests  of  Augustow,  were  ignored.  The  German  10th  Army  attacked  from  the  north 
and  8th  Army  from  the  south  along  the  line  of  AugustOw  and  Suwalki,  where  the 
Guards  Corps  was  positioned,  west  of  the  River  Nieman.  Terrible  blizzards  initially 
hampered  the  German  advance,  but  simultaneously  hid  their  numbers,  with  Sivers 
taken  completely  by  surprise.  Instead  of  digging  in,  the  Russians  decided  to  launch 
their  offensive  for  Berlin  again  with  the  Prasnishskii  Operation,  from  the  fortress  of 
Prasznysz.  However,  German  artillery  superiority  was  immense  with  "suitcase" 
shells,  as  they  were  dubbed,  fired  constantly  against  the  Russian  positions,  with  little 
116  in  reply. 
10th  Army  advanced  into  AugustOw  Forest  between  Suwalki  and  Augustow, 
straight  into  the  German  pincer  movement,  becoming  isolated  strategically  from 
Plehve's  12th  Army,  still  advancing  to  the  south.  An  attempted  retreat  from  14th 
February  was  prevented  by  the  German  21st  Corps  marching  22  miles  on  15th 
February,  to  complete  the  encirclement  of  70,000  Russians  in  AugustOw  Forest  by 
17th  February.  This  centre  group  comprising  mainly  Bulgakov's  20th  Corps  were 
forced  into  rearguard  breakout  actions,  whilst  the  northern  and  southern  (including 
Guards  Corps)  groups  of  10th  Army  fell  back.  Some  56,000  Russians  died  and 
Bulgakov  surrendered  with  barely  12,000  survivors  of  20th  Corps,  mostly  wounded, 
117 
on  21  st  February. 
A  counter-attack  launched  by  12th  Army  and  the  Guards  Corps  on  20th  February 
near  Lom:  ýa  and  Plock,  to  relieve  the  trapped  central  group  failed,  118 
with  the 
Semenovskii  encircled  and  cut  to  pieces  and  Tukhachevsky  taken  prisoner.  On  27th 
February,  Regimental  Order  No.  34  reported  Tukhachevsky  and  others  as  lost.  119  His 
family  only  knew  he  was  alive  when  he  wrote  later  from  prison. 
120 
116  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  pp.  43-44. 
117  R.  Gul',  pp.  2  7-2  8;  N.  Stone,  pp.  116-119;  W.  Rutherford,  pp.  116-118;  R.  Gray  &  C.  Argyle,  pp. 
80-86. 
118  R.  Gray  &  C.  Argyle,  p.  86.  This  included  6th  Company  of  the  Semenovskii  Regiment  led  by 
Tipol't,  who  sustained  a  shrapnel  wound  to  the  head,  A.  A.  Tipol't,  "Takoe  ne  zabyvaetsia"  Marshal 
Tukhachevsky:  Vospominnaniia  druzhei  i  soratnikov.  (Moscow,  1965),  p.  20. 
119 
A.  1.  Todorskil,  p.  18. 
120  E.  N.  Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia  &  0.  N.  Tukhachevskaia,  p.  14. 32 
A  Semenovskii  Non-Commissioned  Officer  (NCO),  who  by  the  1960s  was  a 
Lieutenant-General,  K.  P.  Trubnikov,  recalled  Tukhachevsky  as  well-liked  and 
respected  by  the  men,  not  just  as  an  officer,  but  as  a  person.  Trubnikov  related  that  on 
19th  February,  the  Semenovskii,  along  with  the  Egerskii  and  Kurinskii  Regiments, 
occupied  a  forest  before  the  village  of  Vysokie  Duzhi,  halfway  between  Lom.  2a  and 
Kolno.  The  Germans  shelled  the  Semenovskii  the  whole  day,  but  were  unable  to 
break  them  down.  At  night  the  Germans  attacked  in  two  companies,  made  a  deep 
breakthrough  and  cut  off  7th  Company.  The  reserves  restored  the  position,  but  7th 
Company  had  already  perished.  It  later  emerged  that  Tukhachevsky  led  the  remaining 
troops  after  Veselago  had  been  killed,  until  being  injured  in  the  leg  and  captured.  The 
prisoners  were  loaded  onto  trains  at  Suwalki  and  taken  into  East  Prussia.  1  21 
The  Senior  NCO  of  Semenovskii  Regiment,  Petr  Dorofeevich  Riabov,  recalled 
Tukhachevsky  as  the  best  officer  in  the  regiment,  highly  educated  and  above  all  the 
knights,  barons  and  princes  who  made  up  the  majority  of  the  officers.  He  described 
Tukhachevsky  as  a  humanitarian  man  who  would  meet  with  the  soldiers,  even  at  this 
time  when  officers  and  soldiers  were  deeply  divided.  Riabov  later  fought  for  the  Reds 
122 
in  the  Civil  War. 
Todorskii  notes  that  Tukhachevsky  finished  the  War  a  hero.  Todorskii  served  in 
24th  Siberian  Rifle  Regiment,  fighting  in  the  Warsaw  Region,  but  he  could  remember 
of  noone  else  winning  six  decorations  in  only  six  months  of  fighting,  as 
Tukhachevsky  did.  He  received  three  Orders  of  Anna:  level  4  with  the  inscription 
"For  Bravery",  level  3  with  swords  and  bows,  level  2  with  swords;  two  Orders  of 
Stanislav:  level  3  with  swords  and  bows,  level  2  with  swords;  and  the  Order  of 
Vladimir  already  mentioned. 
123 
It  is  likely  Tukhachevsky  received  these  decorations  for  the  battles  at  Ivangorod, 
Warsaw  and  Krakow  where  the  Semenovskii  fought  well  and  for  leading  7th 
Company  after  Veselago's  death  at  Lom2a. 
One  example  of  bravery  and  self-initiative  he  may  have  been  decorated  for  is 
described  by  A.  A.  Tipol't,  recalled  to  6th  Company  of  the  Semenovskii  in  1914  with 
the  rank  of  ensign,  having  served  his  military  service  in  1907  when  a  final-year 
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jurisprudence  student.  He  met  and  befriended  Tukhachevsky  and  describes  an  episode 
of  September/October  1914,  when  the  Semenovskii  were  positioned  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Wisla,  near  Krakow.  The  Germans  had  fortified  the  left  bank,  but  in  the  middle 
of  the  river  lay  a  small  sandy  island.  While  the  officers  debated  how  to  reach  this 
island  to  carry  out  reconnaissance  unnoticed,  Tukhachevsky  obtained  a  small  fishing- 
boat  and  sailed  at  night  to  the  island.  The  boat  was  so  small  the  side  barely  came  out 
of  the  water.  Tukhachevsky  spent  the  night  and  part  of  the  next  day  alone  on  the 
island,  returning  with  information  on  the  German  positions.  He  returned  not  knowing 
whether  he  would  be  praised  or  reprimanded  for  his  actions,  but  was  possibly 
1  24  decorated  for  this. 
Smirnov  suggests  Todorskii  invented  some  of  these  decorations  because  if 
Tukhachevsky  received  the  Order  of  Vladimir,  Level  4  with  swords  and  bows  in 
September  1914,  he  would  not  have  received  lesser  awards  after  this,  as  this  did  not 
happen.  125  However,  this  is  an  unlikely  scenario  with  decorations  awarded 
specifically  for  separate  deeds  and  not  dependent  upon  decorations  already  received. 
Tukhachevsky  served  actively  on  the  Eastern  Front  for  barely  six  months,  but 
witnessed  a  great  deal  of  savage,  bitter  and  varied  fighting  in  this  time.  He  could 
evaluate  operations  as  an  officer  in  action,  witnessing  the  initial  emphasis  on 
manoeuvre  warfare  giving  way  to  more  static  defensive  entrenchment  as  supplies  ran 
low,  but  then  having  to  attack  in  1915  with  few  supplies  and  scant  ammunition  or 
artillery  support.  The  shortcomings  of  the  Tsarist  war  machine  were  glaringly 
apparent  and  would  have  been  considered  by  him  in  his  years  of  captivity  to  come,  as 
would  the  contrast  between  the  brave  performance  of  the  Russian  soldier  with  the 
inept  leadership  above.  He  would  also  have  contemplated  how  effectively  he  had  been 
trained  at  cadet  corps  and  military  academy  and  wondered  if  changes  could  be  made 
here  to  create  a  more  capable  and  professional  army.  Tukhachevsky  possibly  began 
reaching  the  conclusions  he  would  record  in  December  1919  for  Lenin  when 
evaluating  voenspetsy  in  the  Red  Army,  that  the  most  capable  were  the  young, 
educated  in  the  military  academies  after  1908-10.1  26  His  wartime  experiences  thus  far 
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would  be  supplemented  by  those  of  the  prisoner-of-war  camps  in  Germany  and  how 
he  reacted  to  incarceration. 
POW  Camps  and  Escapes 
Information  on  the  two  and  a  half  years  Tukhachevsky  spent  incarcerated  is 
contradictory  with  most  sources  relating  he  made  five  escape  attempts,  but  not 
agreeing  where  or  when  these  occurred  or  the  methods  used.  Tukhachevsky  wrote 
letters  to  his  family  from  the  prison  camps  and  if  he  was  planning  an  escape  he  would 
write  in  the  letters  for  them  to  read  the  Tale  of  the  Igorev  Regiment,  indicating  he  was 
127 
planning  to  escape. 
Tukhachevsky  was  first  detained  in  the  officers'  camp  on  the  small  island  of 
128 
Danholm  on  the  German  Baltic  coast  between  Stralsund  and  the  island  of  Rugen. 
Ivanov  and  Popov  write  that  Tukhachevsky  first  attempted  to  escape  en  route  to 
Stralsund,  but  failed,  129 
while  Fervacque  suggests  Tukhachevsky  first  escaped  from 
Danholm  by  swimming  from  the  island,  but  was  recaptured. 
1  30  Gorelik  writes 
Tukhachevsky  waited  until  a  wann  July  Sunday  before  going  for  a  walk  and  not 
returning.  He  intended  stealing  a  fishing-boat  to  sail  to  Rugen  and  on  to  Sweden,  but 
was  picked  up  on  the  shore  three  weeks  later.  He  used  this  time  to  get  his  bearings, 
but  was  put  into  solitary  confinement,  then  transferred  to  Beeskow,  between  Berlin 
and  Frankfurt-den-Oder,  which  housed  around  100  officers.  Gul'  suggests  this  was 
because  Tukhachevsky  and  others  were  termed  "disruptive"  for  not  removing  their 
shoulder  straps. 
1  31 
At  this  time  apparently,  the  German  Military  Administration  had  banned  the 
wearing  of  shoulder-straps  by  POWs.  Walks  outwith  the  camp  were  abolished  and 
solitary  confinement  given  for  any  absence  without  special  permission.  Under  these 
conditions  and  hoping  to  be  transferred  from  Beeskow,  a  very  difficult  camp  from 
127 
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which  to  escape,  Tukhachevsky  penned  a  letter  to  the  commandant  asking  if  he  could 
have  pen-nission  for  a  walk  outside  the  camp,  in  order  to  escape  and  return  to  Russia. 
132 
Half  a  day  later  he  was  confined  in  solitary. 
His  wish  was  granted  however,  as  he  was  soon  transferred  to  Bad  Stuer  in 
Mecklenberg  with  several  other  officers.  This  housed  around  150  officers  in  a  looser 
regime  allowing  literature  reading  and  chess.  It  is  suggested  Tukhachevsky  first  read 
the  works  of  Lenin  here  in  1916,  which  were  brought  into  the  camp  via  the  Swiss  and 
Swedish  Embassies.  Ivanov  writes  of  no  international  agreement  existing  for  the 
treatment  of  POWs,  meaning  conditions  inside  the  German  camps  could  be  terrible, 
especially  for  Russians.  Therefore,  since  the  Bolsheviks  were  the  only  Russian 
organisation  to  attempt  any  contact  with  POWs,  this  made  a  big  impression.  The 
Tsarist  Government  did  not  try  to  help,  even  hindering  civilian  organisations  in 
Russia  from  doing  so,  putting  the  Bolshevik  efforts  in  an  even  better  light.  Lenin 
formed  a  Commission  in  Berne  in  1915  for  the  distribution  of  literature  to  the  camps 
with  works  sent  such  as  Alexandra  Kollontai's  "Who  Needs  War".  4,000  copies  of  this 
were  distributed  to  the  camps  with  an  editorial  by  Lenin.  After  the  February 
Revolution,  Lenin  informed  the  inmates  and  stated  they  should  choose  to  fight  for  the 
people  when  they  returned  to  Russia.  A  questionnaire  was  sent  containing  questions 
designed  to  help  inmates  support  the  Bolsheviks.  133  Blagodatov  recalls  that  later,  in 
Ingolstadt,  where  Tukhachevsky  was  incarcerated  when  the  February  Revolution 
occurred,  information  about  this  and  subsequent  events  reached  the  inmates  via 
"agitators".  134  Information  from  Bolshevik  sources  appears  to  have  reached  POWs, 
but  whether  Tukhachevsky  first  encountered  this  in  Bad  Stuer  or  Ingolstadt  is  unclear. 
However,  Speed  suggests  the  Tsarist  policy  was  not  deliberate,  but  a  symptom  of 
the  autocratic  system  collapsing  under  the  strains  of  waging  war.  This  is likely,  given 
that  frontline  troops  were  already  experiencing  shortages  from  late  1914  onwards,  as 
Tukhachevsky  himself  had  witnessed.  This  administrative  chaos  prevented  Russia 
sending  food  packages  to  her  POWs.  Western  prisoners  received  these  to  supplement 
the  diet  provided  by  the  Gen-nan  authorities,  but  Russians  and  other  East  Europeans 
132  R.  GO,  p.  34;  Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  p.  14. 
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134  A.  V.  Blagodatov,  "Plen  i  pobeg"  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  druzei  i  soratnikov. 
(Moscow,  1965),  p.  22. 36 
did  not.  94%  of  East  Europeans  and  Italians  existed  purely  on  prison  food,  but  97%  of 
Western  prisoners  had  this  diet  supplemented  with  food  packages.  This  led  to  a  death 
rate  twice  as  high  amongst  the  former  group  and  contributed  greatly  to  Russians 
comprising  70-80,000  of  the  118,000  POWs  dying  in  German  prisons  during  the 
135  War. 
Speed's  assertion  perhaps  needs  qualifying  by  the  simple  fact  that  since  Russians 
comprised  59%  of  prisoners  in  German  camps, 
136 
more  Russians  inevitably  would 
have  died  in  captivity  than  any  other  nation,  but  the  impression  created  on  the  inmates 
would  obviously  have  been  bad.  This  must  have  influenced  opinion.  With  2,417,000 
Russian  POWs  held  in  Germany  during  The  Great  War,  upon  returning  to  Russia  after 
1917,  the  majority  of  these  would  have  baulked  at  the  thought  of  a  Tsarist  restoration 
after  their  experiences.  This  was  very  likely  a  factor  in  White  recruiting  difficulties 
during  the  Civil  War. 
The  German  authorities  would  have  encouraged  Bolshevik  literature  in  the  camps, 
given  the  defeatist  message  the  Bolsheviks  preached  and  with  the  above 
circumstances,  it  would  have  seemed  more  appealing.  Gorelik  suggests  reading  the 
ideas  of  Lenin  had  a  great  effect  on  Tukhachevsky  and  stiffened  his  resolve  to 
escape. 
137  Tukhachevsky  would  speak  of  this  later  in  Ingolstadt,  but  in  Bad  Stuer  and 
earlier,  escape  was  already  foremost  in  his  mind,  with  the  wish  to  return  to  Russia  and 
rejoin  the  War  against  his  captors  the  most  likely  reason.  It  is  unlikely  he  decided  to 
escape  from  here  because  he  read  a  pamphlet  by  Lenin. 
Tukhachevsky's  next  escape  attempt  was  from  Bad  Stuer.  The  camp  was 
surrounded  by  two  rows  of  barbed  wire  and  prisoners  were  guarded  round-the-clock. 
As  a  rule  escape  attempts  were  unsuccessful  and  Tukhachevsky  had  witnessed  several 
failures  before  he  tried.  Varying  versions  of  this  are  furnished  with  Ivanov  suggesting 
the  escape  attempt  was  made  with  a  2nd  Lieutenant  Phillipov.  138  On  7th  September 
135 
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138  Two  different  names  are  given  in  the  various  biographies  for  this  accomplice.  R.  Gul'called  him 
Semenov,  p.  34;  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  and  B.  A.  Starkov  also  named  him  Semenov,  but  stated  he  was 
called  Phillipov  in  some  accounts,  p.  47;  L.  Nikulin  gave  the  testimony  of  Aleksei  Mikhailovich 
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1916,  they  hid  in  boxes  of  bedlinen  taken  out  of  the  camp, 
139possibly  devising  this 
from  a  story  Tukhachevsky  had  read  about  political  prisoners  in  Siberia  escaping  in  a 
wagon  inside  a  box  of  cabbage. 
140  Hiding  in  a  rubbish  pit  or  forest  outwith  the  camp 
until  nightfall,  they  covered  twenty  kilometres  a  day  for  26  days,  travelling  500  kms 
to  the  Dutch  border,  with  their  knowledge  of  foreign  languages  helping  them. 
Literally  a  step  from  the  Dutch  border  they  were  captured.  Philippov  managed  to  hide 
and  escape  later,  but  Tukhachevsky  was  caught  and  imprisoned  in  a  local  jail. 
Escaping  from  here,  he  swam  the  Elbe  in  a  bid  for  freedom,  but  was  again  captured. 
141 
Ivanov  writes  Tukhachevsky  was  then  incarcerated  in  Ingolstadt,  but  he  was  first 
transferred  to  Fort  Zomdorff,  a  strict  penal  camp  in  the  Cilstrin  Fortress,  east  of 
Berlin.  Here  he  dug  a  tunnel  with  English  and  French  POWs  including  Roland 
Garros,  but  half  an  hour  before  they  were  due  to  go,  it  was  discovered,  possibly  via  an 
142 
informer,  leading  to  his  transfer  to  Fort  9,  Ingolstadt. 
Within  the  German  penal  system,  officers  and  lower  ranks  were  separated  with 
non-officers  put  to  work.  Officers  were  spared  this,  but  Shchetinov  and  Starkov 
suggest  they  were  kept  in  old  castles  and  fortresses,  in  especially  strict  isolation.  143 
However,  Speed  lists  Bad  Stuer  and  COstrin  as  enlisted  men's  camps,  which  suggests 
segregation  was  perhaps  not  always  strictly  adhered  to.  Camp  regimes  did  differ 
markedly  between  the  German  military  districts,  with  local  authorities  running  them 
under  no  central  coordination. 
144  Possibly,  disruptive  officers  such  as  Tukhachevsky 
would  be  transferred  and  housed  with  lower  ranks  in  securer  regimes.  In  Ingolstadt, 
however,  Tukhachevsky  had  reached  the  securest  officer  facility  in  Germany. 
Major  A.  J.  Evans  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  was  imprisoned  in  Ingolstadt  after 
repeated  escape  attempts  in  late  1916/early  1917,  when  Tukhachevsky  was  there.  He 
provides  a  tremendously  detailed  and  entertaining  view  of  life  in  the  camp  and  writes 
that  it  was  populated  by  those  who  had  repeatedly  escaped  or  were  tagged 
"disruptive".  Around  150  officers  were  housed  in  Ingolstadt,  of  whom  "...  at  least  130 
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had  made  successful  attempts  to  escape  from  other  camps,  and  had  only  been  recaught 
after  from  three  days  to  three  weeks  temporary  freedom".  145  Barbed  wire  surrounded 
the  camp. 
146  The  bars  on  the  windows  were  as  thick  as  two  fingers  and  the  cells  had 
steel  doors.  The  fortress  was  surrounded  by  deep  and  wide  ditches  filled  with  water 
and  there  were  as  many  guards  as  there  were  prisoners.  To  make  escape  attempts  even 
harder,  the  Germans  mixed  POWs  of  different  nationalities  -  Russian,  French,  British 
and  Italian.  "Attempt  to  converse!  ",  wrote  Blagodatov,  a  Russian  detained  with 
Tukhachevsky.  147  Undeterred  however,  Tukhachevsky  and  others  tried  to  dig  under 
the  walls.  This  was  detected  and  vigilance  became  even  more  strict. 
148  Evans  recalls 
tunneling  was  impossible  because  water  from  the  moat  flooded  in,  but  he  writes  "The 
camp  was  nothing  less  than  an  escaping  club.  Each  man  was  ready  to  help  anyone 
who  wished  to  escape  and  had  a  plan,  quite  regardless  of  his  own  risk  or  the 
punishment  he  might  bring  upon  himself'.  149  The  descriptions  of  Tukhachevsky's 
activities  within  Ingolstadt  fit  this,  with  more  attempts  tried.  Blagodatov  provides 
several  examples,  recalling  that  whilst  everyone  attempted  to  escape  and  disrupt  life 
in  the  camp,  making  it  more  difficult  for  the  Germans,  Tukhachevsky  was  one  of  the 
most  active  and  inmates  were  "...  always  ready  to  follow  him  on  any  risky  affair". 
150 
At  one  point  the  commandant  tried  to  change  the  taking  of  appel  from  the  cells  to 
the  courtyard.  When  he  ordered  the  guards  to  summon  the  prisoners,  the  inmates 
began  whistling  and  shouting.  The  French  sang  the  Marseillaise  and  fights  broke  out 
between  prisoners  and  guards.  The  commandant  eventually  flung  his  an-ns  up  in  the 
air  in  despair  and  left.  Tukhachevsky  was  an  instigator  of  this  demonstration  which 
characterised  his  and  the  whole  camp's  mood.  When  the  inmates  gathered  in  the 
French  quarters  to  celebrate  Bastille  Day  with  bottles  of  wine  and  beer  provided  in 
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French  aid  packages,  Tukhachevsky  toasted  to  a  land  of  no  camps,  fortresses  or 
jail.  151 
Blagodatov  further  recalls  Tukhachevsky  responding  to  a  rich  landowning  fellow 
inmate,  Colonel  Leotiev,  on  hearing  him  condemning  the  February  Revolution  as 
being  carried  out  by  "Black  Rebels",  that  the  land  should  go  to  those  who  worked 
152 
it. 
Tukhachevsky  was  very  close  with  many  of  the  French  inmates  and  helped 
several  of  them  escape.  He  helped  a  French  officer,  de  Jaubert,  by  preparing  a 
German  uniform  for  his  escape  and  personally  staging  a  concert  to  divert  the  attention 
of  the  guards  and  hide  the  noise  of  cutting  through  the  window  bars.  De  Jaubert 
escaped  through  the  window  and  walked  out  of  the  fortress  in  the  uniform  when  the 
guards  changed. 
153  He  reached  the  railway  station,  escaped  to  Holland  and  later  the 
inmates  heard  he  had  shot  down  a  German  plane.  This  success  led  to  even  stricter 
security  and  barbed  wire  covered  with  bells  strung  round  the  camp.  Several  days  later, 
a  French  naval  officer,  Captain  Bogino,  was  killed  trying  to  escape.  However,  helping 
successful  escapes  and  the  revolutionary  events  back  in  Russia  strengthened 
154 
Tukhachevsky's  desire  to  escape. 
Blagodatov  also  refers  to  accounts  included  in  The  Tukhachevskii  Affair.  155  In  this 
book  Alexandrov  cites  General  de  Goys  de  Mezeyrac,  honorary  president  of  the 
Amicale  de  Ceux  du  Fort  No.  9,  who  arranged  a  reunion  for  Tukhachevsky  with 
twenty  French  officers  incarcerated  with  him  in  Ingolstadt.  De  Mezeyrac  recalled  how 
Tukhachevsky  had  been  mainly  responsible  for  the  former's  escape,  on  3rd  April,  with 
a  British  Major  Gaskell  in  a  biscuit  case.  For  this,  someone  had  to  answer  for  de 
Mezeyrac  at  appel  the  next  morning.  This  was  a  highly  risky  undertaking  and  would 
have  resulted  in  death  if  detected.  However,  de  Mezeyrac  asked  Tukhachevsky  and  he 
agreed  instantly  to  do  it,  donning  the  Frenchman's  uniform  and  greatcoat  the  next  day. 
Another  officer  remembered  an  inspection  by  a  German  general,  several  colonels 
and  other  officers.  Tukhachevsky  stood  with  his  hands  in  his  pockets  and  refused  to 
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salute  the  general.  The  general  "nearly  had  apoplexy"  and  asked  his  aide-de-camp 
who  this  was  refusing  to  salute  him,  but  Tukhachevsky  replied,  "A  Russian  officer 
who  does  not  salute  those  who  massacred  the  French  at  Senlis  and  elsewhere". 
Tukhachevsky  was  put  in  irons,  narrowly  escaping  being  shot. 
156 
An  escape  attempt  made  by  Tukhachevsky  himself  originated  with  a  French 
officer,  Lombard,  who  had  been  detained  in  the  Ingolstadt  jail  and  returned  with  the 
news  that  a  Swiss  smuggler  was  imprisoned.  He  suggested  Tukhachevsky  have 
himself  detained  in  the  jail,  meet  the  smuggler,  and  escape  with  him  to  the  Swiss 
border.  Tukhachevsky  agreed  to  this,  but  since  he  could  not  write  German  well 
enough,  asked  an  Ensign  Tsurkov  to  write  a  report  from  one  of  the  fort  NCOs  to  the 
commandant,  stating  stolen  items  had  been  discovered  in  Tukhachevsky's  room 
during  a  search.  This  was  done  and  Tukhachevsky  was  thrown  into  the  jail,  but  failed 
to  meet  up  with  the  smuggler.  The  reason  he  had  agreed  to  this  plan  was  that  Lombard 
had  criticised  him  for  wanting  to  attempt  simple,  amateurish  Russian-style  escapes 
such  as  just  walking  out  of  the  prison.  After  this  failed  though,  Tukhachevsky  decided 
to  do  just  that. 
157 
Lombard  himself  escaped  and  returned  to  France,  which  along  with  the  growing 
popularity  of  the  Bolsheviks  in  Russia,  Fervacque  suggests  inspired  Tukhachevsky  to 
escape  and  return  to  Russia. 
158 
Tukhachevsky  finally  escaped  successfully,  donning  civilian  clothes,  walking  out 
of  the  camp  and  vanishing. 
1  59  An  international  agreement  existed  which  allowed 
POWs  to  walk  outwith  the  camps  if  they  signed  a  document  giving  their  word  not  to 
escape  whilst  doing  so.  However,  Tukhachevsky  and  a  General  Staff  Captain 
Cherniavskii  signed  each  other's  documents  for  one  of  these  walks  and  escaped. 
1  60 
They  wandered  for  six  days  and  nights,  but  on  the  seventh  day  ran  into  police. 
Tukhachevsky  managed  to  escape,  crossing  the  Swiss  border  later,  but  Chemiavskii 
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was  captured. 
161  A  Swiss  newspaper  reported  the  corpse  of  a  POW  found  on  the 
Swiss  border  by  Lake  Geneva  a  month  after  the  escape  and  it  was  thought  this  was 
Tukhachevsky.  A  requiem  was  held  in  the  camp,  with  a  French  curate  taking  the 
service  in  the  absence  of  a  Russian  priest.  Blagodatov  did  not  know  Tukhachevsky 
was  alive  until  back  in  Russia  himself  during  the  Civil  War.  1  62 
Evans  recalled  the  British  were  suspicious  of  orderlies  in  the  camp  who  were 
Russian  or  French,  but  remembered  other  Russians  better.  He  described  them  as, 
...  very  generous  fellows...  With  regard  to  escaping,  if  you  needed  anything 
such  as  a  leather  coat  or  a  greatcoat  (the  Russian  greatcoat  can,  with  little 
alteration,  be  turned  into  a  very  respectable  German  officer's  greatcoat), 
you  could  be  sure  to  get  it  as  a  gift  or  by  barter  from  the  Russians  if  they 
could  possibly  spare  it.  The  difficulty  of  saying  anything  about  them  is 
added  to  by  the  fact  that  I  cannot  recall  their  real  names. 
He  did  however  recall, 
There  were...  several  Russians,  real  good  fellows,  whom  I  never  got  to 
know  well.  One  of  them  had  escaped  from  a  camp  with  some  friends,  and 
had  reached  the  frontier  after  walking  for  over  thirty  days.  His  friends  had 
got  across,  but  he  had  been  recaptured.  I  heard  a  short  time  ago  that  he  had 
escaped  and  had  crossed  the  Swiss  frontier  at  the  same  place  as  Buckley 
and  I  did.  1  63 
This  was  a  description  of  Tukhachevsky,  his  escape  attempt  to  the  Dutch  border  and 
successful  flight  from  Ingolstadt. 
Crossing  into  Switzerland,  Tukhachevsky  received  documents  at  the  Russian 
Embassy  for  his  return  home.  With  war  waging,  the  direct  route  from  Switzerland  to 
Russia  crossed  two  fronts  and  Germany.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  had  to  go  through 
France,  Britain,  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland.  164  He  travelled  to  Paris,  meeting  the 
Soviet  Military  Attache,  Alexei  Alexeevich  Ignatiev,  who  progressed  to  the 
Administration  of  the  Higher  Military  Academic  Institution  of  the  Red  Army  in  1936. 
He  remembered  his  meeting  with  Tukhachevsky,  retaining  a  document  about  this, 
161 
Fervacque  and  Gul'  write  that  Chernovetskii  was  returned  to  Ingolstadt  after  four  and  three  days 
respectively. 
162  An  operational  report  to  him  was  signed  by  Tukhachevsky,  but  he  did  not  know  this  was  the  same 
man  until  1924,  when  he  again  met  him  at  a  meeting  of  the  Revvoensovet  Respublika  (R  VSR),  A.  V. 
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which  he  had  sent  to  N.  S.  Ermolov,  Military  Attache  in  London,  asking  him  to  help 
Tukhachevsky  return  to  Russia.  1  65  He  did  this  just  before  the  October  Revolution. 
Fervacque's  memoirs  in  Le  Chef  de  LArmee  Rouge  provide  arguably  the  most 
illuminating  insights  on  Tukhachevsky  in  Ingolstadt.  At  the  reunion  organised  by  de 
Mezeyrac  in  1936,  Alexandrov  notes  Tukhachevsky, 
...  suddenly  remembered  that  his  fellow  inmate  at  the  camp,  "Remy 
Roure",  had  written  a  book  citing  Tukhachevsky's  remarks  on  Napoleon 
and  his  Napoleonic  ambitions.  The  author  was  present,  and  so  much  the 
better.  At  least  Tukhachevsky  had  the  chance  to  put  things  in  their  right 
perspective.  So  he  replied  soberly  that  he  was  very  glad  to  talk  of  the  past 
and  that,  having  read  the  book  about  himself,  he  would  comment  on  the 
views  he  held  very  early  in  1917. 
"I  was  still  very  young...  a  novice  at  politics,  and  all  I  knew  about 
revolutions  was  the  last  phase  of  the  citizens'  revolution  in  France:  the 
Bonapartism  whose  military  triumphs  filled  me  with  boundless 
admiration.  When  we  celebrated  the  taking  of  the  Bastille  together,  on 
14th  July,  1917,1  already  realized  that  our  revolution  was  only  in  its  first 
stage,  like  yours  in  1789.  But  your  sans  culottes  went  no  further.  I  felt  that 
our  revolution  would  be  very  different.  And  that  is  why  I  joined  the 
Bolshevik  Party  when  I  got  back  to  Russia.  I  had  read  a  great  deal;  I  had 
been  able  to  complete  my  political  education.  I  knew  that  Bonapartism  on 
the  French  model  could  never  be  the  outcome  of  the  Russian  Revolution. 
Ours  is  not  a  bourgeois  revolution;  its  aims  are  different  from  those  of  the 
great  French  Revolution.  I  have  set  out  my  views  in  a  book:  The  Class 
War;  I  became  a  Marxist.  I  never  think  of  my  views  at  Ingolstadt  without 
regretting  them,  since  they  could  cause  doubts  about  my  devotion  to  the 
Soviet  motherland.  I'm  taking  advantage  of  our  reunion  to  tell  you  my  true 
feelings 
. 
166 
This  was  Tukhachevsky  emphasising  his  loyalty  to  the  USSR  and  dispelling  any 
notion  he  was  a  threat  to  Stalin.  Tukhachevsky  attended  the  reunion  as  part  of  a 
diplomatic  visit  to  London  and  Paris,  representing  the  USSR  at  the  funeral  of  King 
George  V,  along  with  General  Vitovt  Putna,  Soviet  Military  Attache  in  London. 
However,  Alexandrov  writes  that  Tukhachevsky  was  closely  shadowed  by  OGPU 
agents  in  Paris  and  de  Mezeyrac  recalled  Tukhachevsky  seemed  "tormented"  and 
anxious  to  talk  to  him  privately,  but  this  was  impossible  because  of  the  constant 
attention  of  "...  the  two  Soviet  civilians  who  were  with  him".  The  plot  against 
Tukhachevsky  which  originated  with  Stalin's  secret  police  was  being  fabricated  at  this 
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time,  with  Tukhachevsky  accused  of  contact  with  Nazis  and  Western  anti-Soviets 
during  these  visits.  According  to  de  Mezeyrac's  recollections,  Tukhachevsky  was 
evidently  already  worried,  but,  with  this  being  the  case,  it  is  significant  he  did  not 
simply  deny  his  earlier  beliefs  when  he  knew  they  could  be  held  against  him.  Instead 
his  explanation  does  add  credence  to  the  views  Fervacque  attributes  to  Tukhachevsky 
in  Ingolstadt. 
Blagodatov  refers  to  the  Fervacque  book  for  Tukhachevsky's  political  views  at 
this  time  and  Shchetinov  &  Starkov  point  out  Tukhachevsky  never  did  deny  these 
167 
were  his  beliefs  in  1917.  It  is  highly  likely  these  views  were  used  against 
Tukhachevsky  in  1937  and  were  used  to  add  fuel  to  emigre  claims  about  him.  1  68  Gul', 
a  White  emigre  writing  in  1932,  when  Tukhachevsky  was  Deputy  Minister  for 
Defence,  quotes  extensively  from  Fervacque,  but  later  Soviet  biographies  either  quote 
Fervacque  selectively  or  not  at  all.  Shchetinov  &  Starkov  provide  the  only  Soviet 
biography  to  cite  Fervacque  significantly,  but  this  was  not  until  1990  with  Perestroika 
and  Glasnost'  undoubtedly  allowing  a  more  critical  appraisal  of  Tukhachevsky  than 
Gorelik  or  Ivanov  could  make  five  years  earlier.  If  the  object  is  to  portray 
Tukhachevsky  turning  against  his  noble  blood  at  a  young  age  to  support  socialist 
ideals,  then  eventually  joining  the  Bolsheviks  when  he  had  the  opportunity, 
Fervacque's  comments  are  a  problem.  However,  if  we  see  Tukhachevsky  becoming 
gradually  disillusioned  with  the  class  he  was  born  into  as  he  grew  older  and  finally 
turning  against  it  and  the  way  Russia  was  governed  after  his  Great  War  experiences, 
the  views  Fervacque  attributes  to  him  are  more  fitting. 
In  his  own  words  Tukhachevsky  stated  he  was  politically  immature  in  1917  and 
this  is  commented  on  later  by  various  biographers.  He  had  not  read  Bolshevik  or  other 
left-wing  literature  extensively,  with  his  time  spent  studying  military  works.  He 
probably  had  an  interest  in  politics  as  his  father  was  an  advanced,  liberal  man  who 
associated  with  left-wing  people.  Tukhachevsky  was  exposed  to  these  ideas,  but  until 
his  war  experiences,  had  probably  never  fully  considered  the  effect  of  politics  on  his 
life.  The  assertion  he  was  a  fully-fledged  Bolshevik  in  1917  is  almost  certainly  not 
true.  Fervacque  recalled  asking  Tukhachevsky  if  he  was  a  socialist.  Tukhachevsky 
replied, 
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Socialist?  Certainly  not!  What  a  need  for  classification  you  have!  Besides, 
the  great  socialists  are  Jews  and  the  socialist  doctrine  is  a  branch  of 
universal  christianity.  I  laugh  at  money,  and  whether  the  land  is  divided  up 
or  not  is  all  one  to  me.  The  barbarians,  my  ancestors,  lived  in  common, 
but  they  had  chiefs.  No,  I  detest  socialists,  Jews  and  Christians. 
He  had  earlier  said, 
The  Jews  brought  us  Christianity.  That  is  enough  to  make  us  hate  them. 
And  then  they  are  a  low  race.  I  do  not  speak  of  the  dangers  which  they 
have  brought  to  my  country.  You  French  cannot  understand  that;  for  you 
equality  is  a  dogma.  The  Jew  is  a  dog,  a  son  of  a  bitch,  who  sheds  his  fleas 
in  every  country.  It  is  he  who  has  contributed  most  to  infecting  us  with  the 
plague  of  civilisation  and  who  would  like  to  give  us  his  morality,  the 
morality  of  money  and  capital. 
1  69 
However,  despite  this,  Fervacque  related  a  later  discussion,  in  which  he  suggested 
a  Bolshevik  victory  in  Russia  would  lead  to  a  separate  peace  in  the  War  and  the 
Russia  of  Tukhachevsky  to  defeat,  implying  Lenin  would  not  represent 
Tukhachevsky's  nation.  Tukhachevsky  replied  though, 
If  Lenin  could  relieve  Russia  of  its  fetters  of  prejudice,  de-Europeanise  it, 
I  would  follow  him.  But  he  would  have  to  make  a  clean  sweep  and  throw 
us  deliberately  into  barbarism.  What  a  pure  spring!  With  Marxist  formulas 
mixed  with  democratic  couplets  he  could  raise  up  the  world.  The  right  of 
peoples  to  be  their  own  masters!  There  is  the  magic  key  which  will  open 
to  Russia  the  gates  of  the  East,  and  which  will  close  them  to  the  English. 
Fervacque  -  But  in  the  West  it  would  cause  you  to  lose  Poland,  Finland 
and  perhaps  more. 
Tukhachevsky  -  It  is  here  that  the  Marxist  formulas  come  in.  A 
revolutionary  Russia,  propagating  the  class  struggle,  would  extend  its 
boundaries  well  beyond  the  limits  marked  out  by  treaties!  We  could  in  this 
way,  and  only  in  this  way  gain  Constantinople.  But  we  need  a  new 
religion.  Between  Marxism  and  Christianity  I  would  choose  Marxism. 
With  the  red  flag  rather  than  with  our  cross  we  shall  enter  Byzantium  and 
consecrate  Saint  Sophia  anew. 
Fervacque  -  In  the  meantime  there  will  be  defeat  and  a  separate  peace. 
Tukhachevsky  -  For  us  it  is  the  same  thing.  Your  victory  cuts  us  off  just 
as  much  as  our  own  defeat.  Just  think!  The  Emperor  Kerensky,  victorious 
with  the  allies,  will  nevertheless  be  the  defeated  one.  What  a  gaping 
wound  on  Russia's  flank!  Your  democracy  and  your  right  of  self- 
determination  would  tear  Poland  from  us.  The  English  contest  the  East 
with  us.  Only  revolution  and  the  most  extreme  form,  will  leave  our  hands 
free.  Let  the  Polish  workers  and  peasants  also  overthrow  their  bourgeoisie 
and  they  will  become  again  the  brothers  of  the  Russian  workers  and 
peasants  and  the  unity  of  our  empire  is  assured.  What  a  potent  lever  the 
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revolution  can  be!  And  if  the  English  bar  our  way  to  the  Balkans  and  Asia, 
we  shall  rise  up  against  them. 
Fervacque  -  You  are  joking  Mikhail!  Are  you  dreaming? 
He  looked  at  me  for  a  moment  in  silence,  then  he  burst  out  in  a  laugh  that 
was  at  once  ironic  and  despairing. 
Tukhachevsky  -  Of  course  I'm  joking. 
170 
Here  we  have  Tukhachevsky  presented  in  1917  as  a  Panslavist,  anti-semitic, 
Russian  nationalist-imperlalist,  willing  to  follow  Lenin  and  use  Marxism  if  this  would 
secure  the  age-old  territorial  aims  of  the  Tsars  and  cement  Russia's  position  in  the 
world.  The  comment  about  using  revolution  to  hold  Poland  and  the  Balkans  is 
especially  interesting  in  light  of  Tukhachevsky's  later  proposals  in  the  Polish-Soviet 
War.  He  said  on  another  occasion  that  Poland  must  remain  within  the  Russian 
Empire,  whether  under  the  Red  Flag  or  otherwise. 
1  71  The  classic  SlavoPhile  view 
Tukhachevsky  outlined  above  is  repeated  in  further  statements  he  made  to  Fervacque. 
Tukhachevsky  was  said  to  have  been  pleased  with  the  overthrow  of  the  Tsar,  but 
felt  Nicholas  11  had  been  at  fault,  not  for  failing  to  implement  reforms,  but  for  not 
being  a  "great  intelligent  tyrant".  Tukhachevsky  praised  Napoleon  for  using  the 
Jacobins  and  Robespierre  and  also  praised  Catherine  the  Great  and  Peter  the  Great  for 
achieving  their  aims.  He  had  no  faith  in  the  Cadets,  socialists  or  Kerensky  who 
wanted  a  democratic  Russia,  as  he  felt  a  constitutional  democracy,  as  in  France  with 
its  sense  of  "perspective",  would  never  solve  Russia's  problems.  Despotism  was  the 
only  way  to  rule  Russia,  combining  the  guile  of  Peter  the  Great  with  the  barbarism  of 
the  East.  He  felt  the  suspension  of  the  death  penalty  by  Kerensky  was  wrong  and  the 
"Democracy  of  Kerensky  decked  out  with  Marxism"  disgusted  Tukhachevsky  and 
172 
made  him  want  to  escape  more  than  ever  to  play  a  part. 
Tukhachevsky  is  described  as  holding  futuristic  and  avantgardist  views,  stating 
when  the  Bolsheviks  gained  power  they  should  dispose  of  old  cultural  norms  and 
practices.  Latin  and  Greek  cultures  were  not  for  Russia  and  the  Renaissance  and 
Christianity  were  the  greatest  misfortunes  to  befall  man.  "Harmony  and  measure  must 
above  all  be  destroyed".  He  derided  Petrograd  as  "cosmopolitan  and  damned",  but 
believed  Moscow  should  become  the  Russian  capital  and  "a  shining  light  for  the  East 
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around  which  the  ancient  races,  those  called  barbarians  in  the  West,  could  gather". 
173 
Tukhachevsky  loved  to  read  and  quote  from  Dostoevskii,  whose  works  epitomised  the 
barbaric  nature  of  Russia  and  how  it  should  be,  and  at  one  point  compared  Russia  to 
Beethoven,  stating  that,  "It  does  not  know  which  symphony  to  present  to  the  world,  as 
it  does  not  know  even  itself.  It  is  confused  now,  but  wait,  one  beautiful  day  all  will  be 
defeated  by  it 
...... 
As  to  the  role  he  would  personally  play,  Tukhachevsky  stated,  "At 
thirty  years  old  I  shall  be  a  general...  or  I  shall  be  dead.  "  174  As  we  shall  see  shortly,  he 
effectively  achieved  this  the  following  year,  when  he  was  only  twenty-five. 
The  question  about  the  reliability  of  Fervacque  as  a  source  must  be  raised  again, 
with  Ivanov  possibly  also  referring  to  Fervacque  when  condemning  emigre  literature 
against  Tukhachevsky.  However,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  deny  these  beliefs  later  and 
why  would  former  fellow  French  prisoners  invent  such  stories  in  the  late  1920s  and 
1930s?  In  sifting  through  the  multitude  of  opinion  on  Tukhachevsky,  Fervacque  is  a 
controversial  source,  but  when  taken  with  Tukhachevsky's  background  and  later  life, 
he  appears  reliable. 
Tukhachevsky  in  1917  saw  in  Marxism  a  method  by  which  Russian  supremacy 
could  be  maintained  and  the  empire  held  together.  The  political  and  socio-economic 
underpinnings  of  this  philosophy  could  be  learnt  later.  It  was  truly  a  new  religion 
which  matched  his  atheistic  beliefs  and  which  would  allow  the  Slavic  Empire  of 
Russia  to  show  the  way  to  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world,  as  Russia  had  been 
threatening  to  do  for  so  long.  Now  was  the  time  for  this  to  happen  and  Tukhachevsky 
saw  himself  as  part  of  this. 
Shchetinov  &  Starkov  suggest  Tukhachevsky  used  his  time  in  Ingolstadt  as 
effectively  more  time  in  military  academy,  reading  many  books  and  perfecting  his 
French,  with  Charles  de  Gaulle  as  his  language  teacher. 
175  Fervacque  recalled 
Tulchachevsky  enthusiastically  reading  the  Memorial  de  Saint-Helene  about  Napoleon 
and  said  history  was  one  of  Tukhachevsky's  "great  passions",  further  backing  earlier 
assertions  about  this. 
176  Nikulin  contradicts  this,  stating  no  books  were  pennitted,  but 
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that  this  resulted  in  great  discussion  amongst  the  officers. 
177  Whether  books  existed  or 
not,  political  and  military  discussions  would  have  been  commonplace,  alongside  plans 
to  escape. 
However,  despite  the  differing  cosmopolitan  views  and  experiences 
Tukhachevsky  amassed  in  his  years  of  imprisonment,  especially  in  Ingolstadt,  he 
himself  looked  on  this  period  as  lost  time  and  did  not  like  to  talk  about  it.  178  This 
perhaps  explains  the  dearth  of  material  by  him  on  this  time,  or  perhaps  a  reluctance  to 
bring  up  the  views  he  had  expressed  so  explicitly  and  a  need  to  move  away  from  the 
past  prevented  him  mentioning  Ingolstadt. 
POW  Camps:  Influential  Fij!  ures 
Undoubtedly  the  most  famous  and  potentially  influential  fellow  inmate  of 
Tukhachevsky's  was  Charles  de  Gaulle.  Simpkin  and  Erickson  state  there  is  no  finn 
evidence  that  their  meeting  and  sharing  a  cell,  if  it  took  place  at  all,  influenced 
179 
Tukhachevsky's  thinking. 
However,  the  gathering  of  old  Ingolstadt  inmates  held  in  1936  for  Tukhachevsky's 
diplomatic  visit  to  France  is  mentioned  in  a  de  Gaulle  biography,  with  the  two  men 
sitting  next  to  each  other  at  the  dinner.  180  This  was  again  the  reunion  organised  by  de 
Mezeyrac  who  recalled,  "Mikhail  Tukhachevskii  arrived  at  the  Ingolstadt  internment 
camp  on  the  19th  or  20th  of  October,  1916,  a  week  or  so  after  the  arrival  of  another 
young  officer  -  Charles  de  Gaulle.  I  remember  both  events  very  well.  "  181  This  would 
suggest  the  two  men  did  know  each  other  and  Tukhachevsky  is  listed  amongst 
inmates  de  Gaulle  met  and  associated  with. 
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It  is  suggested  Tukhachevsky  and  de  Gaulle  followed  the  War  via  German 
newspapers  and  spoke  extensively,  influencing  each  other-1 
83  They  made  reviews  of 
events  at  the  Fronts,  discussed  the  development  of  military  operations,  strategy  and 
tactics,  their  war  experiences,  how  war  might  develop  in  the  future,  the  advent  of  the 
tank  and  the  need  for  massed  tank  strikes,  which  both  would  pursue  later.  1  84  This  is 
conjecture,  but  Tukhachevsky  did  later  congratulate  de  Gaulle  on  his  work  with  tanks 
and  the  two  men  were  interned  together  in  a  prison  which  only  housed  around  150 
inmates.  185  From  Evans'  recollections,  all  the  inmates  met,  cooperated  and  conversed 
with  each  other  about  various  topics. 
Back  in  Russia 
Tukhachevsky  reached  Russia  on  16th  October,  only  ten  days  before  the 
Bolshevik  uprising,  travelled  to  Moscow  and  spent  a  few  days  with  relatives. 
1  86  His 
family  had  returned  to  Vrazhskoe  after  the  death  of  his  father,  younger  brother  Igor 
and  sister  Nadia.  Nikolai  and  Aleksandr  were  serving  with  the  Semenovskii  which  left 
Tukhachevsky's  mother  with  four  young  daughters.  1  87  Obviously  wishing  to  see  his 
family,  but  also  undoubtedly  concerned  about  their  fate,  with  the  revolution  occurring 
and  nobles  being  dispossessed,  Tukhachevsky  travelled  to  Vrazhskoe. 
He  arrived  unexpectedly,  dressed  in  rags,  looking  like  a  "mummy",  his  family 
only  recognising  him  "by  his  smile".  Any  fears  he  may  have  harboured  were 
dispelled,  as  the  peasantry  repaid  the  good  treatment  received  from  the 
Tukhachevskys  as  landlords,  by  allowing  them  to  retain  their  house  and  some  land.  1  88 
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the  Soviet-Polish  War.  De  Gaulle  wrote,  "Tanks  should  be  brought  into  the  field  in  a  body,  not 
separately.  "  If  de  Gaulle  concluded  this,  Tukhachevsky  also  possibly  did,  but  in  1920,  not  during  the 
Great  War.  They  may  have  discussed  which  method  of  tank  usage  was  more  favourable  and  the  1920 
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Staying  only  three  days  and  nights,  probably  until  certain  his  family  were  in  no 
danger,  Tukhachevsky  returned  to  his  regiment,  travelling  to  the  Semenovskii 
Regimental  Depot  in  Petrograd.  189  The  Regiment  had  been  situated  on  the  South- 
Western  Front,  but  was  now  in  reserve.  Reaching  here  on  20th  November, 
Tukhachevsky  was  reunited  with  his  two  brothers.  1  90 
Hardly  any  officers  remained  and  after  the  Kornilov  Affair  they  were  under 
suspicion. 
191  Authority  was  held  by  a  Regimental  Soldiers  Committee,  but  its 
authority  had  also  largely  disappeared  with  the  situation  in  Petrograd.  192  However, 
upon  his  arrival  Tukhachevsky  was  elected  commander  of  9th  Company  and  possibly 
promoted  to  Captain.  193  He  was  called  Tukhachevsky  the  First  in  staff  documents,  194 
undoubtedly  because  his  two  younger  brothers  were  in  the  regiment.  Tukhachevsky 
was  apparently  greeted  well  by  the  men  as  he  was  not  aloof  like  other  officers. 
Officers  who  had  escaped  from  POW  camps  were  treated  with  respect  and  interest,  if 
195 
guardedly.  Riabov  recalled  Tukhachevsky  was  treated  in  such  a  way  because  he 
1  96 
had  earlier  been  a  fair  officer,  treating  his  men  with  respect. 
Tipol't  relates  he  met  Tukhachevsky  again  in  late  autumn  1917  and  saw  him 
almost  daily,  recalling  "It  seemed  my  room  was  converted  into  a  Regimental  speech 
club.  To  it  came  officers,  NCOs  and  soldiers.  Noise,  debates,  tobacco,  smoke.  "  The 
War,  Revolution  and  what  was  to  happen  in  their  country  was  discussed  during  these 
meetings,  but  Tukhachevsky  did  not  say  much,  listening  to  the  views  of  everyone 
else.  It  seemed  he  was  considering  events  and  different  opinions,  searching  for  an 
answer.  Tipol't  thought  that  only  in  late  autumn  1917/early  1918,  did  Tukhachevsky 
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decide  which  way  to  turn.  197  These  meetings  would  presumably  have  continued  until 
the  Semenovskii  was  disbanded. 
Tukhachevsky  returned  to  Petrograd  at  this  time  because  he  was  a  soldier  and  his 
regiment  was  in  reserve  here.  Tipol't's  account  backs  up  the  assertion  that 
Tukhachevsky  had  no  real  idea,  despite  his  political  views,  over  which  way  to  go.  At 
this  stage  he  merely  wished  to  get  back  into  the  War,  to  defend  his  homeland  against 
the  Germans,  who  had  held  him  prisoner  for  the  past  two  and  a  half  years. 
However,  varying  versions  of  Tukhachevsky's  motives  and  movements  are 
provided  for  this  period.  Suggestions  are  made  that  Tukhachevsky  had  decided  by  this 
point  that  the  Bolshevik  Revolution  was  the  only  way  forward,  but  was  concerned 
about  the  fate  of  the  Russian  Army,  because  as  a  military  man  he  could  not  conceive 
of  goverment  without  a  military  force  and  was  concerned  about  the  Red  Guard  force 
198 
currently  employed  by  the  Bolsheviks. 
The  Tsarist  Army  was  disintegrating  at  this  time  through  desertion  and  Bolshevik 
agitation  with  unreliable  formations  disbanded.  The  Semenovskii  were  similarly 
viewed  as  untrustworthy  and  open  to  counter-revolution. 
1  99  The  Petrovskii  Brigade 
had  played  a  decisive  role  in  the  February  Revolution,  but  did  not  back  the 
Bolsheviks,  supporting  the  convoking  of  the  Constituent  Assembly.  It  still  published 
the  SR  newspaper  Seriia  shinel'  (Grey  Overcoats),  caricaturing  the  Red  Guards  and 
attacking  Lenin  as  their  enemy. 
200  Tukhachevsky  apparently  met  Nikolai  Krylenko, 
who  spoke  at  a  regimental  meeting,  trying  to  turn  regimental  opinion  towards  the 
201 
Bolsheviks 
. 
However,  he  was  barracked  by  the  troops  and  approached  the 
Regimental  Committee,  upon  which  Tukhachevsky  sat,  advising  it  to  convince  their 
troops  to  change  their  minds.  Although  Krylenko  was  unsuccessful  at  this  meeting,  he 
was  the  first  speaker  to  impress  Tukhachevsky  with  his  manner  and  tone  in  front  of 
the  soldiers  and  at  this  point  Tukhachevsky  began  to  disagree  with  other  officers  on 
202 
political  grounds. 
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No  direct  proof  exists  of  this  occurrence  and  it  seems  inaccurate  to  suggest 
Tukhachevsky  had  definitely  decided  to  follow  the  Bolsheviks  at  this  point.  What  is 
certain  is  the  Semenovskii  Regiment  was  disbanded,  probably  in  November  1917. 
Tukhachevsky's  sisters  recall  he  returned  to  Vrazhskoe  in  December  and  stayed  for  a 
month,  carrying  out  physical  work  such  as  gathering  firewood  for  the  family,  before 
travelling  to  Moscow  in  January.  203 
The  reason  Tukhachevsky  travelled  to  the  capital  now  was  almost  certainly  the 
15th  (28th)  January  Sovnarkom  decree  announcing  the  formation  of  the  Workers  and 
Peasants  Red  Army  (RKK,  4).  This  decree  gave  Tukhachevsky  the  opportunity  to  once 
again  serve  in  the  Russian  Army,  a  regular  army  being  established  by  the  government 
to  replace  the  Red  Guard  militia.  Tukhachevsky  was  a  professionally-trained  soldier 
who  wished  to  fight  in  an  organised  professionally-based  regular  army.  If  the 
Bolsheviks  had  not  formed  such  a  force,  but  retained  the  militia  Red  Guard,  it  is 
doubtful  Tukhachevsky  would  have  joined  the  Red  forces.  The  opportunities  provided 
by  a  new  army  were  immense  and  Tukhachevsky  wished  to  be  part  of  it,  defending 
his  country  and  building  the  army  from  scratch. 
As  the  son  of  a  landed  noble,  Tukhachevsky  was  ineligible  to  join  the  Red  Army, 
but  he  decided  to  try  to  join  this  newly-emerging  force  anyhow. 
204  Therefore,  he 
travelled  to  Moscow  as  a  professional  soldier  attempting  to  find  his  place  in  the  new 
society,  seeking  employment  in  the  field  he  was  trained  in  -  the  military.  He  was  not 
driven  here  by  support  of  the  Bolsheviks  or  any  wish  to  join  them  in  a  civil  war,  but 
by  the  wish  to  move  on  with  his  life  after  his  recent  experiences  and  rejoin  the  army 
to  continue  the  fight  with  Germany.  Joining  the  Red  Army  to  defend  his  country  was 
the  reason  Tukhachevsky  travelled  to  Moscow,  as  so  many  other  former  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  Tsarist  Army  did  at  this  time. 
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Conclusion:  Who  was  Tukhachevsky  in  January  1918? 
By  January  1918,  Tukhachevsky  was  twenty-four  years  of  age,  had  completed  a 
professional  military  education  in  the  Tsarist  Army,  served  through  The  Great  War  in 
battle  and  imprisonment,  and  had  been  elected  Company  Commander  in  the 
"democratised"  Semenovskii  Life-Guards  Regiment  shortly  before  its  disbandment.  205 
Tukhachevsky  came  from  an  unusual  background.  His  father  was  of  noble  blood, 
his  mother  a  peasant  girl.  In  late  19th  Century  Russia,  this  placed  him  wholly  in 
neither  the  aristocracy  nor  the  peasantry.  His  father  could  most  accurately  be 
described  as  a  member  of  the  new  intelligentsia  emerging  during  the  1800s. 
Tukhachevsky  was  raised  to  appreciate  literature,  music,  the  arts,  and  to  recognise  the 
importance  of  history,  with  definite  ideas  of  what  Russia  represented.  Living  in  a 
household  constantly  hampered  by  impoverishment,  he  developed  a  disregard  for 
wealth  and  a  disdain  for  those  who  coveted  and  exploited  via  money.  His  father  was 
an  atheist  and  instilled  this  in  his  family,  with  Tukhachevsky  adopting  this  belief 
fully,  ridiculing  and  resenting  religion.  After  an  apparently  chequered  early  schooling 
in  Penza  where  he  displayed  the  above  tendencies  and  performed  poorly,  his 
academic  performance  changed  remarkably  in  Moscow.  Attending  credited  military 
educational  institutions  where  he  could  finally  concentrate  on  subject  matter  he  found 
stimulating,  Tukhachevsky  graduated  top  of  his  year  to  join  the  Semenovskii  Life- 
Guards  Regiment,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  his  great-grandfather  and  Suvorov  to 
fulfill  his  childhood  ambition. 
At  this  stage,  politics  and  revolutionary  ideals  did  not  play  a  part  in 
Tukhachevsky's  life,  but  his  experiences  in  The  Great  War  altered  this  dramatically. 
He  witnessed  the  sheer  ineptitude  and  incompetence  of  the  Russian  Army  High 
Command,  twinned  with  the  shambolic  supply  system  of  the  Tsarist  war  machine,  as 
compared  to  the  devotion  and  bravery  displayed  by  the  rank-and-file  soldier.  This 
convinced  Tukhachevsky  that  the  autocracy,  headed  by  a  weak  Tsar,  ruling  Russia 
through  monetary  corruption  and  manipulation  of  the  weak  Orthodox  Church, 
required  changing. 
205  "Democratisation"  was  the  Bolshevik  term  for  the  process  of  altering  the  Imperial  Army  to  a 
socialist  force. 53 
Hardened  by  this  combat  experience  and  two  and  a  half  years  imprisonment  in  the 
strictest  German  POW  camps,  Tukhachevsky  never  lost  faith  in  his  home  nation  or 
what  he  envisaged  Russia  to  be,  but  looked  to  alter  and  rebuild  the  weak  ruling  strata 
before  it  was  too  late.  In  this  way,  the  rise  of  Bolshevism  in  1917  with  its  militant 
Marxist  outlook  and  wish  to  drag  backwards  Russia  into  the  Twentieth  Century, 
appealed  to  him.  Prejudices  harboured  by  Tukhachevsky  against  religion,  semitism 
and  socialism  were  overcome  by  the  sheer  radicalism  he  saw  in  the  Bolshevik  Party, 
which  could  root  out  the  corruption  of  the  current  regime  and  lead  Russia  onwards 
more  effectively  than  the  weak  alternatives  of  liberalism  or  moderate  socialism. 
Despotism  was  the  natural  order  for  Russia  and  the  combination  of  Marxism  with 
Russian  Nationalism  could  provide  this  potent  force.  To  enforce  this,  however,  an 
army  was  required. 
The  Tsarist  Army  had  all  but  collapsed  when  Tukhachevsky  returned  to  Russia 
and  the  new  Bolshevik  Government  employed  a  militia  force  to  deal  with  internal 
opposition.  A  regular,  professional  army  no  longer  existed  and  the  polarisation  of 
Russian  society,  culminating  in  the  revolutionary  Bolshevik  takeover,  had  created  a 
chaotic,  anarchic  internal  situation,  leaving  Germany  the  opportunity  to  occupy  vast 
tracts  of  European  Russia  to  destroy  any  chance  of  Russian  recovery.  Tukhachevsky 
wished  to  rejoin  the  defence  of  Russia  against  the  foreign  aggressors.  Only  the 
decision  forced  upon  the  Bolsheviks  to  create  the  Red  Army  in  January  1918  provided 
the  opportunity  to  do  this. 
Alternatives  provided  by  anti-Bolshevik  forces  did  not  emerge  until  later  in  1918, 
but  these  emerged  in  regions  distant  from  Tukhachevsky  and  his  family,  making  the 
Red  Army  based  on  his  doorstep,  around  Moscow,  a  better  prospect.  The  family  home 
was  in  Vrazhskoe  and  with  his  father  dead,  Tukhachevsky  would  now  feel  responsible 
for  their  care.  These  were  times  of  hazardous  travel  for  a  man  alone,  far  less  with  his 
whole  family,  but  uprooting  the  family  from  Vrazhskoe  would  never  have  been  a 
realistic  option  and  probably  did  not  cross  his  mind.  He  did  not  want  to  leave  his 
family  alone  and  going  to  fight  for  the  anti-Red  forces  would  effectively  have  meant 
saying  goodbye  to  them  for  ever.  Besides,  these  forces  were  led  by  generals  who 
wished  to  restore  the  regime  which  Tukhachevsky  had  personally  witnessed  as 
already  failing  Russia.  The  emergence  of  a  regular  army  created  by  the  Bolshevik 
Goveminent,  the  regime  ruling  Russia  and  the  one  Tukhachevsky  felt  most  likely  to 54 
restore  the  nation  again,  was  a  golden  opportunity  he  grasped,  despite  being  officially 
ineligible  to  join  in  January  1918.  Therefore,  all  roads  led  to  Moscow  and  to  finding 
some  involvement  in  the  Bolshevik  Red  Army. 
In  the  next  chapter  I  shall  examine  how  Tukhachevsky  did  this  by  joining  the  Red 
Army  and  building  upon  his  Tsarist  military  education  and  Great  War  experience,  to 
become  a  Red  Army  Commander  by  summer  1918  and  launch  his  active  Civil  War 
career.  However,  he  also  joined  the  Communist  Party,  a  highly  unusual  step  for  a 
former  Tsarist  officer  at  this  early  stage.  This  perhaps  reflected  the  individual 
leadership  streak  evident  in  him  from  a  young  age  and  would  be  significant  for  the 
ambitions  he  began  to  display  in  this  new  stage  of  his  military  career.  The  changing 
nature  of  the  Bolshevik  state,  as  pre-revolutionary  ideals  were  reconsidered  in  the 
light  of  the  practical  reality  of  Russia  in  1918,  meant  that  Tukhachevsky  did  not  have 
to  wholly  adjust  his  beliefs  to  fight  for  the  regime,  as  it  developed  closer  to  the  ideals 
he  had  voiced  in  Ingolstadt  than  he  could  possibly  have  hoped. 55 
Chapter  11:  From  Tsarist  Lieutenant  to  Red  Army  Commander-Communist: 
January-August  1918 
Joining  the  Red  Army 
The  first  eight  months  of  1918  were  turbulent  for  the  young  Bolshevik  regime  in 
Russia.  By  March,  Lenin  had  withdrawn  Russia  from  The  Great  War,  but  peace  only 
lasted  until  May,  when  the  first  large-scale  fighting  in  the  Russian  Civil  War  began  in 
the  Volga  Region.  By  the  end  of  August,  a  Red  Eastern  Front  had  been  formed  and 
organised  into  five  Revolutionary  Armies,  the  first  of  which  was  commanded  by 
Tukhachevsky.  How  had  he  advanced  so  quickly  in  such  a  short  period?  He  left 
Vrazhskoe  in  late  January,  a  company  commander  of  a  disbanded  regiment,  but  by 
early  September,  was  Ist  Army  Commander,  leading  his  troops  against  anti-Soviet 
forces  in  Lenin's  hometown  of  Simbirsk.  Events  within  the  Soviet  Republic, 
especially  the  evolution  of  the  Red  Army,  developed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  propel 
Tukhachevsky  into  his  Red  Army  career.  His  previous  experience  combined  with 
work  he  carried  out  and  key  decisions  he  made  in  the  months  ahead,  and  a  sizeable 
element  of  luck,  to  set  him  on  his  way.  In  this  chapter,  I  shall  examine  how  he  joined 
the  Red  Army  and  the  Communist  Party  and  proved  his  worth  in  administrative  posts 
before  gaining  his  first  frontline  command.  Tukhachevsky  played  a  vital  role  in  the 
formation  of  the  Red  Army  in  1918  and  I  shall  closely  examine  the  origins  of  the 
Bolshevik  anned  force  to  highlight  Tukhachevsky's  importance  in  this  process. 
Tukhachevsky  recorded  his  experiences  on  the  Eastern  Front  in  an  essay  written  in 
192  1,  Pervaia  Armiia  v  1918  ("First  Army  in  1918").  Studying  Tukhachevsky's 
recollections  alongside  other  memoirs,  documents  and  archival  sources,  I  shall 
analyse  his  contribution  to  events  in  this  period. 
Conflicting  versions  exist  over  how  Tukhachevsky  joined  the  Red  Army.  Gul' 
provides  a  dramatic  account  of  Tukhachevsky  attending  the  Constituent  Assembly 
meeting  in  Petrograd  and  encountering  Nikolai  Kuliabko.  1  He  took  Tukhachevsky  to 
1  Kuliabko's  parents  were  old  family  friends  of  the  Tukhachevskys  and  had  been  active  in  the  1905 
Revolution.  Kuhabko  had  known  Tukhachevsky  since  1912,  N.  N.  Kuliabko,  "Ia  rekomendoval  ego  v 
partiiu",  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  druzel'i  soratnikov,  (Moscow,  1965),  pp.  26-27. 56 
the  Smolny  Institute, 
2  introducing  him  to  various  high-ranking  Bolsheviks  such  as 
Sverdlov  and  Antonov-Ovseenko,  the  latter  giving  Tukhachevsky  a  position  in  the 
3  Red  Army.  However,  this  is  almost  certainly  inaccurate.  Gul'  fails  to  record 
Tukhachevsky  returning  to  Vrazhskoe  after  the  Semenovskii's  disbandment  and  no 
other  source  mentions  him  attending  the  Constituent  Assembly  or  returning  to 
Petrograd.  Furthermore,  the  Constituent  Assembly  met  on  5th  January,  ten  days 
before  the  Red  Army  was  proclaimed,  making  it  impossible  for  Tukhachevsky  to  join 
it  on  that  day. 
Tukhachevsky's  sisters  also  write  of  him  meeting  Kuliabko,  but  in  MOSCOW.  4 
Kuliabko  was  working  with  the  Bolshevik  Government  and  transferred  with  it  from 
Petrograd  to  Moscow  on  II  th  March,  5  by  which  time  Tukhachevsky  was  already 
working  with  the  Red  Army,  in  the  Military  Department  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  (CEC)  of  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets.  Todorskii  and  Ivanov 
suggest  Tukhachevsky  found  temporary  accomodation  with  Kuliabko's  parents  in 
Moscow.  Kuliabko's  father  worked  for  the  Bolsheviks  and,  knowing  Tukhachevsky's 
military  background,  recommended  him  to  the  Military  Department.  6  However, 
although  Tukhachevsky  possibly  lived  with  the  Kuliabkos,  it  is  possible  he  joined  the 
Red  Army  via  another  source. 
Lidia  North  suggests  Tukhachevsky  met  his  old  Aleksandrovskii  Military 
Academy  friend,  Nikolai  Kuibyshev,  in  the  railway  station  in  Moscow.  Nikolai  is 
described  as  aa  career  soldier  with  no  special  interest  in  politics,  7  very  similar  to 
Tukhachevsky.  However,  Nikolai  was  on  his  way  to  enlist  in  the  Red  Army, 
encouraged  by  his  older  brother  Valerian  Vladimirovich,  a  former  military  doctor 
turned  Bolshevik,  who  headed  the  Red  Army  Political  Department  at  this  time. 
Nikolai  introduced  Tukhachevsky  to  Valerian,  who  acquired  him  the  military  position 
three  days  later.  8  Therefore,  a  significant  element  of  chance  was  involved  at  this  early 
stage. 
2  Smolny  was  the  seat  of  the  Petrograd  Soviet  from  February  1917  and  the  base  of  the  Bolshevik 
Government  until  it  transferred  to  Moscow  on  I  Ith  March  1918. 
3  R.  Gul',  Tukhachevsky:  krasnyi  marshal,  (Berlin,  1932),  pp.  60-61. 
'  1.  N.  Arvatova-Tukhachevskaia  &  0.  N.  Tukhachevskaia,  "On  liubul  zhizn"',  Marshal 
Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  druzei  i  soratnikov,  (Moscow,  1965),  p.  15. 
5  N.  N.  Kuliabko,  P.  28. 
6  A.  1.  Todorskii,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky,  (Moscow,  1963),  p.  25;  V.  M.  Ivanov,  Marshal  M,  N. 
Tukhachevsky,  2nd  Edition,  (Moscow,  1990),  pp.  15-16. 
7  L.  North,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky,  (Paris,  1978),  p.  3  1. 
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The  Military  Department  had  existed  since  early  November  1917,  providing  the 
link  in  military  matters  between  the  CEC  and  the  Bolshevik  Party  Central  Committee 
(CC),  9  and  specifically  at  this  time,  the  creation  and  construction  of  the  Red  Army. 
Joining  this  body  was  an  important  step  for  Tukhachevsky,  involving  him  in  the 
military  process  at  a  crucial  point.  Brest-Litovsk  had  just  been  signed  and  the 
breathing-space  of  the  next  three  months  would  enable  the  Bolsheviks  to  appraise  the 
situation  within  Russia  and  begin  the  formation  of  an  army.  This  intense  activity  and 
military  build-up  had  been  preceded  by  several  months  of  fierce  activity  and  debate, 
especially  within  Bolshevik  ranks,  and  by  simultaneously  dismantling  the  old  Tsarist 
army,  whilst  attempting  to  build  a  new  army. 
A  glance  through  the  first  few  months  of  military  formation  after  October 
introduces  many  important  Bolshevik  figures  and  illustrates  various  strands  of 
opinion  within  the  Party.  Visible  from  the  outset  are  people  important  for 
Tukhachevsky's  short  and  long-term  prospects. 
Assessing  how  the  Red  Army  became  the  force  by  which  the  Bolsheviks  won  the 
Civil  War,  understanding  the  complex  process  this  encompassed  and  the  varied 
characters  and  cliques  which  emerged  at  this  initial  stage,  is  important  for  placing 
Tukhachevsky  in  the  picture.  How  he  compared  to  those  involved  in  military 
construction,  how  it  evolved  before  and  after  he  appeared,  and  how  he  fitted  in,  are 
crucial  in  determining  his  early  contribution  to  the  development  of  the  Red  Army. 
Early  Developments  in  Red  Armed  Forces 
The  necessity  of  defending  the  gains  of  25th  October  was  pressed  home  only  a 
day  later  when  a  force  of  1,000  cossacks  under  Kerensky  and  Krasnov  had  to  be 
repelled  at  Pulkovo  Heights  north  of  Petrograd.  10  On  29th  October,  a  rising  led  by 
Colonel  G.  P.  Polkovnikov  and  the  "Committee  for  the  Salvation  of  the  Fatherland" 
was  repressed,  with  200  killed  in  these  actions.  This  was  accomplished  by  10,000  Red 
Guards  under  A.  P.  Antonov-Ovseenko,  a  professionally-trained  soldier  who  now 
chaired  the  Petrograd  Military  Revolutionary  Committee  (MRCIRevvoensovet, 
9  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  Krasnyi  Marshal,  (Moscow,  1990),  p.  62. 
10  Aleksandr  Fedorovich  Kerensky  (1881-1970)  was  leader  of  the  Russian  Provisional  Government; 
Petr  Nikolavich  Krasnov  (1869-1947)  was  a  Tsarist  Lieutenant  General. 58 
R  VS).  11  He  proceeded  to  lead  forces  comprising  Red  Guards,  revolutionary  soldiers, 
sailors,  armed  workers  and  partisans  along  Russia's  railway  lines  into  the  Northern 
Caucasus,  Southern  Urals  and  Ukraine,  defeating  the  Cossacks  of  Dutov  and  Kaledin 
and  the  Ukrainian  National  Government  in  Kiev. 
By  February  1918,  Lenin  declared  the  Civil  War  won  and  that  no  imminent 
internal  threat  to  Bolshevik  consolidation  existed.  Antonov-Ovseenko  had  won  the 
Railway  War  (Eshelonnaia  Voina)  with  relatively  few  forces,  which,  out  of  necessity, 
had  been  very  quickly  thrown  together,  created  by  local  Party  organisations,  Soviets 
and  RVS-y,  acting  under  general  instructions  from  the  "All-Russian  Bureau  of  Front 
and  Rear  Military  Organisations  under  the  Central  Committee"  (Voenka).  12  This  had 
been  created  in  summer  1917  to  agitate  amongst  the  Tsarist  soldiers  and  sailors  and 
begin  forming  Red  Guard  detachments,  with  Bolshevik  figures  such  as  Lenin, 
Sverdlov,  Dzierzyn'ski  and  Bubnov  involved.  13 
These  were  voluntary  militia  forces,  with  elected  commanders,  who  had  little 
experience  of  conducting  modem  large-scale  warfare  and  no  knowledge  of  military 
theory.  Centralised  administrative  and  command  apparatuses  did  not  exist.  Although 
these  detachments  successfully  defeated  internal  insurgents,  external  factors 
developed  to  necessitate  a  larger,  centrally  organised  military  force  to  defend  the 
Soviet  Republic. 
On  26th  October  1917,  the  2nd  Congress  of  Soviets  had  proposed  an  armistice  of 
three  months  for  the  negotiation  of  a  general  peace  between  all  belligerent  nations,  to 
end  the  Great  War.  14  No  response  from  Russia's  former  Anglo-French  Allies 
prompted  Soviet  moves  for  a  separate  armistice  with  the  Central  Powers,  which  was 
signed  on  2nd  December  at  Brest-Litovsk.  15  Allied  reaction  was  to  begin  plans  for 
intervention  into  Russia  to  reopen  the  Great  War  Eastern  Front,  16  but  the  more 
immediate  threat  was  still  posed  by  the  1.5  million  strong  Austro-German  Army  along 
11  Vladimir  Aleksandrovich  Antonov-Ovseenko  (1883-1939)  became  a  Bolshevik  Party  member  in 
1903. 
12  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  Na  zashchite  Oktiabria:  Organizatsiia  regularnoi  armii  i  militsionnoe  stroitel'stvo  v 
Sovetskom  respublike,  1917-1920.  (Moscow,  1965),  p.  45. 
13  S.  V.  Lipitskii,  Voennaia  deiatel'nost'TsK  RKP(b),  (Moscow:  1973),  p.  87;  Feliks  Edmundovich 
Dzierzy-fiski  (1877-1926)  became  head  of  the  Cheka  in  December  1917;  Andrei  Sergeevich  Bubnov 
(1884-1940);  lakob  Mikhailovich  Sverdlov  (1885-1919). 
14  J.  Bunyan  and  H.  H.  Fisher,  The  Bolshevik  Revolution:  1917-1918.  Documents  and  Materials, 
(California,  1934)  pp.  124-128. 
15  lbid,  p.  273. 59 
Russia's  European  border.  The  potential  threat  posed  by  the  Central  Powers, 
especially  with  armistice  negotiations  stalling,  had  already  supplied  the  stimulus  for 
the  Bolsheviks  to  begin  the  process  of  creating  a  regular  "standing  army".  Practical 
realities  outweighed  revolutionary  principles,  although  few  theoretical  guidelines 
existed  in  Marxism  for  military  construction.  However,  the  ideal  of  a  "people's 
militia"  was  never  abandoned  and  militia  construction  was  to  continue  side-by-side 
with  the  creation  of  regular  army  formations.  The  contradictions  between  theoretical 
want  and  practical  necessity  set  the  scene  for  great  debate  in  late  1917/early  1918. 
The  Peoples  Commissariat  of  Military  and  Naval  Affairs  (Narkomvoen)  was 
formed  at  the  2nd  Congress  of  Soviets,  comprising  Antonov-Ovseenko,  A.  1. 
Dybenko  (Head  of  Naval  Affairs),  Krylenko  (Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed 
Forces)  and  Podvoiskii  as  members,  and  Mekhonoshin,  Lazimir,  Eremeev,  Vasiliev 
and  Sklianskii  as  candidates.  '  7  Meeting  from  3rd-5th  (16th-18th)  November, 
Narkomvoen  discussed  what  to  do  with  the  Tsarist  War  Ministry  and  Tsarist  Army. 
Commissars  were  placed  at  the  head  of  War  Ministry  departments  and  had  to  sign  all 
documents  for  them  to  be  legal.  Counter-revolutionary  activities  by  former  War 
Ministry  members,  Generals  A.  A.  Manikovskii  and  V.  V.  Manushevskii,  led  to  a 
Sovnarkom  decree  of  6th  (19th)  November  for  their  arrest,  and  the  formation  of  the 
"Collegiate  of  Narkomvoen"  of  B.  V.  Legran,  Mekhonoshin,  and  Sklianskii,  led  by 
Podvoiskii,  which  took  over  War  Ministry  duties  on  I  Ith  (24th)  November.  18 
Meanwhile,  on  8th  November  Krylenko  announced  "democratisation"  of  the  old 
army.  19  This  envisaged  abolition  and  replacement  of  rank  by  elected  commanders, 
with  full  citizens'  rights  and  education  for  soldiers,  confirming  Bolshevik  promises 
made  throughout  1917  in  their  efforts  to  undennine  the  Tsarist  Army.  The 
"democratisation"  policy  aimed  to  replace  anti-Bolshevik  officers  and  generals  with 
approved,  elected  men  and  use  those  components  of  the  old  army  trustworthy  enough 
to  form  the  core  of  the  new  army.  Bolshevik  fears  over  the  numbers  of  anti-Bolshevik 
16  However,  recent  evidence  suggests  the  Allies  hedged  their  bets  by  supplying  advisers  for  Antonov- 
Ovseenko,  whilst  preparing  separate  interventionary  plans  against  the  Reds. 
17S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  60. 
18  V.  1.  Lenin,  Voennaia  perepiska  1917-1922,  (Moscow,  1987),  (hereafter  L-  Vp),  p.  23;  S.  M. 
Kliatskin,  pp.  63-64. 
19  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  63. 60 
voenspetsy  still  active  in  the  army  were  in  fact  exaggerated,  as  only  3%  of  the  officer 
corps  were  actively  prepared  to  oppose  the  October  Revolution  in  late  1917.20 
To  achieve  democratisation,  Sovnarkom  began  demobilising  the  Tsarist  Army  on 
1  Oth  November.  As  mentioned  in  chapter  1,  the  Semenovskii  Life-Guards  Regiment 
was  deemed  unreliable  and  disbanded  during  this  democratisation  process.  Lenin 
already  envisaged  the  use  of  Voenspetsy  (Military  Specialists)  to  work  out  the 
"military-technical  supply  of  a  revolutionary  army",  21  with  Stavka  recruited  for  this. 
On  30th  November,  the  RVS  at  Stavka  provided  a  "Project  of  the  Position  about 
Democratisation  of  the  Army",  which  was  telegraphed  to  all  soldiers'  committees.  22 
These  by  now  ran  army  formations  at  all  levels,  but  needed  guidance  from  Moscow 
on  demobilisation.  23 
The  idea  of  using  a  core  of  the  old  army  to  form  the  new  one,  favoured  by  the  old 
General  Staff,  was  but  one  strand  of  opinion  at  this  time.  The  General  Staff  of  the  Red 
Guard  proposed  expanding  their  force,  whilst  M.  S.  Kedrov,  who  was  appointed  to 
Sovnarkom  on  23rd  November  and  was  in  the  Collegiate  of  Narkomvoen  as  Head  of 
the  Army  Demobilisation  Department,  proposed  a  "People's  Guard"  composed  purely 
of  workers,  not  using  the  old  army  at  all  . 
24  Discussions  were  held  at  the  "All-Army 
Conference  on  Demobilisation"  on  17th  (30th)  December  at  which  Lenin  produced  a 
questionnaire  for  delegates  to  complete. 
Krylenko  had  reported  to  Sovnarkom  on  16 
th  (29th  )  December,  "About 
Transitional  Forms  of  Construction  of  the  Army  in  the  Period  of  Demobilisation",  but 
no  decision  on  the  matter  was  reached.  However,  with  the  aid  of  the  questionnaires, 
Sovnarkom  instructed  Narkomvoen  to  commission  Stavka  to  produce  a  plan  for 
reorganising  the  army  and  reinforcing  the  fronts.  The  need  to  maintain  military  action 
against  Germany  with  a  new  voluntary  an-ny  was  particularly  stressed.  In  this  way,  on 
21st  December  (3rd  January),  Stavka  produced  a  plan  for  retaining  100  infantry 
20  A.  G.  Kavtaradze,  Voennie  spetsialisty  na  sluzhbe  Respubliki  Sovetov,  1917-1920  gg.,  (Moscow: 
1988),  p.  50.  -  The  heavy  losses  suffered  by  the  Tsarist  Army  early  on  in  the  Great  War  resulted  in 
"democratisation"  of  the  officer  corps  already  taking  place  as  more  and  more  lower  ranking  officers 
and  NCOs  were  drafted  to  replace  the  casualties,  thus  changing  the  social  composition  of  the  officer 
corps  and  removing  a  buttress  of  the  autocratic  regime. 
2  'J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Army",  R.  Pipes  ed.  Revolutionary  Russia,  (Harvard,  Oxford, 
1968),  p.  295-,  Voenspets 
,v 
was  the  title  bestowed  by  the  Bolsheviks  on  former  officers  and  generals  of 
the  Tsarist  Army  as  the  word  "specialist"  was  deemed  not  to  have  the  same  autocratic  overtones  as  the 
military  terms  and  therefore  to  be  more  acceptable  to  the  common  soldier  to  gain  trust  and  obeyance. 
22  J.  Bunyan  &  Fisher,  H.  H.,  pp.  232-275  on  Bolshevik  takeover  of  Stavka. 
23  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  67. 61 
divisions  on  Russia's  borders  for  the  War's  duration,  whilst  raising  a  new  army  of 
360,000  men,  36  divisions,  in  the  Moscow  Region,  using  soldiers  from  units 
25 
withdrawn  from  front  areas  and  volunteers  . 
This  was  the  embodiment  of  the  Bolshevik  wish  to  use  the  old  army  as  a 
temporary  stopgap  measure  and  also  to  aid  in  the  creation  of  a  new  militia  volunteer 
force.  However,  this  ideal  remained  just  that.  Reports  from  the  Rumanian  Front  noted 
the  an-ny  had  all  but  dissolved,  with  desertion  reaching  new  heights.  26  The  General 
Staff  plan  was  impossible  with  a  new  army  required  to  defend  the  European  borders 
immediately. 
A  meeting  in  Petrograd,  chaired  by  Podvoiskii,  discussed  this  and  a  staff  was 
formed  containing  members  of  Voenka  and  the  Red  Guard  General  Staff,  including 
Nikonov,  Trifonov  and  lurenev  (the  latter  given  the  task  of  formulating  how  to  create 
27 
the  new  army)  . 
This  group  met  on  26th  December  (8th  January)  with  Podvoiskii  and 
V.  1.  Nevskii  elected  the  heads  of  Voenka.  Plans  were  outlined  to  raise  a  new  army  of 
300,000  men  within  one  and  a  half  months,  comprising  politically  conscious 
volunteers  at  the  core.  28  Party  cells  were  to  be  an  integral  part  of  the  an-ny, 
maintaining  Party  control  and  ensuring  loyalty.  29 
Sovnarkom  allocated  10  million  roubles  on  23rd  December  (5th  January)  for 
raising  volunteer  detachments  and  Krylenko  assigned  Bonch-Bruevich  and  Stavka  to 
formulate  orders  for  troops  joining  the  new  army  at  the  front.  On  28th  December 
(10th  January),  Stavka  produced  a  "General  Report  on  Forming  the  Army  by 
Voluntary  Origins"  and  "Approximate  Instructions  on  the  Formation  of  Revolutionary 
Battalions  of  the  Peoples-Socialist  Guard  in  Raion  Divisional  Reserves  and  in  Units, 
Situated  in  Pre-Front  Areas",  the  latter  becoming  the  basis  for  the  later  Sovnarkom 
decree  on  the  formation  of  the  Red  Army. 
Under  this  system,  Corps  Soldiers  Committees  should  select  elements  of  their 
corps  suitable  for  the  new  army,  enlist  volunteers  from  these  and  reorganise  them  into 
battalions  and  regiments.  Unsuitable  elements  would  go  into  "regular"  formations, 
24 
J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Army",  p.  295;  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  75. 
25  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  pp.  75-79. 
26  J.  Bunyan  &  Fisher,  H.  H.,  pp.  567-568  on  situation  at  front. 
27  Valentii  Andreevich  Trifonov  (1888-1938),  a  Bolshevik  since  1904;  Konstantin  Konstantinovich 
lurenev  (1888-1938),  a  Bolshevik  since  1905. 
28 
Vladimir  Ivanovich  Nevskii  (1876-1937). 
29  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  pp.  81-82. 62 
continuing  guard  duties  until  new  units  were  prepared,  at  which  point  the  "regulars" 
would  be  demobilised.  30 
The  plans  for  the  new  army  were  discussed  at  the  All-Army  Conference  and 
pushed  through  by  Podvoiskii  by  153  votes  to  40  with  13  abstentions,  to  proceed  with 
army  formation  immediately.  These  plans  were  laid  out  by  Stavka,  Voenka  and  the 
Petrograd  Red  Guards  General  Staff,  after  discussing  the  two  aforementioned  Stavka 
reports,  and  instructions  were  telegraphed  by  Krylenko  on  17th  (30th)  December  to 
all  troops.  The  Conference  formed  an  Agitational  Collegiate  to  raise  volunteers,  but 
by  2nd  (15th)  January,  the  Red  Army  on  the  Northern  Front  numbered  only  7,500, 
with  similar  levels  elsewhere.  Krylenko's  plan  of  raising  and  basing  the  new  force  at 
the  fronts  from  volunteers  of  the  old  army  was  replaced  by  Podvoiskii's  scheme  to 
organise  it  in  the  rear,  drawing  recruits  from  the  poor  and  unemployed  proletariat  and 
peasantry.  Reports  of  more  desertions  and  chaos  at  the  fronts  supported  this.  The  first 
appeal  for  volunteers  appeared  in  newspapers  on  29th  December  (I  Ith  January)  and 
the  name  Raboche-Krest'ianskaia  Krasnaia  Armiia  (RKK,  4,  Workers'-Peasants'  Red 
Army)  was  first  mentioned  in  Lenin's  3rd  (16th)  January  1918  report  to  the  CEC 
which  became  the  "Declaration  of  Rights  of  Workers  and  Exploited  Peoples".  Twelve 
days  later,  15th  (28th)  January,  the  RKKA  was  announced  as  a  regular  volunteer 
army  .31 
This  decree  provided  the  opportunity  for  Tukhachevsky  to  again  defend  his 
country  against  Germany. 
In  January  1918,  the  Agitational  Collegiate  created  the  "Provisional  Bureau  for 
the  Creation  of  the  Red  Army",  made  up  of  Grigoriev,  Litke,  Iorgensberger,  Mikosho 
and  Nikonov.  32  This  existed  from  8th  (2  1  st)-  I  8th  (3  1  st)  January  and  worked  with 
Narkomvoen  and  the  delegates  from  the  front,  at  the  3rd  Congress  of  Soviets,  to 
produce  a  report  on  forming  the  "All-Russian  Collegiate  for  the  Organisation  and 
Administration  of  the  Workers'-Peasants'  Red  Army",  which  was  accepted  by 
Podvoiskii  on  18th  (31st)  January.  The  All-Russian  Collegiate  was  created  by 
Sovnarkom  on  21  st  January  (3rd  February),  but  only  one  of  the  eight  departments  the 
Provisional  Bureau  had  proposed  for  it  -  the  Organisation-Agitation  Department  -  had 
been  created.  Therefore,  a  commission  including  Grigoriev,  lorgensberger,  Litke  and 
30  Ibid.  pp.  82-87. 
31  Ibid.  pp.  88-98. 
32  Grigorn  Timofeevich  Grigoriev  (1894-1966). 63 
Mikosho  of  the  Provisional  Bureau,  with  Andreev  and  Sheshukov,  was  formed  to 
work  out  the  functions  and  tasks  of  the  remaining  departments.  33 
The  Provisional  Bureau  had  also  proposed  an  Operational  Department  for  the  All- 
Russian  Collegiate  (Operod),  setting  various  matters  for  it  to  resolve,  and  the 
formation  of  a  "Provisional  Staff'  for  the  Red  Army.  A  five-man  leadership  of 
Krylenko,  Podvoiskii,  Mekhonoshin,  Trifonov  and  lurenev  was  appointed  for  the  All- 
Russian  Collegiate  with  the  Heads  of  Departments  becoming  Grigoriev,  Litke, 
Mikosho,  Nikonov  and  Sheshukov. 
The  voluntary  nature  of  the  new  army  was  underlined  by  the  omission  of  a 
Mobilisation  Department  from  the  final  organisation.  Instead  of  this,  the  All-Russian 
Collegiate  attempted  to  coordinate  the  work  of  local  Soviet  Military  Departments 
which  had  appeared  throughout  the  country  from  17th  (30th)  January.  (These  were 
coordinated  by  the  Military  Department  of  the  CEC  in  which  Tukhachevsky  would 
work).  Narkomvoen  aided  this  instance  of  the  localities  leading  the  Centre  by 
dismantling  the  old  Tsarist  military  apparatus  gradually  (on  the  same  lines  as  the 
demobilisation  of  the  army),  using  any  reliable  supply  networks  which  already 
existed,  whilst  dispensing  with  the  rest  and  handing  responsibility  for  these  to  the 
Military  Departments  of  the  Soviets  on  22nd  January  (5th  February).  On  31  st  January 
(12th  February),  "Instructions  for  Leaders  of  Soviets  and  Committees  in  Localities  for 
the  Creation  and  Administration  of  the  Red  Army",  prepared  by  the  All-Russian 
Collegiate,  were  sent  out  by  Narkomvoen.  34 
This  was  the  fragmentary  structure  through  which  the  Red  Army  was  intended  to 
evolve.  However,  even  as  Tukhachevsky  travelled  to  Moscow  to  rejoin  the  fight  with 
Germany,  events  with  his  recent  hosts  escalated  to  further  accelerate  Red  Army 
development.  Negotiations  between  the  Soviets  and  the  Central  Powers  at  Brest- 
litovsk  had  been  stuttering  forward  since  9th  (22nd)  December.  On  29th  January  (I  Oth 
February)  1918,  Trotsky  informed  the  astounded  German  delegation  that  the  new 
Bolshevik  Republic  believed  a  state  of  "no  war,  no  peace"  existed.  This  invited  a 
telegram  from  General  Hoffman  on  16th  February  (New  Style)  declaring  the  armistice 
33  Ivan  I  l'ich  Andreev  (1896-1920). 
34  S.  A  Kliatskin,  pp.  93-112;  J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Anny",  pp.  300-308. 64 
at  an  end  from  12.00pm  on  18th  February  and  an  invasion  of  Soviet  territory  at  that 
hour.  35 
Brest  is  a  perfect  example  of  the  deep  divisions  within  Bolshevik  ranks  in  all 
policy  areas  in  early  1918.  Splits  over  Brest  encompassed  military,  political,  social 
and  economic  elements  and  displayed  the  essence  of  the  Bolshevik  position  at  this 
time  -  attempts  to  secure  their  state  to  enable  Marxist  development  were  being  pushed 
further  and  further  from  their  ideals  by  circumstance,  as  internal  opposition  emerged 
alongside  the  German  juggernaut,  threatening  to  smother  the  Republic  in  its  infancy. 
Left  Communists,  with  the  young  Nikolai  Bukharin  prominent,  wanted  a 
"revolutionary  war"  against  the  Imperialist  Central  Powers,  carrying  the  October 
Revolution  into  Europe  by  force.  This  was  entirely  unrealistic  with  the  armed  forces 
in  such  disarray,  but  the  idea  of  "exporting  revolution  on  the  points  of  bayonets"  did 
not  go  away  and  would  be  picked  up  by  Tukhachevsky  in  1920  against  Poland. 
Trotsky's  "No  peace,  No  war"  was  just  as  unrealistic  in  terms  of  imperial  power 
politics  and  showed  the  absolute  idealism  the  Bolsheviks  hoped  to  impose  on  the 
world.  Lenin  again  had  to  grasp  reality  and,  after  initially  acquiescing  to  Trotsky's 
judgement,  forced  the  Bolsheviks  to  agree  to  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  on  3rd 
March,  accepting  much  harsher  terms  than  previously  offered,  with  German  troops 
now  close  to  Petrograd  and  threatening  Moscow.  36  This  secured  the  breathing-space 
necessary  for  building  the  Red  Army,  but  undermined  the  governmental  coalition  the 
Bolsheviks  had  enjoyed  with  the  Left  SRs,  which  worsened  to  a  complete  breakdown 
by  July  1918  when  the  Left  SRs  revolted  in  Moscow,  assassinating  the  German 
Ambassador  Mirbach.  This  would  play  an  important  part  in  Tukhachevsky's  career. 
However,  in  early  March,  events  leading  to  Brest-Litovsk  forced  a  further 
reevaluation  of  Red  Army  construction.  The  poor  quality  and  numbers  of 
disorganised  detachments  formed  via  voluntary  recruitment  led  to  the  creation  of  the 
Supreme  Military  Soviet  (Vysshii  Voennyi  Sovet/VES)  under  Trotsky's  chairmanship 
on  I  st  March.  37  This  contained  voenspetsy  from  the  Tsarist  General  Staff  to  direct  and 
command  the  new  Red  Army  and  the  Central  Committee  decision  on  21st  March  to 
Use  voenspetsjý  at  all  levels  legalised  Tukhachevsky's  participation  in  the  Red  Army. 
35  j.  Bunyan  and  Fisher,  H.  H.,  pp.  476-540,  for  documents  on  the  Brest-Litovsk  negotiations. 
36  The  severe  splits  in  opinion  are  clearly  shown  by  the  CEC  vote  to  accept  the  Brest-Litovsk  Treaty  - 
116  for,  85  against,  26  abstentions  -a  majority  of  only  5. 
37  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia  interventsiia  i,  SSSR:  Entsiklopediia,  (Moscow,  1983),  pp.  137-138. 65 
With  the  German  invasion,  detachments  of  troops  like  Tukhachevsky,  who  wished 
to  defend  their  nation,  had  appeared  spontaneously  all  over  Soviet-held  Russia. 
However,  before  a  Military  Department  could  be  created  on  any  level,  Soviet  power 
had  to  be  secure  there,  with  a  Soviet  in  existence  and  enough  trained  staff  available 
locally  to  run  the  Military  Department.  By  the  end  of  March,  27  of  the  33  provinces 
of  European  Soviet-held  Russia  had  Military  Departments,  but  only  70  of  the  314 
38  uezdy.  Lack  of  these  necessary  preconditions  prevented  improvement,  with  German 
occupation,  following  Brest  and  White  risings  in  the  South,  reducing  even  these 
figures.  The  disaster  of  the  German  invasion  illustrated  clearly  the  need  to  move  from 
partizanshchina  to  regular  formations.  39  Established  and  new  Red  Guard  detachments 
and  the  sole  part  of  the  Tsarist  Army  which  readily  sided  with  the  Bolsheviks,  the 
Latvian  Rifle  Regiments,  provided  the  core  for  these  new  formations. 
The  decision  to  employ  voenspetsy  widely  on  all  levels  of  the  military  apparatus, 
which  Lenin  himself  forced  through  after  much  bitter  debate  on  25th  March,  provided 
the  necessary  expertise  to  pull  together  these  dispersed  detachments  and  provide  the 
discipline  and  leadership  for  them.  Many  of  the  former  Imperial  General  Staff  had 
already  thrown  their  lot  in  with  the  Bolsheviks,  wishing  to  organise  the  army  to  fight 
against  Germany.  Bonch-Bruevich,  Vasilevskii,  Eremeev  and  Lashevich  had  been 
appointed  members  of  the  "Extraordinary  Petrograd  Military  District  Staff'  along 
with  Mekhonoshin  and  lurenev,  40  by  the  Petrograd  Military  Affairs  Commissariat. 
This  had  been  formed  in  answer  to  the  German  invasion,  alongside  the  15-man 
"Committee  for  the  Revolutionary  Defence  of  Petrograd",  chaired  by  Sverdlov,  with 
Gusev  as  Secretary  and  five  of  the  "Extraordinary  Staff'  also  members  .41 
This 
Petrograd  Defence  Staff  developed  into  the  VVS  under  Trotsky  and  from  early  March 
42  began  to  organise  defences  against  German  encroachments  . 
The  transfer  of 
Podvoiskii,  a  militia  advocate,  to  Vsevobuch,  to  begin  construction  of  militia  reserve 
forces  accompanied  the  resignation  of  Supreme  Commander  Krylenko,  a  staunch 
38  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  109. 
39  Partizanshchina  was  the  Soviet  term  used  to  describe  unregulated  militia  or  partisan  formations. 
40  Mikhail  Dimitrievich  Bonch-Bruevich  (1870-1956),  a  Tsarist  Lieutenant-General;  Aleksandr 
Mikhailovich  Vassilevskii  (1895-1977),  a  Tsarist  Staff-Captain;  Konstantin  Stepanovich  Eremeev 
(1874-193  1),  an  RSDLP  member  since  1896;  Mikhail  Mikhailovich  Lashevich  (1884-1928),  an 
RSDLP  member  since  1901  -,  Konstantin  Aleksandrovich Mekhonoshin  (18  89-193  8),  a  Bolshevik  since 
1913. 
"  Sergei  Ivanovich  Gusev  (1874-1933). 
42  J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Anny",  pp.  306-308;  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  pp.  125-140. 66 
advocate  of  voluntary,  workers-only  militia  forces.  The  latter's  replacement  by 
Trotsky,  who  also  became  People's  Commissar  for  War,  heading  Narkomvoen,  shows 
the  axial  shift  which  occurred  at  this  point.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky,  a  staunch 
advocate  of  a  regular,  central  ly-orgam  sed  army,  joined  the  CEC  Military  Department, 
the  hub  of  Red  Army  formation,  at  precisely  the  time  Trotsky  assumed  control  of  the 
process  at  the  Centre.  Practical  realities  had  moved  the  Bolshevik  regime  towards 
Tukhachevsky's  ideal  of  a  centrally-organised,  regular  army,  just  as  he  appeared. 
What  impact  would  he  have  on  the  construction  and  development  of  the  Red  Army? 
A  Communist  in  the  Military  Department  of  the  All-Russian  Central 
Executive  Committee 
The  4th  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  met  in  Moscow  from  14th-16th  March 
1918.  Nikolai  Kuliabko  was  elected  a  member  of  the  CEC  and  appointed  Military 
Commissar  of  the  Moscow  Defence  Staff,  making  him  a  good  friend  to  have.  43  Upon 
finding  Tukhachevsky  working  for  the  Military  Department,  leaming  of  his  military 
record  and  asking  his  opinions  on  the  state  of  Russia,  Kuliabko  recommended 
Tukhachevsky  join  the  Communist  Party.  Kuliabko  recalled  Tukhachevsky  was 
"deeply  anxious"  and  thought  it  over  "very  seriously"  before  agreeing.  Tukhachevsky 
had  joined  the  Red  Army  to  fight  Germany,  but  joining  the  Communist  Party  was 
another  matter.  This  was  the  step  by  which  he  chose  sides  for  the  forthcoming  Civil 
War.  Hitherto,  he  had  not  involved  himself  in  civil  unrest  and  had  paid  scant  regard  to 
politics.  Therefore,  joining  a  political  party  was  a  big  decision.  However,  he  decided 
to  do  so  and  on  the  oral  and  written  recommendation  of  Kuliabko,  Tukhachevsky 
joined  the  Khamovniki  District  Party  in  Moscow  on  4th  April  1918.44 
By  joining  the  Communist  Party,  Tukhachevsky  completed  his  credentials  for 
advancement  in  the  Red  Army.  This  was  a  regular  army,  but  a  politically-based  one. 
Tukhachevsky  had  professional  military  training  and  wartime  experience,  but  now 
also  had  a  "Party  Father"  in  Kuliabko  and  was  a  Party  member,  not  just  another 
voenspets.  This  was  a  rare  phenomenon  in  Russia  at  this  time.  Indeed  Smirnov 
43  Kuliabko  rose  to  become  Deputy  Chief-of-Staff  of  the  RKKA  during  the  Civil  War,  a  figure  of  some 
influence,  A.  1.  Todorskii,  p.  25,  note  2. 
44  N.  N.  Kuliabko,  p.  28. 67 
suggests  only  around  100  "Commander-Communists"  existed  and  believes  this 
explains  the  rapid  rise  Tukhachevsky  achieved  over  the  next  few  months.  45 
Tukhachevsky  would  have  realised  the  favourable  position  Party  membership 
combined  with  professional  military  training  and  experience  would  give  him,  when 
deciding  to  join  the  Party,  and  it  was  most  likely  this  consideration  which  led  to  his 
decision.  Political  loyalty  was  essential  in  the  new  climate  and  Party  membership 
guarded  him  against  his  noble  heritage,  but  now  he  had  to  prove  his  worth  to  advance 
further. 
Tukhachevsky  had  been  working  at  this  for  some  5-6  weeks  before  joining  the 
Party.  His  work  in  the  Military  Department  involved  him  at  the  very  heart  of  the 
military  construction  process.  He  could  study  the  evolution  of  the  Red  Army,  note 
limitations  and  possibilities  imposed  by  the  prevailing  situation  and  conclude  from 
this  how  army  development  could  best  proceed. 
Working  in  the  Military  Department,  Tukhachevsky  encountered  a  plethora  of 
advisers  from  whom  he  could  learn  and  understand  the  military  and  political 
processes  developing  around  him.  The  Military  Department  lay  at  the  hub  of  the 
simultaneous  demobilising  of  the  Tsarist  Army  and  the  formation  of  the  Red  Army.  It 
was  the  link  between  the  CEC,  the  Central  Committee,  Narkomvoen  and  local 
military  organs  (Soviet  Military  Departments  and  from  8th  April  the  Commissariats 
of  Military  Affairs  (voenkomaty)  at  okrug,  guberniia,  volost  and  uezd  level),  which 
were  forming  military  detachments  across  the  Republic.  46  This  generated  a  mountain 
of  work  for  Military  Department  employees.  Operating  since  early  November  1917 
under  Avel'  Safronovich  Enukidze,  47  between  Ist  November  and  Ist  March  1918,  it 
entertained  1,397  delegations  from  the  fronts.  These  brought  letters,  surveys  and 
requests  to  be  answered  by  Military  Department  staff.  Special  Front  and  Rationing 
Commissions  were  set  up,  receiving  around  400  delegates  a  month,  supplying  them 
with  political  and  military  literature  published  by  the  Military  Department  and 
answering  questions  on  subjects  such  as  peace,  land,  the  organisation  of  Soviet 
power,  national  self-determination  and  the  worsening  conflict  with  counter- 
45  G.  V.  Smirnov,  Krovaiyi  marshal,  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky,  1893-193  7,  (St.  Petersburg,  1997),  pp. 
244-245. 
46 
A.  1.  Todorskii,  pp.  29-30. 
47  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  p.  62;  Avel'  Safronovich  Enukidze  (1877-1937),  a  member  of 
the  RSDLP  since  1898. 68 
revolution.  48  Therefore,  by  the  time  Tukhachevsky  joined,  the  personnel  employed, 
although  probably  completely  embattled,  were  the  most  experienced  figures  in  Red 
Army  construction  -  experts  in  the  field.  This  was  the  perfect  place  for  Tukhachevsky 
to  rapidly  hone  his  military  knowledge,  following  the  fluctuations  of  current  political 
and  military  events,  to  become  an  expert  in  the  field  of  Red  Army  formation,  viewing 
and  learning  the  process  from  all  angles. 
Possessing  the  keen  mind  for  this,  Tukhachevsky  would  have  quickly  anticipated 
the  central  role  of  politics  in  creating  the  new  army  and  the  need  to  apply  Marxism,  as 
preached  by  Lenin,  to  military  problems.  Understanding  Marxism  and  its  symbiotic 
relationship  with  the  new  army  the  Communists  were  creating  was  vital  if 
Tukhachevsky  was  to  fulfill  his  duties  correctly.  He  had  the  military  acumen 
necessary,  but  knew  very  little  of  MarxiSM.  49  However,  this  problem  was  solved 
during  his  first  months  in  Moscow.  The  Moscow  and  District  Party  Committees  held 
courses  of  meetings,  lectures  and  discussion  groups  on  Marxist  Science  and  the 
theories  behind  socialist  construction,  which  Tukhachevsky  attended.  He  also  saw 
Lenin  speaking  in  the  capital  . 
50  This  supplemented  the  theoretical  and  practical 
knowledge  he  gained  working  within  the  Military  Department.  Besides  Enukidze, 
Tukhachevsky  encountered  almost  every  major  figure  in  the  military  construction 
process  outlined  above,  as  they  were  either  in  the  CEC  or  worked  through  or  with  the 
Military  Department.  He  met  such  figures  as  Podvoiskii,  Krylenko,  Dzierzyn'ski, 
Mekhonoshin,  Trifonov,  Dybenko,  Antonov-Ovseenko,  Eremeev,  Kedrov  and 
Sverdlov. 
Working  closely  with  such  prominent  Bolsheviks  who  had  spent  years  in  the 
revolutionary  underground,  suffering  exile  and  imprisonment  for  their  political 
beliefs,  could  only  benefit  Tukhachevsky  in  terms  of  learning  Marxist  theory  and 
practice.  Also,  exposure  to  such  people  during  his  earliest  weeks  in  the  Military 
Department  before  joining  the  Communist  Party  left  Tukhachevsky  with  no  illusions 
about  the  regime  the  Bolsheviks  wished  to  create  and  their  preparedness  to  fight  for  it. 
Tukhachevsky  joined  the  Party  with  his  eyes  wide  open,  knowing  exactly  what  it 
entailed.  The  Cheka  had  been  set  up  on  7th  (20th)  December  1917  and  Red  Guard 
detachments  had  been  requisitioning  grain  from  the  peasantry  for  the  towns  since  late 
lu.  1.  Korablev,  V.  L  Lenin  i  zashchita  zavoevanii  Velikogo  Oktiabria,  (Moscow,  1979),  p.  164. 
49R.  Gul',  p.  62. 69 
1917.51  Working  with  the  Military  Department,  Tukhachevsky  knew  this  and  the  need 
for  extreme  wartime  measures  if  the  Bolsheviks  were  to  survive.  Arriving  in  Moscow 
during  the  February  German  advance,  Tukhachevsky  would  have  appreciated  this  all 
the  more,  witnessing  at  first  hand  the  panicked  retreat  of  Red  forces,  which  illustrated 
starkly  the  need  for  an  organised  army  to  defend  against  external  aggression.  With 
German  occupation  augmented  by  rising  civil  unrest,  Tukhachevsky  joined  the 
Communist  Party  and  worked  at  the  hub  of  the  intense  military  build-up  in  the 
Military  Department,  knowing  precisely  what  was  occurring  and  the  measures 
employed  by  the  Reds  in  the  early  stages  of  the  Civil  War.  He  threw  his  whole  weight 
behind  this.  The  heady  combination  of  a  strong  Bolshevik  Russia,  opposing  Germany 
and  any  restoration  of  the  rotten  Tsarist  autocracy,  with  the  excitement  and 
possibilities  of  being  involved  at  the  very  origins  of  the  new  Red  Army,  proved  too 
much  for  Tukhachevsky  to  resist.  The  Marxism  underlining  it  all  was  simply 
something  to  be  learned  and  applied  to  his  work  towards  this  process.  It  provided  the 
alternative  to  weak  autocracy  and  a  centre  for  the  Russian  nation  to  rally  round. 
Tukhachevsky  became  a  master  of  applying  Marxism  to  military  theory  and 
practice,  using  this  to  great  effect  in  later  years.  He  learned  this  swiftly  after  joining 
the  Military  Department.  That  he  did  so  is  shown  by  reports  he  produced  for  the 
Military  Department  and  then  as  Military  Commissar  for  the  Moscow  District  of  the 
Western  Screens,  before  transfer  to  the  new  Eastern  Front.  To  understand  the 
significance  of  these  reports  and  appreciate  the  importance  of  the  Military 
Department,  it  is  useful  to  first  briefly  assess  the  process  of  Red  Army  formation  from 
March-May,  a  period  of  development  no  less  complex  or  tempestuous  than  the 
previous  three  months. 
Moves  Towards  Conscription  and  Red  Army  Re2ularisation 
This  period  began  with  the  creation  of  the  Supreme  Military  Soviet  (VVS)  and 
witnessed  Lenin  treading  the  line  between  pro-militia  leftists  in  the  Communist  Party 
and  the  VVS  voenspetsy  building  a  "standing  army"  to  face  Germany.  Lenin  himself 
still  envisaged  the  ideal  workers'  armed  force  as  a  territorially-based  militia,  but  this 
5  0  A.  1.  Todorskii,  pp.  25-26,  Todorskii  suggests  Tulchachevsky  saw  Lenin  "at  least  20  times". 
5'  J.  Bunyan  &  Fisher,  H.  H.,  pp.  297-298. 70 
could  only  be  built  up  gradually  and  needed  unchallenged  Soviet  control  of  Russia. 
This  was  not  the  case  in  the  first  half  of  1918  with  German  occupation  and  the 
emergence  of  anti-Bolshevik  movements  in  the  south. 
To  deal  with  the  latter,  the  VVS  formed  the  North  Caucasus  Front  in  early  May.  52 
The  German  threat  was  addressed  on  5th  March  with  the  creation  of  the  Northern  and 
Western  "Screens"  (zavesy)  and  the  Petrograd  and  Moscow  Zones  of  Defence.  53 
Collegial  command  of  one  voenspets  with  two  political  commissars  was  first 
experimented  with  here  and,  proving  effective,  lasted  throughout  the  Civil  War.  54 
This  illustrated  Bolshevik  mistrust  of  former  officers  and  the  perceived  need  for 
political  control  of  the  army  from  the  outset. 
Disparate  detachments  which  had  developed  within  different  sectors  were  drawn 
together  into  regular  formations,  with  seven  divisions  formed  by  April  in  the  two 
"screens",  four  in  the  Moscow  Defence  Zone,  one  in  Petrograd  and  four  in  other 
areas.  The  VVS  plan  had  been  for  88  divisions,  with  28  to  be  raised  in  the  western 
frontier  areas,  requiring  720,000  men  at  full  wartime  complement.  However,  with 
only  450,000  men  raised,  half-strength  companies  (36  men)  were  ordered.  55  This  was 
as  far  as  Red  Army  development  had  proceeded  by  the  time  of  the  Czechoslovak 
Uprising,  but  even  this  point  was  only  reached  through  great  ruptures  and  debates 
within  the  Party  and  Goverrunent. 
The  "screens"  were  intended  as  temporary  measures  to  enable  the  build-up  of  the 
main  body  of  the  army  in  the  rear.  To  facilitate  this,  the  administrative  apparatus  had 
to  be  streamlined  and  Sovnarkom  brought  the  separate  Peoples'  Commissariats  of 
Military  and  Naval  Affairs  within  the  VVS  on  19th  March,  uniting  voenspetsy  like 
Bonch-Bruevich,  Miasnikov  and  Aralov  with  Bolsheviks  like  Podvoiskii,  Sklianskii 
and  Mekhonoshin.  56  Whilst  removing  the  parallelism  of  these  agencies,  this  inevitably 
produced  antagonisms  within  the  enlarged  VVS. 
Alongside  the  VVS,  Sovnarkom  had  created  a  Special  Commission  for  planning 
militia  construction,  including  voenspetsy  such  as  former  Generals  A.  N.  Aledogskii 
52  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  190;  J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Army",  p.  312. 
53  Direkthy  Glavnogo  komandovaniia  Krasnoi  Armii  (1917-1920).  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (Moscow, 
1969),  (hereafter  DGkKA),  doc.  29,  pp.  30-3  1.  The  "screens"  were  a  defensive  system  whereby 
infantry  units  were  supported  by  artillery,  with  cavalry  used  for  reconnaissance  and  communications. 
54  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  pp.  153-155. 
55  J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Army",  p.  312. 
56  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  pp.  147-148. 71 
and  lu.  N.  Danilov  and  Rear-Admiral  V.  M.  Al'tfater. 
57  it  compiled  a  report  for  15th 
March  on  creating  an  army  based  on  socialist  militia  and  universal  arming  of  workers 
58 
and  peasants,  but,  as  this  Commission  worked,  the  VVS  proceeded  with  its  own 
plans. 
Initial  intentions  were  for  a  1.5  million  man  army  to  match  that  of  the  Central 
Powers,  organised  into  regular  divisions,  regiments  etc,  with  one-man  command 
replacing  elected  commanders  and  soldiers'  committees.  This  army  would  be  raised 
through  the  Tsarist  military  district  system  by  compulsory  mobilisation.  With  the 
abolition  of  elected  commanders,  59  accompanied  by  the  decree  on  the  deployment  of 
voenspetsy  within  the  Red  Army  on  21  st  March 
'60 
"leftist"  Bolsheviks  were  incensed 
and  intra-Party  disputes  ensued,  leading  to  heated  debates  on  25th  March  in  Lenin's 
study  in  the  Kremlin,  where  40-50  of  the  top  military  men  argued  for  several  hours 
over  how  the  process  of  Red  Army  construction  should  develop.  The  results  of  this 
meeting  were  discussed  by  Lenin  at  a  CC  plenum  on  31  st  March  and  on  7th  April  the 
CC  ratified  the  decisions  reached  here 
.61 
Lenin  and  the  Central  Committee  basically 
compromised  between  Party  ideals,  the  professional  expertise  of  the  voens  etsy  and  P 
practical  reality. 
The  compromise  solution  which  emerged  was  aI  million  man  army  led  by  R  VS-y 
through  collegial  command  of  one  voenspets  and  two  political  commissars.  Voluntary 
recruitment  would  be  maintained,  but  the  military  district  system  favoured  by  the 
voenspetsy  was  installed,  with  six  created  in  March  and  a  further  five  in  Asia  and  the 
Caucasus  on  4th  May.  62 
The  retention  of  voluntarism  was  to  prevent  industry,  ravaged  after  four  years  of 
war,  being  stripped  of  workers  by  conscription.  Also,  harvest  time  was  approaching 
and  Trotsky  declared  on  22nd  March,  "For  the  time  being  we  shall  confine  ourselves 
to  introducing  universal  compulsory  military  training  and  the  formation  of  volunteer 
57  Vasilii  Mikhailovich  Al'tafer  (1883-1919),  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Soviet  Fleet 
on  29/12/18,  J.  Meijer,  ed.,  The  Trotsky  Papers,  Vol.  1,  (The  Hague,  1964),  p.  80. 
58  S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  149. 
59  L.  D.  Trotsky,  How  The  Revolution  Armed:  The  Military  Writings  and  Speeches  ofLeon  Trotsky, 
Vol.  1,  (trans.  &  annotated  Brian  Pearce),  (London,  1979),  p.  137,  This  was  ratified  on  22/4/18  by  the 
CEC,  at  Trotsky's  instigation,  at  the  same  time  Vsevobuch  was  decreed. 
60S.  M.  Kliatskin,  p.  159. 
61  Ibid.  pp.  160-16  1;  J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Army",  p.  309. 
62  Trifonov  bitterly  opposed  this  and  proposed  the  Red  An-ny  be  raised  through  four  "proletarian 
centres"  in  the  South,  the  Urals,  Siberia  and  the  Volga,  J.  Erickson,  "The  Origins  of  the  Red  Army", 
pp.  309-3  10. 72 
fighting  units  which  will  serve  as  the  skeleton  of  the  new  army".  63  Demobilisation  of 
the  old  army  was  still  continuing  (it  was  completed  on  17th  April)  and  general  war- 
weariness  dictated  the  adverse  reaction  which  would  have  accompanied  another 
mobilisation,  was  best  avoided.  Besides,  apparatus  for  mobilisation  did  not  exist  and 
could  not  be  created  quickly. 
The  All-Russian  Bureau  of  Political  Commissars  was  founded  on  8th  April  under 
lurenev  to  recruit  the  vast  numbers  of  commissars  needed  for  collegial  command.  64 
This  organisation  took  over  the  Agitational-Educational  Section  of  the  All-Russian 
Collegiate,  giving  commissars  the  dual  role  of  watching  the  voenspetsy,  whilst 
educating  and  politically  inculcating  the  troops,  thus  cementing  the  Party  grip  on  the 
Red  Army  from  top  to  bottom. 
The  temporary  nature  of  this  army  was  underlined  by  the  22nd  April  decree  on 
Compulsory  Training  (Vsevobuch).  65  The  population  was  to  be  prepared  militarily  to 
defend  the  country  and  reserves  were  to  be  raised,  but  in  the  longer  term,  a  militia 
army  was  to  be  prepared  to  succeed  the  "standing  army"  currently  forming. 
Vsevobuch  would  come  under  Podvoiskii,  who  was  disillusioned  by  the  VVS  plan, 
but  he  was  first  appointed  Head  of  the  Supreme  Military  Inspectorate  (VVI),  founded 
on  24th  April  by  Narkomvoen.  66  This  body  sent  representatives  around  the  country, 
settling  disputes  or  confusion  which  arose  over  Party  or  Government  decrees  on 
military  construction,  but  this  temporarily  contributed  to  an  overlapping  of  agencies. 
The  VVI,  VVS  and  the  All-Russian  Collegiate  on  the  Organisation  and  Fon-ning  of 
the  Red  An-ny  were  all  at  this  time  involved  in  Red  Army  construction,  but  were 
entirely  uncoordinated,  preventing  effective  central  control  and  hindering  progress. 
Alongside  this,  Operod,  the  Operations  Section  of  Narkomvoen,  was  independently 
handling  internal  insurgency  matters.  Comprising  seasoned  revolutionaries,  not 
voenspetsy,  other  Party  bodies  preferred  to  deal  with  Operod.  This  unsatisfactory 
situation  was  addressed  on  8th  May  by  the  creation  of  the  All-Russian  Main  Staff 
(VserosgIavshtab),  which  assumed  organisational  matters,  leaving  the  Military- 
Economic  Soviet  to  handle  financial  or  quartermastering  activities  and  the  VVI  to 
ensure  military  development  ran  smoothly.  These  organisations  were  under 
63 
L.  D.  Trotsky,  How  the  Revolution  Armed.  Vol.  L  pp.  124-125. 
64  S.  M.  Khatskin,  p.  177. 
65L.  D.  Trotsky,  How  the  Revolution  Armed,  V'ol.  I,  pp.  126-130. 
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Narkomvoen  and  acted  in  their  own  fields,  thereby  removing  parallelism,  but 
complete  coordination  was  only  achieved  with  the  creation  of  the  Revvoensovet 
Respublika  (RVSR)  in  September  1918,  which  centralised  all  military  administrative 
and  command  structures. 
The  March-May  1918  period  witnessed  the  Red  Anny  developing  further  towards 
regulation  and  centralisation,  with  figures  like  Podvoiskii,  Krylenko  and  Trifonov 
either  falling  by  the  wayside  or  having  to  compromise  to  remain  active.  However, 
matters  still  did  not  proceed  as  smoothly  as  the  leadership  hoped  with  some  local 
soviets  standing  by  their  military  departments.  Lenin  and  Sverdlov  had  to  send  out  a 
threatening  circular  to  soviets  on  all  levels  with  instructions  to  fulfill  the  8th  April 
decree  to  create  military  commissariats  (voenkomaty),  as  only  14  of  the  33  provinces 
and  50  of  the  304  uezdy  in  Soviet  territory,  had  done  so  by  18th  May.  67 
This  was  not  just  down  to  intransigence,  but  also  because  of  the  shortage  of 
trained  staff  to  set  up  voenkomaty  and  the  lack  of  secure  Soviet  rule  in  many  areas. 
Vsevobuch  workers  began  setting  up  soviet  organs  in  areas  where  none  existed,  with 
soviets  and  voenkomaty  later  developing  around  these,  quickening  the  organisation  of 
soviet  and  army  organs  in  the  localities. 
The  complexities  involved  in  this  overlapping  of  agencies,  attempted 
centralisation  of  the  military  process  and  two  different  armies  being  created  at  the 
same  time  are  plain  to  see.  The  Military  Department  of  the  CEC  provided  the  crucial 
link  in  the  fragmentary  chain.  The  ever-growing  number  of  detachments  required 
constant  guidance  on  how  to  proceed  and  the  CC  and  CEC  required  information  on 
the  situation  around  the  Soviet  Republic.  This  task  was  still  performed  by  the  Military 
Department,  even  with  the  appearance  of  the  VVT  The  former  still  gathered 
information  from  the  constant  stream  of  delegations,  letters,  surveys  and  requests  it 
received  from  the  localities,  but  was  now  also  sending  representatives  to  all  areas  of 
Soviet-held  territory  to  assess  the  situation,  report  back  on  this  and  advise 
detachments  and  local  organs  how  to  fulfill  Moscow  guidelines.  These  reports  were 
carried  out  by  Inspectors  of  Red  Army  Formations,  the  post  Tukhachevsky  held  by 
May. 
67  Etapy  bol'shogo  puti  -  Vospominaniia  o  grazhdanskoi  voine,  (Moscow,  1963),  p.  117. 74 
Inspector  of  Red  Army  Formations  within  the  Military  Department 
On  18th  May,  Tukhachevsky  submitted  a  report  to  Enukidze,  compiled  from  a 
tour  of  Riazansk,  Voronezh  and  Tambov  Provinces  and  the  Don  Region,  inspecting 
recently  formed  military  commissariats,  68  apparently  experiencing  his  first  Civil  War 
fighting  in  skirmishes  with  White  Cossacks  here.  69  He  began, 
As  a  basis  for  this  work  I  was  presented  with  a  principal  plan,  but  I 
encountered  various  local  conditions  which  often  forced  me  to  deviate 
from  it.  Following  this  I  was  forced  to  compile  the  report  not  as  a  reply  to 
the  prescribed  questions,  but  to  throw  light  on  the  work,  which  involved 
the  whole  essence  and  peculiarities  of  local  conditions.  70 
This  suggests  that  conditions  were  far  worse  than  the  Military  Department  in 
Moscow  perceived  them  to  be.  This  is  bome  out  by  the  report  which  provides  an 
excellent  insight  into  the  disarray  which  exemplified  Red  Army  construction  in  these 
early  days.  Tukhachevsky  initially  reported  on  each  area  individually,  highlighting 
problems  specific  to  each  locale,  then  reported  on  the  "general  position  and  general 
needs",  noting  conditions  common  to  all  four  regions  and  providing  recommendations 
from  his  conclusions. 
He  reported  that  the  "Sovnarkom  decree  about  military  commissariats  is  very 
slowly,  sometimes  even  unwillingly  put  into  practice.  There  are  even  cases  of  open 
hostility".  The  effect  of  the  Lenin/Sklianskii  telegram  was  evidently  limited  thus  far, 
but  Tukhachevsky  stressed,  "It  is  essential  to  insistently  put  into  practice  the  decree 
about  military  commissariats.  Only  this  will  mean  a  uniform  army"  and  "All  traitors 
should  be  brought  before  the  courts"  to  enforce  this.  He  noted  the  decree  had  to  be 
developed  to  provide  definite  guidelines  and  boundaries  for  the  various  departments 
within  the  commissariats  -  formation  and  training,  transport,  artillery,  medical  and 
paymaster.  Existing  military  commissariats  were  functioning  poorly,  but  these 
measures  would  create  five  uniform  departments  in  each  one  which  would  have  to  be 
68  V.  0.  Dairies,  "Istoricheskie  Portrety  -  Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevskii"  Voprosy  Istorii,  No.  10, 
(1989),  p.  4  1. 
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centrally  controlled  for  efficient  administration  and  positive  results.  Further 
centralisation  should  be  introduced  for  supplying  food  and  horses  to  the  troops. 
As  to  unit  composition  and  discipline,  relations  between  command  staff  and 
regulars  were  good,  but  Tukhachevsky  felt  this  was  only  because  military  action  had 
yet  to  begin.  Troops  were  still  enlisted  by  voluntary  means,  although  conscription  was 
now  being  introduced.  This  had  been  carried  out  without  using  the  recommendation 
system,  71  therefore,  unreliable  elements  existed.  Most  of  these  had  signed  up  for 
purely  monetary  gain  and  with  a  scarcity  of  committed  socialists  enlisted, 
revolutionary  discipline  was  absent. 
To  remedy  this,  Tukhachevsky  insisted  a  proper  command  cadre  was  necessary 
and, 
In  recruiting  officers  of  the  old  army  for  the  command  cadre,  it  is  essential 
to  see  this  as  a  necessary,  but  temporary  measure. 
Military  academies  are  needed.  At  least  part  of  them  must  be  with 
shortened  courses,  in  order  to  have  some  socialist  commanders  by  the 
autumn.  For  the  old  officers  it  is  necessary  to  weed  out  the  traitorous 
elements.  Now  specialists  must  be  used  -  officers  and  NCOs,  especially  of 
the  cadres.  72 
Therefore,  a  careful  endorsement  of  his  fellow  former  officers  was  given  here, 
illustrating  he  already  felt  he  had  moved  from  this  status  himself.  He  was  calling  for 
socialist  commanders  like  himself  to  be  quickly  trained. 
The  lone  plus  point  Tukhachevsky  identified  was  in  cultural-educational 
activities,  with  libraries,  clubs  and  lectures  well-established.  However,  any  impact 
this  had  would  have  been  negated  by  other  problems  he  identified  -  absence  of 
military  courts  and  general  conditions.  Most  barracks  were  in  disrepair  and  supplies 
of  clothing,  food,  horses  and  weaponry  were  scarce  and  unregulated,  with  no  cartage 
supply  system  or  quartermaster  and  paymaster  sections  organised.  These  problems 
would  be  solved  by  the  administrative  restructuring  and  organisation  of  cart  supply 
lines,  but  he  noted  in  general, 
The  composition  of  the  army  is  the  same  everywhere.  The  system  of 
recruitment  is  the  same  everywhere.  It  would  be  criminal  to  close  one's 
eyes  to  the  composition  of  the  army.  The  system  of  recruitment  altogether, 
as  is  shown  by  military  history,  was  always  found  to  be  the  weakest 
71  This  was  the  system  by  which  recruits  had  to  be  recommended  by  two  others  for  entry  to  the  Red 
Army,  with  one  referee  usually  being  a  Party  member.  Evidently  the  system  was  not  uniformly  in  use 
at  this  stage. 
72  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Doklad  Voennomu  otdelu,  p.  233. 76 
system.  It  is  giving  especially  bad  results  now,  when  there  is  hunger  in  the 
country  and  we  see  this  in  the  army  kitchen.  In  the  army  there  are  no 
staunch  socialists.  In  this  way  there  is  no  self-discipline...  discipline  is  in 
total  collapse.  There  is  no  sense  of  socialist  duty.  Towards  their  signature 
[about  registering  for  military  service  -  NC],  soldiers  regard  this  with 
complete  indifference  and  do  not  believe  they  are  bound  by  it.  This  is  the 
real  situation.  Commanders  are  powerless.  They  avoid  giving  out  orders. 
Even  among  the  soldiers  such  a  position  sometimes  rouses  fear  and  they 
themselves  establish  order. 
To  instill  discipline  and  prevent  a  total  collapse  of  the  army,  he  recommended 
setting  up  military  tribunals. 
From  the  highest  commander  to  the  lowest  soldier,  no-one  must  remain 
outside  the  law.  The  main  buttress  of  discipline  -  is  the  military  tribunal... 
Military  laws  must  hurriedly  be  prepared  and  brought  within  the  new 
socialist  structure...  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  brave  and  energetic 
introduction  of  practices  of  ordered  measures  will  create  new 
revolutionary  discipline,  and  together  with  it  even  a  mighty  socialist 
army...  No  less  important  than  discipline,  is  the  ignition  of  a  spirit  of 
creative  work.  For  this  it  is  necessary  to  promote  people  who  are  talented 
and  who  believe  in  success.  This  guarantees  all.  Creative  work  is  not 
possible  without  self-sacrifice,  and  this  is  why  this  last  demand  must  be  a 
73  principal  one  . 
Tukhachevsky's  report  was  a  critical  assessment  of  the  disorganisation  he  saw  in 
local  military  commissariats  and  the  voluntary  detachments  they  had  formed.  He  was 
accustomed  to  the  order  of  a  regular  army,  saw  the  current  methods  did  not  work  and 
emphasised  the  need  for  a  disciplined  force  with  a  proper  command  system.  The  way 
to  do  this  was  to  temporarily  recruit  profess  ionally-trained  voenspetsy  and  ensure  only 
those  worthy  of  promotion  received  it,  whilst  training  Red  Commanders.  A  proper, 
fair  and  effective  disciplinary  system  was  required  and  military  tribunals  would 
provide  this.  Tukhachevsky  would  be  the  first  to  install  military  tribunals  in  the  Red 
Army  in  the  summer,  carrying  out  his  own  recommendations.  The  experience  gained 
during  his  May  tour  would  prove  vital,  preparing  him  for  what  to  expect  in  the  East, 
and  he  would  implement  other  measures  reported  here. 
Daines  suggests  this  report  was  used  in  formulating  the  CEC  decree  of  29th  May 
announcing  compulsory  military  service  and  mobilisation.  74  This  is  very  likely. 
Military  Department  reports  were  submitted  to  the  CEC  to  provide  guidance  on 
military  construction,  based  on  evidence  collected,  and  it  apparently  participated  in 
73 
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drafting  decrees.  75  Tukhachevsky's  report,  completed  eleven  days  before  the  CEC 
decree,  does  suggest  measures  which  were  introduced.  The  decree  announced  the 
transition  from  a  voluntary  army  to  one  based  on  conscription  of  workers  and  poor 
peasants.  However,  due  to  difficulties  in  conducting  this  in  all  areas  of  the  Republic, 
it  would  begin  in  those  areas  most  threatened  and  the  main  centres  of  the  working 
movement.  In  this  way  Moscow,  Petrograd,  the  Kuban  and  the  Don  were  selected. 
Soviet  institutions  were  urged  to  energetically  and  actively  ensure  military 
commissariats  fulfilled  their  tasks.  76 
As  noted,  Tukhachevsky  had  recommended  conscription,  heavily  criticising 
voluntary  recruitment  as  the  "weakest"  link  and  he  had  reported  on  the  patchiness  of 
military  commissariat  work,  specifically  criticising  voluntary  recruitment  in  the  Don 
Region.  He  also  reported  that  the  Don  was  a  "theatre  of  operations,  little  by  little 
going  to  the  enemy",  with  military  organs  collapsing,  possibly  explaining  why  it  was 
recognised  in  the  29th  May  decree  as  one  of  the  areas  most  under  threat.  He  had 
advised  that  two  members  of  the  military  collegiate,  newly-formed  in  the  Don,  had 
gone  to  Moscow  and  they  should  be  consulted  for  information.  77  This  also  very  likely 
occurred  before  the  decree  was  published. 
Similarly,  the  lack  of  a  command  cadre  was  addressed  by  mobilising  voenspetsy 
and  on  2nd  August,  a  mobilisation  specifically  for  NCOs  raised  17,500  recruits.  Did 
Tukhachevsky's  report  have  any  influence  here? 
The  report  also  demonstrates  Tukhachevsky's  rapid  assimilation  of  Marxism  in 
relation  to  Red  Army  formation.  He  had  to  date  encountered  most  major  Bolshevik 
figures,  but  whilst  touring  the  provinces,  he  met  Red  Guards,  partisans,  armed 
workers  and  revolutionary  soldiers  and  sailors  -  the  fighting  men  of  the  Red  forces. 
He  would  have  appreciated  the  depth  of  feeling  and  hopes  these  people  had  for  the 
new  society  and  their  willingness  to  fight  for  it.  He  noted  the  motivation  of  the 
politically-active  core  compared  to  those  indifferent  to  Bolshevism  and  recaltricant 
78  about  fighting,  ie.  peasantry  joining  the  Red  Army  purely  for  money.  This  made  an 
impression  on  Tukhachevsky  and  he  acted  accordingly  in  his  future  organisational 
work.  Whether  this  early  encounter  of  the  motivational  Power  of  revolutionary 
74  V.  0.  Daines,  p.  4  1. 
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76  Sbornik  dekretov,  1917-1918gg,  (Moscow,  1920),  p.  39. 
77  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Doklad  Voennomu  otdelu,  p.  230. 78 
ideology  altered  his  perception  of  Marxism  is  doubtful,  but  he  now  knew  political 
trust  was  necessary  not  only  for  advancement,  but  also  to  strengthen  the  army  in  the 
current  climate.  With  sides  being  drawn,  the  troops  needed  something  to  fight  for  and 
he  had  witnessed  at  first  hand  the  binding  ability  of  Marxism.  Also,  with  his  report 
influencing  the  mobilisation  decree,  he  saw  the  advantage  of  using  Marxism  to  have 
his  ideas  accepted.  His  appreciation  of  the  intrinsic  link  between  politics  and  military 
policy  and  organisation  was  demonstrated  clearly  in  the  next  work  he  produced. 
Military  Commissar  of  the  Moscow  Section  of  the  Western  Screens 
Tukhachevsky  wrote  this  next  work  in  June  1918  while  serving  his  short  stint  as 
Military  Commissar  of  the  Moscow  District  of  the  Western  Screens.  Enukidze  had 
recommended  Tukhachevsky  for  the  post  of  Province  Commissar,  three  days  after 
receiving  his  report  on  Red  Army  organisation,  stating, 
21st  May  1918.  To  the  Bureau  of  Military  Commissars.  The  present 
Military  Department  recommends  the  appointment  of  comrade 
Tukhachevsky  to  the  post  of  commissar,  as  one  of  the  experienced 
workers  of  the  department.  Comrade  Tukhachevsky  inspected:  Riazansk, 
Tambov,  Voronezh  Provinces  and  the  forces  of  the  Don  in  relation  to  the 
organisation  of  the  Red  Anny,  about  which  a  detailed  report  was 
presented  by  him,  in  which  he  made  a  mass  of  valuable  directives. 
Comrade  Tukhachevsky,  in  the  opinion  of  the  department,  can  fully  cope 
with  the  duties  of  Province  Commissar.  79 
Enukidze's  recommendation  was  endorsed  by  Kuliabko,  now  Deputy  Chairman  of 
the  All-Russian  Bureau  of  Military  Commissars 
. 
80  However,  Kuliabko's  superior 
lurenev  intervened  and  recommended  to  Trotsky  that  Tukhachevsky  gain  the  higher 
posting  of  Military  Commissar  of  the  Moscow  District  of  the  Western  Screens.  81 
Tukhachevsky  was  installed  in  this  post  on  27th  May.  82  He  only  occupied  it  for  22 
days,  before  being  posted  to  the  Eastern  Front,  but  these  three  weeks  provided 
experience  in  mobilisation,  the  reorganisation  of  variegated  detachments  into  regular 
anny  formations  and  handling  supply  matters.  Ivanov  notes  that  Tukhachevsky 
perfon-ned  well  in  this  period,  gaining  respect  from  those  he  worked  with  as  both  an 
78  Ibid.  pp.  220,222  &  224. 
79  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  p.  66. 
80  N.  N.  Kullabko,  p.  28. 
81  V.  0.  Daines,  P.  42. 
82  A.  S.  Popov,  Trud,  Talant,  Doblest',  (Moscow,  1972),  p.  15. 79 
administrator  and  commander,  and  by  his  respectful  and  sympathetic  nature.  83 
Whether  this  is  overstated  or  not,  military  commissar  was  one  of  the  most  responsible 
posts  at  this  time.  This  was  a  direct  reward  for  his  Military  Department  work  and  an 
important  development  in  his  career. 
Whilst  in  this  post,  Tukhachevsky  was  very  likely  commissioned  by  Kuliabko  or 
lurenev  to  write  his  "Project  on  the  Organisation  of  Courses  for  Military  Commissars" 
for  the  Ist  All-Russian  Conference  of  Military  Commissars,  held  in  Moscow  from 
7th-  II  th  June.  Around  3  00  delegates  attended  the  conference,  with  the  opening  and 
closing  speeches  delivered  by  Trotsky  and  lurenev  respectively.  84  The  conference  was 
held  to  outline  the  rights  and  duties  of  military  commissars  and  discuss  how 
construction  of  the  Red  Army  and  cultural-educational  work  amongst  the  troops  was 
to  proceed,  based  on  information  collected  in  the  localities  by  military  workers  who 
comprised  the  conference  delegates.  85  Military  Commissar  Tukhachevsky  would  have 
attended  this  conference  and,  with  reports  submitted  on  8th  June  on  conditions  and 
military  construction  in  the  localities,  86  he  would  have  delivered  his  May  report  as 
well  as  preparing  his  project. 
As  illustrated,  Tukhachevsky  stressed  the  need  in  his  report  for  military  academies 
to  create  an  organised  command  cadre.  Kuliabko  or  Iurenev,  upon  reading  this,  very 
likely  commissioned  Tukhachevsky  to  prepare  his  project  for  the  June  conference. 
Korablev  suggests  this  was  used  in  December  1918  to  work  out  a  programme  for  the 
87  Central  Courses  for  Military  Commissars 
. 
Tukhachevsky  sent  the  project  to  lurenev 
on  4th  December,  with  a  brief  note  stating,  "Compiled  in  the  month  of  June  of  this 
year  in  Moscow  by  military  commissar  of  the  Moscow  District".  In  a  covering  letter 
Tukhachevsky  wrote,  "I  send  to  you  for  your  consideration  regarding  political 
agitation  in  the  armies  at  the  current  moment,  a  project  for  the  organisation  of  Courses 
for  military  commissars...  ".  He  had  earlier  written  to  lurenev  about  the  lack  of 
military  experience  amongst  the  majority  of  commissars  and  in  the  introduction  to  his 
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project,  commented  on  the  fon-nation  of  RVS-y  containing  two  political  commissars 
and  one  voenspets,  stating, 
Such  an  organisation  is  considered  temporary  and  will  only  exist  until 
Party  commanders  are  prepared... 
For  this  aim  it  is  proposed  to  form  "Courses  for  military  commissars" 
with  two-month  courses.  Completing  such  courses,  military  commisars 
will  be  completely  knowledgeable  in  the  circumstances,  in  the  demands  of 
military  art,  and  receiving  valuable  experience  in  practice,  will  easily 
make  independent  revolutionary  commanders. 
Military  commissar  courses  did  not  begin  until  10th  October  1918,  probably 
because  all  efforts  were  concentrated  towards  aiding  Eastern  Front.  On  25th 
September,  by  which  time  the  Eastern  Front  had  rallied,  Sklianskii  instructed  the  All- 
Russian  Bureau  of  Military  Commissars  to  create  courses.  88  By  the  end  of  the  year, 
1,773  from  a  total  of  6,389  serving  military  commissars  had  passed  through  the 
special  short  courses  . 
89  However,  Trotsky  criticised  the  standard  of  these  graduates  in 
October  and,  on  14th  November  1918,  the  VVI  Political  Department  was  transferred 
to  the  Military  Commissars'  Bureau,  90  to  help  with  political  and  cultural-educational 
work.  It  is  possible  Tukhachevsky  sent  his  project  to  lurenev  two  weeks  later  to  aid 
with  this,  or  that  lurenev  requested  it,  as  he  had  done  in  June.  Whether  the  project  was 
used  or  not,  it  provides  an  excellent  insight  into  Tukhachevsky's  ideas  and 
capabilities  at  this  time.  91 
The  ideas  Tukhachevsky  advocated  in  his  report  and  project  matched  the  direction 
Trotsky  was  taking  the  Red  Army.  Tukhachevsky  almost  certainly  met  Trotsky  for  the 
first  time  at  the  conference.  In  his  opening  address,  Trotsky  commented  on  the 
evolution  of  the  Soviet  armed  forces,  saying, 
The  small  voluntary  detachments  of  the  first  period  of  the  October 
Revolution,  despite  all  their  bravery  and  enthusiasm,  showed  it  was 
impossible  to  fight  with  success  an  army  organised  in  all  matters  of 
modem  technical  warfare.  The  previous  administrative  apparatus  is 
88  Partiino-politicheskaia  rabota  v  Krasnoi  A  rmii  (aprel'  1918-fevral'  1919).  Dokumenty,  (Moscow, 
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98-99. 
90  Paniino-politicheskaia  rabota  v  Krasnoi  Armii  (aprel'  1918-fevral'  1919),  Dokumenty,  p.  90. 
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ruined,  the  new  one  is  just  created.  We  do  not  even  know  how  much 
military  hardware  we  have  in  the  Centre  or  in  the  localities.  92 
This  set  the  background  to  the  conference.  Progressing  to  outline  the  evolution  of 
Red  forces  to  date  and  how  the  Red  Army  was  to  be  constructed,  Trotsky  infonned 
the  delegates  that  military  commissars  were  the  vital  link  needed  to  complete  the 
chain  and  form  a  socialist  army.  Outlining  Military  Commissar  duties,  Trotsky  stated, 
...  one  of  the  fundamental  tasks  falling  to  the  lot  of  the  military 
commissars  is  that  of  bringing  to  the  working  masses,  by  means  of 
ideological  propaganda,  awareness  of  the  need  for  revolutionary  order  and 
discipline,  which  must  be  persistently  mastered  by  each  and  everyone... 
We  took  steps  urgently  to  establish  in  the  localities  the  nuclei  of 
commissariats,  to  consist  of  two  representatives  of  the  local  soviets  and 
one  military  specialist. 
The  local  board,  a  sort  of  local  military  commissariat,  will  be  the 
organisation  that  can,  in  a  given  locality,  fully  embrace  the  planned 
formation  and  servicing  of  the  army.  Everyone  knows  that  the  army  which 
we  are  now  building  on  voluntary  principles  is  regarded  by  the  Soviet 
Government  as  merely  provisional... 
We  appealled  for  volunteers  for  the  Red  Army  in  the  hope  that  the  best 
forces  of  the  working  masses  would  respond.  Have  our  hopes  been 
realised?  It  must  be  said  that  they  are  realised  only  33  1/3  percent.  There 
are,  of  course  ,  in  the  Red  Army,  many  heroic,  self-sacrificing  fighters,  but 
there  are  also  many  worthless  elements  -  hooligans,  ne'er-do-wells,  the 
dregs. 
Undoubtedly,  if  we  were  to  give  military  training  to  the  whole  working 
class,  without  exception,  this  element,  which  in  quantity  is  comparatively 
small,  would  not  constitute  any  serious  danger  to  our  army:  but  now,  when 
our  forces  are  so  small,  this  element  is  an  unavoidable  and  undesirable 
thorn  in  the  flesh  of  our  revolutionary  regiments. 
It  is  the  responsibility  of  the  military  commissars  to  work  tirelessly  to 
raise  the  level  of  consciousness  within  the  army  and  ruthlessly  to  eradicate 
the  undesirable  element  which  had  got  into  it... 
We  must  draw  into  the  work  of  creating  the  army  the  younger 
generations,  the  youth  who  have  not  experienced  war,  and  who  are  always 
distinguished  by  the  elan  of  their  revolutionary  spirit  and  their  display  of 
enthusiasm...  But  here  arises  the  question  of  the  commanding  apparatus: 
experience  has  shown  that  lack  of  technical  forces  has  a  baneful  effect  on 
the  success  of  attempts  to  form  revolutionary  annies,  because  the 
revolution  has  not  brought  forth  from  the  midst  of  the  working  masses 
warriors  with  a  knowledge  of  the  military  art.  This  is  the  weak  spot  of  all 
revolutions... 
If  among  the  workers  there  had  been  a  sufficient  number  of  comrades 
who  were  military  specialists,  the  problem  would  have  been  solved  very 
92  Voennoe  delo,  No.  3,  (15th  June  1918),  p.  14;  excerpts  of  this  speech  are  also  in  No.  2,  (8th  June, 
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simply,  but,  unfortunately,  we  have  extraordinarily  few  persons  with 
military  training. 
The  duties  of  members  of  the  commanding  apparatus  can  be  divided 
into  two  parts...  The  commissar  is  a  political  worker,  a  revolutionary.  The 
military  leader  answers  with  his  head  for  all  his  activity,  for  the  outcome 
of  military  operations  and  so  on.  If  the  commissar  has  observed  that  there 
is  a  danger  to  the  revolution  from  the  military  leader,  the  commissar  has 
the  right  to  deal  ruthlessly  with  the  counter-revolutionary,  even  to  the 
point  of  shooting  him. 
In  order  that  we  may  be  able  quickly  to  train  our  own  peasant  and 
worker  officers,  fighters  for  socialism,  we  have  in  a  number  of  places  set 
about  organising  schools  of  instruction  which  will  train  and  instruct 
representatives  of  the  working  people  in  the  art  of  war. 
... 
At  this  congress  we  shall  exchange  our  observations,  we  shall  learn 
something  from  each  other,  and  I  am  sure  that  you  will  go  back  to  your 
localities  and  continue  your  creative  work  in  the  interests  of  the  labour 
revolution.  93 
This  was  the  critical  point  in  Tukhachevsky's  entry  into  the  Red  An-ny,  meeting 
Trotsky  to  "exchange  observations  [and]  learn  something  from  each  other".  Trotsky 
would  have  wanted  to  meet  the  man  recommended  to  him  so  recently  by  lurenev  as 
Military  Commissar  of  the  Moscow  District  of  the  Western  Screens,  one  of  the  most 
important  zones  during  German  occupation.  Tukhachevsky's  May  report  matched 
Trotsky's  demand  for  "the  need  for  revolutionary  order  and  discipline"'.  His  June 
project  provided  a  platform  for  the  "schools  of  instruction"  about  which  Trotsky 
spoke.  Discussing  these  issues  with  Tukhachevsky,  Trotsky  found  a  man  experienced 
in  military  affairs  and  Red  Army  organisational  work,  but  also  crucially  a  man 
capable  and  prepared  to  deal  with  the  "worthless  elements"  and  to  "ruthlessly 
eradicate  the  undesirable  element"  within  the  Red  forces,  whilst  organising  partisan 
bands  into  regimented  formations.  Also,  Tukhachevsky  was  a  Communist  Party 
member,  not  just  a  voenspets,  providing  a  military  specialist  from  within  the  ranks  of 
socialism  who  could  prepare  commissar  courses,  but  more  pressingly  would  receive 
respect  from  the  rank-and-file  in  the  East,  which  a  voenspets  would  not.  No  matter 
that  Tukhachevsky  was  not  an  old  revolutionary  or  pre-October  Bolshevik.  His 
political  experience  would  develop,  but  he  had  already  imbibed  the  ideology,  he 
seemed  reliable  and  had  the  necessary  military  capabilities. 
Trotsky  later  wrote  on  23rd  July, 
93  L.  D.  Trotsky,  How  The  RevolutionArmed,  Vol.  1,  pp.  164-167.  The  speech  reproduced  in  this 
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A  very  important,  although  alas,  as  yet  only  small  group  consist  of  officers 
who,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  understood  the  significance  of  the 
revolution  and  the  spirit  of  the  new  age.  These  officers  are  now  working 
tirelessly  at  the  creation  of  the  armed  forces  for  the  Soviet  Republic.  To 
require  that  they  repaint  themselves  as  Bolsheviks  would  be  absurd.  They 
must  be  appreciated  and  given  support.  94 
In  Tukhachevsky,  Trotsky  had  a  voenspets  who  "understood  the  significance  of 
the  revolution  and  the  spirit  of  the  new  age"  to  such  a  degree,  he  had  joined  the  Party. 
This  was  enough  for  Trotsky  if  Tukhachevsky  would  build  a  successful  Red  Army  to 
keep  the  Bolsheviks  in  charge.  Trotsky  knew  Tukhachevsky  was  not  a  born-again 
Marxist  devotee,  but  was  willing  to  serve  the  Bolsheviks.  The  goal  of  the  June 
conference  was  to  discuss  the  situation,  discover  solutions  and  despatch  delegates 
with  these,  to  aid  military  construction  in  the  localities,  thus  beginning  the 
centralisation  and  regularisation  of  the  Red  Anny.  Tukhachevsky  wished  to  build  the 
Red  Army  in  the  same  manner  as  Trotsky  and  had  presented  his  ideas  at  the 
conference.  Trotsky  had  found  one  of  his  first  Red  Commanders.  He  would  become 
the  one  to  implement  and  experiment  with  these  measures  first.  After  meeting 
Trotsky,  Tukhachevsky  was  destined  to  go  eastwards.  All  that  was  required,  was  an 
escalation  in  the  situation.  This  occurred  in  May-June  1918. 
Outbreak  of  Civil  War  in  the  Vol2a 
The  second  half  of  1918  was  a  period  of  extreme  danger  for  the  Soviet  Republic. 
Uprisings  by  internal  counter-revolutionary  forces  comprising  Right  and  Left  SRs, 
Mensheviks,  Liberal  and  Rightist  Parties,  White  officer  battalions  and  the 
Czechoslovak  Legion,  combined  with  German  occupation  of  European  Russia  and  the 
Crimea.  Anglo-French,  Japanese  and  American  intervention  into  the  far  north,  south 
and  east  of  Imperial  Russian  territory  began.  The  Soviet  Republic  was  beset  from  all 
sides  and  with  no  organised  army. 
However,  by  December  1918,  the  Reds  had  won  Eastern  Front  battles  on  the 
Volga  and  in  the  Urals,  and  the  end  of  the  Great  War  signalled  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Central  Powers  from  Russian  soil,  with  Germany  in  revolutionary  turmoil  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  collapsing.  This  heralded  increased  Allied  intervention  and 
94 
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offensives  by  far  larger  and  better-equipped  White  forces  in  1919,  but  the  crucial 
difference  was  the  existence  of  a  large,  experienced,  organised,  regular  Red  Army. 
The  Reds  did  not  enter  1919  defenceless  as  they  had  1918. 
To  achieve  this  required  enormous  efforts  at  central  and  local  levels  and 
coordination  from  both  ends.  Numbers  had  to  be  raised  quickly  for  the  emerging 
armed  forces  from  both  frontline  and  central  areas.  With  commanders  having  to 
simultaneously  judge  men  capable  or  not  of  serving  in  and  around  the  battlefields, 
whilst  tackling  enemy  forces,  the  critical  situation  soon  showed  who  were  able,  loyal 
fighters,  agitators  and  organisers  and  who  were  not,  or  were  simply  treacherous. 
Trotsky  later  stated,  "it  was  precisely  the  acuteness  of  the  danger  to  which  we  were 
subjected  that  saved  us.  If  we  had  had  more  time  for  discussion  and  debate  we  should 
95  probably  have  made  a  great  many  more  mistakes".  In  September  1918  he  noted,  "It 
can  be  said  that  if  the  Czechoslovak  Legion  had  not  existed,  they  would  have  had  to 
be  invented,  for  under  peacetime  conditions  we  should  have  never  have  succeeded  in 
forming,  within  a  short  time,  a  close-knit  disciplined,  heroic  army"  . 
96  These  hint  at  the 
methods  Trotsky  deemed  necessary  for  moulding  the  Red  Army  -  absolute  in  style 
and  content  and  to  be  complied  with  unquestioningly. 
The  above  assessments  can  also  be  applied  to  Tukhachevsky.  If  the  Czechoslovak 
Uprising  had  not  occurred,  he  would  not  have  been  propelled  into  the  limelight  so 
dramatically.  On  the  surface  it  appears  surprising  a  more  seasoned  Bolshevik  or 
higher-ranking  voenspets  than  young  former  2nd-Lieutenant  Tukhachevsky  was  not 
selected  as  I  st  Revolutionary  Army  Commander  in  June  1918.  The  fact  he  was  both  a 
voenspets  and  a  communist  played  its  part,  as  did  the  relationship  he  had  forged  with 
Lenin  and  Trotsky.  His  work  for  the  Military  Department  had  brought  him  to  their 
attention.  The  emergence  of  the  Eastern  Front  gave  Tukhachevsky  the  opportunity  to 
prove  himself  in  the  frontline  and  this  combined  with  events,  which,  although  not 
apparent  at  the  time,  were  great  strokes  of  luck  for  Tukhachevsky,  who  happened  to 
be  in  the  right  place  at  the  right  time. 
The  "  breathing-  space"  won  with  the  signing  of  Brest-Litovsk  ended  on  25th  May 
with  the  uprising  of  the  Czechoslovak  Legion.  This  had  been  formed  by  the  Tsarist 
95 
Ibid.  p.  26. 
96 
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Government  in  1914  from  Czechs  and  Slovaks  settled  on  Russian  territory.  They  had 
fought  during  the  Great  War  and  after  the  February  Revolution,  swelled  in  number 
with  the  Provisional  Government  releasing  Czechoslovak  prisoners  of  war.  97  By  mid- 
1918,  the  Czechoslovak  Legion  numbered  38,000  men.  98  The  crumbling  Hapsburg 
Empire  sparked  Czechoslovak  nationalist  sentiments  with  hopes  for  an  independent 
state  centred  around  Tomas  Masaryk  in  Paris.  To  help  achieve  this,  plans  were 
hatched  to  extricate  the  Legion  from  Russian  soil  to  fight  on  the  Great  War  Western 
Front  with  the  Allies.  Agreement  was  reached  between  the  Soviet  Government  and 
Czechoslovak  Legion  representatives  for  their  departure  along  the  Trans-Siberian 
Railway  through  Vladivostok,  with  the  intention  of  crossing  the  Pacific,  America  and 
the  Atlantic  to  eventually  reach  Western  Europe. 
This  scheme  had  little  chance  of  success  in  1918  Russia.  Mutual  suspicion  from 
all  sides  made  a  clash  almost  inevitable.  The  Czechoslovaks  wished  to  leave 
immediately,  fearful  of  the  Bolsheviks  handing  them  over  to  Germany,  currently 
advancing  eastwards  and  southwards  into  Russia.  The  Bolsheviks  meanwhile  grew 
ever  more  suspicious  of  Allied  intentions,  with  the  latter  vacillating  over  employing 
the  Czechoslovaks  in  Europe  or  inside  Russia,  to  reopen  the  Great  War  Eastern  Front. 
Japanese  landings  in  the  Far  East  also  threatened  the  possibility  of  a  joint  Japanese- 
Czechoslovak  force  on  Russian  soil. 
One  of  the  terms  imposed  by  the  Bolsheviks  for  the  Czechoslovak  withdrawal  was 
handing  over  the  majority  of  their  weaponry.  This  had  been  supplied  by  the  Tsar  and 
in  the  Bolsheviks'  opinion  was  now  theirs  by  right.  The  retention  of  only  120  rifles 
and  one  machine-gun  per  rail  echelon  was  permitted.  99  The  Czechslovaks  never 
intended  to  do  this.  With  the  interception  of  a  telegram  from  Trotsky  instructing 
Soviets,  Military  Departments  and  Red  forces  to  disarm  any  Czechoslovaks  or  shoot 
them,  '  00  followed  swiftly  by  an  armed  clash  with  Hungarian  troops  at  Cheliabinsk  on 
14th  May,  '  01  the  Czechoslovaks  decided  to  fight  their  way  eastwards.  102 
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The  situation  swiftly  deteriorated  for  the  Soviets.  Spread  out  along  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  in  three  main  groups,  103  the  Czechoslovaks  occupied  virtually  every 
major  town  along  it.  In  the  Urals,  Cheliabinsk  and  Ekaterinburg  fell,  the  occupation  of 
the  latter  on  17th  July  prompting  the  panicked  execution  of  Tsar  Nicholas  11  and  his 
family  three  days  earlier,  on  Sverdlov's  orders.  On  the  Volga,  Penza,  Syzran'  and 
Samara  were  occupied  and  the  Czechoslovaks  agreed  to  fight  for  the  SR-Menshevik 
Committee  of  Members  of  the  Constituent  Assembly  (Komuch)  Government,  which 
was  proclaimed  in  Samara  on  8th  June.  104 
Other  uprisings  occurred  in  towns  such  as  Vologda,  Murom  and  Iaroslavl.  The 
latter  was  led  by  the  Right  SR  Boris  Savinkov  on  6th  July  to  coincide  with  the  Left 
SR  uprising  in  Moscow,  105  lasting  until  21st  July  when  it  was  suppressed  by  6th  and 
8th  Latvian  Rifle  Regiments.  '  06  Unchecked,  these  threatened  to  link  the 
Czechoslovaks  in  the  east  with  British  forces  landing  in  Arkangel'sk  and  Murmansk 
in  the  north.  107 
However,  the  crux  of  the  matter  was  not  that  the  Czechoslovak  Uprising  occurred, 
but  that  the  Reds  had  no  forces  in  the  east  with  which  to  quell  them,  with  no  more 
than  300,000  volunteers,  scattered  around  some  8,000  kms  of  frontiers  at  the  end  of 
May.  1  08  The  largest  and  most  effective  Red  formations  were  the  18,000  strong 
Latvian  Rifle  Regiments.  109  They  matched  the  Czechoslovaks  when  they  eventually 
met,  but  in  May  they  were  scattered  around  the  Soviet  zone,  forming  the  core  of  the 
existing  Red  forces. 
Most  Red  troops  were  deployed  on  the  Western  "screens"  with  German 
occupation  preventing  a  withdrawal  of  troops  from  west  to  east.  110  Also,  the  Red 
leadership  initially  under-estimated  the  seriousness  of  the  Czechoslovak  Revolt.  Not 
103  J.  D.  Smele,  p.  26. 
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until  the  formation  of  Eastern  Front  R  VS  on  13th  June  was  the  danger  really 
acknowledged.  "'  Even  then,  once  Lenin  and  the  political  hierarchy  grasped  the 
gravity  of  the  situation,  the  VVS,  with  its  voenspetsy  concentrating  on  Germany,  was 
reluctant  to  turn  east  and  leave  the  west  open.  '  12 
The  eastern  situation  was  dire  for  the  Reds.  Small  partisan  and  armed  worker 
detachments  could  not  match  the  Czechoslovaks.  A  regular  army  under  one  unified 
command  system  was  needed.  '  13  Help  was  needed  from  Moscow  to  form  this, 
providing  the  catalyst  to  launch  Tukhachevsky  eastwards. 
Postin2  to  the  Eastern  Front 
Kuliabko  relates  that,  on  his  suggestion,  Lenin  interviewed  Tukhachevsky  as  a 
candidate  for  posting  to  the  east  after  the  Czechoslovak  Revolt.  Returning  from  this, 
Tukhachevsky  told  Kuliabko  that  Lenin  had  asked  him  two  main  questions  -  Why  had 
he  escaped  from  Germany  and  how  did  he  envisage  the  construction  of  a  new  socialist 
army?  Tukhachevsky  replied  he  could  not  stay  in  jail  when  such  revolutionary  events 
were  occurring  in  Russia  and  then  "laid  out  his  thoughts  about  how  to  unite  the 
scattered  Red  Guards  cadres  into  one  regular  army",  presumably  reiterating  his  May 
report.  Kuliabko  notes,  "Evidently  these  thoughts  pleased  Lenin  and  very  soon 
yesterday's  Lieutenant  received  the  promotion  to  the  post  of  I  st  Army  Commander  of 
Eastern  Front".  114 
S.  1.  Aralov's  recollections  of  Lenin  being  closely  involved  with  the  military 
process  on  a  daily  basis,  taking  decisions  personally  if  necessary,  suggest  this  could 
have  occurred,  1  15  but  doubts  have  been  cast  over  Kuliabko's  authenticity.  Ivanov 
comments  that  no  record  exists  of  this  meeting  in  the  Biograficheskaia  khronika 
could  otherwise  have  been  released  for  the  east,  J.  Meijer,  ed.,  The  Trotsky  Papers:  1917-1922,  Vol.  1: 
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be  concentrated,  in  light  of  the  increased  threat  of  a  Japanese  and  American  presence  in  the  East, 
alongside  continued  strained  relations  with  the  Central  Powers  in  the  West,  resulted  in  the  decision  of 
6th  May  to  still  concentrate  nearly  all  available  forces  in  the  West,  due  to  its  close  proximity  to  the  Red 
heartland,  S.  V.  Lipitskii,  pp.  218-219. 
113  E.  1.  Medvedev,  p.  94,  Three  uncoordinated  Red  command  staffs  existed  in  the  East  at  this  point: 
Ural-Orenburg  Front  Command;  Front  Command  headed  by  M.  Kadomtsev;  and  the  Communist 
An-ned  Workers  Detachments. 
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Lenina,  which  lays  out  Lenin's  day  to  day  activities  in  great  detail.  '  16  This  is  true,  but 
does  not  prove  the  meeting  never  occurred.  Kuliabko  is  not  listed  as  a  source  used  for 
compiling  the  Khronika  which  would  explain  his  absence.  Tukhachevsky  was  in 
Moscow  for  a  four  month  period  and  his  report  in  May  was  used  towards  drafting  the 
29th  May  decree.  Through  his  work  it  is  highly  likely  Tukhachevsky  met  Lenin,  even 
if  briefly  at  a  meeting  or  after  a  speech  by  the  Party  leader,  and  very  possibly  at  the 
Ist  All-Russian  Conference  of  Military  Commissars.  Kuliabko's  story  is  consistent 
with  Tukhachevsky's  sisters  and  Koritskii,  who  recall  Tukhachevsky  met  Lenin 
before  leaving  for  the  east  and  discussed  how  to  proceed  with  army  reorganisation.  1  17 
Party  workers  deemed  most  qualified  and  capable  of  salvaging  the  situation  in  the  east 
were  mobilised  and  sent  there  in  mid-late  June  and  Tukhachevsky  was  one  of  these. 
Lenin  spoke  publicly  to  many  of  them  before  their  departure.  Perhaps  Tukhachevsky 
met  Lenin  at  a  briefing  about  his  tasks  ahead. 
Kuliabko's  account  is  inaccurate  insofar  as  Tukhachevsky  was  not  sent  eastwards 
specifically  as  I  st  Army  Commander,  but  in  fact  with  the  following  mandate, 
The  bearer  of  this,  Military  Commissar  of  the  Moscow  Region  -  Mikhail 
Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky  is  despatched  on  a  mission  at  the  disposal  of 
Supreme  Commander  of  the  Eastern  Front  Murav'ev  for  fulfilling  work  of 
exceptional  importance  in  organising  and  forming  the  Red  Army  into 
higher  troop  formations  and  commanding  them. 
An  accompanying  letter  from  the  Moscow  Military  District  Staff  to  Murav'ev 
gave  a  CEC  recommendation  of  Tukhachevsky  as  one  of  the  few  military  specialists- 
communists  who  should  therefore  be  given  the  most  responsible  work  at  the  Front.  "  8 
Aralov  sent  a  telegram  from  Narkomvoen  Operations  Section  (Operod)  to  Murav'ev, 
which  would  have  had  Trotsky's  backing,  stating  Tukhachevsky,  "was  one  of  the  few 
military  specialists  in  the  Communist  Party"  and  should  therefore  be  entrusted  with 
"the  most  important  and  responsible  work  in  the  struggle  with  the  Czechoslovaks".  '  19 
In  possession  of  the  mandate  and  covering  letter,  Tukhachevsky  travelled  by  train 
eastwards,  leaving  Moscow  on  19th  June  and  arriving  at  Kazan',  on  the  Volga,  on 
25th  June.  120 
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Smimov's  assertion  that  Tukhachevsky  was  sent  eastwards  because  he  was  one  of 
only  around  100  "commander-communists"  is  partially  true,  with  the  shortage  of 
similarly  qualified  candidates  making  him  a  prime  choice.  However,  he  had  reached 
this  position  through  his  own  efforts,  by  virtue  of  his  military  career  and  decision  to 
join  the  Party.  The  fact  he  was  a  "commander-communist"  gave  him  both  the  political 
credibility  a  voenspets  did  not  have,  and  the  military  background  a  Party  member  did 
not  enjoy.  However,  he  was  not  posted  as  Ist  Army  Commander,  as  Smirnov 
maintains,  but  to  carry  out  organisational  work,  as  he  had  done  already  in  the  Military 
Department,  to  put  into  practice  the  recommendations  of  his  May  report.  His  work  in 
the  Military  Department  and  as  Military  Commissar  had  gained  commendations  from 
Kuliabko  and  Enukidze,  the  latter  being  one  of  the  most  seasoned  Bolsheviks  in  the 
game.  Tukhachevsky  was  adjudged  capable  of  repeating  this  work  on  the  frontline 
and  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  military  and  Party  hierarchy,  notably  Lenin  and 
Trotsky.  Tukhachevsky  had  earned  his  position  by  merit,  with  his  report  and  project 
demonstrating  his  high  level  of  military  knowledge  on  a  theoretical  and  practical 
organisational  level,  and  personal  interviews  with  Lenin  and  Trotsky  demonstrating 
his  political  reliability.  It  perhaps  seems  ironic  he  was  one  of  the  rare  "commander- 
communists",  but  his  devotion  to  the  Communist  cause  was  not  for  political  ideals, 
but  the  opportunity  to  lead  the  army  of  a  great  Russian  state  rising  through  these. 
However,  Tukhachevsky  provides  the  perfect  example  of  how  the  escalation  of  civil 
war  brought  together  the  Bolshevik  regime  and  specialists  from  the  Tsarist  era.  Lenin 
and  Trotsky  knew  what  Tukhachevsky  was  -a  professional  soldier  who  wanted  to 
patriotically  serve  his  nation  -  but  in  his  Party  membership  and  military  record  they 
saw  the  embodiment  of  the  Red  Commander  they  wished  to  create  and  were  willing  to 
take  a  risk  on  him,  as  the  Bolsheviks  did  with  many  others.  Tukhachevsky  saw  in  the 
Bolsheviks  a  party  which  wished  to  create  a  powerful  Russian  nation  and  empire, 
with  a  new  powerful  army  to  defend  it,  in  which  he  could  serve  at  a  senior  level.  He 
had  studied  Marxism  and  been  impressed  by  its  impact  on  the  core  of  the  evolving 
Red  Army,  but  whether  he  was  impressed  personally  by  these  ideals  remains 
doubtful.  He  did  not  want  Tsarist  autocracy,  but  did  not  believe  in  the  pure 
communist  state  either.  Events  in  1918  Russia  brought  Tukhachevsky  and  the  regime 
together. 90 
Eastern  Front  RVS  Headquarters  were  established  at  Kazan'.  Its  initial 
membership  was  Commander-in-Chief  Murav'ev  (despite  Podvoiskii's 
disagreement),  121  Political  Commissars  Kobozev  and  Blagonravov,  and  Mironov  as 
Secretary.  122 
On  18th  June,  the  RVS  received  instructions  from  the  VVS,  outlining  actions  to  be 
taken  against  the  Czechoslovak  forces,  which  were  identified  as  being  in  three  main 
groups  around  Samara,  Cheliabinsk  and  Omsk. 
Red  forces  in  Simbirsk,  Syzran'  and  Nikolaevsk  were  to  concentrate  in  Simbirsk, 
then  move  to  Ufa,  to  cut  off  the  Czechoslovaks  in  Samara,  enabling  an  attack  on  the 
latter  from  the  north  and  north-east.  Troops  in  Ekaterinburg,  Zlatoust,  Troitsk  and 
Kamyshlov  were  to  crush  the  Czechoslovaks  in  the  eastern  sector  up  to  Kurgan, 
occupying  the  right  bank  of  the  River  Tobol',  to  cut  off  the  second  Czechoslovak 
group  from  the  third  in  Omsk.  123  This  presumably  would  be  faced  after  these 
operations,  as  no  instructions  concerning  it  were  forthcoming.  This  was  due  to  the 
lack  of  Red  forces  in  the  east  in  June  1918,  forcing  them  to  tackle  enemy  groups  in 
adjacent  areas  first.  These  instructions  show  immediately  the  fluidity  of  the  Eastern 
Front,  with  conventional  set  fronts  replaced  by  manoeuvre  amid  constantly  changing 
circumstances  and  positions  of  forces  from  both  sides.  This  was  typical  of  Civil  War 
fronts  throughout  the  conflict. 
Eastern  Front  R  VS  put  these  instructions  into  practice  on  19th  June,  combining  all 
124 
troops  along  the  railway  lines  of  Syzran'-Simbirsk  sectors,  into  Ist  Soviet  Army. 
Local  Soviets,  military  heads  and  military  organisations  were  instructed  to  begin 
mobilisation  and  A.  1.  Kharchenko,  nominated  Ist  Army  Commander  on  16th  June, 
was  to  prepare  an  offensive  from  Penza  and  Inza  sectors.  125 
On  20th  June,  Osobaia  Army  was  created  from  troops  in  Saratov-Ural'sk  sectors 
to  cooperate  with  I  st  Soviet  Army  against  the  Samara  Czechoslovak  Group  and  on 
3rd  July  all  troops  in  Saratov  and  Saratov  Province  were  subordinated  to  its 
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Turkestanskogofrontoi%  Iiun'1918-fevral'1921  gg.  (Sbornik  dokumentov  i  materialov),  (hereafter 
BpPRA),  (Ashkhabad,  1972),  doc.  1,  pp.  23-24. 
124  Troops  were  still  travelling  and  living  in  their  eshelony,  fighting  under  the  conditions  of 
eshelonnaia  voina,  with  no  other  transportation  organised  as  yet. 
125  BpPRA,  doc.  p.  25;  0.  lu.  Kalnin,  p.  36;  DkfKA,  doc.  326,  pp.  386-387;  BpPRA,  doc.  2,  p.  25. 91 
Commander  Rzhevskii.  126  On  22nd  June,  2nd  Soviet  Army  was  formed  from  troops  in 
Ufa  and  Orenburg  sectors  to  act  against  the  Czechoslovaks  there,  under  the  command 
of  the  Left  SR  lakovlev,  former  Supreme  Commander  of  Ural-Orenburg  Front.  127 
Efforts  to  create  3rd  Soviet  Army  by  regulating  Northern-Ural-Siberian  Front 
were  made  from  14th  June,  128  but  it  was  not  officially  decreed  until  20th  July  in 
response  to  the  fall  of  Ekaterinburg  three  days  earlier.  129  Also  on  20th  July,  Osobaia 
became  4th  Army,  130  with  5th  Army  forined  at  Sviiazhsk  after  the  fall  of  Kazan'  on 
6th-7th  August,  with  the  task  of  retaking  the  town.  13  1  These  were  the  five  armies  of 
the  Red  Eastern  Front. 
Tukhachevsky  and  Murav'ev 
Tukhachevsky  replaced  Kharchenko  as  I  st  Army  Commander  on  26th  June,  the 
day  after  reaching  Kazan'  to  begin  his  organisational  work.  132  Kharchenko  had 
commanded  Ist  Army  barely  a  week,  but  already  dissatisfaction  was  rife. 
Tukhachevsky  immediately  departed  for  Inza  Station,  location  of  Ist  Army  HQ, 
arriving  on  28th  June  and  accepting  command.  133  The  circumstances  surrounding 
Tukhachevsky's  appointment  as  I  st  Army  Commander  encapsulate  the  whole  Eastern 
Front  situation  in  summer  1918.  Czechoslovak  support  of  Komuch  added  a  new 
dimension  to  Bolshevik-Left  SR  policy  differences  which  were  pulling  their 
governmental  coalition  apart.  These  had  degenerated  into  open  rivalry  and  disputes 
over  regularisation  and  control  of  the  disparate  Red  forces  in  the  East  would 
culminate  in  the  Murav'ev  revolt,  in  which  Tukhachevsky  was  directly  involved, 
narrowly  escaping  execution.  However,  this  proved  to  be  the  greatest  stroke  of  luck 
for  Tukhachevsky,  who  benefited  from  being  in  the  right  place  at  the  right  time,  was 
able  to  take  advantage  of  situations  presented  by  Bolshevik-Left  SR  rivalries  and 
emerged  from  his  first  few  weeks  in  the  East  as  Ist  Army  Commander,  fully  trusted 
by  Moscow,  if  not  by  all  those  around  him. 
126  DkfKA,  Tom  1,  docs.  327  &  339,  pp.  387  &  393. 
127 
lbid,  doc.  33  1,  p.  389. 
128 
lbid,  p.  392. 
129 
lbid,  doc.  346,  p.  398. 
130 
Ibid,  doc.  347,  p.  398. 
13  1  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  armii  i  osvobozhdeniia  Simbirska",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  58. 
132  DkfKA,  Tom  1,  p.  386;  BpPRA,  p.  25. 
133 
BpPRA,  doc.  3,  pp.  25-26. 92 
How  much  the  local  SRs;  and  Murav'ev's  actions  before  I  Oth  July  were 
premeditated  and  fulfilled  on  orders  from  the  Moscow  Left  SRs  is  uncertain,  but 
likely.  134  The  Left  SR  Central  Committee  decided  on  24th  June  to  rebel  against  the 
Bolsheviks,  to  overturn  Brest-Litovsk  and  reopen  the  Great  War  Eastern  Front  for  a 
"revolutionary  war"  against  the  Central  Powers.  135  Tukhachevsky  described  Murav'ev 
as  "Napoleonistic"  and  "...  an  adventurous  scoundrel  and  nothing  more.  His  Left 
SRism  was  completely  false,  serving  only  as  a  label  for  hirn",  '  36  but  the  revolt 
coincided  with  the  Left  SR  uprising  of  6th  July  in  Moscow.  Murav'ev  ordered  an 
Eastern  Front  offensive  on  this  day  to  disguise  and  prepare  his  coup.  He  intended  to 
win  control  of  the  Volga  area  either  to  aid  the  Left  SR  rising  or,  as  Tukhachevsky  and 
Chistov  suggest,  to  use  this  to  his  own  advantage  and  set  up  his  own  "Independent 
Volga  Republic") 
. 
137 
With  the  fall  of  Samara,  Simbirsk  was  crucial  for  the  Reds  in  the  East,  guarding 
the  railway  line  westwards  to  the  Red  interior  and  the  Volga  to  Kazan'  and  the  north. 
The  Simbirsk  Communist  Party  was  small  compared  to  the  Left  SRs,  who  held 
several  important  posts  in  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Simbirsk  Province  Soviet, 
such  as  Head  of  Simbirsk  Army  Group  (Klim  Ivanov)  and  Province  Military 
Commissar  (Nedashkovskii).  138  With  Murav'ev,  they  recruited  voenspetsy  loyal  to 
their  Party,  which  proved  crucial  in  the  days  after  Murav'ev's  uprising  as  mass 
betrayals  aided  the  Komuch  advance  on  Simbirsk.  139 
The  Simbirsk  Bolshevik  Party's  first  step  to  recovering  their  position,  vis-a-vis  the 
Left  SRs,  was  the  arrival  in  May  1918  of  1.  M.  Vareikis,  a  24  year-old  locksmith- 
134  A.  P.  Nenarokov,  Vostochniifront  1918,  (Moscow,  1969),  p.  100;  1.1.  Mints,  Grazhdanskaia  voina 
vpovolzh'e.  -  1918-1920gg,  (Kazan',  1974),  p.  63;  E.  1.  Medvedev,  p.  145.  These  sources  suggest 
Murav'ev,  when  Supreme  Commander,  kept  in  close  contact  with  and  acted  through  only  the  narrow 
circle  of  Left  SRs  he  had  secured  military  postings  for.  He  instructed  them  to  hinder  reorganisational 
work  within  the  Red  Army  in  the  period  before  his  revolt.  However,  Nenarokov  writes  there  is  no  hard 
evidence  these  actions  were  carried  out  on  the  instructions  of  or  in  concert  with  the  Left  SR  CC  in 
Moscow. 
135E. 
1.  Medvedev,  p.  147. 
136  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  anniia  v  1918  godu",  Iibrannyeproizvedenda,  Vol.  1,1919-1927,  p. 
76. 
137  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatslia  v  dni  grazhdanskoi  voiny",  1918  god  na  rodine  Lenina, 
(Kuibyshev,  1936),  (hereafter  1918  god),  pp.  64-65;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervala  an-niia  v  1918 
godu",  p.  76. 
138  V.  M.  Kadyshev,  "Iz  perezhitogo",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  155;  B.  I.  Chistov,  1918  god,  p.  65;  B. 
1.  Chistov,  Sinibirskaia  guberniia,  p.  173. 
139G.  D.  Kauchukovskii,  "Simbirskie  bolsheviki  i  avantiura.  Murav'eva",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p. 
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toolmaker,  who  became  head  of  the  Simbirsk  Town  Party  Organisation.  140 
Kauchukovskii,  a  20  year-old  technician,  became  secretary.  141  With  the  help  of 
Podvoiskii,  who  was  in  Simbirsk  whilst  touring  Volga  Region  as  Head  of  VVI,  142  and 
Oskar  lu.  Kalnins,  who  arrived  at  Inza  on  14th  June  to  became  Ist  Army  Political 
Commissar  on  16th  June,  143  Vareikis  worked  to  strengthen  the  Bolshevik's  military 
position.  On  22nd  June,  Simbirsk  Party  Committee  instructed  its  Military 
Commission  to  select  Communists  to  form  a  political  apparatus  under  the  Staff  of 
Simbirsk  Army  Group,  which  was  being  created  for  Ist  Army.  '  44  Amongst  those 
selected  were  B.  1.  Chistov,  Pershin,  S.  M.  lzmailov  (Head  of  Communications)  and 
K.  S.  Shelenshkevich  (Head  of  Transport  Department).  145  Lavrov,  who  had  just 
arrived  from  Kazan'  with  an  RVS  mandate  for  service,  became  Simbirsk  Group 
Political  Commissar.  Samara  Revolutionary  Committee  members,  who  had  arrived  in 
Simbirsk  on  9th  June  after  the  fall  of  Samara,  were  drafted  into  the  Staff.  146 
Podvoiskii  appointed  Kuibyshev,  Chairman  of  Samara  Revolutionary  Committee,  as 
Ist  Army  Political  Commissar.  147  Working  closely,  the  Simbirsk  and  Samara 
Bolsheviks  formed  I  st  and  2nd  Simbirsk  Regiments.  148 
The  Simbirsk  Communists  strove  to  gain  more  influence  than  the  Left  SRs  in  the 
local  institutions  as  relations  deteriorated  in  the  East.  The  tightening  up  of  Simbirsk 
Party  Organisation,  launching  of  armed  patrols  in  Simbirsk  and  agitation  in  the 
surrounding  countryside  were  steps  in  the  right  direction,  but  crucial  to  supremacy 
was  control  of  Ist  Soviet  Army.  The  formation  of  the  two  regular  Simbirsk 
Regiments,  headed  by  the  new  Staff,  helped  redress  Left  SR  dominance  of  the 
140  A.  M.  Ural'tsev,  "Ego  ukrashala  skronmost",  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  soratnikov  i 
druzei,  p.  102. 
141  Ibid.  p.  102;  G.  D.  Kauchukovskii,  p.  122. 
142  B.  1.  Chistov,  "V  tiazhelye  dni  obrony  Simbirska",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  173;  DGkKA,  p.  794, 
endnote  19. 
143  Geroi  grazhdanskoi  voiny.  Sbornik,  (Moscow,  1974),  p.  17;  DkfKA,  Tom  I,  p.  533. 
144  The  "Special  Party  Military  Comission"  was  selected  on  I  st  June  at  a  General  Meeting  of  the 
Simbirsk  Communists,  where  Vareikis  passed  the  resolution  to  forrn  a  "Military  Detachment"  under 
the  Simbirsk  Party  Committee.  The  Military  Commission  of  Zvirbul',  Oleinik,  Neiland,  Shver  and 
Chistov  were  to  organise  this,  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  pp.  47-48. 
"'  Ibid,  p.  53. 
146  Ibid,  p.  47. 
147  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  573  -  The  exact  date  for  Kuibyshev  taking  this  post  is  given  as  15th  July  1918, 
after  the  Murav'ev  Revolt,  but  it  is  highly  likely  he  was  working  unofficially  in  this  capacity,  as 
Chistov  suggests,  before  this  date. 
148  B.  1.  Chistov,  -V  tiazhelye  dni...  ",  pp.  173-174. 94 
unregulated,  partisan  Simbirsk  Army  Group  and  Extraordinary  Staff,  149  but  the  Left 
SRs  still  tried  to  hold  onto  the  important  posts,  counter-acting  any  Bolshevik 
influence  from  new  postings.  Also,  although  the  Bolshevik  P.  Smimov  became 
Commander  of  2nd  Simbirsk  Regiment  and  the  Left  SR,  lagodin,  Commander  of  lst 
Simbirsk  Regiment,  this  seemingly  fair  distribution  was  undermined  by  the  existing 
town  militia  being  drafted  into  Ist  Battalion  of  Ist  Regiment,  ensuring  Left  SR 
control  of  the  best  troops,  if  necessary,  for  use  against  the  Bolsheviks.  '  50 
The  crucial  post  was  still  held  by  the  Left  SR  Kharchenko  as  1  st  Army 
Commander.  Therefore,  the  arrival  of  Tukhachevsky  in  Kazan'  on  25th  June,  a 
"commander-communist"  with  excellent  credentials  and  recommendations,  was 
viewed  as  a  godsend  by  Vareikis  and  Kalnins.  Chistov  notes  that  Kalnins,  "exposed 
Kharchenko  as  a  traitor",  151  which  is  perhaps  slightly  inaccurate  at  this  exact  time, 
with  Murav'ev  securing  Kharchenko  another  posting  as  2nd  Army  Commander,  from 
3rd-18th  July,  before  the  latter  defected  to  the  Whites  during  their  later  advance  on 
Simbirsk.  152  However,  Kalnins  did  succeed  in  convincing  Kobozev  and  Blagonravov 
in  Eastern  Front  RVS  of  the  need  to  replace  Kharchenko.  1  53  In  this  way,  the 
candidature  of  Tukhachevsky,  the  right  man  in  the  right  place,  at  the  right  time,  was 
forced  on  Murav'ev.  Murav'ev  was  probably  not  too  disappointed  at  Tukhachevsky's 
appointment,  believing  he  could  win  over  the  former  "noble"  officer.  154 
Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  was  a  man  both  sides  felt  they  could  use,  meaning  no 
opposition  was  raised  to  him  becoming  Ist  An-ny  Commander.  Chistov  recounts 
Vareikis  introducing  lst  Army  Commander  Tukhachevsky  to  him  on  3rd  July  1918 
and  registering  him  with  Simbirsk  Party  Organisation.  He  recalls,  "When  I  told 
friends  at  the  Communist  Club  later  of  Tukhachevsky's  visit  to  the  Party  Committee 
149  Th  is  headed  Simbirsk  Army  Group  and  had  been  formed  on  31  st  May  by  the  Province  Executive 
Committee.  The  Military  Commissar  of  Simbirsk  Province,  Gladyshev  reported,  "At  the  head  of  the 
Staff,  Military  Commissar  of  Simbirsk  Province  Ivanov,  Chief  of  Staff  Pen'evskii,  members  of  staff: 
Freiman,  Gol'man,  lzmailov,  Gladyshev  and  Dolnikov",  1918  god  na  rodine  Lenina,  p.  322. 
150  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  p.  53. 
151  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandarm-Kommunist",  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  druzei  i 
soratnikoi,,  (Moscow,  1965),  pp.  33-34. 
152  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  534. 
1530.  lu.  Kalnin,  p.  38. 
15'  Murav'ev  did  try  this  at  Simbirsk  on  10th  July  after  Tukhachevsky  had  reacted  with  derision  to  his 
plans  stating,  "Lieutenant  Tukhachevsky,  you  are  a  Russian  landowner!  I  promise  you  any  responsible 
post  in  the  armies,  which  I  shall  organise  on  the  Volga  unifying  the  Red  Army  with  the  Czechs",  B.  I. 
Chistov,  "Komandarm-Kommunist",  p.  42. 95 
they  took  it  almost  as  victory  on  the  Front.  And  indeed  it  was  a  victory  over  the  Left 
SRs  for  position  in  the  Army".  155 
The  arrival  of  Tukhachevsky  and  Kuibyshev  began  the  second  period  In  the 
formation  of  I  st  Army,  156  when  real,  effective  organisational  work  commenced, 
transforming  it  from  a  partisan  to  a  regular  force.  Tukhachevsky  travelled  to 
Simbirsk,  arriving  there  on  3rd  July,  after  appraising  Ist  Army's  condition  and 
assessing  the  need  for  urgent  mobilisation  of  a  command  staff  to  bind  together  the 
variegated  Red  forces.  He  and  Vareikis  did  this  the  next  day,  but  proper 
reorganisation  of  Red  units  in  Simbirsk  Province  into  a  regular  army  was  impossible 
in  early  July. 
The  Czechoslovaks,  with  virtual  control  of  Siberia,  tried  to  extend  this  with  their 
Southern  Urals  and  Volga  Groups.  Therefore,  Red  units,  instead  of  pulling  back  for 
reorganisation  and  regrouping,  were  constantly  forced  into  skirmishes  to  prevent 
further  advances.  This  hindered  reorganisation,  meaning  the  scattered,  partisan  nature 
that  the  Red  High  Command  was  so  anxious  to  extinguish,  remained.  In  this  state, 
hindering  the  organised  Czechoslovak  forces  was  possible,  but  Eastern  Front  could 
never  hope  to  match  or  defeat  them.  In  late  June  however,  in  an  effort  to  stop  the 
Czechoslovaks'  advance,  the  RVS  were  forced  to  try,  ordering  counter-attacks  to 
crush  the  Czechoslovak  Groups  in  the  Volga  Region  at  Samara  and  in  the  Urals  at 
Cheliabinsk. 
The  main  thrust  of  the  offensive  was  to  concentrate  on  Samara,  Komuch's  base, 
but  Tukhachevsky  recorded,  this  "simple  task  was  expressed  by  Murav'ev  in  the  form 
of  a  fantastic  and  completely  impracticable  plan".  157  Murav'ev  was  laying  the 
foundations  for  his  revolt.  Northern-Ural-Siberian  Front  was  ordered  to  move  on 
Omsk,  Cheliabinsk  and  Kysht  on  20th  and  23rd  June.  158  On  the  Volga,  Osobaia  Army 
at  Saratov,  was  instructed  on  20th  June  to  move  towards  Samara,  Buzuluk  and 
Ural'sk.  159  It  was  then  to  continue  north-east  to  Orenburg.  160  Also  on  20th  June,  Ufa 
Military  Detachment  was  to  advance  towards  Samara,  occupying  Miass,  or  digging  in 
155  lbid,  p.  33. 
156  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  p.  52;  V.  V.  Kuibyshev,  "Pervaia  revoliutsionnaia  anniia", 
Simbirskaia  gubernil'a,  p.  42. 
157  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armiia  v  1918",  p.  75. 
158  DkfKA,  Toni  I,  docs.  329  &  333,  pp.  388-389. 
159  lbid,  doc.  328,  pp.  387-388. 96 
before  it,  if  it  was  occupied.  161  On  23rd  June,  2nd  Army,  was  ordered  to  take  Buzuluk 
and  combine  with  Osobaia  Army's  left  flank  at  Nikolaevsk,  162  then  coordinate  with 
3rd  Army  at  Cheliabinsk.  163  Ist  Army  was  to  attack  along  an  initially  wide  front 
stretching  from  Kuznetsk-  Sengi  lei-Bugul'ma,  gradually  closing  a  pincer  movement 
around  Syzran'  and  Samara,  with  troops  moving  from  Surgut  and  Bugul'ma,  cutting 
the  Czechoslovaks'  line  of  retreat  from  Samara  to  Ufa.  Tukhachevsky  relates  this 
elaborate  plan,  which  envisaged  the  Czechoslovaks  in  Samara  and  Cheliabinsk 
relying  on  each  other,  was  a  complete  miscalculation.  The  Czechoslovaks  in  Samara 
were  well-fortified  and  self-sufficient.  Splitting  Red  forces  to  attack  from  different 
areas,  with  no  effective  communications  for  coordination,  simply  meant  the 
Czechoslovaks  could  handle  them  separately.  '  64  Therefore,  the  Red  forces  were  easily 
encircled  and  wiped  out.  165 
This  offensive  came  too  early  for  the  Reds,  which  although  on  paper  divided  into 
I  st,  2nd,  3rd  and  Osobaia  Armies  and  occupying  distinct  areas  by  28th  June,  166  were 
still  an  amalgam  of  partisans,  Red  Guards  and  workers.  Only  the  scattered  Latvians 
were  organised.  In  Simbirsk  Province  alone,  Ist  Army  encapsulated  80  units, 
numbering  between  20-250  bayonets  each,  spread  out,  not  cooperating  and  still  in 
their  eshelony,  167  despite  instructions  from  Murav'ev  and  Blagonravov  on  24th  June  to 
find  alternative  transport.  '  68  This  limited  any  military  action.  These  problems  are 
well-illustrated  by  the  telegram  sent  by  Northern-Ural-  Siberian  Front  Commander 
Berzin  on  I  st  July  reporting,  "The  Czechoslovaks  are  attacking  along  the  whole  front. 
Reserves  and  artillery  are  essential...  I  ask  for  the  transfer  to  us  of  Moscow  or  Gomel' 
Regiment.  Mobilisation  is  impossible  here".  169  Lack  of  manpower  and  the  poor 
standard  of  existing  Red  forces,  combined  with  peasant  support  for  the 
Czechoslovaks,  meant  the  Reds  struggled  to  hold  them,  far  less  counter-attack. 
However,  Ist  Army  made  some  progress  under  Tukhachevsky  before  Murav'ev 
rebelled.  On  assuming  command,  Tukhachevsky  received  a  detailed  plan  of  Ist 
160  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  anniia  v  1918",  p.  77. 
16  1  DkfKA,  tom  I,  doc.  330,  p.  388. 
162  Ibid,  doc.  332,  p.  389. 
163  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armiia  v  1918",  p.  77. 
164  Ibid. 
165  0.  lu.  KaInin,  p.  38. 
166  DkfKA,  Tom  I,  doc.  336,  pp.  392-393. 
167 
N.  1.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny...  ",  p.  64. 
168 
DkfKA  Tom  I,  doc.  334,  p.  390. 
169DkJKA,  Tom  I,  doc.  337,  pp.  392-393. 97 
Arrny's  role.  He  was  to  divide  his  8,000  men  into  seven  columns,  which  were  to 
attack  simultaneously  along  a  front  of  300  versty.  The  main  attack  was  to  be  made  by 
a  column  containing  only  800  bayonets,  starting  from  Melekess  and  Musorka  and 
advancing  through  Stavropol'  to  Samara.  170  The  other  six  columns  would  conduct 
diversionary  attacks,  whilst  surrounding  Samara  at  a  radius  of  150  versty.  This  was 
how  Murav'ev  proposed  Tukhachevsky  take  a  well-fortified  town  containing  over 
5,000  Czechoslovaks.  Red  forces  were  to  attack  by  rail  from  Syzran',  which  would 
have  been  costly,  and  overland  across  sandy,  partially  wooded  steppeland,  when  no 
form  of  transport  for  this  existed.  Seeing  the  potential  for  disaster,  Tukhachevsky 
radically  altered  the  plan.  17  1  He  decided  to  transport  the  main  attacking  force, 
Simbirsk  Division,  in  boats  up  the  Volga  and  up  each  river  bank  with  both  cavalry 
and  armoured-cars,  to  attack  the  most  advanced  White  group  around  Usol'e-Musorka- 
Stavropol'  and  then  onto  Samara.  The  smaller  Inza  and  Penza  Divisions  were  to  cover 
the  flanks  with  diversionary  attacks  on  Syzran'  and  Bugul'ma.  172  Tukhachevsky 
calculated  Ist  Army  would  be  operational  by  15th  July,  173  but  was  ordered  to  launch 
the  offensive  nine  days  earlier.  Chistov  suggests  Murav'ev  did  this  deliberately  to 
inflict  defeat  upon  the  unorganised  Red  troops,  even  mixing  up  the  operational 
maps,  174  but  a  Red  counter-attack  was  essential  at  this  point.  A  renewed  attack  by  the 
Czechoslovaks  from  Samara  towards  Ufa  and  Cheliabinsk  had  witnessed  their 
occupation  of  Sergievsk,  Birsk,  Sterlitamak,  Bugul'ma  and  other  towns,  on  their  way 
to  uniting  with  the  Czechoslovak  Siberian  Group  at  Zlatoust.  175  This  opened  up  I  st 
Army's  left  flank  and  threatened  the  entire  Red  position.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky 
was  ordered  on  6th  July  to  retake  Bugul'ma  and  attack  Czechoslovak  forces  along  the 
Volgo-Bugul'ma  Railway.  176 
On  the  same  day,  Kalnins  reported  to  the  Eastern  Front  R  VS  Political  Department 
(Politotdeo, 
170  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  p.  60. 
171  1.1.  Mints,  p.  64;  E.  1.  Medvedev,  p.  146.  These  sources  suggest  Tukhachevsky  drew  up  the  first 
plan  of  attack,  which  Murav'ev  then  altered,  but  Tukhachevsky's  version  is  that  he  had  to  change  the 
Murav'ev  plan. 
172  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armila  v  1918",  pp.  78-79;  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  pp. 
60-61. 
173  BpPRA,  doc.  10,  p.  3  2. 
174  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandarm-Konu-nunist",  p.  38. 
175N.  E.  Kakurin,  Kak  srazhalasrevoliuaiia,  Tom  1,191  7-1918gg,  (Moscow,  1990),  p.  198. 
176 
DkIKA.  Tom  I,  doc.  340,  p.  394. 98 
Inza  Division  under  the  command  of  comrade  Lacis  has  seized  the  left 
flank  up  to  Syzran'-Zaborovka.  Penza  Division  has  occupied  the  right 
flank  from  Zaborovka  to  the  Volga.  Mood  of  the  units,  operating  at 
Syzran',  hearty.  Everyone  fully  believes  in  victory  over  the  enemy.  "' 
Taking  Syzran',  the  first  Red  victory,  gave  the  opportunity  to  attack  on  a  wider 
front  than  had  been  possible  in  June,  with  the  Red  line  stretching  some  30  versty. 
However,  the  undisciplined  nature  of  the  Red  troops  took  over  with  drunkenness 
breaking  out.  In  an  effort  to  combat  this,  Kalnins  and  Lacis  ordered  an  immediate 
attack  to  Batravka  Station,  from  where  the  Whites  were  still  able  to  shell  Syzran'. 
However,  Murav'ev  at  this  point  recalled  the  International  Regiment,  which  was 
serving  with  Inza  Division,  to  Simbirsk,  leaving  insufficient  troops  to  hold  the  line. 
The  Czechoslovaks  counter-attacked  at  Zaborovka,  forcing  Inza  Division  back  with 
the  undisciplined  Red  troops  panicking  under  shellfire.  1  78  Tukhachevsky  sent  two 
telegrams  from  I  st  Army  HQ  at  Inza  Station  on  8th  July,  the  first  to  Kuliabko  stating, 
"Carefully  prepared  operation  of  lst  Army  has  been  completed  brilliantly.  The 
Czechoslovaks  were  beaten  and  Syzran'  taken  with  a  battle".  179  He  also  sent  a 
congratulatory  telegram  to  Ist  Army  Groups  reporting,  "Today,  8th  July,  at  8.00  in 
the  morning,  Syzran'  was  occupied  by  the  brave  revolutionary  units  of  Inza  and 
Penza  Divisions  after  stubborn  resistance  from  the  Czechoslovaks  and  White  Guards. 
The  pursued  enemy  in  a  panic  is  fleeing  to  Samara".  180 
However,  the  success  of  the  two  supporting  groups  was  limited  by  further 
treachery  on  Murav'ev's  part,  giving  orders  over  Tukhachevsky's  head, 
countermanding  directions  given  by  Tukhachevsky  to  his  forces.  The  main  attack 
group  was  to  contain  Ist  Kursk  Broneviki  Armoured  Division,  but  this  had  been 
withheld  by  Murav'ev  since  9th-  I  Oth  June,  when  it  was  ordered  to  travel  from  Kazan' 
via  Ruzaevsk  to  Samara,  to  help  retake  the  town  from  the  Whites  and  Czechoslovaks. 
However,  Murav'ev  continually  redirected  it  around  the  rear  stations,  keeping  it  out 
of  the  firing-line,  for  later  use  in  his  coup.  In  this  way,  the  Broneviki,  commanded  by 
a  Left  SR  Beretti,  arrived  in  Simbirsk  on  8th  July  to  participate  in  the  offensive,  but 
was  instructed  by  Klim  Ivanov  to  remain  in  Simbirsk,  under  Murav'ev's  direct 
command,  contrary  to  Tukhachevsky's  order  for  them  to  reinforce  the  offensive  on 
177  BpPRA,  doe.  5,  p.  27. 
1780. 
lu.  Kalnin,  pp.  38-39. 
179  N.  N.  Kullabko,  p.  29. 
180  BpPRA,  doe.  6,  pp.  27-28. 99 
Usol'e  and  Stavropol  1.18  1  Therefore,  on  9th  July,  even  as  Pravda  printed  news  of  Ist 
Army's  success  in  taking  Bugul'ma  and  Syzran'  and  their  imminent  capture  of 
Stavropol',  182  Tukhachevsky  had  to  leave  Inza  for  Simbirsk  to  find  out  what  was 
going  on.  The  next  morning,  en  route  at  Kindiakovka  Station,  he  wrote  a  scathing 
report  to  be  sent  to  Muravev. 
I  am  going  to  Inza-Syzran'.  Syzran'  is  abandoned.  I  still  wanted  to  begin 
an  offensive  yesterday,  but  the  armoured  division  was  forbidden  to 
advance  by  you,  and  therefore  our  attack  on  Usol'e  and  Stavropol'  was 
conducted  only  by  sparse  cavalry  units.  My  independence  is  completely 
impossible  with  such  interference  as  you  give. 
It  is  visibly  better  for  me  on  the  spot,  to  see  how  things  need  to  be  done. 
Give  me  tasks  and  they  will  be  fulfilled,  but  don't  give  me  methods  -  this 
is  impracticable...  Armies  are  bound  by  regulations...  they  receive  only 
tasks  and  directives  of  the  most  general  character.  Even  to  give  orders  to 
armies  is  avoided.  You  command  for  me  and  even  for  my  divisional 
commanders. 
Perhaps,  this  was  called  for  with  previous  inefficient  commanders,  but 
it  seems  to  me,  that  until  now  I  have  not  summoned  your  dissatisfaction  in 
this  respect  ... 
1  83 
Murav'ev's  order  to  the  Broneviki  to  remain  in  Simbirsk  was  his  final  preparation  and 
signalled  the  beginning  of  his  revolt  proper. 
Such  subversive  activity  or  conversely  inactivity  was  commonplace  amongst 
Murav'ev's  appointees  and  was  a  major  factor  behind  the  Red  defeats  in  late 
June/early  July.  Kharchenko  was  heavily  criticised  in  the  telegram  sent  to  him  at  Inza 
on  26th  June,  the  day  he  was  replaced  by  Tukhachevsky.  This  stated, 
Penza  Army  Group  is  heroically  attacking  and  driving  the  enemy  out  of 
Syzran'.  It  is  a  disgrace  that  Inza  Group  is  not  supporting  their  comrades. 
18  1  F.  M.  Ivanov,  Pyrkov,  M.  P.  &  Seluianov,  A.  S.,  "Rol'Kurskogo  bronedivisiona  v  likvidatsii 
avantiury  Murav'eva",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  14  1;  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  p.  62. 
182  BpPRA,  doc.  7,  pp.  28-29. 
183  TsGASA,  f,  157,  op.  3,  d.  39,11.59-59,  in  A.  P.  Nenarokov,  pp.  103-104;  1.1.  Mints,  pp.  64-65, 
these  sources  date  this  telegram  as  I  st  July.  However,  Chistov  suggests  I  Oth  July  (with  no  archival 
reference  given)  as  the  date  of  this  telegram,  with  Tukhachevsky  writing  it  in  his  command  train  on  his 
way  to  Simbirsk  to  meet  Murav'ev.  This  date  is  echoed  by  various  Soviet  biographers.  10th  July 
appears  to  be  the  date  which  fits  in  with  events,  with  Tukhachevsky  in  Inza  on  28th  June  and  then 
travelling  to  Simbirsk  and  arriving  there  on  3rd  July.  There  is  no  evidence  he  led  an  offensive  between 
these  dates  and  this  seems  unlikely,  since  I  st  Army  at  Inza  was  in  disarray,  in  no  fit  state  to  attack  and 
had  no  organised  command  staff.  Hence  Tukhachevsky  went  to  Simbirsk  to  raise  this.  The  order  to 
attack  Bugul'ma  on  6th  July  was  the  first  offensive  order  he  received  and  therefore,  it  would  appear  the 
telegram  criticising  Murav'ev  fits  in  with  the  offensive  starting  on  7th  July,  B.  I.  Chistov, 
"Komandarrn-Kommunist",  pp.  40-4  1;  1918  god  na  rodine  Lenina,  p.  63;  L.  Rakovskii,  Mikhail 
Tukhachci,  Aý,  -  Povest,  (Leningrad,  1967),  pp.  169-170;  Iu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  pp.  71- 
72;  V.  M.  Ivanov,  p.  43. 100 
I  order:  immediately,  move  forwards,  to  occupy  Zaborovka  Station, 
establishing  links  on  the  right  with  Penza  Group  through  Rep'evka,  and  on 
the  left  with  Simbirsk  Group  through  Goriushka.  1  84 
That  Murav'ev  had  to  send  this  to  his  own  trusted  appointee  shows  the  tricky 
position  he  and  his  cohorts  occupied,  planning  the  coup,  whilst  appearing  to  lead  Red 
forces  loyally,  if  incompetently.  That  this  charade  was  successfully  maintained  has 
already  been  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Murav'ev  secured  Kharchenko  the  position  of 
2nd  Army  Commander.  The  plot  thickens  further  as  Kharchenko  replaced  F.  E. 
Makhin,  a  Right  SR  and  another  Murav'ev  appointee, 
185 
who  lasted  barely  a  week, 
186 
before  defecting  to  the  Whites  himself  187  Makhin  had  only  become  2nd  Army 
Commander  after  Murav'ev  was  forced  to  remove  lakovlev  from  this  post  on  26th 
June  for  inaction  and  a  general  failure  to  organise  Red  troops  or  prepare  defensive 
positions,  188  very  similar  "shortcomings"  to  those  displayed  by  Kharchenko. 
However,  Murav'ev  again  succeeded  in  retaining  his  accomplice,  appointing  him  to 
the  RVS  Staff,  then  as  2nd  Army  Political  Commissar  on  3rd.  July  under 
Kharchenko.  1  89  lakovlev  defected  in  early  July,  as  did  Mel'nikov  and  Voronov, 
commanders  of  Sengilei  sector  and  Simbirsk  Communist  Detachment  respectively.  190 
With  such  incompetence  from  his  subordinates,  Murav'ev  himself  did  not  escape 
suspicion.  Tukhachevsky  sent  a  telegram  to  Moscow  at  the  end  of  June,  complaining 
that  Murav'ev  was  deliberately  hindering,  "essential  work  in  organising  First 
Army".  191  After  the  Left  SR  Revolt  in  Moscow,  Mekhonoshin,  by  now  in  Eastern 
Front  R  VS,  questioned  Murav'ev  over  his  loyalties,  with  the  latter  replying  he  had  left 
the  Left  SRs.  Upon  receiving  this  news  on  7th  July,  Lenin  ordered  Mekhonoshin  to, 
"Record  Murav'ev's  report  about  his  leaving  the  Left  SR  Party,  maintain  vigilant 
184 
DkfK,  4,  Tom  I,  doc.  335,  p.  391. 
185B.  1.  Chistov,  "Kommandarm-Kommunist",  p.  32,  Murav'ev  had  appointed  Makhin  Head  of  the 
Defence  of  Ufa.  He  also  led  Ufa  Military  Detachment  which  combined  with  Orenburg  Military 
Detachment,  under  lakovlev,  to  form  2nd  Army.  Chistov  blames  Makhin's  and  Kharchenko's 
treachery  for  the  fall  of  Ufa  on  5th  July. 
186 
DkfY,  4,  Tom  IV,  p.  534. 
187 
1.1.  Mints,  p.  63. 
188  E.  1.  Medvedev,  p.  9  1;  This  same  lakovlev  had  failed  to  organise  any  Red  resistance  to  the 
Czechoslovaks  whilst  Supreme  Commander  of  Orenburg-Ural  Front.  He  left  Samara  for  Kinel'  with 
lils  staff  and  did  nothing  to  prevent  the  Czechoslovak  advances.  Traitorous  behaviour  was  also  in 
evidence  here  in  May  at  the  start  of  the  Czechoslovak  Uprising,  L  1.  Mints,  p.  40. 
189  1.1.  Mints,  p.  63. 
190  DkfK4,  Toni  I,  p.  774  (note  95);  B.  1.  Chistov  1918  god  na  rodine  Lenina,  p.  60. 
"I  TsGAK,  4,  f.  157,  op.  3,  d.  26,  pp.  174-175,  in  E.  1.  Medvedev,  p.  145. 101 
control...  The  struggle  with  the  Czechoslovaks  and  Cossacks  must  be  conducted  with 
threefold  energy".  192 
A  message  from  Sovnarkom  Secretary  N.  P.  Gorbunov  to  Eastern  Front  Staff 
followed,  warning,  "Comrade  Lenin  asks  you  to  transmit  the  following:  The  Left  SRs 
were  bragging  they  are  counting  on  Murav'ev...  I  instruct  you  to  establish  threefold 
control  over  Murav'ev".  193 
Therefore,  Tukhachevsky's  complaint  was  acted  upon,  displaying  his  rising 
stature.  This  was  the  first  of  several  episodes  during  the  Civil  War  involving 
Tukhachevsky  appealling  directly  to  Moscow  about  his  commanding  officers.  Trust  in 
Murav'ev  was  visibly  waning  from  the  end  of  June,  but  with  no  suitable  replacement 
and  fighting  continuing,  the  Reds  had  to  retain  him  and  watch  for  signs  of  treachery, 
if  they  arose.  Also  retained  were  Murav'ev-appointed  voenspetsy  on  I  st  Army  Staff. 
As  Kalnins  recalled,  "From  a  number  of  in  all  60-70  staff,  not  including  Kobozev  and 
Blagonravov,  there  were  four  communists  and  3  "Left"  SRs.  All  the  remainder  were 
"specialists"',  who  were  selected  by  Supreme  Commander  Murav'ev".  194  These  were 
all  men  loyal  to  him. 
With  such  treacherous  leadership,  it  is  not  surprising  the  Red  counter-offensive 
failed  and  the  Czechoslovaks  continued  to  make  ground  on  all  fronts,  with  local 
uprisings  provoked  by  SR,  Menshevik  and  White  agitators  contributing.  195  This  was 
exactly  as  Murav'ev  had  planned.  Loyal  Red  forces  were  split  into  small,  weak  groups 
which  could  be  easily  defeated  by  the  Czechoslovaks,  leaving  those  formations 
headed  by  Left  SRs  or  which  Murav'ev  felt  he  could  control,  in  the  rear  and 
unharmed.  196 
On  9th  July  Murav'ev  attempted  to  take  control  of  Eastern  Front  RVS  HQ  in 
Kazan',  but  was  arrested.  Escaping,  he  secretly  left  the  town  aboard  the  steamship 
Mezhen.  1  97  He  sailed  to  Simbirsk,  arriving  during  the  evening  of  10th  July,  198  with 
192  V.  1.  Lenin,  p.  64. 
193  E.  N.  Medvedev,  p.  148. 
1940.  Iu.  Kalnin,  p.  34. 
195  DkfK.  4,  Tom  I,  doc.  341,  pp.  394  &  774,  note. 
1960.  lu.  Kalnin,  p.  38;  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandann-Kommunist",  p.  38. 
197  The  Mezhen  was  formerly  the  Tsarina's  royal  yacht.  Murav'ev  had  earlier  commandeered  it  as  his 
mobile  HQ,  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandan-n-Komunist",  p.  41. 
198  Vareikis  gives  the  exact  time  of  arrival  as  7.00  pm  in  his  memoirs  of  the  affair,  whilst  Kuibyshev  in 
his  official  report  to  Sovnarkom  at  the  time  gave  the  time  as  9.00  pm,  1.  M.  Vareikis,  "Ubiistvo 
Murav'eva",  1918  god,  p.  5;  TsAOR,  f.  1235,  d.  525,  op.  52,  in  1918  god,  p.  330. 102 
600  men  comprising  his  Yugoslavian  bodyguards  and  Ufa  Detachment  under 
Khlebnikov,  to  add  to  the  International  Regiment  and  Broneviki  already  there.  199 
Murav'ev  summoned  the  Simbirsk  Soviet  Praesidium  to  the  Mezhen  and,  with  no 
warning  rom  Kazan'  of  the  previous  day's  events,  several  members  obeyed.  200  Those 
who  arrived  were  arrested  and  imprisoned  on  the  ship,  including  Chistov,  S.  A 
lzmailov  and  Cheka  Chairman  Levin.  201  Muravev  despatched  his  adjutant 
Chudoshvili  to  fetch  Tukhachevsky,  who  duly  arrived  at  the  yacht. 
The  Supreme  Commander's  arrival  worried  Tukhachevsky  as  he  feared  Murav'ev 
was  planning  to  direct  the  Red  offensive  himself  and  would  discover  Tukhachevsky 
had  disobeyed  his  orders  and  completely  altered  the  offensive  plan.  Worse  though 
was  the  possibility  Muravev  would  reinstate  his  original  suicidal  plan.  202  However, 
when  Tukhachevsky  boarded  the  Mezhen,  he  relayed  his  critical  report  of  the  previous 
day.  Murav'ev  listened,  then  informed  Tukhachevsky  it  no  longer  mattered,  as  war 
had  again  broken  out  with  Germany  and  they  must  ally  with  the  Czechoslovaks  who 
were  fighting  for  the  Anglo-French  and  Americans.  Tukhachevsky  disagreed,  stating 
if  war  had  started  against  Germany,  Red  forces  must  immediately  strive  to  defeat  the 
Czechoslovaks  and  Whites  on  the  Volga  to  guarantee  the  Red  Army's  rear.  203  When 
Murav'ev  then  appealed  to  Tukhachevsky's  "noble"  roots,  204  asking  him  to  counter- 
sign  his  order  to  the  Czechoslovak  Legion  to  turn  their  eshelony  westwards  to  reopen 
the  Great  War  Eastern  Front,  Tukhachevsky  branded  him  a  traitor  and  was  arrested. 
Murav'ev  did  not  imprison  Tukhachevsky  with  the  other  Bolsheviks  on  the 
Mezhen,  but  took  him  to  Simbirsk-I  Station  where  the  Broneviki  were  assembled. 
Murav'ev  announced  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Germany  to  the  Kursk  Armoured 
Division,  promised  them  10,000  roubles  apiece  if  they  backed  him  and  stated  he  had 
arrested  Tukhachevsky  who,  with  Simbirsk  Soviet  Deputies,  had  wanted  to  arrest  and 
execute  the  Broneviki  Commander  Beretti.  At  this,  some  of  the  Broneviki  demanded 
199  TsAOR,  f,  1235,  d.  525,  op.  52,  in  1918  god,  p.  330;  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Partorganizatsiia...  ",  p.  67.  The 
Ufa  Detachment  had  of  course  been  under  the  leadership  of  Makhin  and  lakovlev  and  by  this  point,  as 
part  of  the  2nd  Army,  was  under  Kharchenko.  The  counter-revolutionary  agitation  by  these  three 
towards  the  Bolsheviks  perhaps  explains  why  the  troops  followed  Murav'ev  initially. 
200  The  sources  in  Simbirskaia  guberniia  attach  a  great  deal  of  mystery  to  why  no  warning  came  from 
Kazan'. 
201  1.  M.  Vareikis,  p.  6. 
202  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armiia  v  1918  gody",  p.  79. 
203  Tukhachevsky  had  outlined  this  plan  of  action  to  Vareikis  only  three  days  before,  after  leaming  of 
the  Left  SR  assassination  of  the  German  Ambassador  Mirbach  in  Moscow  and  the  possibility  this 
could  lead  to  a  renewed  war,  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandarm-Komunist",  p.  39. 103 
Tukhachevsky's  execution,  but  curiously  Murav'ev  refused.  Instead  Tukhachevsky 
was  imprisoned  in  the  Broneviki  eshelon  at  Simbirsk-1,  guarded  by  two  Broneviki  and 
several  Red  Army  men.  Possibly  Murav'ev  was  attempting  to  get  Tukhachevsky  on 
side,  reprieving  him  from  execution,  thereby  winning  him  over  through  fear  or 
gratitude,  but  entirely  the  opposite  resulted. 
Murav'ev  sent  three  telegrams  at  this  point.  205  The  first  was  to  the  Czechoslovak 
groups,  stating  the  Soviets  declared  peace  and  wished  to  ally  with  them  against 
Germany  and  detailing  positions  they  should  assume  from  the  Urals  through  the 
Volga  Region  to  Tsaritsyn.  206  The  second  was  to  loffe,  Soviet  Ambassador  in  Berlin, 
declaring  war  with  Germany  and  the  third  was  to  Red  forces  in  the  East,  instructing 
them  to  ally  with  the  Czechslovaks  against  Gen-nany. 
Upon  receiving  the  latter  telegram  at  Kuzovatovo  Station,  207  Kalnins  telegraphed 
Kazan',  inquiring  what  was  going  on.  Kobozev  relayed  Murav'ev's  treachery,  reported 
Tukhachevsky  was  also  in  Simbirsk  and  therefore  made  Kalnins  Ist  Army 
Commander.  208  Blagonravov  sent  an  extraordinary  telegram  stating,  "Under  pain  of 
death,  it  is  the  most  severe  responsibility  not  to  permit  or  disseminate  the 
provocational  telegrams  signed  by  Murav'ev".  209  Penza  and  Inza  Groups  were  by  now 
in  full  retreat  and  it  was  not  known  whether  or  not  Simbirsk  Group  were  allied  with 
Murav'ev.  Kalnins  attempted  to  stabilise  the  line  and  sent  troops  secretly  to  Simbirsk 
on  I  Ith  July  to  assassinate  Murav'ev.  From  Ruzaevsk  Station,  Kobozev  ordered  an 
attack  on  Simbirsk,  but  this  was  not  possible  with  I  st  Army  in  such  disarray.  210 
After  sending  the  telegrams,  Murav'ev  left  with  80  infantrymen  and  six  annoured- 
cars  for  the  Cadet  Corps  building,  in  the  centre  of  Simbirsk,  where  Simbirsk  Soviet 
met.  Fedor  Mikhailovich  Ivanov,  a  Moscow  Communist  in  the  Broneviki,  was  left  at 
204 
See  p.  94,  note  152. 
205  V.  M.  Kadyshev,  p.  156. 
206  1.1.  Mints,  p.  65. 
207  Other  Red  units,  receiving  this  telegram,  abandoned  the  front  and  returned  to  Simbirsk  as  ordered, 
leaving  the  way  open  for  the  Czechoslovaks,  N.  Ia.  Gimel'shtein,  "S  bronepoezdom  "Svoboda  ili 
smert  ......  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  pp.  191-192;  Chistov  found  a  telegram  sent  by  Klim.  Ivanov  to  Gai 
(who  was  a  Left  SR  before  the  Murav'ev  Revolt,  but  swore  allegiance  to  the  Communist  Party  after  it), 
to  return  to  Simbirsk  with  his  Red  Sengilei  Group,  B.  1.  Chistov,  'T  tiazhelye  dni...  ",  p.  178. 
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Simbirsk-I  as  Murav'ev  did  not  trust  him,  dressed  in  a  black  Communist  Party  state 
uniform.  This  was  an  error  as  Ivanov  and  Egorov,  Commander  of  the  Broneviki 
infantry  detachment,  learned  from  the  Simbirsk-I  telegraph  operator  about  the  Left 
SR  Revolt  in  Moscow  and  of  Murav'ev's  telegrams.  Realising  Murav'ev  was 
committing  treason,  Ivanov  ordered  Egorov  to  free  Tukhachevsky.  211 
Tukhachevsky  meanwhile  had  been  persuading  his  guards  of  Murav'ev's 
treachery.  He  informed  them  of  the  Left  SR  uprising  in  Moscow,  explaining  Murav'ev 
was  supporting  it.  Questioned  as  to  why  he  had  been  arrested,  he  declared,  "Because  I 
am  a  Bolshevik".  As  Bolsheviks  themselves,  the  guards  sent  a  delegate  to  the  town 
centre  to  find  out  exactly  what  was  happening.  212  This,  combined  with  the  arrival  of 
Egorov,  resulted  in  Tukhachevsky's  release.  However,  during  his  several  hours  of 
imprisonment,  the  revolt  had  already  been  suppressed. 
Fedor  Ivanov  had  gone  to  the  town  square,  in  front  of  the  Cadet  Corps  building, 
where  the  Broneviki,  Latvians  and  International  Regiment  were  assembled.  He 
relayed  the  situation  and  entered  the  Cadet  Corps  building  to  discuss  what  to  do,  with 
the  most  important  figure  in  quelling  the  Murav'ev  Revolt,  Vareikis. 
Vareikis  had  been  waiting  for  a  car  to  take  him  to  the  Mezhen,  when  he  learned  of 
sailors  roaming  the  streets  with  machine-guns  and  heard  bombs  detonating. 
Therefore,  he  gathered  the  Latvians  and  Moscow  Communist  Detachmentý  under 
Pavel  Medved',  in  the  Cadet  Corps  building.  Chudoshvili  arrived  to  arrest  Vareikis, 
but  the  troops  forced  the  former  to  leave. 
Vareikis  then  organised  resistance  against  the  revolt.  Agitators  from  the 
Communist  Detachment  were  sent  to  all  troop  formations  in  Simbirsk  and  to  Gimov, 
Chain-nan  of  the  Province  Executive  Committee  and  Simbirsk  Soviet,  to  gain  outside 
help.  Meeting  with  Fedor  Ivanov  and  discovering  the  Broneviki,  Latvians  and 
International  Regiment  in  the  Town  Square  had  switched  sides,  Vareikis  called  a 
Soviet  Executive  Committee  Extraordinary  Meeting  for  24.00  hours  on  10th-Ilth 
July.  Murav'ev  was  to  be  led  to  believe  the  troops  were  still  loyal  to  him,  invited  to 
213  the  meeting  and  arrested  . 
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For  this,  Vareikis  assembled  an  ambush  force  of  some  120  men  led  by  Medved', 
made  up  of  Latvians,  Broneviki  and  Moscow  Communist  Detachment.  They  waited  in 
rooms  three  and  five  of  the  Cadet  Corps  building,  setting  up  machine-guns  behind  the 
doors  and  surrounding  room  four  where  the  Executive  Committee  meeting  was  held. 
The  remainder  of  the  troops  guarded  outside  the  Cadet  Corps  building,  arresting 
Chudoshvili,  who  arrived  with  a  detachment  of  80  men  whilst  the  meeting  was  in 
progress,  and  other  detachments  backing  Murav'ev.  214 
When  Murav'ev  arrived,  Klim  Ivanov,  smelling  a  rat,  tried  to  have  the  meeting 
switched  to  another  room,  but  Vareikis  swiftly  began  the  meeting.  The  meeting  lasted 
several  hours  and  began  with  a  speech  by  Murav'ev,  declaring  his  intentions  and  the 
necessity  of  the  Executive  Committee  supporting  him.  The  Left  SR  fraction  supported 
Murav'ev  in  forming  a  new  Volga  Region  Republic,  215  before  the  Bolshevik  fraction, 
led  by  Vareikis,  declared  him  a  traitor  and  Ivanov  declared  Broneviki  support  for  the 
Bolsheviks.  The  meeting  was  interrupted  several  times  by  noise  from  the  ad*acent 
rooms  as  more  soldiers  arrived  and  Vareikis  had  to  leave  the  room  several  times  to 
keep  things  calm.  216  These  disturbances  evidently  aroused  Murav'ev's  suspicions  as, 
"by  the  end  of  the  meeting,  he  was  terribly  pale,  constantly  looking  at  the  door".  217  He 
declared,  I  will  go  and  calm  the  detachment"  and  made  for  the  door.  At  this,  Vareikis 
gave  the  signal,  Medved'  flung  open  the  door  and  Murav'ev  was  faced  by  the 
ambush. 
Vareikis  had  ordered  Murav'ev  to  be  taken  alive,  so  he  could  be  taken  to  Moscow 
to  face  a  military  tribunal,  218  but  on  seeing  he  was  trapped,  Murav'ev  opened  fire  with 
his  Mauser,  wounding  three  Red  Army  men,  2  19  before  Medved'  grabbed  his  arm  and 
Murav'ev  was  felled  by  seven  bullets.  220  Izvestiia  Simbirskogo  Soveta  wrongly 
reported  on  12th  July  that  Murav'ev  had  committed  suicide  with  his  last  bullet,  but 
this  rather  romanticised  version  was  swiftly  corrected  by  Vareikis  who  telegrammed 
Aralov  and  the  VVS  in  Moscow  with  the  correct  details.  221 
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Kobozev  reported  on  12th  July  that  a  train  commanded  by  a  Tsigebeev  carrying 
some  Murav'ev  accomplices,  was  halted  at  Ruzaevka,  with  23  arrests  made. 
Blagonravov's  wife  was  found  on  the  train,  although  it  is  not  clear  if  she  was  held 
hostage  or  otherwise.  222  With  Murav'ev  dead  and  his  units  disarmed,  the  revolt  was 
over.  It  lasted  barely  8-10  hours,  but  the  effect  the  revolt  had  on  Eastern  Front, 
leading  to  a  general  collapse,  prolonged  fighting  for  months. 
Tukhachevsky  and  Vareikis  attempted  to  allay  the  confusion  caused  by  the  revolt. 
Tukhachevsky  took  command  of  Red  troops  in  Simbirsk  Province,  and  in  Simbirsk, 
all  Left  SRs  were  removed,  with  Pugachevskii  replacing  Klim  Ivanov  as  Head  of 
Simbirsk  Garrison  and  Ivanov  replacing  Beretti  as  Broneviki  Commander.  223 
Tukhachevsky  and  Vareikis  published  an  appeal  in  Izvestiia  Simbirskogo  Soveta  to  all 
Red  forces  on  12th  July,  outlining  Murav'ev's  betrayal,  explaining  the  Soviets  were 
not  fighting  Germany  and  calling  for  a  renewal  of  the  struggle  with  the 
Czechoslovaks.  224  On  II  th  July,  Lenin  and  Trotsky  signed  a  "Government  Report 
about  the  Betrayal  of  M.  A.  Murav'ev"  before  news  of  his  death  was  known  stating, 
"All  honest  citizens  are  instructed  to  shoot  him  [Murav'ev]  on  the  spot...  All  orders 
for  troops,  acting  against  the  Czechoslovaks,  will,  until  newly  instructed,  be  signed  by 
Mekhonoshin  and  Blagonravov",  225  thus  removing  Murav'ev  from  the  RVS  and 
declaring  him  an  outlaw.  However,  none  of  these  measures  prevented  the 
Czechoslovak  advance. 
The  ultimate  importance  of  the  Muravev  Revolt  for  Tukhachevsky  on  a  personal 
career  level  was  that  he  was  now  completely  trusted  by  Moscow  as  Ist  Army 
Commander.  He  had  not  been  sent  out  to  fill  this  position  and  had  really  fallen  into  it 
by  chance.  Doubts  had  remained  over  his  trustworthiness.  However,  he  stood  aloof 
from  Murav'ev's  treachery  and  played  his  part  in  its  suppression,  thereby  displaying 
his  support  for  the  Bolshevik  regime  and  stating  this  wholeheartedly  in  the  report  he 
submitted  on  the  Murav'ev  Affair  and  its  consequences,  after  the  fall  of  Simbirsk  later 
in  jUly.  226  With  Moscow's  trust  confirmed,  he  had  to  now  show  his  ability  and  retain 
the  faith  of  all  those  in  the  East,  by  turning  the  conglomeration  of  Red  forces  into  an 
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organised,  disciplined  Ist  Revolutionary  Army,  the  task  he  had  originally  been 
despatched  to  do. 
Organiser  and  Commander  of  Ist  Revolutionary  Army 
When  I  arrived  at  Inza  Station  on  27th  July  to  assume  command  of  I  st 
Army,  the  army  staff  consisted  of  only  five  men...  In  no  way  did  an 
administrative  apparatus  exist;  no  one  knew  the  army  staff;  units  were 
equipped  only  thanks  to  the  extraordinary  energy  and  inventiveness  of 
Shteingaus,  who  intercepted  all  loads,  travelling  across  the  army  region, 
assessed  them  and  always  in  time  supplied  the  units. 
These  units  almost  without  exception,  lived  in  eshelons  and  conducted 
so-called  "eshelonnaia  voina". 
These  detachments  presented  themselves  as  extremely  united,  with 
military  traditions,  despite  their  short  existence.  And  the  commanders  and 
Red  Army  men  suffered  from  extreme  egocentrism. 
They  identified  operations  or  battles  only  to  the  extent  that  detachments 
participating  were  guaranteed  all  possible  advantages  and  security.  There 
was  not  any  kind  of  serious  discipline  to  speak  of.  These  detachments, 
disembarking  from  wagons,  fought  spontaneously  and  bravely  in  battle, 
but  weak  discipline  and  lack  of  self-control  meant  that  under  the  slightest 
failure  or  even  in  one  case  of  an  envelopment,  these  detachments  threw 
themselves  in  the  eshelons  and  the  entire  eshelon  "in  file"  made  off 
sometimes  as  much  as  100  versty  (for  example  from  Syzran'  to  Penza).  227 
Such  was  Tukhachevsky's  early  impression  of  I  st  Army.  Like  Eastern  Front  as  a 
whole,  it  was  completely  unorganised  or  regulated,  comprising  workers'  detachments, 
Red  Guards,  peasant  bands  from  various  settlements  and  other  partisan-like 
formations.  By  the  turn  of  the  year  however,  I  st  Army  was  one  of  the  major  forces  of 
a  structured,  uniform  Eastern  Front  and  a  Southern  Front  had  been  formed  copying 
this  model.  I  shall  now  examine  Tukhachevsky's  Ist  Army  organisational  and 
formational  work  carried  out  before  and  after  the  Murav'ev  Revolt,  with 
Tukhachevsky,  Kuibyshev  and  Kalnins  as  I  st  Army  R  VS,  to  assess  how  this  occurred. 
The  Murav'ev  Revolt  had  positive  and  negative  aspects  for  Tukhachevsky's 
reorganisation.  It  finally  confirmed  beyond  doubt  the  severity  of  the  eastern  situation. 
One  man  with  a  small  force  had  completely  destroyed  the  gains  made  by  Eastern 
Front  in  June  and  July,  showing  starkly  the  precarious  Red  position  and  the  threat  to 
the  very  heart  of  the  Soviet  Republic  this  presented.  in  the  longer  term,  Bolshevik 
diplomatic  efforts,  enforced  by  the  Left  SR  assassination  of  Mirbach,  to  avoid  further 108 
German  advances  and  almost  certain  destruction  of  the  Soviet  State,  led  in  August  to 
a  Supplementary  Treaty  to  Brest-Litovsk.  This  settled  the  Western  situation,  allowing 
the  release  of  resources  to  reinforce  Eastern  Front  to  the  levels  required  to  defeat  the 
228  Czechoslovaks  and  White  officer  battalions 
. 
However,  before  this,  survival  had  to 
be  eked  out  with  local  resources  amid  the  rapidly  deteriorating  conditions  of  the  post- 
Murav'ev  Eastern  Front.  The  fact  that  he  inherited  temporary  control  of  Red  forces  on 
I  Ith  July,  until  Vacietis  arrived  eleven  days  later,  provided  Tukhachevsky  with 
information  on  troop  numbers  and  resources.  However,  reorganising  these  disparate 
forces  was  complicated  by  Eastern  Front  conditions  both  before  and  after  the 
Murav'ev  Revolt,  with  mass  defections  by  commanders  and  men  sympathetic  to  the 
Left  SRs  and  other  anti-Bolshevik  groups.  Fear  of  mistrust  and  betrayal  seized  the 
majority  of  the  Red  forces. 
This  was  exacerbated  by  the  mid-July  Komuch  offensive,  with  accompanying 
anti-Bolshevik  agitation  further  convincing  commander  and  rank-and-file  alike  that 
treachery  was  in  the  air  and  wholesale  defections  imminent.  Tukhachevsky  recalled, 
This  all  made  a  colossal  impression  on  the  still  incompletely-formed  units. 
A  panicky  fear  of  treachery  arose,  developing  into  mistrust  between  units, 
Red  Army  men  and  command  staff  and  so  on.  SRs,  Mensheviks  and  other 
White-guardists  further  reinforced  this  feeling.  Constant  rumours  began 
about  envelopments,  revolts  and  so  on.  Troops  began  to  retreat  without 
229  battle 
. 
On  6th-7th  July,  the  Komuch  troops  captured  the  Tsarist  gold  reserve  in  the 
important  communications  town  of  Kazan'  and  gradually  advanced  through  Bugul'ma 
(I  3th  July),  Melekes  (I  6th  July),  Stavropol'  and  Syzran'  (2  1  st  July)  before  occupying 
Simbirsk,  Lenin's  birthplace,  on  21st-22nd  July.  These  were  major  gains  along  the 
Volga,  pushing  the  Reds  to  the  Western  bank  and  threatening  Moscow.  These 
successes  were  matched  in  Siberia  and  the  Urals,  leaving  Eastern  Front  near  collapse. 
With  no  support  from  Moscow,  Tukhachevsky  had  to  reorganise  his  forces  using 
only  local  resources.  He  had  provided  a  blueprint  for  this  in  May,  but  conditions  in 
Riazansk,  Tambov,  Voronezh  and  the  Don,  although  bad  in  May,  were  nothing 
compared  to  the  Volga  in  July.  Therefore,  did  Tukhachevsky's  suggestions  stand  up 
or  was  he  forced  to  adapt  them? 
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To  answer  this  ,  it  is  first  useful  to  examine  who  exactly  composed  Ist  Army  in 
July  1918.  Tracing  its  exact  origins  is  not  easy,  with  Koritskii,  Ist  Army  Chief-of- 
Staff,  himself  declaring  that  the  exact  numbers  of  the  original  partisan  detachments 
which  formed  Ist  Army  were  unknown.  230  However,  a  rough  picture  can  be  drawn 
which  illustrates  Tukhachevsky's  task,  forming  an  army  whilst  surrounded  by 
Komuch  forces,  but  also  infiltrated  by  those  waiting  for  the  moment  to  betray  him  and 
his  small  band  of  loyal  staff. 
I  st  Army  was  officially  created  on  19th  June,  although  detachments,  groups  and 
Fronts  had  already  appeared  in  reply  to  the  Czechoslovak  Revolt.  Kalnins  listed  6 
regiments,  7  detachments,  2  batteries  and  the  Polupanov  annoured-train  as  the  first 
components  of  1  st  Army,  with  Briansk  Armoured-Car  Detachment  and  other  infantry 
detachments  raised  soon  after. 
231 
Tukhachevsky  had  to  reorganise  these  into  a  competent  force  to  defeat  the 
Czechoslovaks.  The  troops  he  achieved  this  with  were  found  in  Syzran',  Simbirsk  and 
Penza  areas,  but  also  in  these  zones  by  the  end  of  July  were  forces  originating 
elsewhere,  but  driven  out  by  the  Czechoslovaks. 
Red  forces  in  Volga  Region  had  clashed  with  the  Czechoslovaks  in  late  May  and 
early  June  in  Penza  and  Samara.  Penza  was  taken  by  5,000  Czechoslovaks  under  S. 
Chechek  on  29th  May,  defeating  2,000  Red  fighters.  Penza  Town  Soviet  and  Province 
Committee  had  raised  a  machine-gun  company,  workers  detachments  and  several 
batteries.  These  were  joined  by  workers  detachments  from  Simbirsk  and  Ruzaevka, 
200  rail  guards  with  3  machine-guns  and  I  gun,  120  men  sent  by  Saransk  Uezd 
Soviet,  Ist  Czechoslovak  Revolutionary  Regiment,  raised  from  Czechoslovaks  who 
had  defected  to  the  Reds,  and  a  Hungarian  International  Company.  232  This 
uncoordinated  assortment  of  forces  was  defeated  with  heavy  casualties  and  Penza 
Communist  Party  Committee  evacuated  to  Ruzaevka.  Upon  reaching  here,  it  created  a 
Province  Military  Commissariat  (gubvoenkomat)  with  S.  1.  Ostrovskii  and  1.  N. 
Polokov  as  Military  Commissars.  In  early  June,  this  reformed  Ist  and  3rd  Penza 
Infantry  Battalions  into  Ist  Soviet  Infantry  Regiment.  233  These  joined  detachments 
230  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny  ---",  p.  64. 
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which  had  retreated  to  Kuznetsk  from  Syzran'  after  the  Czechoslovak  attack  and 
formed  the  basis  of  Penza  Division  of  Ist  Army,  under  the  command  of 
Vosdvizhenskii,  a  voenspets  mobilised  in  Penza.  234 
Valerian  Vladimirovich  Kuibyshev  and  M.  S.  Kadomtsev,  the  latter  arriving  with 
an  Ufa  Red  Guard  detachment,  were  instrumental  in  organising  the  Samara  "Military 
Revolutionary  Staff'  on  30th  May.  This  instructed  the  factory  workers  committees, 
unions  of  metalworkers,  leatherworkers  and  others,  to  organise  workers  into  military 
detachments.  Meetings  were  held  in  Samara  Communist  Club  and  Communist  Party 
leaders  assumed  the  mantle  of  military  leaders.  The  Samaro-Simbirsk  District 
Commissariat  of  Labour  and  Samara  Province  Commissariat  on  Muslim  Affairs 
appealed  to  Tatar  workers,  with  ten  detachments  in  Samara  alone  formed  by  workers 
of  various  nationalities.  Training  of  militia  in  Samara  was  increased  and  numbers  rose 
from  400  to  2,000  in  early  June.  235 
These  forces  were  joined  by  further  international  detachments,  Korsunsk  and 
Buinsk  workers  detachments  and  Ivashchenko  Red  Guard  detachment,  possibly 
organised  by  Chapaev,  who  had  taken  over  command  of  Nikolaevsk  uezd  Red  forces 
in  April 
. 
236  A  450-man  detachment  arrived  from  Simbirsk  Province  Executive 
Committee  (gubispolkom),  237  now  energised  by  Vareikis'  arrival  and  instituting  a 
course  of  general  training  for  Simbirsk  inhabitants. 
These  efforts  were  in  vain  as  the  Czechoslovaks  captured  Samara  after  four  days 
of  fighting.  Treachery  aided  the  Czechoslovaks,  with  a  Right  SR,  1.  M.  Brushvit, 
defecting  and  revealing  Red  positions,  238  whilst  a  detachment  from  Syzran',  intended 
for  Samara,  was  led  by  a  D.  1.  Popov  to  Moscow,  to  become  the  main  Left  SR  armed 
force  in  the  July  coup  attempt.  239  The  Reds  had  5,000  men  in  12  detachments  between 
Samara  and  Syzran',  240  but  the  Red  leaders'  inexperience  was  exposed  by  positioning 
their  main  4,000-strong  force  at  Samara  in  front  of  the  River  Lipiagi,  cutting  their 
own  path  of  retreat.  Knowing  these  positions,  the  Czechoslovaks  encircled  the  Reds  at 
night  and  attacked  on  4th  June,  killing  1,300  Reds.  The  other  forces  fought  until  8th 
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June,  led  by  Gai  and  Pershin  amongst  others,  but  the  efficiency  and  organisation  of 
the  Czechoslovaks,  combined  with  their  vast  superiority  in  numbers,  proved  decisive. 
From  Samara,  Gai  and  Kuibyshev  retreated  up  the  Volga  to  Simbirsk  by 
steamboat  with  the  remainder  of  their  forces.  Here,  Kuibyshev  and  Vareikis  reformed 
Samara  and  Simbirsk  detachments  into  Samaro-Simbirsk  Combined  Militia 
Detachment  under  Gai's  command  to  defend  Sengilei  area.  As  Gai  recalled, 
In  the  course  of  June  and  July  1918  we  conducted  bitter  battles  with 
Czechoslovaks  and  Kappelists,  holding  off  their  offensive  to  Sengilei  and 
Simbirsk.  With  these  battles,  we  gave  comrades  Kuibyshev  and 
Tukhachevsky  the  possibility  to  organise  I  st  Army  Staff 
. 
241 
The  remnants  of  the  Samara  forces  combined  with  Simbirsk  detachments  to  form  the 
nucleus  of  Simbirsk  Iron  Division. 
As  Simbirsk  Division  evolved  around  Gai,  Inza  Division  evolved  around  Ia.  Ia. 
Lacis,  a  Junior  Officer  in  4th  Vidzem  Latvian  Rifle  Regiment  of  the  Tsarist  Army, 
which  he  had  commanded  since  the  October  Revolution.  242  The  regiment  was  used  by 
Murav'ev  to  attack  Syzran'  on  16th  June  1918,  but  he  prevented  Lacis  and  Kalnins 
sending  for  reinforcements  and  the  attack  was  repulsed.  243  However,  the  regiment 
remained  involved  in  fighting  between  Syzran'  and  Inza  into  July.  The  fall  of 
Simbirsk  and  Syzran'  presented  the  Czechoslovaks  with  the  opportunity  to  advance  up 
the  railway  line  to  capture  I  st  Army  HQ  at  Inza.  At  one  point  the  only  obstacle 
preventing  this  was  Lacis  and  20  men,  predominantly  his  staff,  who  had  retreated 
from  Syzran'  to  Bazarnaia  Station,  and  an  annoured-train.  244  This  was  the  core  around 
which  Inza  Division  was  built,  245  Latvians  and  newly-mobilised  voenspetsy. 
These  varied  forces,  which  formed  the  core  elements  of  the  three  Ist  Army 
divisions,  were  supplemented  by  peasant  partisan  detachments.  A  Komuch 
mobilisation  of  30th  June  in  Kazan',  Simbirsk  and  Samara  Provinces,  encouraged 
peasants  to  leave  their  villages  and  form  partisan  detachments  in  the  forests,  to  avoid 
conscription.  Detachments  in  Samara  and  Kazan'  were  brought  within  4th  and  5th 
Red  Armies  respectively,  whilst  those  in  Simbirsk  came  under  Tukhachevsky's 
jurisdiction.  One  such  detachment  organised  by  a  Bolshevik  1.  S.  Kosmovskii  joined 
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Alatyr'  Group,  which  Tukhachevsky  received  for  the  Simbirsk  Operation  in  early 
September. 
Therefore,  the  forces  Tukhachevsky  inherited  were  predominantly  a  mixture  of 
anned  factory  workers  and  peasants,  who  perhaps  had  a  few  weeks  fighting 
experience  against  the  Czechoslovaks,  during  which  they  had  been  constantly 
defeated  and  pushed  back.  Some  would  have  been  Great  War  veterans,  but  war- 
weariness  or  disinterest  meant  not  many  volunteered,  with  the  majority  of  those 
joining  the  Reds  doing  so  through  political  allegiance  as  Bolshevik  Party  members  or 
sympathisers.  The  detachments  they  formed  were  partisan,  guerilla-type  outfits,  with 
elected  commanders  who  could  as  quickly  lose  their  men's  support,  as  gain  it.  No 
leadership  cadre  experienced  in  fighting  on  conventional  terms  against  an  organised 
force  such  as  the  Czechoslovak  Legion,  existed.  A  few  Red  Guards  had  six  months  or 
more  fighting  experience,  some  of  which  was  against  a  conventional  force  in  the 
Germans,  but  they  had  also  tasted  defeat  here.  Moreover,  the  majority  of  the 
experienced  troops,  including  the  Latvians,  were  employed  on  the  Western  screens 
against  Germany,  still  perceived  as  the  main  threat.  This  remained  the  policy  within 
the  VVS  until  26th  July.  Not  until  Simbirsk  fell  did  Moscow  eventually  realise  it 
mattered  not  how  valiantly  their  forces  fought.  Without  a  properly  organised  army  led 
by  capable  experienced  leaders,  they  stood  little  chance  of  defeating  the 
Czechoslovaks,  a  situation  similar  to  the  West  six  months  previously.  Retaining  a 
screen  in  the  East  was  no  longer  viable  now  the  Czechoslovaks  dominated  the  entire 
area  and  the  formation  of  Eastern  Front  was  the  first  step  to  redressing  this.  However, 
vehement  protests  by  Vacietis,  Tukhachevsky  and  others  were  required  before  the 
29th  June  decree  declaring  Eastern  Front  as  the  main  operational  theatre  was  in  reality 
fulfilled.  246  Before  this,  Eastern  Front  was  very  much  alone  in  organising  forces 
against  the  Czechoslovaks  with  Tukhachevsky  recalling,  "...  I  st  Army  received 
.)  247  virtually  nothing  from  the  Centre' 
. 
Tukhachevsky,  Kuibyshev  and  Kalnins  had  to 
work  independently  to  create  I  st  Army. 
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Buildinj!  a  Command  Cadre 
Tukhachevsky  commenced  reorganisational  work  as  soon  as  he  assumed 
command  of  I  st  Army  at  Inza.  Penza,  Simbirsk  and  Inza  Divisions  already  existed  on 
paper,  but  morale  amongst  the  detachments  was  generally  low,  given  the  constant 
defeats  they  had  suffered.  To  transform  these  from  the  disorderly  amalgam  described 
above  into  regular  divisions  required  experienced  army  and  divisional  staffs  to 
rejuvenate  and  inspire  them.  This  was  the  first  task  in  creating  a  regular  Ist  Anny.  In 
early  July,  surmising  Murav'ev  was  hindering  reorganisation,  Tukhachevsky 
proceeded  without  authorisation,  again  displaying  his  readiness  to  act  independently 
and  risk  censure,  if  he  did  not  agree  with  his  superior  officer.  Given  Ist  Army  Staff  at 
Inza  comprised  only  five  men  when  Tukhachevsky  arrived,  248  the  urgency  and 
enon-nity  of  this  task  was  apparent  to  him.  A  firm  basis  for  mobilisation  and 
reorganisation  was  needed  and  Tukhachevsky  created  this  on  Ist  July,  establishing 
Military-Revolutionary  Field  Tribunals  for  Ist  Army  formations.  249  These  were  the 
first  established  in  the  RKKA  and  set  the  legal  basis  by  which  mobilisation  on  a  vast 
scale  could  be  conducted.  Mass  mobilisation  had  never  previously  been  envisaged 
under  voluntary  recruitment,  meaning  tribunals  were  not  required,  but  the  escalation 
of  Eastern  Front  demanded  large  numbers  of  recruits,  so  Tukhachevsky  formed  the 
tribunals  with  Kuibyshev  and  Kalnins. 
This  was  consistent  with  Tukhachevsky's  May  recommendations  when  he 
emphasised  the  need  for  strict  revolutionary  discipline  and  order  in  the  Red  Army.  It 
is  no  surprise  this  was  his  first  reorganisational  measure,  reintroducing  the  strict 
disciplinary  system  he  had  known  in  the  Tsarist  Army,  if  under  the  guise  of 
"Revolutionary"  Tribunals.  The  acceptance  of  this  as  necessity  by  Moscow  was 
another  significant  step  away  from  revolutionary  ideals  when  faced  with  reality.  The 
masses  were  not  volunteering  to  fight  for  socialism  as  ideological  belief  had  said  they 
would,  therefore  this  belief  would  have  to  be  coerced.  This  was  another  decision 
taken  by  Trotsky  and  Lenin,  against  the  wishes  of  the  core  Bolshevik  Party,  but 
necessary  under  Civil  War  conditions.  Tukhachevsky  was  the  man  envisaged  capable 
248  The  only  positions  filled  were  Chief-of  Staff  Shimunich,  Head  of  Operational  Matters  Shabich, 
Staff  Commissar  Mazo,  Head  of  Supplies  (Quartermaster)  Shteingaus  and  Paymaster  Razumov,  M.  N. 
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of  introducing  the  tribunals  since  he  had  written  of  their  necessity.  Not  blinded  by 
revolutionary  beliefs,  but  with  the  practicality  of  a  soldier,  he  knew  this  system  was 
required  to  swiftly  install  discipline  within  I  st  Army  and  the  Red  Army  as  a  whole. 
With  tribunals  created,  Tukhachevsky  proceeded  with  the  mobilisations  they 
empowered  him  to  implement.  He  left  for  Simbirsk,  the  Province  town,  where  the 
Party  and  Soviet  organs  to  coordinate  mobilisation  were  situated,  arriving  on  3rd  July 
and  meeting  with  Vareikis  and  Chistov,  a  member  of  the  Bolshevik  Military 
Commission 
. 
250  This  meeting  confirmed  the  lack  of  staff  and  line  officers  at  all  levels, 
with  only  four  former  officers  having  volunteered  for  Simbirsk  Army  Group.  251 
Vareikis  informed  Tukhachevsky  the  Province  Cheka  had  discovered  an  underground 
White  Officer  Organisation,  but  it  also  contained  very  few  former  officers  and  these 
were  the  sons  of  landowners  and  merchants.  Vareikis  felt  the  majority  were  waiting  to 
see  what  happened  before  committing  themselves.  Tukhachevsky  apparently  replied, 
"I  know  the  officers'  mood.  There  are  inveterate  White  Guards  amongst  them.  But 
there  is  a  sincere  love  of  their  people;  their  Homeland.  It  is  necessary  to  help  them  to 
go  with  the  people,  and  not  against  them  ...... 
252 
To  do  this,  Tukhachevsky  and  Vareikis  published  their  "Order  For  Ist  Eastern 
Army"  the  next  morning  in  Izvestiia  simbirskogo  soveta  No.  128  demanding, 
The  Russian  Socialist  Federative  Soviet  Republic  is  living  through 
difficult  days,  surrounded  from  all  sides  by  enemies,  who  are  looking  to 
profit  at  the  expense  of  Russian  citizens.  Prepared  and  supported  by  them 
were  various  mercenary  enemies  of  the  counter-revolutionary 
Czechoslovak  uprising. 
The  duty  of  each  Russian  citizen  -  to  take  up  arms  and  stand  up  for  the 
government  against  enemies,  who  are  bent  on  its  destruction. 
For  creating  an  efficient  fighting  army  experienced  leaders  are  essential, 
and  therefore  I  order  all  former  officers,  living  in  Simbirsk  Province, 
immediately  to  arise  in  the  name  of  the  Red  Banner  entrusted  to  me  by  the 
army. 
Today,  4th  of  July,  officers,  living  in  the  town  of  Simbirsk  are  to  come 
at  12.00  to  the  Cadet  Corps  building,  to  me. 
Non-appearance  will  result  in  a  military-field  court  martial. 
Commander  of  I  st  Eastern  Army  Tukhachevsky. 
Comrade  Chairman  of  Simbirsk  Province  Executive 
Committee  losif  VareikiS.  253 
250  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandan-n-Konimunist",  p.  33. 
251  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  anniia  v  1918  gody",  p.  77. 
252  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandarm-Kommunist",  p.  34. 
253  1918  god,  p.  324. 115 
The  appeal  to  Russian  "patriotism"  is  apparent.  The  labelling  of  the 
Czechoslovaks  as  Imperialist  mercenaries  is  also  crucial,  as  is  the  absence  of  any 
mention  of  the  Whites.  Voenspetsy  had  joined  the  Red  Army  to  fight  Germany  in  the 
West  through  patriotism,  but  were  against  fighting  a  civil  war  against  fellow 
Russians.  This  was  the  case  with  voenspetsy  in  the  East.  As  Tukhachevsky  noted,  they 
were  patriotic,  but  had  no  wish  for  civil  war.  Therefore,  the  appeal  to  patriotism  was 
used  alongside  intensive  political  propaganda,  evidence  that  Tukhachevsky  and 
Vareikis  appreciated  the  importance  of  both  methods  at  this  early  stage,  but  also 
hinting  at  the  intertwining  of  Bolshevik  ideals  with  Russian  nationalism  which 
occurred  later.  This  twin  approach  was  legally  underpinned  by  the  newly-formed 
Revolutionary  Military  Field  Tribunals,  allowing  Tukhachevsky  to  adopt  an  amiable 
"softly-softly"  approach  during  mobilisation  interviews,  secure  in  the  knowledge  the 
tribunals  were  there  and  more  significantly,  that  the  voenspetsy  knew.  The  political 
commissars  provided  the  "hard"  element  during  mobilisation,  encouraging  voenspetsy 
to  turn  to  Tukhachevsky  and  enlist.  Voenspetsy  would  provide  the  military  knowledge 
necessary  for  the  new  army  and  communists  the  political  experience  and  control  over 
voenspetsy. 
In  January  1918,  Tukhachevsky  had  been  in  a  similar  position  to  the  majority  of 
the  former  officers.  He  had  taken  the  decision  to  join  the  Reds  and  now  used  this 
experience  and  knowledge  of  voenspetsy  attitudes  to  attract  them  to  the  Reds.  The  use 
of  patriotism  (which  would  be  repeated  by  Stalin  23  years  later)  worked.  Pershin, 
Deputy  Province  Military  Commander  conducted  the  recruitment  with  Tukhachevsky 
on  4th  July  and  related  to  Chistov,  "Tukhachevsky  used  great  tact  in  these  talks.  The 
new  Commander  made  a  great  impression  on  his  interlocutors,  and  several  hundred 
254 
officers,  thanks  to  him,  crossed  at  that  time  to  the  side  of  the  Soviet  authorities"  . 
The  recruitment  of  voenspetsy  in  Simbirsk  was  as  far  as  Tukhachevsky's 
reorganisational  efforts  proceeded  before  Murav'ev's  Revolt,  but  after  this,  with 
sufficient  calm  restored  to  Simbirsk,  Tukhachevsky  took  his  next  step,  recruiting 
officers  for  Penza  Division. 
Travelling  west  from  Simbirsk,  Tukhachevsky  reached  Penza  on  15th  or  16th 
July.  As  Vareikis  and  Kuibyshev  played  vital  roles  in  the  Simbirsk  recruitment, 
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Province  Soviet  Chairman  Minkin  and  Kalnins  did  so  in  Penza.  The  three  men 
published  an  appeal  in  the  Penza  Province  newspaper  on  18th  July,  decreeing, 
For  the  creation  of  an  efficient  fighting  Red  Anny  all  former  officer- 
specialists  are  summoned  in  the  name  of  the  Banner. 
Tomorrow,  19th  July,  all  former  artillerymen  and  artillery  technicians, 
cavalry-officers  and  engineering  officers  must  appear  at  the  Province 
Military  Commissariat  at  16.00  hours. 
All  former  infantry  officers  must  appear  at  the  same  place  on  20th  July 
at  12.00  hours. 
Officers  from  20-50  years  old  are  summoned. 
Non-appearance  will  result  in  a  Military-Field  Tribunal.  255 
The  similarities  to  the  Simbirsk  appeal  are  apparent,  although  the  development  of 
separating  infantry  officers  from  technical  officers  emerged  here,  perhaps  speeding  up 
the  reorganisation  process. 
The  recruitment  panel  comprised  Tukhachevsky,  Kalnins,  Head  of  I  st  Army 
Administration  Department  Ustichev  and  Solov'ev,  Commissar  of  Penza  Military 
Commissariat  Instruction  Department,  representing  the  Soviet  and  Province  Party 
Committee.  In  the  two  days  between  the  appeal  and  the  recruitment,  the  latter  had 
quelled  unrest  incited  by  counter-revolutionary  elements  in  Penza,  spreading  rumours 
that  the  mobilisation  was  designed  to  capture  and  execute  voenspetsy.  This  incitement 
was  part  of  the  wider  agitation  disseminated  by  anti-Soviets  before  the  mid-July 
Komuch  offensive,  but  Penza  Party  Organisation  agitated  intensively  to  dispel  these 
rumours.  Solov'ev  apparently  appealed,  "Who  are  you  Russian  officers  with?  With  the 
people  or  against  the  people?  vt256  This  patriotic  plea  again  succeeded  as  voenspetsy 
appeared  in  great  numbers. 
M.  N.  Tolstii,  a  former  gimnasiia  classmate  of  Tukhachevsky,  worked  in  the 
Province  Military  Commissariat  Instruction  Department.  He  introduced  Koritskii  to 
Tukhachevsky,  who  recalled  Tukhachevsky's  actions  at  the  recruitment  similarly  to 
257 
Pershin  at  Simbirsk 
. 
During  the  recruitment  most  voens  etsy  initially  addressed  Ustichev,  a  former  P 
Li  eutenant-Co  lone  1,  who  had  been  in  line  for  a  generalship,  believing  him  to  be  the 
senior  officer.  Ustichev  "tactfully"  referred  them  to  Tukhachevsky,  introducing  him  as 
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"comrade  Commander  Tukhachevsky",  emphasising  the  word  comrade,  reiterating 
this  was  a  new  Bolshevik  army,  despite  the  appeal  to  patriotism. 
Tukhachevsky's  youth  surprised  many  who  appeared  for  mobilisation,  but  his 
reassuring  manner  encouraged  many  to  enlist.  Many  officers  declared  they  wished  to 
join  the  Red  Army,  but  did  not  feel  trusted  by  the  regime.  Tukhachevsky  referred  to 
his  own  experiences,  apparently  stating, 
To  feel  suspicion  pointed  to  oneself  is  distressing.  I  experienced  it.  But  the 
thing  is,  this  trust  itself  does  not  spring  up.  It  is  necessary  to  earn  it,  to 
achieve  it.  And  how  can  an  officer  achieve  trust  and  authority  over  his 
soldiers?  Firstly,  by  honesty,  secondly,  by  excellent  knowledge  of  their 
business,  and,  thirdly  by  kindness  to  the  soldiers,  earned  by  respect 
towards  their  human  dignity.  258 
Tukhachevsky  was  possibly  comparing  the  Red  and  Tsarist  Armies.  He  received 
respect  in  both  as  an  officer,  but  relations  between  the  officer  corps  and  lower  ranks 
differed  markedly  now. 
Growing  up  in  Penza,  Tukhachevsky  and  many  of  the  interviewees  knew  each 
other.  Many  voenspetsy,  seeing  the  position  a  former  noble  had  achieved  and  hearing 
that  he  experienced  similar  fears  to  them,  would  have  been  reassured  and  joined  the 
Red  Army. 
While  loyalty  was  crucial  in  selecting  voenspetsy  for  I  st  Anny,  one  voenspets 
recalled  Tukhachevsky  quizzing  him  about  his  background,  education  and 
qualifications  . 
259AII  voenspetsy  were  interviewed  in  this  manner,  allowing  candidates 
to  be  posted  by  individual  ability,  placing  recruits  in  positions  in  which  they  had 
previous  experience  and  speeding  up  formation,  with  the  separation  of  officers  by 
branch  of  service  in  the  Penza  decree,  possibly  part  of  this. 
In  1919,  Tukhachevsky  recalled  conducting  the  mobilisations  and  the  impact 
voenspetsy  had  on  I  st  Army  formation.  Writing  of  Penza,  Simbirsk  and  Inza 
Divisions  rapidly  gaining  discipline  and  comprising  regular  troops  by  mid-July,  he 
asked, 
What  explains  these  successes?  I  consider  the  main  reason  -  the  fortunate 
selection  of  command  and  commissar  staff  and  the  great  quantity  of 
volunteers,  almost  from  the  very  moment  of  forming  Ist  Arrny.  This 
successful  combination  was  produced  by  the  fact  that  those  voenspetsy 
mobilised  to  responsible  posts,  were  selected  not  by  previous  length  of 
258  lbid,  p.  54. 
259  L.  Nikulin,  Tukhachevsky,  biograficheskii  ocherk,  (Moscow,  1964),  p.  54. 118 
service  or  rank,  but  by  showing  the  ability  for  independent  action,  for  self- 
initiative.  A  significant  part  of  the  responsible  workers  were  appointed 
from  young  officers.  We  had  absolutely  no  qualms  about  subordinating 
generals  to  2nd  Lieutenants  or  Captains,  and  in  the  rear  the  same  was 
done... 
The  basis  of  the  work  was  reciprocal  trust.  The  army  staff,  which  wore 
a  very  trans  i  ent-gloomy  outlook  immediately  after  the  voenspetsy 
mobilisations,  very  quickly  got  used  to  each  other,  pooled  their  resources 
into  a  harmonious  family,  sincerely  devoted  to  the  Soviet  republic.  260 
Further  to  this,  in  Simbirsk,  Klim  Ivanov  reftised  to  help  with  recruitment,  stating 
his  staff,  the  Province  Military  Committee  and  part  of  the  garrison  were  already  at  full 
complement  with  voenspetsy.  However,  when  Simbirsk  fell  on  21  st-22nd  July,  almost 
to  a  man,  Ivanov's  voenspetsy  defected,  whilst  those  recruited  by  Tukhachevsky  and 
Pershin  remained  loyal.  Amongst  these  were  Ustichev,  K.  P.  Dikov,  a  former  captain 
who  became  Head  of  Operations  Department,  his  assistant  1.1.  Chemomontsev,  and 
Assistant  Head  of  Intelligence  Department  B.  N.  Arsen'ev.  261 
The  Simbirsk  and  Penza  mobilisations  recruited  over  1200  staff  and  line  officers 
for  Ist  Army,  250  of  these  forming  Ist  Army  Staff.  262  These  and  other  voenspetsy, 
who  were  recruited  as  they  were  found  or  volunteered  throughout  July,  allowed 
Tukhachevsky  to  organise  and  bring  up  to  strength  Ist  Army  HQ  at  Inza  and 
Divisional  Staffs  for  Simbirsk,  Inza  and  Penza  Divisions  and  a  fourth  Vol'sk  Division, 
created  on  19th  July,  in  response  to  the  Czechoslovak  occupation  of  Vol'sk.  263 
Koritskii  noted  Tukhachevsky  had  already  planned  Ist  Army  on  a  4-division  basis 
before  the  Murav'ev  Revolt.  264  This  could  only  be  put  into  practice  after  the  Penza 
and  Simbirsk  mobilisations  were  completed  on  19th  July,  suggesting  if  Vol'sk  had  not 
fallen,  a  fourth  division  would  still  have  been  formed,  but  possibly  elsewhere. 
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Remanisation  in  the  Frontline  from  Partizanshchina  to  Regular  Army 
Voenspetsy  selected  in  Penza  travelled  by  train  with  Tukhachevsky  to  Inza, 
arriving  at  I  st  Army  HQ  on  22nd  July.  265  With  Simbirsk  lost,  Inza  came  under  threat. 
A  defensive  line  had  to  be  maintained  whilst  reorganisational  work  was  carried  out, 
with  no  breathing-space  for  Tukhachevsky  to  organise  Ist  Army  for  its  forthcoming 
battles.  This  occurred  simultaneously. 
The  mobilisations  facilitated  the  reorganisation  of  the  disparate  detachments, 
bands,  groups  and  units  into  regular  regiments  and  divisions,  led  by  the  newly- 
introduced  line  and  staff  officers.  This  was  not  easy  with  vast  discrepancies  in  size 
and  position  of  the  scattered  units.  As  shown  already,  the  earliest  formations  were  not 
coordinated  from  Moscow,  but  had  sprung  up  in  the  localities  to  defend  against  anti- 
Bolshevik  forces.  The  military  commissariats  which  had  the  task  of  mobilising  Soviet 
forces  in  the  localities  were  undermanned  in  July  1918  and  could  only  exist  in 
Bolshevik-held  areas.  Therefore,  the  task  of  mobilising  recruits  for  Ist  Army  also  fell 
directly  to  the  RVS  of  Tukhachevsky,  Kuibyshev  and  Kalnins,  aided  by  local  Party 
Chairmen,  Vareikis  and  Minkin.  As  numerous  and  varied  Red  fighting  formations  had 
appeared  locally  with  no  input  from  Moscow,  apart  from  general  appeals  and 
addresses,  the  pulling  together  of  these  disparate  forces  was  also  directed  in  the 
localities,  without  any  Moscow  contribution. 
The  composition  of  the  varied  detachments  was  reported  on  21st  July  by 
Zakharov,  Ist  Army  Chief-of-Staff,  266  giving  Ist  Army  figures  for  19th  July. 
Pugachevskii's  Simbirsk  Group  contained  6,975  infantry,  100  cavalry,  133  machine- 
guns,  130  guns  and  an  armoured-train  and  Lacis'  Inza  Group  comprised  1,516 
infantry,  no  cavalry,  38  machine-guns,  13  light  and  2  heavy  guns  and  an  armoured 
train.  Gailit's  Penza  Group  contained  1,525  infantry,  no  cavalry,  8  machine-guns  and 
8  guns  with  164  crew-members.  The  latter  also  contained  Mtsenskii,  Smolensk, 
Moscow,  Petrograd  and  Inza  Regiments  with  a  total  of  2,951  infantry,  38  cavalry,  51 
machine-guns,  3  bomb-throwers,  I  mortar  and  10  guns  with  193  crew,  but  these 
regiments  were  described  as  unbattleworthy  and  in  need  of  reformation.  Zakharov 
265  Ibid.  pp.  57-58;  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  armii",  p.  52. 
266  Zakharov  soon  after  was  evacuated  to  Moscow,  suffering  from  tuberculosis  and  malaria.  His  post 
was  taken  up  by  N.  1.  Koritskii  who  had  deputised  for  him  on  several  occasions  previously  during  his 
illness,  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny...  ",  pp.  59-60. 120 
267 
reported  these  figures  were  not  exact  as  I  st  Army  was  in  constant  combat  . 
Indeed, 
on  25th  July,  Vacietis  submitted  a  report  to  the  VVS  on  the  fall  of  Simbirsk,  in  which 
he  estimated  Simbirsk  Group  numbers  to  have  fallen  to  around  3,000.268  The  other 
Groups  probably  fared  little  better. 
When  these  figures  are  compared  to  a  report  Tukhachevsky  submitted  to  Vacietis 
on  23rd  July,  the  glaring  shortage  of  men  and  equipment  within  I  st  Army  is  clear.  To 
match  and  defeat  the  Czechoslovaks,  Tukhachevsky  reported  he  required  2-3  infantry 
divisions  (of  up  to  20,000  men  each),  2-3  cavalry  regiments  of  2-3,000  cavalry,  2-3 
light  artillery  divisions  of  24-36  guns,  a  heavy  division  of  42  guns,  48-72  line  guns 
and  48-72  6-inch  howitzers.  Required  to  back  these  up  were  2-3  sapper  battalions,  2-3 
pontoon  detachments,  4-6  cycle/motorcycle  companies,  2-3  broneviki  divisions,  200 
transport  trucks  and  4  fighter-plane  squadrons.  269 
By  his  reckoning,  Tukhachevsky  was  some  50,000  infantry  and  6-9,000  cavalry 
short  of  the  numbers  required  to  defeat  the  Czechoslovaks,  not  to  mention  the  back-up 
material  and  technical  resources.  This  was  typical  of  Eastern  Front  in  July,  as  the 
Czechoslovaks  advanced,  amidst  the  post-Murav'ev  chaos,  threatening  to  completely 
rout  Eastern  Front.  Mekhonoshin  of  Eastern  Front  RVS  and  Vacietis,  newly-arrived 
from  Moscow,  despatched  telegrams  on  17th  and  19th  July  respectively,  requesting 
270 
Latvian  Regiments  to  reinforce  Ekaterinburg  and  Simbirsk 
. 
Vacietis  identified 
Simbirsk  as  the  key  to  the  whole  Eastern  Front  position  as  its  fall  would  result  in  the 
loss  of  the  last  oilfields  held  and  the  entire  Central  Volga  Region 
. 
27  1  The  transport 
route  provided  by  the  river  would  also  be  lost. 
Unfortunately  for  the  Bolsheviks  in  Simbirsk,  there  was  little  time  to  act  upon 
these  requests.  The  Czechoslovaks  swept  into  Simbirsk  on  21st-22nd  July,  taking 
control  of  Volga  Region  up  to  Sviiazhsk,  where  the  Reds  stabilised  the  line.  Hundreds 
of  Bolsheviks  were  captured  and  deported  east  to  their  death.  Lenin  ordered  Zinov'ev 
on  20th  July  to  send  eastwards  from  Petrograd,  "...  several  dozen  "leaders"  (a  la 
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-estimated  the  Kaiurov)  and  thousands  of  "ranks' 
5 
but  Moscow  had  grossly  under 
Czechoslovaks.  Trotsky  tried  to  blame  the  local  soviets  saying, 
We  did  not  receive  even  from  those  local  Soviets  that  were  closest  to  the 
events  that  had  occurred  over  there,  along  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  and 
up  to  Cheliabinsk,  the  response  that  we  had  the  right  to  expect.  The  local 
Soviets  did  not  appreciate  the  full  scope  of  the  diabolical  conspiracy.  273 
This  was  perhaps  true  in  some  cases,  but  in  late  May-early  June,  even  if  local 
Soviets  appreciated  the  danger,  they  had  no  capable  military  forces.  With  Moscow 
treating  the  Czechoslovak  Uprising  as  a  local  affair,  isolated  Bolshevik  pockets  could 
do  little  more  than  they  did,  hampered  by  Left  SRs  in  the  Soviets.  Tukhachevsky 
explicitly  said  as  much  in  his  23rd  July  report  to  Vacietis,  outlining  measures 
necessary  for  strengthening  1  st  Army.  He  wrote,  "We  are  now  making  great  mistakes 
which  can  completely  threaten  socialism.  These  mistakes  are  an  under-valuation  of 
the  strengths  of  the  enemy,  ignorance  of  their  forces  and  a  lack  of  attention  given  to 
what  is  necessary  to  save  the  position".  Noting  the  Czechoslovaks  had  strengthened 
since  beginning  their  uprising  he  continued, 
...  until  we  prepare  superior  forces  for  its  suppression,  all  forces  and 
resources  of  the  state  must  be  used,  even  to  the  detriment  of  work  planned 
for  the  state  apparatuses.  Only  such  efforts  will  correspond  to  the  true 
significance  of  the  Czechoslovak  Uprising  and  only  in  such  a  case  can  the 
High  Command  be  actively  demanded  to  energetically  fulfill  the  tasks  laid 
down  for  it. 
The  basic  question  in  preparing  success  is  the  organisation  of  the  armed 
forces.  In  this  case,  what  must  not  be  forgotten  is  that  good  infantry,  after 
all  the  losses  which  have  been  sustained,  cannot  quickly  be  created. 
Therefore,  as  was  even  known  already,  it  is  necessary  to  rely  on  the 
technical  side.  But  in  this,  finally  it  is  essential  to  refrain  from 
bureaucratic  measures.  It  is  necessary,  finally,  to  possess  revolutionary 
genius  and  create  new  methods,  reacting  to  circumstances  instead  of 
overloading  the  already-obsolete  system  in  existence.  274 
The  numbers  deemed  necessary  have  already  been  given  above.  This  report  was  a 
fulfillment  of  the  work  Tukhachevsky  was  originally  despatched  from  Moscow  on 
25th  June  to  carry  out,  with  suggestions  on  how  reorganisational  work  on  Eastern 
272  V.  N.  Kaiurov  was  Secretary  of  the  Vyborg  District  Soviet  in  St.  Petersburg.  He  arrived  on  Eastern 
Front  with  a  workers'  detachment,  three  days  before  Kazan'  fell  and  the  detachment  was  drawn  into 
5th  Army.  This  was  typical  of  recruitment  for  all  Eastern  Front  Armies,  including  I  st  Army,  V.  N. 
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Front  should  be  conducted.  It  shows  Tukhachevsky  stressing  the  need  to  utilise 
available  technical  resources  to  compensate  for  the  manpower  shortfall,  possibly  a 
step  towards  his  later  theory  of  huge  technical  ly-based  annies.  All  technical  means 
available  should  be  used,  allowing  civilians  to  go  short  if  need  be.  The  numbers  of 
men  necessary  to  transform  a  small  technically-based  force  into  a  mass  mechanised 
army  were  available  once  the  Soviets  had  control  in  the  1930s  to  develop  his  theories. 
In  July  1918  though,  Tukhachevsky  was  already  calling  for  a  command  economy  to 
furnish  the  army  with  all  its  needs  first,  as  this  was  the  only  way  to  defend  Russia, 
making  the  army  the  most  important  section  of  the  Communist  state.  This  points 
towards  the  military-industrial  complex  Tukhachevsky  played  a  major  part  in 
constructing  in  the  1930s.  However,  already  in  1918,  his  point  about  the  interests  of 
the  civilian  state  apparatuses  being  subverted  to  the  armed  forces  was  realised  only 
six  weeks  later,  with  the  introduction  of  "War  Communism"  and  the  transformation  of 
the  Soviet  zone  into  one-armed  camp.  Did  Tukhachevsky's  suggestion  have  anything 
to  do  with  this? 
This  report  also  illustrates  the  self-confidence  Tukhachevsky  had,  explicitly 
criticising  the  VVS  and  Moscow  for  under-estimating  the  Czechoslovaks  and  failing  to 
reinforce  Eastern  Front.  It  was  also  a  criticism  of  Vacietis'  demands  for  an  immediate 
counter-attack  to  retake  Simbirsk.  Tukhachevsky  was  asking  for  sense  to  be  used  in 
the  handling  of  the  Eastern  Front  situation,  with  well-laid  plans  replacing  knee-jerk 
reactions  to  Czechoslovak  gains.  He  had  been  forced  to  act  independently  as  Ist 
Army  Commander,  altering  Murav'ev's  offensive  plans,  whilst  the  latter  hampered 
his  every  move,  betrayed  Eastern  Front  and  threatened  to  execute  him.  Now 
Tukhachevsky  was  being  ordered  by  Vacietis  to  launch  a  second  attack  with  forces  he 
knew  were  not  ready.  The  command  cadre  had  been  recruited,  but  the  troops  were 
still  untrained  and  untrusting  of  these  commanders.  This  had  to  be  addressed  before  a 
successful  attack  could  be  made.  Tukhachevsky  had  to  attack  Simbirsk,  but  the 
rabble,  which  Ist  Army  had  become  post-Murav"ev,  was  easily  repelled.  However, 
Tukhachevsky  did  not  waste  opportunities  presented  by  the  attack. 
Knowing  there  was  little  chance  of  success,  Tukhachevsky  used  the  attack  to 
gather  intelligence.  Telegraph  communications  had  been  lost  with  Simbirsk  since  21  st 
July  as  the  Czechoslovaks  cut  the  wire  to  Inza.  275  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  ordered 
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Lacis  to  transfer  4th  Latvian  Rifle  Regiment  and  6th  Mtsensk  Infantry  Regiment  to 
Chufarovo  Station,  where  Tolstii  was  ordered  to  lead  these  units  to  reconnoitre  the 
Czechoslovak  positions.  Koritskii  recalls  this  as  the  first  operation  conducted  by  the 
Red  Army,  utilising  tactics  other  than  eshelonnaia  voina,  with  Tolstii,  on  orders  from 
276  Tukhachevsky,  despatching  patrols  on  foot  towards  Simbirsk 
. 
Tukhachevsky 
praised  Tolstii  on  23rd  July  for  this  and  on  25th  July  travelled  in  his  command  train 
from  Inza  to  Chufarovo,  the  station  for  Veshkaima,  to  meet  with  Tolstil,  Koritskii  and 
Kuibyshev  to  assess  the  situation.  277  On  26th  July,  Tukhachevsky  and  Koritskii 
accompanied  a  reconnaissance  patrol  of  the  territory  between  Veshkaima  and 
Simbirsk,  discussing  the  position  with  the  most  advanced  reconnaissance  patrols. 
With  this  information,  Tukhachevsky  outlined  to  Tolstii  defensive  measures  to  be 
taken  around  Veshkaima  and  Chufarovo,  but  at  the  next  Ist  Army  Staff  meeting 
including  Kuibyshev,  Kalnins,  Koritskii,  Ustichev,  Head  of  Artillery  Gardner  and 
Quartermaster  Shevchuk,  he  began  to  outline  the  operation  to  retake  Simbirsk.  278  This 
was  an  early  demonstration  of  Tukhachevsky  utilising  temporary  defensive  measures 
to  pave  the  way  for  an  offensive  operation,  which  would  become  a  cornerstone  of  his 
military  theories.  Ist  Army  was  in  too  weak  a  position  to  attack,  forcing  defensive 
measures,  but  only  until  sufficient  organisation  and  numbers  allowed  an  attack.  To 
facilitate  maximum  speed,  offensive  plans  had  to  be  made  inunediately.  This  was 
typical  of  Civil  War  fighting,  with  small  numbers  and  fluidity  of  frontage,  allowing 
defence  to  be  transformed  into  attack  very  rapidly. 
Whilst  planning  attacks,  reorganisation  proceeded  simultaneously.  With  the 
command  cadre  now  formed  to  mobilise  troops  for  the  Simbirsk  Operation, 
Tukhachevsky  set  up  a  Mobilisation  Department  under  Ibragimov 
. 
279  Since  war- 
weariness  affected  initial  mobilisation,  a  Political  Department  was  fori-ned  under 
Kuibyshev  with  100  staff  for  agitational-propaganda  work,  comprising  voenspetsy, 
but  mainly  Bolsheviks.  By  early  August,  this  contained  200  political  workers,  who 
toured  the  villages  mobilising  men  for  the  army  and  helping  their  families.  280  This 
was  the  first  such  political  department  set  up  in  the  Red  Army.  The  Mobilisation 
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Department  assumed  the  role  of  the  absent  Military  Commissariats  and  through  it 
Tukhachevsky  conducted  the  first  mobilisations  carried  out  in  a  Red  Army 
operational  area,  another  experimental  step  for  1  st  Army. 
Before  this  department  could  make  an  impact,  I  st  An-ny  received  a  timely  boost 
on  27th  July.  Tukhachevsky  and  Kuibyshev,  back  in  Inza,  received  a  call  by  Hughes 
Telegraph  from  Lesnoe  Annenkovo,  281  close  to  Maina  Station.  This  was  Komuch- 
occupied  territory  and  they  initially  suspected  a  ruse  to  locate  their  position.  However, 
on  questioning,  the  caller  was  identified  as  Gai,  Commander  of  Sengilei-Syzran' 
Group,  282  which  had  been  cut  off  from  Simbirsk  Army  Group  during  the  evacuation 
of  Simbirsk  on  22nd  July.  Gai  had  collected  scattered  Red  units  in  Sengilei  area, 
commandeered  all  local  resources  he  could  find  and  assimilated  these  into  his  own 
group.  He  successfully  led  this  huge  train  of  carts  on  a  3-day,  150  versty  march 
through  the  Czechoslovak  encirclement,  without  loss,  283  recruiting  more  people  along 
the  way.  284  Tukhachevsky  instructed  Gai  to  make  for  Veshkaima  and  with  Kuibyshev, 
met  Gai  at  Chufarovo  Station  on  28th  jUly.  285  Gai  was  entrusted  with  reorganising  the 
3,000  men  of  Sengilei  and  Stavropol'  Groups  and  Tolstii's  1,000-man  detachment  to 
form  Ist  Simbirsk  Combined  Rifle  Division.  286  On  9th  August,  for  their  valorous 
efforts  in  the  battles  around  Simbirsk  and  Sengilei,  the  division  was  renamed 
Simbirsk  Iron  Division.  On  18th  November  it  became  24th  Infantry  Division,  287 
perhaps  the  first  elite  Soviet  division. 
Gai's  appearance  was  vital  for  Tukhachevsky.  The  Czechoslovaks  still  threatened 
along  Simbirsk-Chufarovo  and  Syzran'-Inza  rail  lines  and  lack  of  numbers  left  Ist 
Army  HQ  vulnerable.  Gai'  covered  Inza  from  the  Simbirsk  direction  and  as  he  had 
earlier  provided  time  for  the  voenspetsy  mobilisation  to  take  place,  so  he  held  off  the 
Czechoslovaks  in  July  and  August  to  allow  Ist  Army  RVS  to  mobilise  and  organise 
the  lower  ranks.  Gai's  role  in  the  successes  of  lst  Army  should  not  be  under- 
estimated.  Whilst  Tukhachevsky,  Kuibyshev  and  Kalnins  provided  the  expertise 
necessary  to  reform  the  disparate  Red  detachments  into  organised  divisions  under 
280  N.  I.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny...  ",  p.  65;  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  armii",  pp.  53-54. 
28  1  K.  M.  Pavlova-Davydova,  "Hezabyvaemoe",  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia,  p.  107. 
282  BPpRA,  pp.  38-40. 
283  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  anniia  v  1918",  p.  80. 
284  G.  D.  Gai,  p.  3  1. 
285  BpppA,  p.  40;  K.  M.  Pavlova-Davydova,  p.  107. 
286  V.  V.  Kuibyshev,  pp.  28-29. 
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political  control,  Gai  supplied  gritty,  determined  leadership  necessary  to  hold  together 
the  still  disorganised  troops  in  a  screen,  allowing  reorganisation  to  take  place. 
Tukhachevsky  would  entrust  Gai  with  the  toughest  tasks  in  forthcoming  military 
operations  and  it  is  no  surprise  Gai  became  Ist  Army  Commander  when 
288  Tukhachevsky  was  transferred  in  December  1918.  The  other  candidate  for  this  post, 
Lacis,  was  transferred  with  Inza  Division  at  the  same  time. 
With  the  already  under-equipped  Ist  Army  increasing  in  number,  the  need  for 
clothing,  supplies  and  weapons  was  critical.  Again  Tukhachevsky  had  to  solve  this 
locally  with  the  formation  of  a  Department  for  Procurement  of  Supplies.  This  was 
headed  by  Shteingaus,  who  had  been  lst  Army  Chief-of-  Supplies  since  its  formation 
and  now  received  a  mandate  to  intercept  and  impound  any  loads  or  stores  found 
within  Ist  Ari-ny's  operational  area.  Stockpiles  of  Tsarist  Army  equipment  lay  in 
depots,  warehouses  and  railway  sidings,  undisturbed  since  demobilisation.  The 
Procurement  Department  systematically  scoured  Ist  Army's  operational  area, 
uncovering  a  great  wealth  of  resources.  As  Koritskii  related,  "What  did  our  procurers 
not  find  in  alleys  and  warehouses!  There  was  everything,  from  textiles  to  machine- 
guns  and  even  cannons.  ,  289 
Alongside  supplies  for  the  men,  horses  were  urgently  required,  both  for  the 
formation  of  mounted  infantry  (korvolanty)  as  instructed  by  Vacietis  on  23rd  July,  290 
and  for  transportation.  Vacietis  identified  the  lack  of  cavalry  as  a  major  weakness  in 
I  st  Army.  In  his  25th  July  report  to  the  VVS  and  Trotsky  about  the  fall  of  Simbirsk,  he 
reported  of  White  Cossack  cavalry  suddenly  appearing  in  the  flanks  and  rear  of  Ist 
Army  forces  retreating  from  Bugul'ma  to  Simbirsk.  Encirclement  and  cutting  of 
communications  caused  panic.  The  retreat  became  a  rout  as  Reds  "abandoned 
weapons,  an  armoured-train,  military  equipment,  despite  there  being  no  danger,  apart 
from  the  appearance  of  enemy  cavalry  in  our  flanks  and  rear"  . 
29  1  The  importance  of 
cavalry  was  apparent  from  the  first  clashes  in  the  East,  but  it  was  not  immediately 
addressed  by  the  Reds,  due  to  the  lack  of  trained  cavalrymen  and  horses.  Korvolanty 
were  a  stopgap  measure,  but  "flankfear"  was  a  ma  or  problem  at  this  time  which  only  i 
288  Voennye  bumagi  L.  D.  Trotskogo,  1918-1924,  reel  2,  RGVA,  f  4,  op.  3,  d.  26,  p.  311. 
289  N.  1.  Koritskii,  p.  65. 
290  Each  anny  was  instructed  to  create  a  korvolanty  group  of  400  horses,  DkfKA,  Tom.  1,  p.  403. 
291  0.  lu.  Kalnin,  p.  4  1,  This  had  come  in  the  wake  of  the  Murav'ev  Revolt  and  was  the  beginning  of 
the  Czechoslovak  general  offensive.  The  Red  troops,  attacking  from  Bugul'ma  and  Melekess,  confused 126 
proper  training,  discipline  and  organisation  could  combat.  Tukhachevsky,  as 
instructed,  began  to  form  three  cavalry  detachments  alongside  the  infantry  divisions, 
but  Red  Cavalry  did  not  come  of  age  until  the  emergence  of  Budennyi's  Ist  Cavalry 
Army  on  Southern  Front  and  Gai's  3rd  Kavkor  on  Eastern  Front  in  19195  when 
cossacks  sympathetic  to  the  Reds  were  employed  and  trained  further  Red  cavalrymen. 
In  summer  1918,  horses  were  more  immediately  needed  for  transport  purposes, 
with  the  need  to  "de-train"  the  troops  paramount.  Lenin  emphasised  this  on  22nd 
August,  having  Vacietis  telegram  Tukhachevsky  to  ask  him  to,  "...  report  why  Ist 
Army  troops  until  now  are  living  in  wagons  and  not  crossing  to  field  warfare.  Take 
-)  292 
measures  to  evict  the  troops  from  the  trains.  Let  the  troops  form  strings  of  carts'  . 
However,  Tukhachevsky  had  taken  these  measures  already.  Vacietis  replied  to 
Lenin,  Bonch-Bruevich  and  Trotsky  on  24th  August, 
Military  Director  Bonch-Bruevich,  by  assembling  from  unknown  sources, 
data  on  the  activities  and  state  of  morale  of  army  units,  places  me  in  a 
false  position.  On  the  basis  of  his  telegram  No.  1255  of  21/8  1  issued  a 
strong  reprimand  to  Ist  Army  Commander  and  received  the  following 
answer: 
"First  Army  troops  have  long  since  been  detrained  and  have  taken  up 
bivouac  quarters.  I  do  not  know  who  it  is  your  end  that  is  putting  out 
provocational  reports". 
I  ask  that  attention  be  given  to  the  fact  that  official  communications 
emanating  from  the  highest  organ  of  the  War  Department  without  any 
adequate  check-up  are  unfounded  and  upset  the  army.  I  am  reporting  this 
to  you  in  accordance  with  your  instructions  communicated  to  me  by 
293  Bonch-Bruevich  in  his  same  telegram  No.  1255  No.  13 
. 
This  episode  displays  several  aspects  of  Tukhachevsky's  command  perfectly.  He  was 
far  ahead  of  Moscow  expectations  in  terms  of  reorganising  I  st  Army  and  Moscow  did 
not  know  which  measures  had  been  enacted,  illustrating  the  true  isolation  and 
independence  of  action  Tukhachevsky  had  on  Eastern  Front.  It  also  displays  his 
willingness  to  vehemently  defend  himself  against  false  accusations,  no  matter  from 
where  they  originated. 
by  the  conflicting  orders  sent  out  by  Murav'ev,  were  routed  and  abandoned  both  towns,  retreating  to 
Simbirsk,  leaving  the  railway  line  to  the  town  unguarded  and  open;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  I,  pp.  405-406. 
292  Nikulin  dates  the  telegram  as  I  st  August,  but  this  appears  to  be  the  one  sent  by  Bonch-Bruevich  on 
21  st  August,  which  Vacietis  relayed  to  Tukhachevsky  on  Lenin's  instructions,  L.  Nikulin,  p.  5  7;  J. 
Meijer,  ed.  The  Trotsky  Papers,  Vol.  I,  pp.  108-111. 
293  j.  Meijer,  ed.  The  Trotsky  Papers,  Vol.  I,  pp.  108-111. 127 
Similarly,  Vacietis  criticised  Tukhachevsky  on  21st  July,  ordering  him,  "...  to  stay 
in  the  Army  HQ  and  lead  the  troops  and  do  not  bolt  around  the  rear".  294 
Tukhachevsky  strongly  replied  that  he  spent  most  of  his  time  in  the  front  areas,  but 
had  to  travel  to  Penza  to  reform  broken  units  and  mobilise  artillery  and  engineers. 
With  no  reply  to  this,  Tukhachevsky  sent  a  second  telegram  with  Kuibyshev's 
backing,  asking  that  restrictions  on  his  movement  be  lifted.  Vacietis  replied, 
confirming  this.  Such  incidents  would  recur  throughout  the  Civil  War. 
Despite  the  above  dispute,  a  major  step  towards  reorganisation  and  regularisation 
of  I  st  Army  was  ceasing  to  fight  by  eshelonnaia  voina  tactics,  removing  troops  from 
the  trains.  To  defeat  a  mobile  force  with  cavalry,  mobility  outwith  the  restrictions  of 
the  railway  lines  was  required.  Tukhachevsky  had  already  advocated  the  use  of  the 
Volga,  Kama  and  other  waterways  as  alternative  transport  routes,  more  reliable  than 
the  wrecked  railway  system,  but  overland  transport  was  required  if  Red  forces  were  to 
push  the  Czechoslovaks  back  behind  the  Volga. 
The  use  of  peasant  carts,  as  suggested  above  by  Lenin,  was  the  solution  and 
Tukhachevsky  wrote  about  this  later.  295  Carts  were  seized  by  Ist  Army,  but  required 
horses  to  pull  them.  Acquiring  these  was  entrusted  to  a  Special  Department  of  the 
Procurements  Department.  Tukhachevsky  followed  Vacietis'  instructions  to  buy 
further  horses  and  carts  from  the  local  population,  authorising  payment  instead  of 
296  seizures,  which  would  have  turned  the  peasantry  further  towards  Komuch 
. 
However,  Tukhachevsky  recalled  Red  forces  merely  changed  from  "movement  by 
rail"  to  "movement  by  wire"  -  telegraph  communications.  297  Hughes  Telegraph  was 
the  most  common  form  of  communication  used  during  the  Civil  War  and  difficulties 
associated  with  this  would  be  significant  in  several  of  Tukhachevsky's  operations. 
This  had  already  been  mentioned  by  Vacietis  in  his  25th  July  report.  The  use  of 
cavalry  to  encircle  and  cut  telegraph  wires  to  destroy  enemy  communications  was  a 
tactic  used  by  all  sides  during  the  Russian  Civil  War.  Tukhachevsky  used  it  to  great 
effect,  but  was  also  on  the  receiving  end. 
These  reorganisational  measures  were  all  taken  in  the  final  week  of  July  with  Ist 
Army  RVS  envisaging  Ist  Army  being  capable  of  military  action  by  the  end  of 
294 
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298 
fect,  events  outwith  August  However,  before  they  could  take  proper  ef 
Tukhachevsky's  control  again  hampered  his  efforts. 
The  Czechoslovaks,  regrouping  after  taking  Simbirsk,  captured  Kazan'  on  6th-7th 
August,  and  with  it  the  Tsarist  gold  reserve,  evacuated  here  from  Samara  by 
Kuibyshev  and  Gai,  in  June.  Vacietis  barely  escaped  when  most  of  the  voenspetsy  in 
Kazan',  whom  he  had  suspected  upon  assuming  command,  but  not  had  time  to 
replace,  defected  to  the  Czechoslovaks.  This  left  him  with  120  of  his  Latvians  to 
shoot  their  way  out  of  Eastern  Front  HQ  and  flee  Kazan'.  He  desperately  despatched 
orders  to  Eastern  Front  Armies,  urging  a  counter-offensive.  Tukhachevsky  received  a 
flurry  of  orders  from  3rd-  II  th  August  to  make  a  second  attack  on  Simbirsk.  299  Spahr 
mistakenly  dates  the  first  two  attacks  on  Simbirsk  as  occurring  on  3rd  and  9th  August, 
but  all  orders  issued  here  related  to  only  the  second  attack.  The  first  attack,  as  has 
been  demonstrated,  occurred  immediately  after  the  Czechoslovak  occupation,  on  22nd 
July.  Tukhachevsky's  recollections  and  the  documentary  evidence  confirm  this.  300 
Moscow,  not  under-estimating  the  danger  a  second  time,  reacted  swiftly.  Lenin 
wrote  to  Eastern  Front  RVS,  declaring,  "Now  the  whole  fate  of  the  revolution  stands 
on  one  map:  swift  victory  over  the  Czechoslovaks  on  the  Kazan'-Ural-  Samara  Front. 
Everything  depends  on  thiS,,.  30  1  Trotsky  himself  left  for  Eastern  Front  the  day  after 
Kazan'  fell,  his  command  train  packed  with  around  fifty  of  the  most  fervent,  effective 
Communist  Party  agitators,  amongst  them  S.  1.  Gusev.  302  Trotsky  arrived  at  Sviiazhsk 
Station,  met  the  retreating  Vacietis  and  began  work  to  stabilise  the  Red  line.  He 
appointed  Slaven  5th  Army  Commander  and  started  reorganisational  work  of  the 
broken  Red  units  into  5th  Army.  303 
Trotsky's  arrival  at  Sviiazhsk,  where  he  remained  until  30th  August,  when  he 
returned  to  Moscow  after  the  shooting  of  Lenin,  304  was  a  turning-point  for  Eastern 
Front.  It  witnessed  a  severe  stiffening  in  methods  used  to  organise  and  hold  together 
297  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armila  v  1918  gody",  p.  82. 
298  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  anniia...  ",  p.  58. 
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300  W.  j.  Spahr,  Stalin's  Lieutenants:  A  Study  of  Command  Under  Duress,  (Novato,  CA,  1997),  p.  67; 
M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armila  v  1918  gody",  p.  81. 
30  1 
DGkKA,  p.  106. 
302  L.  D.  Trotsky,  My  Life,  an  attempt  at  an  autobiography,  (Harrnondsworth,  1975),  pp.  398-399. 
303  Ibid.  p.  398. 
304  Lenin  was  shot  and  wounded  by  two  bullets  fired  by  a  Left  SR  sympathiser  Fania  Kaplan  whilst 
leaving  the  Mikhel'son  Factory  after  giving  a  speech  to  workers  there,  Voennye  bumagi  L.  D. 
Trotskogo,  1918-1924,  reel  38,  RGVA,  f  4,  op.  3,  d.  201,  pp.  4-5. 129 
Red  units.  Tukhachevsky  had  set  up  tribunals  on  I  st  July  and  had  used  them  in  his 
mobilisations  and  almost  certainly  after  the  Murav'ev  Revolt,  when  any  collaborators 
would  have  been  tried  and  executed.  Also  as  Tukhachevsky  himself  relates  of  the 
fighting  in  the  East,  "For  a  long  time  prisoners  were  not  taken  by  either  side"  . 
305  Civil 
War  fighting  was  of  an  especially  bitter,  savage  nature  and  Tukhachevsky  acted  no 
differently  in  this  respect  than  any  other  leader  during  the  conflict,  a  fact  glossed  over 
by  Soviet  sources.  Trotsky's  arrival  in  August,  however,  sparked  an  even  more 
widespread  employment  of  the  tribunals'  arbitrary  powers,  especially  with  regards  to 
Red  Army  men.  Tukhachevsky  did  not  have  the  position  or  clout  to  carry  out 
repressive  discipline  towards  serving  men,  especially  serving  communists,  still  being 
regarded  partly  as  a  voenspetsy,  despite  his  Communist  Party  membership.  However, 
introducing  repressive  measures  to  ensure  Red  Army  men  fought,  306  Trotsky  later 
recalled, 
The  situation  before  Kazan'  changed  beyond  recognition.  Heterogeneous 
detachments  became  regular  units,  buttressed  by  worker-communists  from 
Petrograd,  Moscow  and  other  places.  The  regiments  stiffened  up.  Inside 
the  units,  the  commissaries  acquired  the  importance  of  revolutionary 
leaders,  of  direct  representatives  of  the  dictatorship.  The  tribunals 
demonstrated  to  everyone  that  revolution,  when  threatened  by  mortal 
danger,  demands  the  highest  sacrifice.  Propaganda,  organisation, 
revolutionary  example  and  repression  produced  the  necessary  change  in  a 
few  weeks.  A  vacillating,  unreliable  and  crumbling  mass  was  transformed 
into  a  real  army.  Our  artillery  had  emphatically  established  its  superiority. 
Our  flotilla  controlled  the  river.  Our  airmen  dominated  the  air.  No  longer 
did  I  doubt  that  we  would  take  Kazan'.  307 
Trotsky  announced  this  hardening  of  method  on  8th  August,  authorising, 
... 
the  setting  up  at  Murom,  Arzamas  and  Sviiazhsk,  of  concentration 
camps  for  the  imprisonment  of  suspicious  agitators,  counter-revolutionary 
officers,  saboteurs,  parasites  and  speculators,  other  than  those  who  are  to 
be  shot  at  the  scene  of  their  crimes  or  else  sentenced  by  the  Military 
Revolutionary  Tribunal  to  other  punishments.  I  wam  Soviet  officials  in  all 
areas  where  military  operations  are  in  progress,  and  in  the  zone  of  military 
movements,  that  we  shall  be  doubly  exacting  towards  them.  The  Soviet 
Republic  will  punish  its  negligent  and  criminal  servants  no  less  severely 
than  its  enemies.  The  country's  terrible  situation  obliges  us  to  take  terrible 
measures.  308 
305  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pen,  aia  armiia  v  1918",  p.  83. 
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Trotsky  set  new  standards  for  revolutionary  discipline,  but  his  swift 
reorganisational  work  mirrored  Tukhachevsky's  achievements  with  Ist  Army.  Soviet 
sources  do  not  record  Tukhachevsky  and  Trotsky  working  closely  at  this  time. 
However,  it  would  seem  likely  that  Tukhachevsky  was  at  Sviiazhsk  almost  as  soon  as 
Trotsky  arrived  there,  obviously  summoned  by  him  to  report  on  the  situation,  discuss 
how  best  to  proceed  and  receive  new  orders,  including  introducing  repressive 
measures  towards  Red  An-ny  men.  The  evidence  is  not  concrete,  but  centres  around 
4th  Latvian  Regiment  and  the  punishment  of  its  Commander  and  Commissar.  This 
incident  turned  out  to  be  crucial  for  Eastern  Front,  with  Trotsky  and  Tukhachevsky 
both  in  mortal  danger  from  mutinous  troops. 
4th  Latvian  Division  had  been  fighting  around  Syzran'  for  two  months  with  no 
respite  . 
309  Trotsky  described  them,  "Of  all  the  regiments  of  the  Latvian  Division  that 
had  been  pulled  to  pieces,  this  was  the  worst"  .3 
10  This  is  confirmed  by  a  series  of 
telegrams  sent  from  20th-22nd  June  by  Vacietis  to  4th  Latvian  Regiment  and 
Tukhachevsky,  urging  it  to  advance  from  Inza  to  Simbirsk  as  part  of  the  first  attack  on 
Simbirsk,  immediately  after  the  Czechoslovak  occupation.  4th  Regiment  refused  to 
advance  after  holding  a  regimental  meeting  and  Tukhachevsky  was  criticised  by 
Vacietis  on  22nd  July  for  altering  his  order  and  instructing  the  Latvians  to  guard 
Ruzaevka,  which  was  not  under  threat.  Possibly  Tukhachevsky  was  reluctant  to 
commit  the  Latvians  when  he  knew  1st  Army  was  not  ready  to  attack.  Vacietis 
threatened  4th  Latvian  Regiment  with  Military  Tribunals  and  reiterated  the  order  to 
attack.  However,  with  the  attack  on  Simbirsk  collapsing  quickly  into  a  rout,  neither  of 
these  seems  to  have  occurred,  although  Kobozev  stressed  the  need  to  reform  the 
Popov  detachment  of  4th  Latvian  Regiment.  311 
When  the  second  attack  on  Simbirsk  was  launched  on  8th-9th  August,  the 
Commander  and  Regimental  Committee  of  4th  Latvian  Regiment  again  demanded 
exemption  from  this  stating,  "unless  the  regiment  is  relieved  at  once  "consequences 
f  lloWmo.  312 
for  the  revolution  would  0  Trotsky  summoned  the  Commander  and 
Chairman  of  the  Regimental  Committee  to  his  train  and  declared  them  under  arrest  for 
309  B.  1.  Chistov,  "Komandarm-Kommunist",  p.  47. 
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this  mutinous  behaviour.  313  Chistov  relates  that  the  Commander  and  Commissar  were 
"admonished".  314  Chairman  of  the  Regimental  Committee  Ozol'  and  member  of  the 
Regimental  Committee  Saulut'  were  in  fact  sentenced  on  20th  August  1918  by 
Revolutionary  Field  Tribunal  to  five  years  exclusion  from  Soviet  organisations  and 
three  years  imprisonment.  315  Trotsky  recalled  that  if  the  two  arrestees  or  their  men 
had  resisted,  Sviiazhsk  and  its  bridge  over  the  Volga  would  have  had  to  be 
surrendered  and  his  command  train  would  have  been  captured  by  the  enemy,  resulting 
in  the  possible  collapse  of  Eastern  Front  and  a  threat  to  Moscow.  However,  he 
recalled  that,  "...  the  arrest  came  off  safely.  I  announced  the  commitment  of  the 
commander  of  the  regiment  to  trial  before  the  revolutionary  tribunal.  The  regiment 
remained  at  its  post.  The  commander  was  merely  sentenced  to  prison".  316 
However,  Chistov  recalled  the  "admonishment"  of  the  Commander  and 
Commissar  did  not  help  the  situation, 
But  here  amongst  the  Latvian  Rifles  appeared  the  Army  Commander  and 
in  all  their  hearing  he  explained  that  if  they  would  not  advance,  then  he 
would  go  at  the  head  of  their  commanders  and  lead  them  himself  to  help 
I  st  Latvian  Regiment,  fighting  in  Simbirsk  in  an  enemy  encirclement.  The 
Riflemen  wavered,  began  to  hold  a  mass  meeting.  170  men  together  with 
their  commanders  and  political  workers  close  up  around  Tukhachevsky.  In 
this  way  it  turned  out  that  the  detachment  began  without  delay  to  load 
onto  their  eshelon.  This  decisively  changed  the  mood  of  the  rest.  4th 
Latvian  Regiment  again  was  battleworthy.  317 
Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  played  a  critical  role  in  the  survival  of  Eastern  Front, 
preventing  a  Latvian  mutiny  which  could  have  resulted  in  Trotsky's  and 
Tukhachevsky's  arrest  or  death  either  by  the  Latvians  or  Czechoslovaks  and  Whites. 
Chistov  does  not  mention  Trotsky  because  the  latter  was  never  rehabilitated  and  a 
non-person.  Why  Trotsky  does  not  mention  Tukhachevsky  is  a  little  less  clear. 
Possibly  he  did  not  wish  to  admit  Tukhachevsky  saved  him  as  it  would  detract  from 
the  overall  sense  which  Trotsky  purveys  that  he  alone  turned  the  tide  in  the  East.  To 
develop  this  further,  it  is  possible  the  reorganisational  work  Trotsky  carried  out  on  5th 
Army  was  based  on  that  already  achieved  by  Tukhachevsky  with  Ist  Army.  It  would 
have  been  logical  for  Trotsky  to  ask  the  man  he  had  despatched  eastwards  how  he  had 
313  Ibid.  p.  400. 
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achieved  success  with  I  st  Army,  so  this  could  be  duplicated  with  5th  Army.  However, 
to  admit  this  would  take  even  more  from  Trotsky's  claim  to  have  reorganised  5th 
Army  before  it  took  Kazan'.  It  is  also  possible  Trotsky  did  not  mention  Tukhachevsky 
because  at  the  time  of  writing  My  Life  (1930),  he  did  not  wish  to  discredit 
Tukhachevsky  by  saying  they  had  been  so  close,  as  Trotsky  hoped  Tukhachevsky 
would  lead  a  coup  to  overthrow  Stalin,  with  or  without  Trotsky's  knowledge  and 
collaboration.  However,  if  Trotsky  did  not  mention  Tukhachevsky  later,  Gul'  suggests 
that  in  1918  Trotsky  criticised  Eastern  Front  commanders  and  commissars  such  as 
Lacis,  Lashevich  and  Smilga  of  inaction  but  set  one  example,  the  "glorious  name  of 
Tukhachevsky".  318  Smirnov  produces  a  personal  letter  from  Trotsky  to  Tukhachevsky 
as  further  evidence  of  their  closeness.  319  Whether  this  occurred  or  not,  Tukhachevsky 
and  Trotsky  worked  closely  on  Eastern  Front.  Tukhachevsky  took  more  severe 
actions  with  Trotsky  to  back  him  up.  Trotsky  had  summoned  Tukhachevsky  to 
discuss  how  they  should  deal  with  the  worsening  Czechoslovak  menace.  Whilst  here, 
Tukhachevsky  had  risked  his  own  life  and  had  saved  Trotsky's.  Trotsky  would  have 
expected  no  less  from  a  loyal  communist,  but  Tukhachevsky  was  not  essentially  so. 
This  display  of  loyalty,  coming  so  soon  after  the  Murav'ev  Affair,  must  have  truly 
cemented  Tukhachevsky's  position  vis-a-vis  the  top  Communist  Party  leadership. 
As  a  result  of  the  4th  Latvian  Regiment  episode,  Trotsky  commanded, 
I  give  warning  that  if  any  unit  retreats  without  orders,  the  first  to  be  shot 
down  will  be  the  commissary  of  the  unit,  the  next  the  commander.  Brave 
and  gallant  soldiers  will  be  appointed  in  their  places.  Cowards,  dastards 
and  traitors  will  not  escape  the  bullet.  This  I  solemnly  promise  in  the 
presence  of  the  entire  Red  Army.  320 
For  this,  Trotsky  introduced  zagraditel'nye  otriady  (blocking  battalions). 
Volkogonov  claimed  Tukhachevsky  used  these  first  in  August  1918,32  1  but  the 
archival  source  he  cited  does  not  specifically  say  this,  with  Trotsky  referring  in  1921 
to  previous  use  of  "blocking  detachments",  but  no  more.  322  Volkogonov  possibly  had 
another  source  to  back  this  up,  but  he  did  not  cite  it.  However,  if  this  did  occur  in 
summer  1918,  Tukhachevsky  probably  first  used  "blocking  detachments"  in  the 
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second  or  third  attack  on  Simbirsk.  Severe  measures  were  now  employed  with 
Tukhachevsky  again  the  one  to  experiment. 
Whilst  employing  these  measures,  Tukhachevsky  still  used  more  conventional 
methods  of  persuasion,  cajoling  troops  personally  as  with  4th  Latvian  Division. 
Chistov  related  a  similar  incident  occurring  with  Ufa  Engineering  Detachment,  which 
had  retreated  from  Ufa  to  Simbirsk  and  wished  to  retreat  further,  with  morale  at  a 
very  low  ebb.  The  detachment  commander  complained  to  Tukhachevsky  about  his 
men,  technical  troops,  being  employed  as  infantry,  and  demanded  they  be  sent  to 
Kazan'  for  re-equipping.  323 
This  situation  must  have  struck  Tukhachevsky  with  a  certain  irony.  He  had  just 
stressed  the  need  to  develop  the  technical  ability  of  the  Red  Army  to  compensate  for 
troop  shortages,  but  here  was  an  engineering  unit  used  as  infantry  because  of  this 
shortage.  However,  he  apparently  explained  the  desperation  of  the  position  to  the  unit 
declaring, 
As  Army  Commander  and  communist,  I  consider  that  the  reasons  you  give 
do  not  free  you  from  your  duty  to  defend  Soviet  power  in  Simbirsk  at  this 
very  critical  moment.  Until  now  I  have  never  heard  members  of  our  Party 
refusing  to  fight  for  the  Soviets. 
And  so  forwards!  I  shall  go  together  with  you!  " 
This  speech  worked  and  the  Ufa  Engineering  Detachment  did  indeed 
fight  on  the  approaches  to  Simbirsk.  324 
However,  this  mixture  of  persuasive  and  repressive  measures  was  not  enough  to 
overcome  Ist  Army's  lack  of  preparation  and  discipline.  The  second  attack  on 
Simbirsk,  launched  on  8th  August,  fared  little  better  than  the  first,  collapsing  into 
another  chaotic  rout,  although  Velikanov's  2nd  Simbirsk  Regiment  did  retain  its 
discipline  during  the  retreat,  possibly  indicating  some  reorganisational  progress. 
Tukhachevsky  ordered  Simbirsk  Division  to  break  off  the  attack  and  withdraw  to  its 
starting  positions  around  Chufarovo  Station,  which  it  did  by  16th  August,  325  but  this 
order  produced  an  extraordinary  response  from  Tukhachevsky's  superiors. 
Eastern  Front  RVS  member  Kobozev  hurried  to  Tukhachevsky's  command  train 
and,  with  the  support  of  Kalnins,  demanded  he  launch  the  attack  once  more.  Upon 
refusing  to  do  so,  Tukhachevsky  was  threatened  with  one  of  the  tribunals  he  had  been 
instrumental  in  forming.  Kobozev  accused  him  of  treachery  similar  to  that  of 
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Murav'ev  at  Simbirsk,  hampering  the  Red  attack  and  withdrawing  units  during  battle. 
With  Kalnins,  he  telegrammed  Trotsky  and  Vacietis.  The  matter  was  temporarily 
resolved  by  Kuibyshev  backing  Tukhachevsky  against  the  two  other  commissars  and 
explaining  retreat  was  necessary,  with  the  troops  in  disarray  and  no  state  to  fight. 
Koritskii  suggests  however,  that  Trotsky  and  Vacietis  supported  Kobozev  and 
Kalnins  and  again  threatened  Tukhachevsky  with  a  tribunal  if  he  did  not  attack.  At 
this  point,  Kuibyshev  contacted  Lenin  via  Aralov  of  the  MR,  explaining  the 
hopeless  position  of  Ist  Army  and  the  wisdom  of  Tukhachevsky's  decision.  Aralov 
replied,  with  Lenin's  direct  backing,  for  Tukhachevsky  to  complete  the 
reorganisational  work  he  had  been  despatched  to  do,  before  committing  Ist  Army  to 
direct  military  action  again.  326 
This  extraordinary  sequence  of  events  displays  vividly  the  tension,  panic  and 
mistrust  which  gripped  the  Red  military  leadership  in  the  East.  Tukhachevsky,  who 
had  reported  Murav'ev  for  hampering  reorganisational  efforts,  refused  to  join  his 
revolt  and  had  nearly  been  executed  for  it,  was  now  accused  of  similarly  treacherous 
behaviour.  Not  only  was  he  accused  by  Kobozev,  who  perhaps  did  not  know  him  that 
well  and  Vacietis,  with  whom  Tukhachevsky  did  not  have  the  best  of  working 
relationships,  327  but  also  by  Kalnins,  with  whom  he  had  worked  closely  for  the  past 
six  weeks,  and  Trotsky,  whose  life  he  had  just  saved.  Such  were  the  conditions  on 
Eastern  Front  in  summer  1918.  Noone  was  truly  trusted  and  everyone  was  judged 
only  by  their  last  act.  This  was  a  moment  of  acute  danger  for  Tukhachevsky.  Trotsky 
had  Blagonravov  removed  for  merely  talking  of  desertion  (although  he  escaped  a 
tribunal)  and  had  ordered  the  execution  of  Red  Commanders  and  Commissars  by  this 
time.  328  If  Tukhachevsky  had  not  been  backed  by  Kuibyshev  and  Lenin,  he  may  well 
have  been  committed  to  a  tribunal,  which  could  have  meant  death  or  imprisonment 
and  an  end  to  his  career.  The  backing  Tukhachevsky  received  from  Lenin  further 
supports  the  suggestion  the  two  had  met  before  Tukhachevsky  travelled  eastwards.  It 
is  doubtful  whether  Lenin  would  have  intervened  on  Tukhachevsky's  behalf 
325  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny...  ",  pp.  59-62  ;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armiia  v  1918",  p.  81. 
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August  and  authorised  Panteleev's  execution.  He  had  stolen  a  ship  and  tried  to  desert  with  his  men 
down  the  Volga,  J.  Meijer,  ed.  The  Trotsky  Papers,  vol.  I,  pp.  154-157,252-253  &  362-365;  L.  D. 
Trotsky,  How  the  Revolution  Armed,  Vol.  1,  p.  313;  Rozengol'ts,  Bor'ba  za  Ural  i  Sibir',  p.  22. 135 
otherwise,  overruling  staunch  Bolshevik  commissars  Kobozev  and  Kalnins,  Supreme 
Commander  Vacietis  and  Trotsky.  This  also  illustrates  Trotsky's  ruthlessness  and 
motivation  to  make  the  Red  Army  succeed,  with  its  progression  and  success 
outweighing  the  life  of  the  man  who  had  just  saved  him  from  the  Latvian  mutiny.  The 
reaction  to  Tukhachevsky's  decision  from  the  political  conunissars,  a  purely  military 
decision  to  pull  forces  back  from  Simbirsk,  would  have  certainly  contributed  to  his 
conviction  that  unified  command  was  urgently  required  for  the  Red  forces,  replacing 
collegial  command  involving  one  voenspets  and  two  political  commissars. 
Tukhachevsky  would  suggest  this  in  his  December  1918  letter  to  lurenev  and  was 
very  vocal  on  this  subject  throughout  the  Civil  War,  which  undoubtedly  hampered  his 
acceptance  by  many  hard-line  communists  such  as  Voroshilov  and  Stalin,  who 
viewed  such  suggestions  as  reactionary  and  "Napoleonistic". 
The  tribunal  episode  was  another  escape  for  Tukhachevsky,  but  like  those  before, 
it  did  have  positive  results.  The  way  was  now  clear  to  complete  the  reorganisational 
work  required  on  I  st  Army.  Whilst  being  freed  from  attacking  the  Czechoslovaks  and 
Whites  directly,  Tukhachevsky  still  had  to  aid  5th  Army,  which  was  even  less 
organised  than  Ist  Army,  in  stalling  the  Czechoslovak's  advance  from  Kazan'.  This 
was  a  far  more  realistic  objective  for  August  1918  and  matched  the  plans  he  had 
already  laid  out  for  Simbirsk  Division  at  Veshkaima  and  Chufarovo.  It  meant  that  by 
the  following  month,  Ist  Army  would  be  in  a  position  to  switch  from  the  defensive 
and  finally  attack  effectively  to  retake  Simbirsk,  supporting  the  main  Red  thrust  by 
5th  Army  to  Kazan',  launching  Tukhachevsky  on  his  Civil  War  campaign  career. 
Taking  Simbirsk,  was  only  a  supplementary  operation  to  the  main  object  of  capturing 
Kazan',  but  this  turned  out  to  be  another  stroke  of  luck  for  Tukhachevsky.  Simbirsk 
was  Lenin's  birthplace  and  the  prestige  Tukhachevsky  gained  for  capturing  it  added 
further  to  the  trust  he  had  built  up  with  the  Bolshevik  leadership,  but  also  enhanced 
his  reputation  throughout  Russia  as  a  Red  Commander  of  note.  Trotsky  described  it  as 
a  "...  historic  page  in  the  history  of  the  socialist  revolution"  . 
329 
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Conclusion:  Who  Was  Tukhachevsky  by  September  1918? 
By  September  1918,  Tukhachevsky  was  firmly  embedded  as  I  st  Army 
Commander  of  Eastern  Front,  or  as  firmly  embedded  as  one  could  be  in  the  tense, 
paranoid  atmosphere  of  the  escalating  Civil  War.  He  had  achieved  this  position 
through  a  variety  of  reasons,  circumstance  and  luck.  The  assertion  that  he  achieved 
his  position  because  he  was  a  rare  "commander-communist"  and  had  Trotsky's 
backing  is  only  partially  true.  Joining  the  Communist  Party  was  a  crucial  step,  but  the 
opportunities  this  offered  had  to  be  maintained  by  gaining  the  trust  of  the  Bolshevik 
Party  and  Red  Army  hierarchies.  The  only  way  to  achieve  this  was  to  perform  well  in 
the  tasks  allocated  to  him. 
Tukhachevsky  did  this  as  Military  Inspector  with  the  Military  Department  and  as 
Military  Commissar  on  the  Western  Screens,  so  much  so  that  the  written  work  he 
produced  was  used  to  help  fonTiulate  official  state  military  policy.  Having  proved 
himself  in  the  administrative  background,  albeit  involving  a  tour  of  frontline  areas, 
and  personally  meeting  Trotsky,  Lenin  and  many  other  Bolshevik  and  military 
luminaries,  Tukhachevsky  was  deemed  the  man  to  reorganise  the  ailing  Eastern  Front 
in  face  of  the  Komuch  offensives.  He  was  sent  to  implement  his  recommendations  on 
the  frontline,  an  extraordinary  situation.  He  would  later  write  "Armies  could  only  be 
raised  in  areas  where  uprisings  had  already  occurred.  030  This  was  exactly  what 
Tukhachevsky  had  to  do  on  the  Eastern  Front  in  1918.  No  help  was  received  from 
Moscow  and  he  had  to  reorganise  completely  disparate  partisan,  guerilla  detachments 
into  a  regular  army.  Tukhachevsky  readily  acknowledged  the  help  he  received  from 
his  Eastern  Front  colleagues  -  Kuibyshev,  Kalnins,  Gai  and  Vareikis  -  and  emphasised 
the  pivotal  role  played  by  Communists  in  creating  the  disciplined  Ist  Revolutionary 
Army.  However,  these  were  local  efforts,  not  coordinated  from  Moscow.  Once  Red 
Army  organisers  were  despatched  to  Eastern  Front,  they  were  isolated,  having  to 
build  a  team  to  survive  and  create  Red  armed  forces  using  only  local  men  and 
resources.  The  military  commissariats  did  not  exist  in  practical  terms  and  no 
apparatus  for  mobilisation  was  in  place.  Tukhachevsky  had  to  create  Revolutionary 
Military  Field  Tribunals,  mobilisation  panels  and  departments  for  gathering  supplies, 
horses  and  resources  for  his  army  within  their  operational  area.  Creation  of  the  Red 
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Army  was  not  actually  directed  from  Moscow  by  Trotsky  as  previous  accounts  claim. 
The  Bolshevik  Party  and  military  leadership  had  vacillated  and  argued  over  how  to 
build  a  new  army  and  where  to  do  so,  in  the  rear  or  at  the  front.  The  point  was 
eventually  reached  where  the  Czechoslovak  Revolt  led  to  people  like  Tukhachevsky 
having  to  do  this  on-the-spot,  whilst  waging  the  Civil  War  simultaneously,  a  situation 
of  extreme  danger  and  isolation.  Trotsky's  biggest  contribution  was  also  made  as  a 
local  organiser  at  Sviiazhsk  in  August  1918,  but  although  intensifying  discipline,  the 
organisational  methods  he  used  were  probably  those  Tukhachevsky  had  experimented 
with  in  July. 
Tukhachevsky's  contribution  with  the  other  original  organisers  of  I  st  Army,  to  the 
overall  formation  of  the  Red  Army  was  immense.  Personally  he  produced  his  May 
recommendations,  and  with  his  Ist  Army  colleagues,  showed  these  to  be  correct 
evaluations  of  how  the  Red  Army  should  be  set  up  in  frontline  areas.  The  structure 
which  emerged  for  Eastern  Front  was  copied  for  Southern  Front  and  indeed  for  the 
whole  Civil  War  arena.  Tukhachevsky  played  a  crucial  role  in  this  from  the 
beginning,  laying  the  foundations  upon  which  the  Red  Army  was  built.  This  was  the 
reason  for  his  joining  the  Bolshevik  Party  in  April,  to  play  a  major  role  in  building  a 
powerful  new  arrny  to  defend  Russia  and  take  on  the  world.  He  had  achieved  this  in 
the  most  dangerous  of  areas  on  the  1918  Eastern  Front  and  had  proved  himself 
amongst  the  most  capable  commanders  the  Red  Army  possessed.  He  had  successfully 
shown  the  way  in  organisational  terms,  but  had  only  limited  combat  opportunities  to 
date.  To  prove  himself  a  capable  Red  Army  Commander,  a  better  candidate  for 
promotion  than  the  other  Eastern  Front  Army  Commanders,  he  would  have  to  be 
successful  in  combat. 
In  chapters  III  and  IV,  I  shall  examine  Tukhachevsky's  command  performance  in 
the  Russian  Civil  War  from  September  1918-April  1920  and  assess  his  and  others' 
evaluations  to  see  if  patterns  of  command  emerged  and  if  he  displayed  further 
evidence,  as  he  had  already  in  summer  1918,  of  his  military  career  and  theories  to 
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Chapter  III:  Conventional  Commander  in  the  Class  War  -  1:  Analysis  and  Early 
Command  Experience:  August  1918-March  1919 
The  Seeds  of  "Deep  Battle" 
On  26th  January  1926,  Tukhachevsky,  as  Red  Army  Chief-of-Staff, 
commissioned  members  of  the  Red  Army  Staff  to  compile  a  work  to  which  he 
contributed  and  edited,  Budushchaia  voina,  (Future  War).  This  was  completed  by  the 
Staffs  Intelligence  Directorate  and  assessed  the  Soviet  Union's  position  in  the  late 
1920s  viv-a-vis  the  capitalist  world.  Possible  threats  and  likely  scenarios  of  how  a 
future  conflict  might  begin  and  develop  were  outlined  in  detail.  ' 
In  the  preface,  citations  from  Tukhachevsky's  1926  commissioning  directive  were 
included.  He  wrote, 
From  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  many  statements  have  arisen  about  a  future 
revolutionary  war,  how  that  is  fashionable,  based  on  revolutionary  spirit 
etc.  Of  course,  not  many  now  indulge  in  such  sins.  In  essence,  on  such 
positions  of  manifested  revolutionary  idealism,  nothing  general  in 
Marxism  exists.  However,  some  preconditions  for  such  conclusions  all  the 
same  existed  in  the  period  of  ruined  industry  during  the  civil  war,  but 
now,  as  the  growth  and  reestablishment  of  our  economy  reaches  pre-war 
levels  in  productive  forces,  we  stand  before  another  task. 
Industrial  development  meant  the  Soviets  would  have  to  fight  a  "cultured  war" 
with  "massed  artillery,  asphyxiating  gas  etc  -  with  all  the  ensuing  strategic, 
organisational  and  mobilisation  consequences".  2 
From  this  it  could  appear  Tukhachevsky  believed  any  lessons  learned  during  the 
Civil  War  were  obsolete  next  to  the  industrially-based  total  warfare  of  the  Great  War. 
In  their  studies  on  Tukhachevsky's  involvement  in  the  build-up  of  the  Soviet  Union 
military-industrial  complex  from  the  late  1920s  to  his  execution  in  1937,  Lennart 
Samuelson  and  Sally  Stoecker  suggest  Tukhachevsky  looked  to  the  Great  War,  rather 
than  the  Russian  Civil  War  for  the  answers.  3  Samuelson  emphasises  the  final  years, 
'  Budushchaia  voina  was  printed  in  only  80  copies,  which  were  restricted  to  the  military  and  Party 
hierarchy,  but  these  were  destroyed  after  Tukhachevsky's  execution,  the  only  surviving  copy  held  by 
Rossiiskii  Gosudarstvennyi  Voennyi  Arkhiv  (hereafter  RGVA),  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Budushchaia 
voina,  (Moscow,  1928),  (from  publishers  note). 
2  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Budushchaia  voina,  pp.  12-13, 
3  L.  Samuelson,  Plans  For  Stalin's  War  Machine:  Tukhachevskii  and  military-economic  planning, 
1925-1941.  (London,  2000),  p.  24;  S.  Stoecker,  Forging  Stalin's  Army:  Marshal  Tukhachevsky  and  the 
Politics  of  Innovation.  (Oxford,  1998),  pp.  18-19  &  168-169. 139 
stressing  the  line  suggested  by  Tukhachevsky  In  the  above  quote,  whilst  Stoecker 
points  to  Tukhachevsky  writing  in  Budushchaia  voina  that  the  early  years  of  the  Great 
War  were  more  important  than  the  Civil  War  for  manoeuvre  warfare. 
In  a  secret  Doklad  ob  oborone  SSSR  (Report  about  the  defence  of  the  USSR), 
completed  in  August  1926,  Tukhachevsky  echoed  an  RVSR  suggestion  to  begin  a 
Four-Year  Plan  of  military  construction,  as  he  felt  "At  the  present  time  neither  the 
USSR,  nor  Red  Army  are  ready  for  war".  4  However,  he  emphasised  that  this 
weakness  came  not  only  from  the  need  to  modernise  the  army  technically,  but  also 
because  the  ma  ority  of  the  Red  Army  had  not  fought  in  the  Civil  War  and  90-95%  of  i 
soldiers  were  peasants,  excepting  the  fleet  and  specialists,  of  whom  20-40%  were 
workers.  He  insisted, 
With  discipline  ensured  -  it  is  possible  to  consider  the  mass  of  troops  as 
wholly  Soviet.  However,  under  present  conditions,  there  is  a  serious 
danger  that  in  the  occurrence  of  war,  as  a  whole  the  common  masses  are 
not  instilled  from  the  political  side.  The  basis  for  this  is  as  follows: 
... 
Need  for  strict  discipline  in  the  anny/correct  internal  interrelations, 
successful  political  training  and  absence  of  any  kind  of  negative 
phenomena. 
Presence  of  strong  politically-conscious  Red  Army  activists...  Most 
committed  Party  members  should  compose  25-30%  of  all  Red  Army 
staff.  5 
Tukhachevsky  based  this  on  his  Civil  War  experiences  of  how  the  army  had 
functioned  well  under  battle  and  probably  how  its  political  core  had  deteriorated 
6 
under  the  New  Economic  Policy  years,  without  the  activist  drive  of  the  war  years  . 
He 
felt  the  Civil  War  mentality  of  politically-driven  discipline  should  be  restored  by 
reintroducing  the  idea  of  a  politically-  inculcated  activist  core.  I  would  argue  that 
Tukhachevsky  combined  this  and  other  aspects  of  his  Civil  War  experience  with 
knowledge  of  the  Great  War,  military  history,  industrialisation  and  weapons 
development,  to  formulate  his  theories  during  the  1920s  which  led  to  Glubokoi  boi 
("Deep  Battle"). 
"Deep  Battle"  was  developed  to  provide  the  answer  to  creating  and  exploiting  a 
breakthrough  in  depth  of  enemy  defensive  lines,  thereby  avoiding  another  static 
RGVA,  f.  33988,  op.  2,  d.  67  1,  pp.  58  &  140.  This  report  did  not  go  down  well  with  Stalin  and  was 
restricted.  For  more  on  the  evolution  of  the  Four  Year  Plan,  see  D.  R.  Stone,  Hammer  and  Rifle:  The 
Militarization  of  the  Soviet  Union,  1926-1933.  (Kansas,  2000). 
5  RGVA,  f.  33988,  op.  2,  d.  671,  p.  132. 
6  The  Soviet  Union  operated  under  the  New  Economic  Policy  from  1921-1928. 140 
positional  war  like  the  Great  War.  Tactics  and  weaponry  utilised  during  the  Great 
War  such  as  machine-gun  and  artillery  use  were  studied,  as  were  developments  to 
combat  these  in  the  closing  years  of  the  War,  especially  tanks.  These  were  intertwined 
with  later  developments  in  aviation  and  innovation,  such  as  the  use  of  paratroopers,  to 
produce  "Deep  Battle".  However,  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  experiences  were  also 
important  and  played  a  crucial  part  in  his  operational  formulation  for  "Deep  Battle". 
The  importance  he  attached  to  these  and  the  value  of  the  lessons  learned  are  evident 
by  the  frequent  reference  to  them  in  his  writings  during  the  1920s.  His  involvement  in 
the  manoeuvre  warfare  of  the  Great  War  Eastern  Front  in  1914-15  was  crucial,  but  he 
was  only  a  2nd  Lieutenant  at  that  time.  The  command  experience  of  the  Civil  War, 
when  he  was  able  to  put  his  theoretical  ideas  of  warfare  into  practice,  was  possibly  the 
vital  link  in  his  military  development,  and  it  would  be  rash  to  discount  these  years. 
In  1926,  the  same  year  he  commissioned  Budushchaia  voina,  Tukhachevsky 
published  an  essay  entitled  Voprosy  sovremennoi  strategii  (Questions  of 
Contemporary  Strategy).  In  this  he  explained, 
Campaigns  have  lost  the  characteristic  appearance  they  formerly  had. 
They  may  characterise  the  entire  period  of  the  war,  a  part  of  it,  or  they 
may  coincide  with  a  series  of  successive  operations. 
Special  attention  must  be  directed  to  operations.  Whereas 
contemporary  wars  are  waged  with  large  numbers  of  troops  and  are 
dragged  out  over  long  periods  of  time,  it  does  not  in  the  least  signify...  that 
we  must  disregard  the  art  of  destroying  the  enemy's  armed  forces. 
This  is  one  of  the  basic  skills  to  which  our  military  art  and  our  strategy 
must  direct  attention...  It  must  be  repeated  that  the  imperialist  war  with  its 
catastrophic  consequences  to  capitalism  has  brought  great  instability  to  the 
question.  Now  we  often  meet  with  uncertainties:  Is  it  possible  at  the 
present  time  to  annihilate  an  armed  force,  is  it  necessary  to  concern 
ourselves  with  such  tasks,  is  this  essential,  isn't  this  frivolous?  Of  course 
not.  War  would  be  senseless,  it  would  be  impossible  to  wage  war  if  there 
were  no  armed  forces...  prepared  to  crush  the  enemy.  These  armed  forces 
are  essential  for  defending  every  state  even  in  that  case  when  war  is 
waged  by  all  the  people.  The  absence  of  determined  armed  forces  may 
prove  fatal  for  any  state.  The  more  skilled  troops  are  in  the  business  of 
annihilating  enemy  armed  forces,  the  more  economical  it  will  be  to  wage 
war.  This  is  the  basic  principle  of  military  training.  And  we  should  train 
our  Red  Army  and  nurture  it  on  these  principles  and  impregnate  it 
thoroughly  with  these  ideas.  From  the  experience  of  the  Civil  War  we 
greit,  accustomed  to  active  operations,  but  we  must  continue  the  work, 
deepen  it,  perfect  ourselves  in  the  art  of  annihilating  the  enemy.  And  this 
art,  I  repeat,  is  embodied  in  the  operation  or  in  a  series  of  successive 
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Operations  must  not  be  conducted  anarchically  without  ideological 
ideals.  We  must  all  be  imbued  with  a  single  general  method.  Our  assertion 
is  not  a  fruitless  cry  about  the  necessity  of  creating  a  unified  military 
doctrine.  Such  a  doctrine  from  year  to  year  percolates  more  and  more  to 
the  depth  of  our  Red  Army.  We  have  service  regulations,  in  which  are 
presented  in  black  and  white  the  completely  defined  methods  of  both 
operational  and  tactical  art.  However,  we  are  preparing  ourselves,  we  are 
perfecting  ourselves  and  must  continue  in  this  work  and  further. 
It  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  under  contemporary  conditions  of 
waging  war  it  may  not  be  possible  to  annihilate  the  enemy  in  a  single 
operation.  The  enemyfrequently  will  slip  awayfrom  an  attack.  Therefore, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  conduct  operations  one  after  the  other,  until  the 
enemy  is  destroyed,  even  if  it  is  at  his  last  line  of  resistance.  And  this  line 
is  located  where  areas  providing  direct  support  to  the  war  begin.  We  must 
perfect  ourselves  in  this  art  of  conducting  operations,  continuously 
practice  and  learn  the  process  of  conducting  them  sequentially...  [My 
italics] 
We  must  recognise  that  we  are  confronted  with  difficult,  prolonged 
wars;  we  must  be  able  to  distinguish  the  different  periods  of  a  war,  to  be 
able  to  successively,  systematically  liquidate  a  capitalist  coalition... 
It  must  be  remembered  that  the  art  of  annihilating  enemy  armed  forces 
is  the  basic  condition  of  the  economical  and  successful  conduct  of  war, 
and  we  must  constantly  perfect  ourselves  both  in  this  art,  and  in  all  the  arts 
of  strategy.  7 
Tukhachevsky,  whilst  stressing  the  need  to  develop  and  deepen  a  unified  military 
theory  in  light  of  the  evolution  of  total  warfare,  still  emphasised  the  overriding  need 
to  annihilate  enemy  armies.  He  wrote  of  this  in  another  1926  article  Voina  (War)  in 
which  he  compared  contemporary  tactics  with  those  of  Napoleon's,  writing  that  these 
had  extended  from  the  "tactics  of  the  theatre  of  operations".  He  continued, 
The  contemporary  operation  consists  in  concentrating  the  necessary 
manpower  for  delivering  an  attack  and  launching  continuous, 
uninterrupted  attacks  by  these  forces  in  great  depth.  The  nature  of 
contemporary  weapons,  modem  battles  is  such  that  it  is  impossible  to 
destroy  an  enemy  force  by  a  single  blow  in  a  single  day's  encounter.  The 
engagement  in  a  modem  operation  is  expanded  into  a  series  of  battles  not 
only  frontally,  but  also  in  depth  until  the  enemy  is  dealt  a  final,  destructive 
blow  or  the  advancing  troops  have  exhausted  themselves.  8 
This  was  Tukhachevsky's  advocacy  of  the  strategy  of  annihilation  as  compared  to 
the  strategy  of  attrition.  This  debate  waged  within  the  Soviet  military  hierarchy 
througout  the  1920s  and  only  by  the  end  of  the  decade  did  Tukhachevsky  gain  the 
7  M.  N.  Tukhachesvky,  "Voprosy  sovremennol  strategli",  Izbrannye  proizvedeniia,  Tom  1,1919-192  7. 
(Moscow,  1964),  pp.  260-261. 142 
upper  hand  in  promoting  the  goal  of  the  complete  destruction  of  the  enemy  force. 
Tukhachevsky,  Triandafillov,  Uborevich  and  others  developed  "Deep  Battle"  to  do  so. 
Therefore,  whilst  commissioning  Budushchaia  voina  to  appraise  the  most  likely  war 
scenarios  and  ways  to  emerge  victorious  from  a  war  on  the  scale  of  the  Great  War, 
Tukhachevsky  was  striving  to  develop  the  operational  side  of  "Deep  Battle"  and 
specifically  the  use  of  successive  operations,  to  enable  this  victory  to  be 
accomplished.  This  would  not  be  by  an  "attrition"  strategy  similar  to  the  Great  War. 
In  Voprosy  sovremennoi  strategii,  he  stated  the  operational  roots  were  to  be  found  in 
the  Civil  War,  during  which  the  Red  Army  had  grown  "...  accustomed  to  active 
operations",  but  this  had  to  be  developed  and  "deepened"  in  light  of  technological 
advances.  The  Civil  War  contained  the  roots  of  his  military  thinking  and  was  clearly 
still  important  to  him  in  1926. 
Also  published  in  1926  was  Armeiskaia  operatsiia:  Rabota  komandovaniia  i 
polevogo  upravleniia  (Army  Operations:  Work  of  Command  and  Field  Control), 
which  Tukhachevsky  edited  and  wrote  with  Varfolomeev  and  Shilovskii.  9  This  was 
compiled  from  work  conducted  within  the  Red  Army  Military  Academy  in  1924-25 
on  a  course  entitled  Vedenie  operatsii  (Conduct  of  operations).  Tukhachevsky 
lectured  on  this  course  and  contributed  his  work  Voprosy  vysshego  komandovaniia 
(Questions  of  Higher  Command).  10  This  covered  tasks  on  the  strategical  and  tactical 
level,  but  also  included  operational  art,  which  was  evolving  to  link  the  two. 
Tukhachevsky  wrote  of  the  need  to  develop  successive  operations  over  distances  of 
180-350  kms  to  fully  rout  enemy  armies.  However,  he  warned  of  the  dangers  of 
strategic  overstretch  and  the  need  to  fully  develop  the  rear  to  avoid  the  transport  and 
supply  problems  experienced  by  Napoleon  in  1812  at  Moscow  and  the  Red  Army  in 
1920  at  Warsaw.  Tactically,  he  mentioned  glubokie  reidy  (deep  raids)  by  cavalry, 
referring  to  actions  of  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  during  the  Polish-Soviet  War  of  1920  and 
8  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky.  -  A  Collection  ofArticles  by  the  Red  Army's  Leading  Military  Theoretician. 
(May,  1983),  p.  64. 
9  Evgenii  Aleksandrovich  Shilovskii  (1889-1952)  served  on  Western  Front  with  Tukhachevsky  during 
the  Polish-Soviet  War. 
10  M,  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Armeiskaia  operatsiia.  -  Rabota  komandovaniia  ipolevogo  upravleniia. 
(Moscow,  1926),  pp.  7-12.  Voprosy  vysshego  komandovaniia  was  published  in  1924  and  is  included  in 
M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Izbrannyeproizvedeniia,  Tom  I,  pp.  185-197;  A  translation  is  provided  in  R. 
Simpkin  &  Erickson,  J.,  Deep  Battle:  The  Brainchild  ofMarshal  Tukhachevskii.  (London; 
Washington,  1987),  pp.  88-101;  The  1926  publication  was  the  series  of  lectures  Tukhachevsky 
delivered  at  the  Academy,  V.  0.  Daines,  "Istoricheskie  portrety:  Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky", 
Voprosy  Istorii.  No.  10,  (Oct.  1989),  p.  53. 143 
the  use  of  concentric  offensives,  as  employed  by  Germany  in  1914  to  surround  and 
defeat  Samsonov's  and  Rennenkampfs  Russian  Armies.  11  Although  the  lectures  and 
book  were  prepared  in  1924,  before  the  Soviet  economy  had  reached  sufficient  levels 
to  allow  expansive  military  development,  Tukhachevsky  believed  the  ideas  in  them 
were  still  important  to  study  and  learn  from  in  1926  and  beyond,  as  the  military- 
industrial  complex  emerged.  Technology  and  industry  may  have  evolved  to  alter  the 
face  of  warfare,  but  the  ideas  behind  the  operational  side  of  "Deep  Battle"  originated 
from  past  military  campaigns  including,  prominently,  the  Civil  War. 
The  continuities  from  the  Civil  War  to  "Deep  Battle"  are  apparent  in 
Tukhachevsky's  1929  article  on  the  new  Red  Army  Field  Regulations,  which  outlined 
for  the  first  time  the  objects  of  "Deep  Battle".  This  also  demonstrated  further  that  he 
still  looked  back  to  the  revolutionary  fervour  engendered  in  the  Red  Army  during  the 
Civil  War  in  some  respects,  despite  his  1926  directive.  In  1929  he  wrote, 
The  class  nature  of  the  Red  Army  is  reflected  in  its  structure  and  content. 
The  tactical  art  of  our  troop  units  is  developed  around  a  lofty  moral  and 
political  core,  and  is  based  on  mobility,  boldness,  and  constant  pressure. 
The  force  inherent  in  the  class  nature  of  the  training  conducted  by  our 
party  is  all-powerful  and  is  the  strength  of  the  Red  Army:  "Teamwork  in 
action  and  political  stability  in  our  units,  disorganisation  (demoralisation) 
of  the  enemy's  fighting  power,  and  calling  upon  his  army  and  working 
population  in  the  theatre  of  operations  to  join  the  proletarian  revolution  of 
the  workers  and  peasants  -  all  these  are  very  important  conditions  for 
beating  the  enemy. 
The  spiritual  strength  of  the  Red  Army  is  a  very  powerful  weapon  in 
organising  a  modem  battle.  The  complexity,  high  degree  of  mechanisation 
and  intensity  of  the  action  demand  the  highest  degree  of  intiative  and  the 
manifestation  of  heroism  on  the  part  of  individual  troopers  and  the 
smallest  units.  Unless  these  elements  prevail  even  the  most  carefully 
prepared  attack  can  fail.  12 
Later  in  the  article  Tukhachevsky  echoed  Lenin,  saying  that  in  a  future  war 
against  capitalism,  "the  imperialist  war  will  develop  into  a  civil  war",  although 
continuity  from  his  Tsarist  Army  days  is  evident  when  he  wrote  of  the  infantry 
following  up  artillery  preparation  to  "...  destroy  the  enemy  quickly  with  bayonet  and 
grenade  attacks  ...... 
13 
These  could  be  dismissed  as  mere  window  dressing  for  the  military  regulations, 
applying  the  necessary  Marxism-Leninism,  as  we  have  already  seen  Tukhachevsky  do 
"  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Armeiskaia  operatsiia.  pp.  68-70  &  79-92. 
12  Mikhail  TukhachevsAy:  A  Collection  ofArticles.  p.  65. 144 
in  1918.  However,  in  chapters  III  and  IV,  I  shall  examine  his  Civil  War  commands  to 
show  that  by  the  end  of  the  conflict,  he  was  convinced  of  the  efficacy  of  a 
revolutionary  doctrine  to  create  and  bind  a  strong  internationalist  Red  Army.  He 
retained  this  belief,  as  shown  in  the  above  quote,  throughout  the  1920s,  during  his 
"Deep  Battle"  formulations. 
In  chapters  III  and  IV,  I  shall  examine  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  career  on 
several  levels.  The  chronology  in  Appendix  A  provides  an  outline  of  Tukhachevsky's 
life  and  a  detailed  list  of  operations  he  conducted  during  the  Civil  War.  With 
reference  to  this,  I  shall  provide  a  biographical  account  of  Tukhachevsky's 
progression  during  the  conflict.  To  examine  his  commands  I  shall  use  his  works, 
especially  Voina  klassov  (War  of  the  Classes),  a  collection  of  essays,  lectures,  letters 
and  polemics  published  in  1921,  but  written  sporadically  from  1919-21  during 
breathing-  spaces  in  the  fighting.  Voina  klassov  launched  Tukhachevsky's  career  as  a 
prodigious  and  much-read  military  writer.  It  was  an  on-the-spot  evaluation  by  the 
raw,  but  developing  soldier,  attempting  to  understand  and  evaluate  his  Civil  War 
experiences  in  order  to  improve  his  own  abilities  and  influence  the  Red  Army  as  a 
whole.  The  fact  that  it  was  written  at  different  stages  of  the  Civil  War  is  significant. 
When  a  piece  was  written  influenced  the  subject  matter  addressed  and  views 
expressed.  Tukhachevsky  analysed  various  parts  of  army  operations  within  the  Civil 
War  as  they  emerged  during  his  commands  and  suggested  ways  of  coping  with 
conditions  prevalent  to  the  conflict.  In  examining  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War 
commands  chronologically  from  September  1918-April  1920,  a  period  in  which  he 
rose  from  Ist  Army  Commander  to  Acting  Caucasian  Front  Commander,  I  shall 
analyse  components  of  Voina  klassov,  when  they  were  written,  alongside  archival, 
documentary  and  memoir  sources,  to  illustrate  why  he  wrote  about  certain  topics  at  a 
given  time  and  how  accurately  he  did  so.  In  this  way  mitigating  factors  which 
influenced  his  performance  will  be  examined:  troop  numbers;  weaponry  and 
resources  available;  supply  and  reinforcement;  geography  and  topography;  opponents 
faced;  relations  with  Red  Army  personnel. 
By  examining  Tukhachevsky's  postings  in  different  ways  I  shall  demonstrate  the 
strands  which  came  together  to  form  his  overall  outlook  by  the  end  of  the  conflict. 
13  Ibid.  pp.  66  &  68. 145 
Initially,  I  shall  concentrate  on  two  operations  he  conducted  whilst  Eastern  Front  I  st 
Army  Commander  in  autumn  1918.  This  detailed  study  of  civil  warfare  at  the  tactical 
battlefield  level  will  provide  an  insight  into  the  type  of  fighting  involved  in  the 
Russian  Civil  War,  show  Tukhachevsky's  adaptability  and  suitability  to  command  and 
the  early  lessons  he  learned.  It  will  also  serve  as  a  template  for  a  broader  study  of  his 
1919  5th  Army  Eastern  Front  command  in  chapter  IV,  when  I  shall  demonstrate  how 
the  overall  strategy  employed  to  defeat  Kolchak,  and  Tukhachevsky's  role  in  it,  was 
vital  in  shaping  his  operational  theory.  Between  these  postings,  I  shall  examine  intra- 
Red  Army  and  Bolshevik  Party  relations  and  how  these  affected  Tukhachevsky's 
career  in  late  1918-early  1919,  when  he  was  posted  to  Southern  Front.  Events  before 
and  after  his  8th  Army  Command  posting  are  more  important  than  the  actual  combat 
itself,  as  disagreements  with  other  personnel  predominated,  but  these  are  as  crucial  in 
determining  the  evolution  of  Tukhachevsky's  military  belief,  as  the  operational 
experience  of  1918  and  1919.  The  final  section  of  chapter  IV  will  study 
Tukhachevsky  as  Acting  Caucasian  Front  Commander  in  1920  when  he  defeated 
Denikin  and  directed  probably  the  archetypal  Civil  War  operation. 
A  natural  break  between  chapters  III  and  IV  is  provided  by  Tukhachevsky  moving 
from  8th  to  5th  Army  command  in  March  1919.  His  command  experiences  before  this 
were  formative  and  introduced  him  to  the  varied  strands  involved  in  fighting  the 
Russian  Civil  War.  After  March  1919,  Tukhachevsky's  command  career  accelerated 
and  witnessed  his  rise  and  development  into  perhaps  the  prime  example  of  a  former 
voenspetsy  Red  Commander.  Although  this  natural  chapter  break  occurs,  conclusions 
on  Tukhachevsky's  frontline  command  career  are  reserved  until  the  end  of  chapter  IV, 
analysing  this  period  of  his  life  as  a  whole. 
In  studying  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  commands  in  such  a  manner,  I  shall  assess 
the  evolution  of  his  operational  command  on  a  tactical  and  strategical  level,  how  his 
earlier  commands  prepared  him  for  the  North  Caucasus,  and  fonned  the  operational 
basis  for  his  Western  Front  Command  during  the  Soviet-Polish  War  and  the 
development  of  "Deep  Battle"  later. 
In  doing  so,  I  shall  demonstrate  how  Tukhachevsky's  postings  matched  Moscow's 
strategy  of  threat-identification  and  resource  allocation,  which  saw  the  best 
commanders  and  majority  of  resources  sent  to  the  front  prioritised.  To  set  the  scene,  I 
shall  outline  Tukhachevsky's  earliest  assessments  of  the  Civil  War,  fon-nulated 146 
throughout  1919  into  a  cogent  argument  by  December.  Whilst  examining  his 
commands,  Tukhachevsky's  observations  will  be  compared  to  his  experiences  before 
December  to  discuss  the  roots  of  his  analysis  and  to  decide  whether  these  played  a 
role  in  his  conduct  of  the  1920  Caucasus  campaign. 
Tukhachevsky's  analysis  of  the  Civil  War 
On  17th  November  1919,  Efraim  Sklianskii  commissioned  Tukhachevsky  to 
prepare  a  report  for  Lenin  and  the  Communist  Party  Central  Committee,  evaluating 
voenspetsy  in  the  Red  Army  and  the  likelihood  in  the  near  future  of  raising  a 
Communist  Command  Staff.  Tukhachevsky  had  just  been  relieved  as  5th  Army 
Commander  and  the  report,  which  he  submitted  on  19th  November,  was  based  on  this 
command.  14  It  contains  conclusions  drawn  from  Civil  War  combat  experience,  but 
also  hints  at  clashes  with  Red  Army  personnel.  These  will  be  examined  later,  but  the 
report  displays  how  these  had  become  intertwined  for  Tukhachevsky  and  how  he  was 
prepared  to  further  his  views  on  Red  Army  organisation  through  political  argument. 
Referring  to  the  employment  of  Tsarist  voenspetsy  at  the  inception  of  the  Red 
Army,  he  wrote  that  it  would  be  correct  to  continue  this  policy  if  voenspetsy  were 
military  experts.  However,  Tukhachevsky  dismissed  the  majority  as  receiving  a 
limited  military  education  and  possessing  the  cowed  lack  of  initiative  typical  of 
Tsarist  officers.  The  only  capable  voenspetsy  were  those  educated  after  the  reshaping 
of  military  academies  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  specifically  after  1908-10, 
when  foreign  (especially  German)  works  were  translated  and  taught.  However,  most 
of  these  young  officers  had  perished  in  the  Imperialist  War  and  the  majority  of 
survivors  now  served  Denikin.  Some  officers  had  completed  shorter  command 
courses  during  the  Great  War  and  although  this  provided  a  limited  education, 
Tukhachevsky  noted  that  more  good  commanders  were  emerging  from  this  group 
than  older  voenspetsy.  He  continued  his  attack  on  the  latter,  noting,  "Our  old  officers 
are  completely  ignorant  of  the  bases  of  Marxism  and  in  no  way  can  or  want  to 
understand  the  class  struggle  and  the  need  and  inevitability  of  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat".  This  ignorance  of  Marxism  prevented  older  voenspetsy  understanding  the 147 
concepts  underpinning  the  new  class-based  army  and  new  forms  of  warfare  involved 
in  the  Civil  War,  necessitating  their  replacement.  However,  "Amongst  military 
commissars  and  junior  command  staff,  many  suitable  for  commanders  and  other  posts 
exist".  Promotion  opportunities  had  to  be  created  for  them  with  only  short  theoretical 
courses  needed  to  create  unified  commanders.  The  proof  of  this  was  provided  by  5th 
Army  where, 
...  already  for  a  long  time  this  slogan  was  raised  [unified  Red  Conu-nander] 
and  the  command  staff  are  all  communists,  and  the  military  conditions 
demonstrate  its  superiority  over  the  generals  and  old  officers. 
The  great  number  of  untalented  voenspetsy  must  be  pushed  aside. 
Young  and  talented  revolutionary  commanders  must  occupy  their  places.  '  5 
Attacking  older  voenspetsy,  but  recommending  younger  ex-Tsarist  officers  such 
as  himself,  most  of  whom  had  perished  during  the  Great  War,  could  appear  to  be  an 
attempt  to  solidify  his  own  position.  Promoting  young  military  commissars  and  NCOs 
who  had  proved  themselves  in  Civil  War  combat  at  the  expense  of  former  senior 
Tsarist  officers  would  also  help  Tukhachevsky  move  to  the  top  of  the  pile.  Therefore, 
was  this  a  ploy  to  ensure  further  personal  promotion?  Citing  ignorance  of  Marxism 
against  older  voenspetsy  suggests  this,  distancing  himself,  a  Communist  Party 
member,  from  them.  However,  Tukhachevsky  was  also  now  beginning  to  relate  the 
idea  of  strategic  concepts  existing  specific  to  Civil  War,  which  would  be  applicable  in 
the  wider  class  struggle  to  come.  In  this  way,  his  use  of  Marxism  now  intertwined 
with  his  assessment  of  how  military  doctrine  had  developed  during  the  Civil  War.  He 
wrote, 
In  short,  in  civil  war,  not  only  ours,  but  in  other  countries,  because  of  the 
circumstances  accompanying  the  struggle  of  the  classes,  there  will 
inevitably  be  one  and  the  same  characteristics  to  the  strategic  forms, 
which  are:  huge  extension  of  frontage,  small-numbered  annies,  conditions 
of  reinforcement,  organisation  of  defence  and  securing  the  flanks  and  rear 
by  way  of  using  the  allied  classes,  lowering  of  technology,  and  this  will  all 
result  in...  distinct  operational  forms.  All  these  distinctions  are  proposed  in 
comparison  with  forms  of  national  and  imperial  war.  16 
With  belief  in  the  impending  class  struggle  growing  in  late  1919  as  revolutionary 
movements  appeared  in  Europe  and  uprisings  had  occurred  in  some  countries,  the 
14  A  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Doklad,  napisannyi  porucheniiu  V.  I.  Lenina,  ob  ispol'zovanii  voennykh 
spetsialistov  i  vydvizhenn  konu-nunisticheskogo  komandnogo  sostava  (po  opytu  5-i  annii)",  Izbrannye 
prol'Zvedeniia,  Toni.  I,  pp.  27-30. 
l-'  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Doklad,  napisannyi  porucheniiu  V.  1.  Lenina",  pp.  27-28  &  30. 148 
possibility  of  spreading  Civil  War  abroad  was  growing.  With  post-War  East  and 
Central  Europe  in  a  similarly  ravaged  state  as  Russia,  conditions  experienced  during 
the  Russian  Civil  War  would  be  prevalent  there.  Therefore,  an  army  trained  and  ready 
to  fight  under  these  conditions  was  vital.  Tukhachevsky  did  not  criticise  senior 
voenspetsy  to  get  ahead,  but  suggested  they  were  incapable  of  adapting  to  the  new 
conditions  of  the  class  struggle  in  civil  war.  Therefore,  a  new  command  staff 
composed  of  younger  people  who  could  assimilate  new  methods  was  needed.  This 
vision  of  youth  echoed  Lenin's  earlier  calls  and  moves  to  set  up  the  Communist  Youth 
League  (Komsomoo  and  indeed  Trotsky's  speech  to  the  Ist  All-Russian  Congress  of 
Military  Commissars  in  June  1918.17  The  young  were  to  be  educated  and  inculcated 
as  the  future  of  the  Soviet  regime.  Using  the  naivety  and  radicalism  of  youth  as 
opposed  to  the  conservatism  which  often  comes  with  age  was  viewed  as  the  way 
forward  and  was  successful  in  the  early  years  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Tukhachevsky  was 
making  a  similar  argument  because  younger,  more  zealous  military  commanders  were 
more  likely  to  adapt  to  new  forins  of  warfare,  whilst  the  older  generation  would  look 
back  to  methods  in  which  they  had  been  educated  and,  not  being  Marxists,  would  not 
want  to  change. 
Tukhachevsky  wanted  the  Red  Army  to  develop  on  the  basis  of  his  ideals  with 
unified  command  prominent.  In  July  1919,  he  wrote  that  the  use  of  dual  command 
with  political  commissars  watching  over  Tsarist  voenspetsy  was, 
... 
harmful  to  the  quality  of  the  army  and  the  uprising  proletariat  must 
immediately  look  to  create  its  own  command  cadre  and  in  the  shortest 
time  possible  produce  unified  command. 
It  is  possible  to  boldly  emphasise  that  a  completely  built  and 
disciplined  army  will  only  be  created  by  introducing  the  principle  of 
unified  command.  18 
The  suggestion  that  he  had  employed  this  within  5th  Army  was  a  bid  to  show  that 
he  was  at  the  forefront  of  Red  Army  development,  as  he  had  been  with  I  st  Army 
previously.  In  late  1919  he  did  appear  to  be,  because  at  Lenin's  request,  and  possibly 
because  of  his  report,  Tukhachevsky  delivered  a  lecture  to  the  Red  General  Staff 
16 
Ibid.  p.  29. 
17  See  pp  81-82. 
18  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  1,  p.  59. 149 
Academy  on  24th  December  entitled  Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia  (National 
and  Class  Strategy),  "  assessing  the  Civil  War  and  comparing  it  with  the  Great  War. 
It  appears  that  this  may  have  been  delivered  at  a  conference  of  some  kind  and  he 
probably  met  the  man  with  whom  he  would  work  most  closely  on  "Deep  Battle"  on 
this  day,  Vladimir  Kiriakovich  Triandafillov.  The  latter  also  delivered  a  paper  to  the 
General  Staff  on  24th  December  on  Southern  Front  offensive  operations  against 
Denikin.  20  Tukhachevsky  and  Triandafillov  had  not  fought  together  before  this  date, 
but  would  against  Denikin  in  1920  and  in  Tambov  in  1921.  As  two  speakers  at  this 
conference,  it  seems  likely  they  would  have  exchanged  ideas  and  their  collaboration 
could  possibly  be  dated  from  this  point. 
Tukhachevsky  had  outlined  the  basis  of  his  lecture  and  the  military  doctrinal  side 
of  his  report  in  two  works  completed  on  4th  and  I  lth  July  1919,  Vozniknovenie 
grazhdanskoi  voiny  (Rise  of  civil  war)  and  Sootnoshenie  sil  v  grazhdanskoi  voine 
(Corellation  of  forces  in  civil  war),  the  former  of  which  was  included  in  Voina  klassov 
in  a  slightly  altered  form.  21 
The  differences  Tukhachevsky  outlined  between  "national"  (The  Great  War)  and 
"class"  (Russian  Civil  War)  strategy  were  taken  from  his  command  experience. 
Whilst  this  could  be  taken  as  an  early  display  of  his  belief  in  and  support  for  the 
development  of  a  "new,  unique"  Soviet  Revolutionary  Military  Doctrine,  with  which 
he  is  often  associated,  an  early  paragraph  in  his  lecture  is  significant.  Speaking  of  the 
peculiarities  of  waging  civil  war  he  said,  "To  research  these  peculiarities  is  our  task. 
Old  strategy  has  not  died  out,  it  is  not  unnecessary  for  us,  but  simply  does  not  contain 
several  essential  chapters  about  civil  war.  To  write  these  chapters  is  the  task  of  the 
moment".  22  Tukhachevsky  was  not  advocating  a  new  revolutionary  doctrine.  He 
appreciated  the  importance  of  military  history  and  the  difference  conditions  make  to 
warfare.  This  was  the  point  of  his  lecture  -  to  show  that  civil  war  had  these 
peculiarities,  but  that  other  forms  still  existed.  He  would  do  this  later  in  "Deep 
Battle",  using  methods  he  had  successfully  utilised  in  the  Civil  War  to  answer 
19  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia",  Voina  klassov.  Stati  1919-1920gg. 
(Moscow,  192  1),  pp.  5-3  1;  Izbrannye  proizvedeniia,  Tom.  I,  (Moscow,  1964)  pp.  31-5  1. 
20  V.  K.  Triandafillov,  Kharakter  operatsd  sovremennykh  armii.  (trans.  W.  A.  Burhans;  ed.  and 
foreword  J.  W.  Kipp;  intro.  J.  J.  Schneider),  (Portland,  Or.,  1994),  p.  11. 
21  RG  VA,  f  37605,  d.  1,  op.  1,  pp.  54-68  &  100-  10  1.  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Vosniknovenie 
grazhdanskoi  voiny  and  Sootnoshenie  sil  v  grazhdanskoi  voine;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Voina  klassov. 
pp.  37-49. 
22  A  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia",  p.  32. 150 
problems  brought  to  military  questions  by  industrialisation  and  technology,  to  avoid  a 
repetition  of  the  Great  War.  Tukhachevsky  existed  somewhere  between  the  two  poles 
in  the  military  debates  of  the  early  1920s  Soviet  Union,  about  the  efficacy  of  a  new 
revolutionary  doctrine,  against  the  use  of  eternally  lasting  strategic  truths. 
Tukhachevsky  accepted  that  some  methods  from  the  past  remained  valid,  but  tried  to 
answer  evolving  questions  with  what  he  had  found  in  the  Civil  War.  This  led  to  his 
continued  advocacy  of  "annihilation"  strategy  over  "attrition",  retaining  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy  force  as  the  primary  aim  in  warfare. 
The  first  difference  between  national  and  class  war  was  the  build-up.  Before  a 
national  war,  preparations  could  be  made  and  armies  created  and  trained  in  readiness, 
but  in  class  war,  it  could  not  be  predicted  where  conflict  would  arise.  Armies  could 
only  be  created  once  an  uprising  had  occurred  and  it  was  known  where  population 
supportive  of  the  uprising  was  situated.  As  an  example,  Tukhachevsky  noted, 
...  we  were  not  able  to  predict  the  Czechoslovak  uprising...  in  Penza...  that 
they  would  advance  to  Samara,  create  the  Constituent  Assembly  there, 
that  they  would  move  further  into  Siberia  and  create  an  uprising  in 
Cheliabinsk.  We  were  not  able  to  predict  the  counter-revolutionary  Centre 
would  subsequently  unite  and  eventually  the  Constituent  Assembly  would 
convert  to  Kolchak's  Imperialism,  which  would  stretch  from  the  Great 
Ocean  to  the  Volga.  23 
It  was  only  after  the  Czechoslovak  uprising  occurred  that  Tukhachevsky  had  been 
able  to  create  lst  Army.  Earlier,  there  was  no  need  for  an  army  in  the  Volga,  leading 
to  a  point  he  made  elsewhere  that  civil  war  operational  theatres  appeared  in  areas  in 
which  fighting  normally  would  not  occur.  24  Initially  annies  would  be  formed  along 
partisan  lines,  but  reorganisation  and  regularisation  was  essential  to  form  a  uniform 
capable  army. 
Another  distinction  between  national  and  class  war  was  the  absence  of  recognised 
borders  in  the  latter.  These  appeared  between  rival  groups  only  when  fighting  broke 
out  and  formed  front  lines  in  the  conflict.  Where  these  occurred  depended  on 
population  spread  with  "living  centres"  occurring  in  areas  sympathetic  to  the 
revolution  (Moscow,  Petrograd,  the  industrialised  Donbass  Region)  and  "dying 
centres"  where  anti  -revolutionary  elements  existed  (the  Don).  Crucial  to  operational 
23  Ibid.  pp.  33-34. 
24  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Statistika  v  grazhdanskoi  voine",  p.  84. 151 
success  was  routing  actions  through  "living  centres"  to  provide  a  secure  rear  and 
operational  area. 
Instability  of  borders  combined  with  lower  troop  numbers  and  lower  military 
technology  in  class  war  than  in  "national  wars  of  mass  armies",  to  lead  to  extreme 
fluidity  in  civil  war  fighting,  with  entrenchments  replaced  by  manoeuvre  and 
mobility.  Low  troop  numbers  meant  large  fronts  could  not  be  defended,  with  troops 
too  loosely  strung  along  the  line,  ruling  out  a  defensive  strategy.  However,  the 
retention  of  territory  was  essential  in  civil  war  because  if  it  was  lost,  troops  to  be 
raised  were  also  lost.  Therefore,  defence  sometimes  had  to  be  used,  but  only  to 
prepare  for  attack.  Screens  were  required  in  some  front  sections  to  hold  these,  whilst 
concentrating  troops  in  sectors  allocated  for  offensive  action,  striking  at  the  enemy's 
weak  point  to  achieve  a  breakthrough  and  win  more  territory.  Feigned  attacks  in  other 
sectors  should  be  used  to  spread  enemy  forces  and  by  these  methods,  victory  could  be 
achieved  in  a  front  sector,  even  if  an  army  was  outnumbered  along  the  whole  line. 
This  introduced  one  of  the  fundamental  differences  Tukhachevsky  saw  between 
national  and  class  war.  In  the  former,  reinforcements  had  to  be  sent  from  the  rear  to 
replace  casualties  and  maintain  offensive  momentum.  However,  in  class  war,  recruits 
could  be  mobilised  by  an  attacking  army  as  it  advanced  because  classes  sympathetic 
to  the  revolution  would  willingly  join  the  revolutionary  army  as  it  liberated  them. 
Therefore,  continuous  offensives  could  be  conducted,  allowing  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
until  its  final  defeat.  Continually  recruiting  liberated  class  sympathisers  would  enable 
this.  Swift  pursuit  was  a  vital  part  of  operations  and  smaller  troop  numbers  facilitated 
this  as  less  supplies  were  required,  allowing  "...  an  extremely  quick  development  of 
operations  and  to  one  operation  almost  uninterruptedly  following  another". 
Pursuit  in  civil  war  was  the  opposite  of  that  employed  in  national  war.  In  the 
latter,  tactical  pursuit  was  effective  as  retreating  forces  took  time  to  form  and  turn  into 
marching  columns,  which  had  great  depth  due  to  vast  troop  numbers.  These  troops 
could  be  overtaken,  encircled  and  taken  prisoner.  However,  strategical  pursuit  was 
ineffective,  as  a  rearguard  would  be  mounted  by  the  retreating  force,  using  few 
troops,  to  remove  the  main  body  to  the  rear  for  reorganisation  and  reintroduction 
later.  However,  in  civil  war,  with  sparse  numbers,  tactical  pursuit  showed  little  profit 
as  retreating  columns  had  little  depth,  organised  quickly  and  could  not  be  surrounded 
before  retreating.  Strategic  pursuit  however,  was  highly  effective.  Small  troop 152 
numbers  meant  rearguard  actions  could  not  be  effectively  conducted  as  the  main 
forces  themselves  were  often  smaller  than  the  force  necessary  for  an  effective 
rearguard.  With  forces  scattered  over  the  wide  expanses  prevalent  in  civil  war, 
continual  strategic  pursuit  of  the  whole  enemy  force  was  highly  effective.  This 
allowed  the  enemy  no  time  for  reorganisation  with  reconnaissance,  a  crucial  part  of 
operations,  on  foot  and  in  carts,  providing  knowledge  of  enemy  positions  and 
allowing  pursuit  to  be  maintained.  Operations  against  Ataman  Dutov  were  cited  as  an 
example.  25 
During  pursuit  actions,  utilisation  of  friendly  class  elements  could  secure  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  the  offensive,  if  attacking  through  "living  centres".  This  required 
organisation  and  the  set-up  of  military  and  political  organs  for  coordination. 
Another  possibility  this  particular  nuance  of  class  warfare  introduced  was 
uprisings  by  sympathisers  in  the  enemy  rear,  causing  disruption  and  allowing 
encirclements.  Partisan,  guerilla  activity  was  a  crucial  part  of  class  warfare  and  one 
which  Tukhachevsky  criticised  many  within  the  Red  Army  for  not  understanding,  as 
they  dismissed  partisan  use  through  fear  of  the  disorganisation  of  partizanshchina  of 
the  early  Red  Army.  This  was  a  mistake  because  partisans,  upon  linking  with  the  Red 
Army,  provided  reinforcements.  A  difference  had  to  be  drawn  between  class  and 
national  partisans,  with  the  former  evident  within  Eastern  Front  in  Siberia  in  1919, 
but  the  latter  disrupting  Southern  and  Ukrainian  Fronts. 
Connected  to  this  is  a  small  section  of  Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia  which 
is  omitted  ftom  Izbrannye  proizvedeniia.  This  points  to  the  use  of  espionage  and 
organising  agents  for  class  warfare,  which  although  highly  useful,  was  not  employed 
in  the  Civil  War.  Why  this  was  omitted  from  the  1964  collection  is  unclear. 
However,  problems  existed  which  limited  operational  speed.  With  such  fluidity  of 
frontage,  the  use  of  railways,  (as  shown  in  chapter  11),  lost  its  effectiveness  after  the 
eshelonnaia  voina  of  early  1918.  Mobility  in  the  field  required  transport,  but  a  severe 
shortage  of  military  transport  was  evident  under  civil  war  conditions.  As  also 
demonstrated  in  chapter  II,  Tukhachevsky's  answer  was  to  mobilise  local  transport 
resources,  peasant  carts,  and  where  possible  waterways.  Tukhachevsky  listed  cartage 
necessary  for  transport.  He  later  produced  a  detailed  plan  of  cart  numbers  required 
25  General  Aleksandr  Il'ich  Dutov  (1879-192  1),  a  fon-ner  Tsarist  colonel,  led  the  Orenburg  Cossack 
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and  a  system  of  linked  depots  for  supply  by  division,  to  enable  continuous  supply  and 
operations,  whilst  ensuring  that  the  local  population  had  their  carts  returned.  He 
emphasised  this  should  be  employed  to  prevent  troops  commandeering  local  transport 
and  antagonising  the  peasantry.  26 
Communications  and  control  in  the  field  were  other  problems  in  mobile 
operations.  Army  staff  were  often  restricted  to  the  railways  and  could  not  maintain 
contact  with  their  forces  conducting  pursuit  operations.  Field  staffs  were  therefore 
necessary,  but  communications  were  generally  bad,  (with  "movement  by  wire"  as 
indicated  in  chapter  11,  usually  the  limit). 
As  to  initial  operational  forms,  the  use  of  strategic  reserves  was  not  possible,  as 
poor  transport  and  communications  prevented  them  reaching  the  front  in  time  to 
influence  the  battle,  effectively  wasting  troops.  Tukhachevsky  included  an  extra 
section  in  the  Voina  klassov  version  of  Vozniknovenie  grazhdanskoi  voine,  which  was 
not  in  the  original  essay  of  July  1919,  and  appears  to  have  been  a  defence  of  his  non- 
employment  of  reserve  forces  during  the  Civil  War.  This  will  be  investigated  further 
when  examining  his  commands. 
The  above  conditions  meant  offensives  were  often  launched  along  wider  frontages 
than  would  normally  be  the  case,  to  allow  all  troops  to  participate  in  battle. 
Consequently,  concentric  offensives  were  viable  in  that  troops  could  be  positioned 
along  an  initially  wide  front,  with  the  flank  formations  closing  in  tighter  to  the  centre 
as  the  offensive  approached  the  target.  In  this  way,  all  troops  could  be  utilised  and 
provide  the  necessary  concentration  of  troops  at  the  vital  sector  at  the  same  time, 
allowing  an  envelopment  of  one  or  both  flanks  and  a  possible  encirclement,  leading  to 
the  annihilation  of  the  enemy  group,  the  ultimate  objective  of  warfare.  This  required 
great  coordination  and  the  correct  location  for  success,  ensuring  all  forces  arrived  at 
the  optimum  time  and  ensured  superiority  of  numbers,  but  in  the  Civil  War  this  did 
not  always  occur.  Speed  and  surprise  were  key  factors  in  civil  war  to  enable 
envelopment  and  encirclement,  with  intelligence  and  reconnaissance  crucial  in 
determining  enemy  location.  The  possibility  of  breakthrough  operations  in  civil  war 
was  again  very  high,  with  troop  numbers  low,  but  again  this  required  bold  and 
decisive  command  which  was  not  always  forthcoming  during  the  Civil  War. 
26  A  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Marsh-manevr  i  organizatsiia  transporta  v  grazhdanskoi  voine",  Voina 
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Offensive  was  therefore  preferable  to  defensive  strategy.  Tukhachevsky 
surnmarised  the  conditions  under  which  victory  could  be  achieved  in  Soomoshenie  sil 
v  grazhdanskoi  voine, 
Thus  a  correlation  of  forces  advantageous  for  us  is  achieved: 
1.  a)  By  increasing  the  number  of  our  troops  in  the  sector  of  the  decisive 
attack. 
b)  Distracting  enemy  forces  from  this  sector. 
2.  By  increasing  the  quality  of  troops  in  the  decisive  sector. 
The  first  is  achieved  by: 
a)  Transfers, 
b)  Offensive,  mobilisation  of  loyal  elements  and  reinforcement  or  in 
permitting  a  percentage  of  our  units,  if  only  those  manning  and  guarding 
the  rear, 
c)  Demonstrations  [feints  -  NC], 
d)  Concentric  movement  and 
e)  Organisation  of  uprisings  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 
The  second  is  achieved  by  concentrating  in  the  place  of  attack  our  most 
disciplined  troops  and  concentrating  in  the  appointed  sector  natives  from 
other  fronts.  [loyal  class  elements  from  elsewhere  -  NC].  27 
The  role  of  strict  revolutionary  discipline  -  tribunals,  Cheka  and  blocking 
detachments  -  would  have  been  envisaged  in  the  latter  point.  This  was  one  role 
Tukhachevsky  saw  political  agitation  playing,  but  he  would  also  connect  his  idea  of 
the  bold  offensive  as  the  primary  aim  of  all  military  actions  to  Marxism,  with  the 
continuous  offensive  matching  the  need  to  maintain  the  continuous  Marxist  offensive 
against  capitalism.  The  offensive  "annihilation"  doctrine  was  an  aggressive, 
revolutionary  doctrine  and  a  method  to  conduct  class  struggle.  Older  voenspetsy  did 
not  understand  this  and  therefore  had  to  be  replaced  by  younger  communist- 
commanders. 
This  was  Tukhachevsky's  assessment  of  civil  war,  formulated  and  written  during 
1919.  However,  before  examining  his  commands  in  1918  and  1919  to  identify  the 
origins  of  his  ideas,  their  accuracy,  and  his  1920  command,  to  see  if  he  followed  his 
prescribed  methods,  it  is  useful  to  compare  the  Red  view  of  Civil  War  in  class  terms, 
with  the  White  Command's  assessment  of  the  conflict  at  the  same  time. 
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A  White  Analysis 
On  7th  December  1919,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ovchinnikov,  Head  of  Intelligence 
Department  of  Main  Command  Staff  of  Eastern  Front,  and  Head  of  I  st  Department  of 
Intelligence  Department,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lovchitskii,  prepared  a  report  entitled 
Opyt'  issledovaniia  strategicheskikh  i  takticheskikh  uslovie  grazhdanskoi  voiny 
(Experience  of  research  of  strategic  and  tactical  conditions  of  civil  war).  28  These  were 
evidently  two  figures  within  the  Kolchak  establishment  and  possibly  prepared  this 
report  at  his  request.  It  was  based  on  the  same  battlefields  at  the  same  time  as 
Tukhachevsky  had  recorded  his  Civil  War  observations  and  makes  a  telling 
comparison.  How  did  the  other  side  view  the  conflict? 
Some  obvious  similarities  exist  between  the  two  accounts,  describing  the  old  army 
disintegrating  at  the  start  of  the  Civil  War  and  the  necessity  for  a  new  one  to  be 
created,  initially  along  voluntary  lines,  but  eventually  by  mobilisation,  preferably  in 
areas  containing  a  sympathetic  population.  Agitation  and  espionage,  and  punitive 
expeditions  conducting  raids  into  enemy  areas  were  necessary  to  attract  recruits  and 
promote  unrest  respectively. 
The  main  plan  of  civil  war  was  to  hold  occupied  territory  and  try  to  increase 
influence,  whilst  thwarting  aggressive  military  and  political  enemy  moves.  Internal 
order  should  be  maintained  by  punitive  detachments  and  enemy  forces  annihilated. 
Towns  and  rail  and  road  junctions  were  recognised  as  the  main  points  of  defence  with 
fortified  depots  necessary.  Offensives  were  carried  out  mainly  along  rail  lines, 
highways  and  waterways. 
Small  troop  numbers  and  insufficient  military  equipment  and  weaponry  meant 
swift,  almost  partisan  actions  were  required  and  troops  had  to  be  organised  in  lighter, 
more  mobile  formations  than  a  regular  army.  Lack  of  troops  should  be  compensated 
for  by  swift  action  and  the  use  of  modem  military  technique,  eg.  flame-throwers  for 
street-  fighting.  Offensives  must  be  decisive,  with  the  basic  principle  of  operations, 
"..  to  defeat  the  enemy  by  sectors  and  to  be  always  stronger  in  the  decisive  moment  in 
28  Rossiiskii  tsentr  khraneniia  i  izucheniia  dokumentov  noveishei  istorii  (hereafter  RTsKhIDNI),  f71, 
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the  decisive  sectorit.  29Defence  was  only  to  be  used  to  win  time  and,  when  attacking, 
attempts  had  always  to  be  made  to  move  into  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy.  These 
were  precisely  the  same  tactics  Tukhachevsky  advocated. 
Supply  could  be  easily  obtained  from  local  populations.  Interestingly,  no 
organised  mechanism  was  proposed  for  this  process  and  a  key  factor  in  the  collapse  of 
Kolchak's  rear  in  1919  were  his  forces'  requisitions  and  depredations.  In  contrast, 
Tukhachevsky  suggested  organised  use  of  local  resources  to  prevent  antagonism  of 
the  local  population. 
The  report  continued  that  armed  forces  were  organised  into  fortress  troops  for 
garrisoning  depots  and  field  troops  for  fighting  along  a)  railways;  b)  main  and  dirt 
roads.  Those  acting  outwith  railways  should  have  automobiles,  bicycles,  cavalry  and 
horse  artillery  and  all  forces  could  conduct  combined  actions  if  necessary. 
However,  with  so  few  troops,  field  actions  were  not  always  possible,  meaning 
partisan-type  warfare  was  the  most  common  form  of  engagement,  and  clashes 
occurred  predominantly  along  rail  lines,  roads  and  in  towns.  This  was  an  accurate 
portrayal  of  Kolchak's  forces  on  the  Eastern  Front. 
Under  these  conditions,  unit  commanders  had  to  be  able  to  independently  carry 
out  tasks  and  troop  units  capable  of  operating  independently,  moving  swiftly,  having 
flexibility  in  organisation  and  operating  in  the  absence  of  a  secure  rear,  without 
communications  lines.  These  were  all  similar  assessments  to  Tukhachevsky's  as  was 
the  point  that,  "The  link  of  politics  with  strategy  has  never  been  so  close  as  in  the 
Civil  War"  and  centralisation  of  Supreme  Command  was  essential  to  direct 
operations.  30  Tukhachevsky  wrote  an  essay  entitled  Politika  i  strategiia  v 
grazhdanskoi  voine  (Politics  and  strategy  in  civil  war)  in  January  1920  in  which  he 
made  similar  conclusions.  31  However,  with  the  above  conditions,  only  directives 
could  be  given  from  the  top  and  individual  commanders  had  to  translate  these  into 
action  determined  by  local  conditions.  This  was  another  point  appreciated  by 
Tukhachevsky  and  reminiscent  of  his  criticism  of  Murav'ev. 
A  final  similarity  is  supplied  in  the  statement,  "Executions  of  enemies  rendering 
armed  resistance  must  be  mercilessly  carried  out  -  sentimentality  will  destroy 
29  R  TsKhIDNI,  f71,  op.  3  5,  d.  113  1,  p.  24. 
30  Ibid.  p.  25. 
31  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Politika  i  strategiia  v  grazhdanskoi  volne"  Voina  klassov,  pp.  31-36. 157 
everything".  32  At  the  same  time,  non-Party  troops  were  to  be  attracted  to  join  the 
White  forces.  This  reflected  the  idea  of  recruiting  whilst  attacking,  but  also  the 
bitterness  and  savagery  brought  to  the  fighting  by  both  sides.  While  the  Cheka 
arrested,  imprisoned  and  executed  anti-Soviets,  so  anti-Communists  executed  any 
Party  members,  workers  or  sympathisers  captured. 
It  is  interesting  to  see  the  similarities  in  tactics  and  strategy  between  the  Whites 
and  Reds  proposed  by  these  reports.  However,  differences  have  been  discerned  which 
did  make  an  impact  on  the  outcome  and  a  major  one  worth  stressing  is  the  difference 
in  organisation  envisaged  as  Tukhachevsky  urged  a  regular  army  on  the  Reds,  while 
the  Whites  had  to  resort  to  partisan-like  actions  through  lack  of  numbers.  This 
restricted  White  action  to  main  transport  routes  and  allowed  the  Reds  greater  freedom 
of  action  in  attempting  envelopments  through  terrain  around  these.  However,  White 
forces  did  manage  several  offensives  of  a  wider  nature  and  were  successful  to  an 
extent.  Troop  shortages  limited  the  impact  of  these  offensives  and  was  a  factor  in  the 
outcome  of  the  Civil  War.  The  viability  Tukhachevsky  saw  in  Marxism  as  a  tool  to 
attract  recruits  to  the  Red  Army  was  based  on  experience,  with  Red  mobilisations 
more  successful  than  White,  although  desertion  levels  remained  as  high.  The  belief  in 
the  efficacy  of  Marxism  would  affect  Tukhachevsky's  development  as  a  person  and  a 
military  commander  during  the  conflict  and  influenced  his  theories. 
lst  Army  Commander  -  Eastern  Front:  September-December  1918 
In  the  second  half  of  August  1918,  Tukhachevsky  mobilised  new  recruits  for  Ist 
Army  at  the  front  and  completed  reorganisational  work,  whilst  aiding  5th  Army 
before  Kazan.  After  the  wounding  of  Lenin  and  murder  of  Cheka  Deputy  Head 
Uritskii  in  Petrograd,  the  Bolsheviks  introduced  the  Red  Terror  coordinated  by  Feliks 
Dzierzyn'ski,  a  figure  with  whom  Tukhachevsky  would  later  work.  This  drive  against 
anti-Soviet  elements  resulted  in  6-7,000  executions  over  the  next  three  months  and 
accompanied  the  launch  of  an  Eastern  Front  Volga  offensive. 
Volga  Region's  communications  hub  Kazan'  was  the  main  target  for  5th  and  2nd 
Armies.  3rd  Army  was  to  attack  in  Ekaterinburg  sector,  whilst  4th  Army  was  to 
occupy  Khvalinsk,  close  to  Syzran'  and  Samara.  Ist  An-ny  was  to  take  Simbirsk,  a 
32  R  TsKhIDNI,  f.  7  1,  op.  3  5,  d.  113  1,  p.  2  8. 158 
supporting  operation  for  5th  Army,  but  more  important  than  this  for  Tukhachevsky,  as 
he  became  the  liberator  of  the  wounded  Lenin's  hometown.  33 
On  8th  September,  Komuch  met  with  the  Siberian  Regional  Government  and  other 
anti-Soviet  organisations  at  Ufa,  creating  a  social  democrat-conservative  coalition, 
headed  by  a  5-man  Directory.  However,  the  Directory  never  enjoyed  the  peasant 
support  of  the  SR  Komuch  Government.  By  10th  September,  it  was  on  the  back  foot, 
abandoning  Kazan'  to  5th  Army  and  Simbirsk  to  I  st  Army  two  days  later.  34  This  was 
Tukhachevsky's  first  operation  as  a  Red  Army  Commander  with  troops  sufficiently 
organised  for  the  task.  It  provides  an  example  of  Civil  War  combat  and  illustrates 
Tukhachevsky's  development  and  ability  to  lead  and  coordinate  an  army  in  the  field. 
Tukhachevsky  wrote  about  the  Simbirsk  Operation  in  early  January  1919,  probably 
whilst  waiting  to  be  posted  on  Southern  Front.  The  essay,  Obkhody  i 
kontsentricheskie  dvizheniia  (Envelopments  and  concentric  movement),  was  his 
earliest  written  work  on  the  Civil  War.  35  As  can  be  sun-nised  from  the  title, 
Tukhachevsky  used  a  concentric  offensive  to  take  Simbirsk,  as  he  did  with  the  Syzran' 
Operation  to  follow.  From  where  did  the  idea  for  a  concentric  offensive  arise? 
Tukhachevsky  provides  a  clue  by  citing  the  German  General  Sigismund  von 
Schlichting,  a  critic  of  Schlieffen.  36  Koritskii  recalls  Tukhachevsky  having  to  explain 
what  a  concentric  offensive  was  to  his  staff  before  the  Simbirsk  Operation  because  it 
was  not  in  Russian  Army  regulations.  37  Therefore,  it  appears  the  use  of  the  concentric 
offensive  came  from  Tukhachevsky's  Tsarist  military  academy  days,  but  from  reading 
he  did  in  his  own  time.  His  German  language  skills  had  proved  worthwhile.  However, 
another  Koritskii  recollection  demonstrates  Tukhachevsky  was  influenced  by  his 
Tsarist  training.  Tukhachevsky  apparently  said,  "In  the  present-day  stage  of  war...  it  is 
necessary  to  strive  to  seize  bayonet  clashes.  As  long  as  moral  superiority  is  on  our 
side,  success  is  guaranteed  in  our  hands".  38  Tukhachevsky  later  wrote  of  the 
concentric  offensive  carried  out  by  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorf  to  defeat  Samsonov 
33  Direktiyjý  komandovaniiafrontov  Krasnoi  Armii,  (1917-1922gg.  ).  Sbornik  dokumentov  v  4-kh 
tomakh,  (Moscow,  1971-1978),  (hereafter  DkfKA),  Tom  I,  docs.  393-411,  pp.  428-436. 
34  DkfKA,  Tom  I,  p.  437,  note. 
35  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Obkhody  i  kontsentricheskie  dvizheniia"  Voina  klassov,  pp.  105-115. 
36  H.  Strachan,  The  First  World  War,  Volume  I,  To  Arms,  (Oxford,  200  1),  p.  178;  For  a  discussion  of 
Schlichting's  theories  see  D.  J.  Hughes,  "Schlichting,  Schlieffen,  and  the  Prussian  Theory  of  War  in 
1914",  Journal  of  Military  History,  59,  (April  1995),  pp.  257-277. 
37  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny  i  N,  dni  mira"  Mikhail  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  druzei  i  soratnikov, 
(Moscow,  1965),  p.  69. 
38  N.  1.  Koritskii,  p.  69. 159 
and  Rennenkampf  in  1914,  so  he  knew  of  its  effectiveness  in  1918 
. 
39How  did  he 
employ  it  at  Simbirsk? 
Preparatory  Operations 
The  Czechoslovaks  had  a  strong  defensive  position  in  Syzran-Samara-Simbirsk, 
in  terms  of  communications  and  transport  for  transferring  troops  and  reserves,  with 
railway  lines  linked  to  their  rear  and  Ufa.  The  Volga  linked  the  three  towns,  allowing 
troop  transfers  between  flanks.  Simbirsk  was  also  linked  by  the  Volga  to  Kazan' 
further  north. 
I  st  Arrny  troop  numbers  fluctuated  greatly,  since  Zakharov  had  listed  11,451  on 
21  st  July,  as  mobilisations  were  countered  by  constant  combat.  Varying  figures  are 
available.  A  figure  of  7,072  infantry  and  325  cavalry,  with  194  machine-guns,  40 
guns  and  2  armoured-trains  for  Ist  Army  on  15th  September,  roughly  matches  an 
archival  estimate  of  10,000  and  Tukhachevsky's  figure  of  9-10,000  for  early 
September,  allowing  for  casualties  and  mobilisations  . 
40  During  the  main  attack  from 
9th-12th  September,  the  Czechoslovaks  in  Simbirsk  were  outnumbered  roughly  2:  1, 
but  Tukhachevsky  only  achieved  this  numerical  superiority,  a  vital  prerequisite  for  a 
concentric  offensive,  by  carrying  out  preliminary  operations  from  25th-28th  August, 
and  regrouping  to  improve  I  st  Army's  starting  positions. 
On  the  right  flank,  Inza  Division  had  been  pressed  back  by  a  slightly  larger 
Czechoslovak  force  (1,000:  1,200),  but  counter-attacked  at  Kuzovatovo  Station,  whilst 
Vitebsk  Regiment  of  Simbirsk  Division  swept  into  the  Czechoslovaks'  rear,  forcing 
them  to  retreat.  On  20th  August,  Vareikis  informed  Tukhachevsky  that 
reconnaissance  had  detected  Czechoslovak  movement  from  Buinsk  towards  Alatyr'- 
Ibresi  Station 
.41 
The  latter  two  were  stations  on  the  Saransk-Kazan'  Railway,  whilst 
Buinsk  lay  on  the  Kazan'-Simbirsk  road.  This  threatened  I  st  Army's  left  flank  for  the 
Simbirsk  Operation.  Subordinated  to  Tukhachevsky  for  his  offensive,  Alatyr'  Group 
screened  Alatyr'  then  attacked  from  Ibresi  to  outflank  the  Czechoslovaks  at  Belyi 
39  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  ed.,  Armeiskaia  operatsiia,  p.  70. 
40  DkJKA,  Tom  IV,  pp.  36-37;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armiia  v  1918  godu",  Izbrannye 
proizvedeniia,  Tom  I,  p.  87;  RTsKhIDNI,  f.  71,  op.  35,  d.  24,  p.  6. 
"  1918  god  na  rodine  Lenina,  (Kuibyshev,  1936),  appendix  of  documents,  p.  334. 160 
Batyrevo  and  drive  them  back  to  Buinsk.  This  cleared  the  way  for  the  Simbirsk 
Operation.  42 
In  early  September,  Vacietis  informed  Tukhachevsky  that  reinforcements, 
promised  on  25th  August,  had  been  delayed.  This  prevented  Tukhachevsky  using 
Simbirsk  and  Inza  Divisions  in  a  two-pronged  attack  as  he  had  planned,  with  the 
former  now  given  the  central  attacking  role  and  the  latter  guarding  the  right  flank  with 
Penza  Division.  Regiments  from  Penza  and  Inza  Divisions  were  transferred  to 
Simbirsk  Division,  giving  it  around  8,000  men  for  the  main  attack  and  the  other  two 
1,000  apiece.  The  left  flank  was  screened  by  Alatyr'  Group  with  367  men  and  1,237 
43  troops  further  north  at  Shikransk  screened  the  juncture  between  I  st  and  5th  Armies 
. 
Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  troops  in  the  main  sector  attack 
force,  which  would  become  typical  of  Civil  War  operations.  Barely-covered  screens 
on  the  flanks  shielded  the  majority  of  troops  in  the  decisive  central  sector,  but  the 
former  advanced  under  the  concentric  offensive,  feigning  offensive  action  to  pull 
some  of  the  defenders  away  from  Simbirsk. 
Tukhachevsky  appears  to  have  decided  on  a  concentric  attack  only  after 
discovering  that  the  reinforcements  were  not  coming.  He  could  maximise  the  troops 
he  had  by  this  tactic,  but  it  required  the  employment  of  all  troops  to  extend  I  st  Army's 
front  wide  enough  to  enable  the  double  envelopment.  Only  the  small  International 
Regiment  was  retained  in  reserve,  but  even  it  was  flung  into  the  final  assault  on 
Simbirsk.  To  coordinate,  Tukhachevsky  moved  Ist  Army  HQ  forward  from  Inza  to 
Paigarm.  Monastery  and  formed  a  field  staff,  including  Kalnins,  to  advance  with 
Simbirsk  Division  from  Chufarovo  Station.  44  Therefore,  no  strategic  reserves  were 
retained  and  a  field  staff  was  used  to  alleviate  communications  difficulties. 
On  5th  September,  5th  Army  attacked  towards  Kazan'.  The  following  day, 
Vacietis  ordered  Tukhachevsky, 
... 
It  is  essential  to  draw  off  enemy  reserves,  so  they  cannot  be  transferred 
to  Kazan'. 
42  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armna  v  1918  godu",  p.  86. 
43  R  TsKhIDNI,  f71,  op.  35,  d.  24,  p.  6;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  ariniia  v  1918  godu",  pp.  86- 
87. 
44  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  I  st  armii  I  osvobozhdenie  Simbirska",  Simbirskaia  guberniia  v  1918-1920 
gg.  Sbornik  vospominanii.  (Ul'ianovsk,  1958),  (hereafter  Simbirskaia  guberniia)  p.  65. 161 
... 
7th  September,  at  dawn...  launch  a  decisive  offensive  to  Simbirsk 
and  take  this  town.  5th  Army's  success  is  much  dependent  on  the 
45  decisiveness  of  your  offensive  . 
Tukhachevsky  discussed  final  preparations  with  Eastern  Front  R  VS  on  7th 
September,  apparently  concluding,  "I  think  the  attack  on  Simbirsk  will  take  three 
days...  from  the  morning  of  8th  September.  46 
Main  Concentric  Offensive 
On  8th  September,  Ist  Army  was  positioned  along  an  arc  100  versty  in  length, 
with  Simbirsk  Division  in  the  centre,  spread  out  from  Prislonika  on  its  left  flank 
through  Chufarovo  Station-Annenkovo  to  Popovka  on  its  right.  Gai  moved  his  forces 
to  their  starting  positions  at  20.00  hours  and  advanced  the  next  morning,  a  day  later 
than  planned,  along  the  Prislonika-lushansk-Tetiushkoe-Barataevka  highway  on  the 
left  flank,  the  Chufarovo-Simbirsk  Railway  in  the  centre  and  the  Popovka-Elshanka- 
Kliuchishche-Belyi  Much  dirt-road  on  the  right.  To  maintain  an  equal  momentum 
along  the  whole  front  and  enable  envelopment  of  the  Czechoslovak  right  flank  to 
occur  simultaneously  to  the  central  railway  group  arriving,  5th  Kursk  Regiment 
advanced  up  the  left  flank  main  road  in  motorised  trucks.  A  cavalry  group  under 
Borevich,  kept  pace  with  the  motorised  columns,  advancing  along  the  dirt  road  on  the 
right  flank. 
47 
lst  Brigade  of  Simbirsk  Division  (Ist  and  2nd  Simbirsk  Regiments) 
under  Pavlovskii,  formed  the  main  body  of  the  central  and  right  flank  groups,  with  the 
48 
central  group  advancing  behind  armoured-trains.  Reconnaissance  detected  the  first 
enemy  defensive  line  at  lushansk-Kliuchishche,  the  latter  on  Simbirsk  Division's  right 
flank.  Advancing  as  outlined  above,  Alatyr'  Group  reached  Nagatkino  on  the  left 
flank  and  Inza  and  Penza  Divisions  reached  Belyi-Gremiachi-Kliuch  on  the  right,  to 
tighten  the  arc  to  60  versty  by  the  end  of  the  first  day,  without  any  fighting. 
The  advance  continued  the  next  day  amid  bitter  fighting  with  the  well-fortified 
Czechoslovaks.  Tukhachevsky  had  attached  an  artillery  battery  to  each  infantry 
regiment.  The  artillery  division's  political  commissar  Samoilov  recalled  this  as  the 
45DkfKA,  Tom  I,  doc.  409,  pp.  435-6. 
46  1.1.  Mints,  Grazhdanskaia  voina  vpovoIzhe,  (Kazan',  1974),  p.  93. 
47  Petr  Mikhailovich  Borevich  (1890-192  1)  was  Polish  and  a  foriner  Tsarist  staff-captain. 
48  N.  G.  Samoilov,  "Kak  my  uchilis'voevat"',  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  237,  Tukhachevsky  had 
reorganised  2nd  Ukrainian  Artillery  Division  which  had  arrived  in  early  August. 162 
first  occasion  combined  operations  between  artillery  and  infantry  had  been  applied 
correctly  on  Eastern  Front.  49  The  combination  proved  very  effective  in  the  battles 
before  Simbirsk. 
The  heaviest  fighting  on  10th  September  was  in  the  centre  around  Okhotnich'ia 
Station-1vanovka,  where  the  Czechoslovaks  moved  up  reserves  overnight  and  were 
entrenched  behind  three  rows  of  barbed  wire  entanglements.  With  2nd  Simbirsk 
Regiment  pinned  down  by  machine-gun  and  artillery  fire,  3rd  Artillery  Battery  was 
moved  forward  and  directly  bombarded  the  entrenchments.  Simultaneously,  Gai 
ordered  3rd  Moscow  and  International  Regiments  to  envelop  the  Czechoslovaks  left 
flank,  leaving  only  Ist  and  2nd  Simbirsk  Regiments  holding  the  railway.  The 
envelopment  was  successful  with  grenade  and  bayonet  attacks  wiping  out  most  of  the 
Czechoslovaks  and  forcing  a  retreat.  Gai  employed  similar  tactics  on  the  right  at 
Kubshinovka,  as  direct  artillery  fire  on  Czechoslovak  entrenchments  forced  them 
back  to  Simbirsk.  This  was  also  successful  on  the  left  flank  at  the  second  heaviest 
area  of  fighting  where  Orlovskii  and  Ist  Kursk  Regiments  were  pinned  down  around 
Tetiushkoe,  Pogreba  and  Otrad.  4th  and  6th  Artilley  Batteries  advanced  and  took  out 
Czechoslovak  gun  emplacements  in  turn,  allowing  5th  Kursk  Brigade  to  break 
through  to  Lashaevka  by  the  evening  and  prepare  to  attack  Simbirsk  from  the  north.  50 
By  evening  of  10th  September,  Ist  Army  had  advanced  30-40  versty  in  two  days, 
tightened  the  arc  to  under  50  versty,  occupied  the  line  Laishevka-Kliuchishchi- 
Kremenka,  and  was  positioned  for  the  final  assault  on  Simbirsk 
.51 
Tukhachevsky 
conducted  reconnaissance  of  the  Simbirsk  approaches  on  horseback  with  Kalnins  and 
Gai,  selecting  artillery  positions  for  supporting  the  infantry  assault  the  following 
day.  52 
The  advance  continued  on  11  th  September  amid  steady  fighting.  In  the  centre,  1  st 
Simbirsk  Regiment  again  utilised  close-range  artillery  fire,  to  force  a  Czechoslovak 
armoured-train  back  to  the  Simbirsk  suburbs.  Villages  were  occupied  on  both  flanks 
to  encircle  Simbirsk  completely  from  three  sides.  The  only  open  side  was  the  Volga 
bank  to  the  east.  53 
"  Ibid.  p.  237. 
50  Ibid.  pp.  238-239;  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  annii...  ",  p.  66. 
51  RTsKhIDNI,  f71,  op.  35,  d.  24,  p.  8;  0.  lu.  KaInin,  "Bor'ba  na  vostochnom  fronte"  Simbirskaia 
guberniia,  p.  46. 
52  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  armii...  ",  p.  67. 
53  P.  A.  Shuvatov,  "V  riadakh  zheleznoi  divizii",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  28  1. 163 
The  final  assault  was  launched  at  dawn  on  12th  September.  After  outflanking  the 
final  Czechoslovak  trenches  beside  the  River  Sviiagi  south-west  of  Simbirsk  and  a 
clash  with  White  cavalry,  Simbirsk  Division  advanced  into  Simbirsk.  A  short  street 
battle  ensued  and  a  Czechoslovak  annoured-train  positioned  on  the  Volga  bridge 
bombarded  the  town  as  the  Reds  progressed,  but  by  12.00pm,  the  west  bank  of  the 
town  had  been  cleared.  54  Tukhachevsky  informed  Lenin  by  telegram  that  his 
hometown  had  been  retaken.  55  Simbirsk  factory  workers  had  prepared  an  uprising  in 
the  Czechoslovak  rear,  but  the  swiftness  of  the  Red  attack  meant  it  was  not 
56  necessary.  Indeed,  Tukhachevsky  informed  Kuibyshev  on  I  Ith  September,  "Swift 
movement  of  our  units  and  constant  envelopments  brought  them  [the  Czechoslovaks] 
to  a  state  of  panic,  weakening  its  resistance.  157 
Tukhachevsky  later  recalled, 
This  success  was  so  unexpected  for  the  enemy,  that  when  we  arrived  in 
Simbirsk,  and  located  Simbirsk  Division  HQ  there,  to  comrade  Gai 
suddenly  appeared  an  ensign  with  a  dispatch,  sent  from  Sengilei  to  the 
Whiteguard  Divisional  Commander.  Arriving  in  the  evening  and  asking 
where  the  divisional  HQ  was,  this  ensign  was  directed  straight  to  the 
Divisional  Commander  and  completely  unexpectedly  for  him,  presented 
himself  before  comrade  Gai.  58 
Peasants  who  had  been  forcibly  mobilised  by  the  Czechoslovaks  willingly  joined 
I  st  Army  upon  being  captured,  an  early  instance  of  mobilising  whilst  advancing.  59 
If  the  operation  seemed  to  have  proceeded  smoothly,  there  were  signs  of  problems 
which  would  crop  up  througout  the  Civil  War.  Tukhachevsky  informed  Kuibyshev  on 
II  th  September  that  I  st  Army  troops  were  approaching  Simbirsk,  but  he  did  not  know 
exact  positions  because  of  communications  difficulties 
. 
60  A  more  pressing  concern, 
but  also  recurrent  throughout  the  Civil  War,  was  a  breakdown  in  troop  discipline  upon 
51  P.  F.  Ustinov,  "Osvobozhdenie  Simbirska",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  pp.  262-264;  N.  1.  Koritskii, 
"Sozdanie  pervogo  an-rin...  ",  pp.  67-68. 
55RGVA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  3,  p.  10. 
56  D.  E.  Perkin,  "Bor'ba  za  Simbirsk",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  273. 
57  Boevoiput'Pervoi  RevoliutsionnoiArmii  Vostochnogo  i  Turkestanogo  Frontov,  RuW-fevral'1921gg. 
(hereafter  BpPRA),  doc.  27,  pp.  52-53. 
58  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  anniia  v  1918  godu",  p.  89;  Upon  taking  Simbirsk  on  12th 
September,  Gai  sent  a  telegram  to  Lenin  saying,  "Dear  Vladimir  Ilich!  Have  taken  your  hometown  of 
Simbirsk  -  this  is  the  reply  to  your  first  wound,  and  for  the  second  -  will  be  Samara",  G.  D.  Gai, 
"Pobednyi  put"',  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  32;  Gai  accepted  an  Order  of  the  Red  Banner  for  Simbirsk 
Division  on  28th  September  and  the  division  was  renamed  Iron  Division  in  recognition  of  its 
performance,  RTsKhIDNI,  f.  7  1,  op.  35,  d.  962,  p.  55;  BpPRA,  doc.  40,  p.  63. 
59  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "Sozdanie  pervogo  armii...  ",  p.  67. 
'0  BpPRA,  doc.  27,  pp.  52-53. 164 
liberating  Simbirsk.  1,500  prisoners  were  released  by  the  Red  troops  and  a  great  deal 
of  cartage  and  artillery  captured,  but  instead  of  pressing  on  after  the  retreating 
Czechoslovaks,  episodes  of  looting  and  drunkenness  broke  out.  61  This  encouraged  the 
Czechoslovaks,  who  had  rallied,  to  push  Red  units  back  over  the  Volga  bridge,  dig  in 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Volga  and  begin  shelling  the  right  bank  side  of  Simbirsk. 
Tukhachevsky  saw  the  need  to  act  swiftly  to  restore  order  and  retain  the  initiative. 
He  drew  up  plans  for  storming  the  bridge  at  01.00  hours  on  14th  September.  Gai  led 
the  attack  again.  An  empty  locomotive  was  released  at  full  steam  across  the  bridge  to 
test  its  safety  and  tackle  any  Czechoslovak  annoured-trains.  A  Red  armoured-train 
and  two  brigades  of  Simbirsk  Division  advanced  behind  it  under  an  artillery  barrage, 
which  had  been  adjusted  during  the  day,  onto  the  Czechoslovak  positions.  The  bridge 
measured  a  verst  in  length  and  was  illuminated  by  barges  of  burning  oil  from  the  far 
side,  but  Simbirsk  Division  successfully  crossed  in  the  face  of  machine-gun  and 
artillery  fire,  capturing  the  bridge  intact  and  forcing  the  Czechoslovaks  to  flee 
Simbirsk 
. 
62  Ist  Arrny  now  had  an  operational  rail  crossing  over  the  Volga,  but  this 
success  was  short-lived. 
Pursuing  the  retreating  Czechoslovaks  to  Cherdakly,  east  of  Simbirsk,  Ist  Army 
ran  into  a  counter-attack  on  15th  September  by  Kappel's  White  Officer  Battalion, 
which  was  retreating  from  Kazan'  down  the  Volga  left  bank.  Although  only 
numbering  2-3,000,  this  was  enough  to  push  the  1,500  Ist  Army  pursuit  troops  back 
to  Simbirsk.  The  Whites  blew  up  the  rail  crossing  and  the  intervention  of  the 
International  Regiment  was  necessary  to  prevent  Kappel'  routing  Ist  Army  from 
63  Simbirsk.  This  swinging  to  and  fro  of  battle  was  typical  in  the  Civil  War,  both  on 
this  scale  of  several  thousand  troops  per  side  and  also  on  a  larger  scale.  With  numbers 
limited  and  the  terrain  covered  so  extensive,  forces  would  breakthrough  or  envelop 
the  enemy,  force  it  to  flee  and  pursue.  However,  with  no  reserves  to  bolster  the  attack, 
a  tactical  overreach  would  occur,  or  in  the  case  of  Denikin  in  his  1919  drive  on 
Moscow,  a  strategical  overreach.  The  intervention  of  only  a  small  force  at  this  point 
would  send  the  erstwhile  victorious  force  back  to  its  starting  point  and  sometimes 
61  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia  armila  v  1918  godu",  p.  89.  RTsKhIDNI,  f  71,  op.  35,  d.  24,  pp.  10- 
62  RTsKhIDNI,  f  71,  op.  35,  d.  962,  pp.  56-57;  BpPRA,  doc.  32,  p.  58;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pervaia 
an-niia  Nf  1918  godu",  pp.  89-90. 
63  The  railNvay  bridge  was  rebuilt  by  late  October  1918,  RTsKhIDNI,  f.  7  1,  op.  35,  d.  962,  pp.  II-  12  & 
58-59. 165 
further,  before  the  same  phenomenon  would  occur  to  swing  the  battle  again.  This 
pattern  continued  until  both  sides  were  exhausted.  Simbirsk,  an  early  clash,  sets  the 
pattern  and  shows  the  effect  such  small-numbered  formations  had  on  military  action. 
However,  strategical  pursuit  was  effective,  as  Tukhachevsky  later  noted.  64 
The  tide  swung  in  I  st  Army's  favour  again  with  the  arrival  from  Kazan'  of  5th 
Army  elements.  Vacietis  ordered  5th  Army  Commander  Slaven  to  move  his  troops 
down  the  Volga  banks  and  in  boats  to  Simbirsk,  where  they  were  subordinated  to 
Tukhachevsky.  65  The  latter  directed  the  operation  of  5th  and  1  st  Army  elements, 
ordering  the  right  and  left  bank  groups  of  5th  Army  which  numbered  10,500  troops  in 
total,  66  to  disembark  above  and  below  Simbirsk  and  outflank  Kappel',  whilst  Simbirsk 
Division  launched  a  costly  frontal  attack  to  pin  down  the  Komuch  troops  in  the  town. 
This  operation,  another  double  envelopment  manoeuvre,  succeeded  in  pushing  the 
Komuch  forces  back  and  cleared  Simbirsk  completely,  with  envelopments  at 
Cherdakly  and  Briandino,  but  the  intended  encirclement  was  not  completed. 
Tukhachevsky  later  criticised  the  commander  of  the  group  which  landed  below 
Simbirsk  for  not  understanding  manoeuvre  warfare.  The  commander  had  successfully 
disembarked  his  troops  and  occupied  Petrovskoe  and  Krasnyi  Iar,  but  instead  of 
advancing  had  wanted  to  dig  in.  The  troops  did  not  receive  the  order  and  continued 
advancing,  but  the  Czechoslovaks  escaped  on  a  train  waiting  three  versty  behind 
them.  Tukhachevsky  emphasised  speed,  decisiveness  and  initiative  as  essential  for 
effective  manoeuvre.  67  Another  possible  reason  for  failure  to  complete  the 
encirclements  was  again  shortage  of  numbers.  Enough  troops  did  not  exist  to  carry 
out  deep  envelopments  and  encirclements,  but  Tukhachevsky  still  attempted  it.  He  did 
so  in  the  next  Syzran'-Samara  Operation. 
64  See  pp.  151-152. 
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66  V  boiakh  rozhdennia,  1918-1920:  boevoi  put'5  armii.  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (hereafter  Vbr),  (Irkutsk, 
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Continuous  Mobile  Offensive 
On  12th  September,  Vacietis,  evidently  not  aware  of  events  in  Simbirsk,  ordered, 
"Ist  Army  energetically  develop  its  success  in  direction  of  Syzran'  and  on  the  left 
iM  bank  of  the  Volga... 
Two  days  later,  he  directed  Tukhachevsky  to  assume  command  of  all  Red  forces  in 
Simbirsk-Syzran'-Samara  area  and  pursue  the  fleeing  Komuch  forces,  occupying 
Khvalinsk  and  Syzran'.  4th  Army  Commander  Khvesin  was  to  ensure  sufficient  troops 
were  transferred  to  Ist  Arrny  for  this  and  attack  Samara  with  his  remaining  forces. 
Vacietis  emphasised, 
...  remember  the  enemy  is  stunned  by  our  powerful  attacks  and  only  quick 
and  combined  action  of  all  units  will  give  us  complete  victory...  The 
flotilla  must  render  its  utmost  aid,  giving  continuous  energetic  pursuit  into 
the  depth  of  the  hostile  positions  and  allowing  disembarking  of  loyal 
troops  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  69 
The  offensive  was  to  be  maintained  without  respite  to  knock  out  the  remaining 
Czechoslovak  positions  before  they  could  reorganise.  Therefore,  mobile  operations 
followed  by  pursuit  were  used  immediately. 
Whilst  Ist  and  5th  Armies  fought  around  Simbirsk,  4th  Army,  including  Vol'sk 
Division,  occupied  Khvalinsk  on  16th  September, 
70 
enabling  Khvesin  to  split  his 
forces  according  to  Vacietis'  plan.  Vacietis  flooded  Ist,  4th  and  5th  Armies  with 
further  orders  and  directives  whilst  the  struggle  for  Simbirsk  continued,  also 
instructing  2nd  and  3rd  Armies  to  prepare  offensives  on  Ufa,  Ekaterinburg  and 
71 
Cheliabinsk. 
While  the  latter  two  armies  prevented  Czechoslovak  reinforcements  reaching  the 
Volga,  on  28th  September,  immediately  after  defeating  Kappel's  group, 
Tukhachevsky  informed  Vacietis  that  he  was  beginning  the  Syzran'-Samara  offensive. 
He  reported,  "In  Melekess  sector  enemy  enveloped  on  both  flanks,  defeated  and 
68DkfY,  4,  Tom  I,  doc.  412,  p.  438. 
69  Ibid.  doc.  413,  p.  439. 
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retreated  in  panic  through  Cherdakly.  Right-bank  Group  took  its  preappointed  sector. 
Simbirsk  Division  will  concentrate  in  preappointed  sector.  "  72 
Probably  because  of  the  Simbirsk  success,  Tukhachevsky  launched  a  second 
concentric  offensive  for  Syzran'.  Vol'sk  Division,  a  brigade  of  Samara  Division  of  4th 
Army  and  the  Volga  Flotilla  occupied  the  right  flank  at  Khvalinsk-Fedorovka; 
Simbirsk  Division  occupied  the  left  flank,  facing  Komuch  emplacements  at 
Goriushki-Masa;  and  Inza  and  Penza  Divisions  advanced  in  the  centre  from 
Kuzovatovo  and  Novospasskoe  Stations.  73  Therefore,  the  flanks  again  advanced  by 
road,  although  Vol'sk  Division's  Group  advanced  up  both  Volga  banks  with  only  dirt 
roads  on  the  left  bank,  whilst  the  centre  advanced  along  and  beside  the  railway  behind 
armoured  trains,  an  initial  frontage  of  100-120  versty.  Simbirsk  Division  was  again 
given  the  main  task  to  take  the  Aleksandrovskii  Most  Volga  bridge  behind  Syzran', 
cutting  the  Komuch  forces'path  of  retreat.  Tukhachevsky  gave  command  of  the  other 
three  divisions  to  Engel'hardt  to  ease  coordination,  but  also  because  he  was  forced  by 
Vacietis'  stream  of  directives,  to  move  on  Syzran'  with  these  Divisions  on  22nd 
September.  Therefore,  a  numerical  superiority  of  2:  1  was  only  gained  after  Simbirsk 
Division  was  freed  from  the  Kappel'  battle.  This  was  probably  another  reason  for  the 
concentric  offensive  as  Simbirsk  Division  could  slot  into  place  on  the  left  flank, 
despite  Engel'hardt's  group  attacking  earlier,  allowing  the  continuous  offensive  to 
proceed. 
From  28th  September,  the  attack  group  numbered  around  20,000  infantry,  1,000 
cavalry,  140  guns,  400  machine-guns  and  10  armed  steamboats  against  a  Komuch 
force  of  6,480  infantry,  3,300  cavalry,  25-35  guns,  100-150  machine-guns  and  8-12 
armed  steamboats,  defending  along  internal  lines  and  switching  men  between  flanks. 
Tukhachevsky  concentrated  9,000  men  under  Gai  for  the  vital  sector,  Inza  and 
Penza  Divisions  numbered  2,000  apiece  and  the  right  flank  7,000.  Vol'sk  Division  had 
just  been  formed  from  partisan  detachments  by  Kuibyshev  and  4th  Army's  formations 
were  not  much  better  organised,  which  was  probably  a  factor  in  Tukhachevsky 
retaining  larger  numbers  here,  although  the  twin-bank  advance  did  need  more  bodies 
and  the  rapid  offensive  development  left  no  time  for  regrouping. 
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From  22nd  September-Ist  October,  Vol'sk  Division's  group  advanced  60  versty 
northwards,  whilst  Inza  and  Penza  Divisions  battled  along  the  railway  lines,  with  the 
Czechoslovaks  blowing  up  bridges  and  burning  down  railway  stations  and  villages  as 
they  retreated,  to  slow  the  Reds.  Railway  engineers  worked  ahead  of  the  Red  forces 
and  local  inhabitants  were  mobilised  as  the  advance  continued.  After  heavy  fighting  at 
Balasheika  Station,  Inza  Division  captured  four  armoured-trains  and  weaponry,  but  on 
27th  September,  the  Czechoslovaks  counter-attacked  against  Vol'sk  Division,  driving 
it  back  to  Khvalinsk  and  threatening  to  open  up  Penza  Division's  right  flank. 
Czechoslovaks  advanced  into  this  gap  to  exploit  the  breakthrough,  but  Penza 
Division's  right  flank  battalion  and  Smolensk  Regiment  held  firm,  almost  wholly 
wiping  out  the  Czechoslovaks.  As  the  advance  continued,  Kappel's  2nd  White 
Volunteer  Division  was  routed  and  retreated.  At  this  point,  Simbirsk  Division  joined 
the  fray,  crossing  the  Volga  by  steamboat  to  capture  Sengilei  and  Novodeviche  on  the 
right  bank  on  30th  September.  74 
On  the  same  day  K.  Kozlov,  Deputy  Head  of  Ist  Army  Political  Department, 
reported, 
On  the  front  of  Simbirsk  Division  organisational  work  is  continuing. 
Pursuing  enemy  very  successfully,  occupying  Sengilei  without  battle. 
Have  started  evacuating...  valuable  materials,  metals  etc.  Masses  of 
mobilised  whiteguards  defected  to  us  with  weapons  in  hand.  Workers  of 
the  cartridge  factory  passed  a  grateful  resolution,  proposing  a  mobilisation 
75  of  workers.  They  sense  the  need  for  energetic  work... 
This  illustrates  perfectly  the  methods  used  not  only  in  1918,  but  throughout  the 
Civil  War.  A  breakthrough  was  followed  by  swift  pursuit,  mobilising  not  only 
liberated  civilians  on  the  way,  but  also  defectors  or  prisoners  from  anti-Soviet  forces. 
Supplies  were  captured  or  acquired  and  new  recruits  meant  that  the  "organisational 
work"  mentioned  by  Kozlov  continued,  to  retain  regular  formations  and  prevent  a 
reversion  to  partizanshchina.  Therefore,  at  this  early  stage,  Tukhachevsky  witnessed 
the  possibility  of  mobilising  liberated  workers  and  captured  troops  alike,  allowing 
offensives  to  proceed  continuously  without  respite,  pursuing  the  enemy  relentlessly 
and  retaining  momentum,  which  he  outlined  in  Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia. 
This  reinforced  the  need  for  a  communist  hardcore  to  politicise  new  recruits  and 
retain  discipline,  as  proper  induction  and  training  were  not  possible  under  battle 
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conditions.  In  many  respects,  this  was  a  continuation  of  the  summer  formation  period, 
mobilising  recruits  and  sending  them  straight  into  action  with  virtually  no  training. 
The  capture  of  Sengilei  exposed  Syzran'  and  Samara.  On  2nd  October,  Vacietis 
directed  I  st  and  4th  Armies  to  attack  the  two  towns, 
Received  reports  that  Samara  is  being  evacuated  amid  panic. 
I  order  all  forces  to  move  energetically  to  Syzran'  and  Samara,  not 
allowing  the  enemy  the  possibility  to  create  a  planned  evacuation  of  these 
towns.  The  attack  must  be  as  decisive  as  possible.  76 
The  pursuit  was  to  continue  and  gain  its  ultimate  objective,  the  encirclement  and 
defeat  of  the  enemy  forces.  However,  reports  of  evacuations  were  premature  as 
Komuch  forces  still  defended  Syzran'and  Samara. 
With  Simbirsk  Division  advancing  southwards  down  the  Volga  and  Vol'sk 
Division's  group  moving  northwards  again,  the  Komuch  forces,  pinned  down  frontally 
by  Inza  and  Penza  Divisions,  were  in  danger  of  encirclement.  In  bitter  defensive 
battles,  Komuch  lost  over  3,000  men.  As  I  st  Arrny  closed  the  ring,  a  workers'  uprising 
occurred  at  Ivashchenko  Factory,  between  Syzran'  and  Samara,  throwing  the 
defenders  rear  into  disarray  and  forcing  retreat  to  Samara.  77  Inza  and  Simbirsk 
Divisions  occupied  Syzran'  at  midday  on  3rd  October,  only  a  day  behind 
Tukhachevsky's  schedule.  78 
Again  encirclement  had  not  been  completed,  but  the  delay  in  employing  Simbirsk 
Division  counted  against  this,  as  did  the  tenacity  of  the  Komuch  defending,  with  two 
efforts  required  by  Simbirsk  Division  to  take  Aleksandrovskii  Most  under  intense 
artillery  and  machine-gun  fire.  Vitebsk  Regiment  blocked  the  Czechoslovaks'  retreat 
over  the  bridge,  forcing  the  latter  to  cross  the  river  by  boat  or  swimming.  79 
Engel'hardt  may  also  have  influenced  the  failure.  After  the  operation,  he  defected 
southwards  to  Denikin  and  during  the  fighting  lost  contact  with  his  staff  and  gave 
contradictory  reports  to  those  received  from  the  front.  Ist  An-ny  staff  were  forced  to 
communicate  directly  with  divisional  staffs  to  direct  the  operation.  80 
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On  6th  October,  the  new  Eastern  Front  Commander  S.  S.  Karnenev,  ordered 
Tukhachevsky  and  Khvesin  to  regroup  and  attack  Stavropol'  and  Samara 
respectively.  81  However,  fierce  pursuit  battles  had  been  raging  for  the  previous  three 
days  and  the  Samara  Czechoslovak  Group  advanced  to  reinforce  those  retreating  from 
Syzran',  brutally  suppressing  the  Ivashchenko  workers'  rising.  4th  Army  units  under 
Chapaev  advanced  from  the  south  and  Vol'sk  Division  linked  with  Inza  and  Penza 
Divisions  to  maintain  pursuit.  Further  armoured-trains,  artillery  and  equipment 
abandoned  by  the  retreating  Komuch  forces  were  captured.  Simbirsk  Division, 
advancing  along  the  left  bank  above  the  Volga's  vast  curve  before  Samara,  captured 
Stavropol'  on  6th  October,  exposing  Samara  from  the  right  for  the  final  assault.  82 
However,  this  was  not  needed  as  on  8th  October,  Tukhachevsky  telegraphed 
Vacietis,  "7th  October  workers  of  Samara  expelled  the  Whiteguards  at  14.00  hours. 
At  17.00  hours  units  of  4th  Army  entered,  and  at  20.00  hours  units  of  my  army 
entered.  Samara  is  in  our  hands.  ,  83 
This  introduced  another  vital  component  of  class  warfare  to  Tukhachevsky  - 
uprisings  in  the  enemy  rear.  It  had  occurred  at  Ivashchenko  and  proved  crucial  at 
Samara  when  Komuch  troops  evacuated  the  town  after  the  rising.  Dependent  upon 
scale,  risings  could  disrupt  enemy  communications  or  contribute  to  an  encirclement 
and  would  impact  further  in  1919. 
From  10th-17th  October,  a  further  1,000  troops  were  mobilised  to  Ist  Army  from 
those  liberated  in  Samara,  another  case  of  mobilising  on  the  move.  84 
Kappel'  later  assessed  the  Syzran'-Samara  Operation, 
Upon  abandoning  Syzran'  and  Samara  after  a  long  productive  march  in 
difficult  conditions  from  Syzran'  to  Kinel'  (with  our  left  flank  and  rear 
constantly  threatened  with  Red  units  intersecting  our  path  of  retreat)  2nd 
Division  had  completely  fallen  apart,  both  morally  and  in  number.  The 
final  result  was  those  mobilised  almost  to  a  man  fled  from  the  ranks  of  the 
units...  Almost  exclusively  volunteers  remained... 
The  condition  of  the  troops  was  such  that  military  tasks,  although  of  a 
defensive  character,  could  not  be  fulfilled  successfully,  since  2nd  Division 
no  longer  functioned  as  a  fighting  unit  .... 
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Tukhachevsky  had  proven  adaptable  to  civil  war  conditions.  This  was  fighting 
quite  different  to  that  encountered  during  the  Great  War,  which  had  also  involved 
manoeuvre,  but  on  a  larger  scale  than  the  Volga  battles.  Less  troops  demanded  the 
utilisation  of  whatever  technology  or  weaponry  was  available  and  Tukhachevsky  had 
shown  great  imagination  in  his  planning  of  both  Simbirsk  and  Syzran'-Samara 
Operations,  employing  motorised  vehicles  alongside  armoured-trains  and  cavalry  to 
give  each  of  his  divisions  mobility  and  coordinate  their  movement,  to  enable  the 
application  of  concentric  offensives.  He  later  wrote  of  the  need  for  speed  and 
initiative  in  conducting  concentric  offensives  and  had  shown  here  that  he  possessed 
the  latter  which  enabled  him  to  maintain  the  former.  Launching  continuous 
manoeuvre  envelopment  operations  alongside  sustained  rapid  pursuit  battles  cleared 
the  Volga  within  a  month,  a  remarkable  feat  considering  the  previous  faltering 
performances  of  Eastern  Front.  Tukhachevsky  had  played  the  decisive  role  with  Ist 
Anny,  spearheading  the  Simbirsk  and  Syzran-Samara  Operations,  which  involved  the 
heaviest  fighting  of  the  1918  Eastern  campaign.  He  had  been  well-served  by  his 
divisional  commanders,  notably  Gai,  but  also  Lacis  with  Inza  Division,  and  he  readily 
acknowledged  their  roles  and  called  upon  them  in  later  campaigns  as  trusted 
comrades. 
This  detailed  look  at  the  Volga  battles  illustrates  the  type  of  warfare  involved  in 
the  Civil  War.  Although  the  numbers  of  some  forces  increased  in  1919,  the  tactics 
utilised  above  remained  valid  as  the  level  of  weaponry  barely  increased.  Mobility  and 
manoeuvre  were  the  order  of  the  day  and  although  Tukhachevsky  did  not  have  great 
cavalry  numbers  in  his  forces,  he  compensated  for  their  absence  by  motorising  his 
infantry,  giving  him  an  early  appreciation  of  the  advantages  this  proffered  and 
perhaps  influencing  his  preference  for  the  motor  over  the  horse. 
Pursuit  Operations 
I  st  and  4th  Armies  had  covered  200  kms  in  nine  days,  whilst  5th  Army  had 
advanced  eastwards  from  Simbirsk  along  the  railway  towards  Bugul'ma.  However,  no 
respite  was  allowed  and  on  8th  October,  Eastern  Front  R  VS  directed  further  tasks. 
I  st  Army  develop  energetic  actions  for  pursuing  the  retreating  enemy  to 
Buguruslan-Belebei  sector,  having  final  aim  of  taking  Ufa. 172 
4th  Army  develop  actions  with  right  flank  in  Ural'sk  sector,  with  main 
forces  -  in  Buzuluk-Orenburg  sector. 
5th  An-ny  to  continue  movement  in  general  direction  of  Bugul'ma, 
having  final  aim  of  taking  Ufa.  86 
This  was  the  initial  order  for  the  Ufa  Operation  to  capture  the  Directory  HQ.  For 
Tukhachevsky,  this  involved  the  Buguruslan,  Bugul'ma,  Buzuluk  and  Belebei 
Operations  in  October  and  November  and  the  final  combined  assault  with  4th  Army 
on  Orenburg,  in  support  of  5th  Army's  December  attack  on  Ufa. 
The  rise  in  1  st  Army  numbers  during  the  capture  of  the  Volga  areas  and  the 
mobilisation  of  local  inhabitants  and  ex-Komuch  soldiers  is  apparent,  with  the  army 
doubling  in  size  from  7,072  in  mid-September  to  14,774  infantry  and  627  cavalry 
with  368  machine-guns,  72  guns  and  2  armoured-trains  on  7th  October.  Evidently, 
Tukhachevsky's  later  theory  about  increasing  the  size  of  the  army  by  attacking  during 
civil  war  was  working  in  terms  of  captured  military  hardware  and  personnel.  87 
The  October-November  operations  did  not  involve  the  bitter  fighting  of  Simbirsk 
or  Syzran',  but  by  the  end  of  the  year,  I  st  Army  and  Eastern  Front  as  a  whole,  had 
been  fighting  continuously  for  four  months.  They  had  been  engaged  in  battle  or 
pursuit,  unable  to  stop  for  reorganisation,  mobilising  on  the  move,  trying  to  catch, 
encircle  and  destroy  retreating  anti-Soviet  forces,  whilst  holding  their  own  stretched 
forces  together.  However,  by  late  1918,  Eastern  Front  was  nearing  its  strategic  reach. 
This  can  be  surmised  by  I  st  Army  containing  14,070  infantry  and  600  cavalry  with 
315  machine-guns  and  54  guns  by  Ist  December.  88  With  no  great  combat  ensuing  as 
the  remaining  Komuch  forces  continued  to  retreat,  inhabitants  of  areas  Ist  Army 
travelled  through  had  little  compulsion  to  join  the  Reds.  They  had  not  been  forcibly 
mobilised  by  Komuch  and  had  experienced  no  fighting  around  their  home  areas. 
Therefore,  the  numbers  gained  on  the  Volga  were  not  matched  further  east.  Desertion 
was  also  a  huge  problem  for  all  sides  during  the  Civil  War  as  troops  left  armed 
service  to  remain  in  their  home  areas.  The  Russian  word  mir  translates  as  both  peace 
and  world.  The  mir  system  was  still  strong  in  the  villages  and  for  many  their  village 
was  their  world.  Peasants  saw  no  reason  to  travel  anywhere  else  when  they  had  their 
land  at  home,  far  less  fight  elsewhere.  Therefore,  Ist  Army  figures  remained  fairly 
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constant  for  the  rest  of  Tukhachevsky's  command,  dropping  slightly  if  anything 
towards  the  end  of  the  year. 
This  pattern  is  clear  for  Eastern  Front  as  a  whole,  numberIng  52,799  infantry  and 
3,394  cavalry  on  15th  September,  but  ballooning  to  106,000  infantry  and  7,000 
cavalry  (minus  2nd  Army)  by  7th  October.  The  potential  for  problems  emerging  by 
the  end  of  the  year  is  demonstrated  by  numbers  plummeting  again  to  75,820  infantry 
and  10,030  cavalry  by  Ist  December,  as  Moscow  prioritised  Southern  Front. 
Hardware  captured  and  acquired  saw  machine-guns  rise  from  916  to  1,717  and  guns 
from  215  to  376  from  September  to  December,  but  again  the  biggest  rise  occurred  on 
the  Volga.  89 
During  the  drive  East,  Ufa  was  targeted  to  the  neglect  of  2nd,  but  especially  3rd 
Army  in  Perm'.  The  installation  of  Kolchak  as  Supreme  Ruler  of  Russia  by  an 
officers'  coup  in  Omsk  on  18th  November,  overthrowing  and  arresting  the  Directory, 
and  the  appearance  of  Denikin  with  the  Armed  Forces  of  Russia,  meant  something 
had  to  give.  This  occurred  on  24th  December,  as  Kolchak  captured  Penn'  during  his 
first  offensive. 
Moscow,  believing  the  Eastern  situation  was  well  in  hand,  had  prioritised  the  new 
Southern  Front  forming  against  Denikin,  transferring  troops  from  Eastern  Front. 
Tukhachevsky  received  a  directive  on  10th  November  from  Eastern  Front  RVS 
concerning  this.  Whilst  4th  and  5th  Armies  were  instructed  to  attack  Ural'sk  and  Ufa 
respectively,  "Supreme  Commander  has  nominated  the  whole  of  Ist  Army  for 
despatch  to  the  other  front".  90  However,  worsening  conditions  on  Eastern  Front  under 
Kolchak's  offensive  led  to  only  Inza  Division  transferring  in  early  December. 
Tukhachevsky  remained  with  Penza  and  Simbirsk  Divisions,  to  act  in  Orenburg  and 
Ufa  sectors,  as  4th  and  5th  Armies  had  insufficient  forces  to  hold  the  line  without 
them.  91  This  had  left  the  Ufa  attack  force  understrength,  far  less  3rd  Army.  2nd  Army 
was  belatedly  sent  to  reinforce  the  line  and  stall  Kolchak's  offensive,  whilst  Stalin  and 
Dzierzyn'ski  were  despatched  to  investigate  the  "Red  Marne".  92 
89  Ibid.  pp.  38,49  &51.  On  7th  October,  Eastern  Front  possessed  1,627  machine-guns  and  404  guns. 
From  15th  September-7th  October,  the  number  of  annoured-trains  increased  from  6  to  8,  but  no  figure 
is  given  for  December. 
90  DkfKA,  Toni  I,  doc.  664,  p.  708. 
91  Ibid.  p.  782,  endnote  167. 
92  This  was  the  name  given  to  the  "Perm'  catastrophe". 174 
Despite  the  loss  of  Perm',  transfer  of  resources  southwards  and  Ufa  falling,  the 
push  eastwards  continued,  aiming  for  Kolchak  further  east  in  Omsk.  Ist  Army 
captured  Sterlitamak  on  29th  December  and  5th  Army  occupied  Ufa  two  days  later, 
but  were  ordered  to  maintain  the  offensive  the  next  day,  although  the  need  to  halt 
temporarily  was  acknowledged  on  3rd  January  when  Eastern  Front  RVS  instructed 
regrouping  to  be  conducted  before  moving  on  Orenburg.  93 
This  signalled  the  end  of  campaigning  on  Eastern  Front  for  Tukhachevsky.  On  4th 
January,  he  handed  over  command  to  Gai  and  departed  for  Southern  Front.  94 
In  1919,  Tukhachevsky  recalled  Ist  Army's  contribution  to  Eastern  Front  in  1918, 
writing, 
From  the  start  of  the  Simbirsk  offensive  until  the  taking  of  Buguruslan 
was  six  weeks  (from  9th  September-28th  October),  and  in  this  time  units 
of  Ist  Army  covered  in  battles  800  versty.  This  is  a  rare  example  in 
military  history. 
For  these  six  weeks  on  Eastern  Front  the  white  guards  lost  around 
150,000  square  versty.  Of  these  the  portion  of  Ist  Army  alone  (of  five 
[Eastern  Front  Armies])  was  around  70,000  square  versty. 
During  these  six  weeks  on  Eastern  Front  19  towns  were  taken. 
Of  these:  a)  alone  the  troops  of  Ist  Army  took  nine  towns  (Buinsk, 
Tetiushi,  Simbirsk,  Melekess,  Sengilei,  Stavropol',  Syzran',  Buguruslan 
and  Buzuluk)  and  b)  under  cooperation  I  st  Army  took  three  towns 
(Khvalinsk,  Samara,  Sergievsk). 
It  is  possible  to  say  without  exaggeration  that  last  autumn  I  st  Army 
decided  the  fate  of  Eastern  Front.  95 
Murky  Transfers? 
If  Tukhachevsky's  service  as  I  st  Army  Commander  had  been  successful,  it 
apparently  ended  under  a  cloud.  S.  P.  Medvedev,  who  had  replaced  Kuibyshev  as 
political  commissar  in  October  1918,  complained  to  Trotsky  about  Tukhachevsky 
ordering  provisions  to  celebrate  New  Year.  Tukhachevsky  retaliated  by  describing 
Medvedev  as  "provocational"  and  undermining  his  command.  Daines  suggests 
93  BpPRA,  doc.  63,  p.  88;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  I,  docs.  687  &  689,  pp.  723-724  &  725-726;  Orenburg  was 
eventually  taken  by  I  st  and  4th  Armies  on  22nd  January,  meeting  at  this  point  with  Turkestan  Amy, 
advancing  from  the  south,  linking  Central  Russia  with  Turkestan.  I  st  and  Turkestan  Armies  were 
united  under  Gai's  command  and  captured  Ural'sk  on  22nd  January,  with  4th  Anny  coming  under  the 
command  of  Frunze  on  31  st  January,  MIKA  Tom.  IV,  p.  536;  RTsKhIDNI,  f.  7  1,  op.  35,  d.  962,  pp. 
64-64  &  68. 
94  BpPRA,  doc.  64,  pp.  88-89. 
95  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "K  iubileiu  pervoi  annii",  Simbirskaia  guberniia,  p.  25. 175 
Trotsky  demanded  that  Tukhachevsky  be  called  to  order  and  posted  him  away.  96 
Tukhachevsky  was  appointed  Deputy  Commander  of  Southern  Front  on  26th 
December  1918,  which,  although  on  paper  a  promotion,  could  have  been  punishment 
for  his  indiscretion.  He  apparently  languished  in  this  post  for  three  weeks.  97  SMiMOV 
simply  remarks  Tukhachevsky  and  Medvedev  had  a  "serious  dispute",  98  but  Sokolov 
points  to  deeper  issues  and  to  the  two  men  being  complete  opposites. 
Medvedev  was  part  of  the  "Workers'  Opposition"  at  the  1921  1  Oth  Party  Congress, 
a  hardline  leftist,  very  likely  against  the  use  of  voenspetsy.  (The  two  men  were 
certainly  at  opposite  poles  of  the  communist  spectrum  in  March  1921  as 
Tukhachevsky  was  suppressing  Kronstadt  at  this  time,  an  action  condemned  by  the 
Bolshevik  hard-left).  As  has  already  been  shown,  Tukhachevsky  firmly  believed  in 
unified  command  by  communist-commanders.  Possibly  related  to  the  dispute,  he 
wrote  to  Vacietis  on  22nd  December,  emphasising  that  he  was  a  loyal  communist  and 
did  not  require  political  commissars  to  watch  over  him. 
Sokolov  suggests  Medvedev's  complaint  was  also  related  to  Tukhachevsky  having 
his  wife,  family  members  and  others  staying  in  his  command  train,  using  army  stores 
for  them  and  amassing  a  swollen  Ist  Army  staff  with  no  apparent  qualitative  gain. 
However,  as  Sokolov  also  notes  and  as  has  already  been  shown  in  chapter  11,  hardly 
any  Tukhachevsky-appointed  staff  defected.  His  two  brothers,  Nikolai  and  Aleksandr, 
apparently  worked  in  his  staff  on  the  command  train,  but  they  were  trained  soldiers.  99 
However,  Tukhachevsky  did  invite  the  female  members  of  his  family  to  stay  in  his 
train  during  the  Civil  War.  His  mother  was  at  Inza  en  route  to  Simbirsk  when  the 
Murav'ev  uprising  occurred  and  his  sisters  visited  him  -  Sonia  with  5th  Army;  01'ga 
and  Elizabeth  on  Western  Front;  Maria  at  Tambov,  although  no  mention  of  visitors  to 
Eastern  Front  after  his  mother  is  made.  100  His  wife  was  a  regular  visitor,  but  this  was 
possibly  regular  practice  within  the  Red  Army.  101  All  this  could  have  antagonised 
Medvedev.  Sokolov  refers  to  Koritskii  who  described  Tukhachevsky  as  maintaining 
96  V.  0.  Daines,  p.  44. 
97  Voennye  bumagi  L.  D.  Trotskogo,  Reel  5,  f  4,  op.  3,  d.  26,  p.  34.  Frunze  was  appointed  4th  Army 
Commander  and  Novitskii  as  4th  Army  Chief-of-Staff  in  the  same  order. 
98  G.  V.  Smimov,  Krovaiývi  marshal:  Mikahil  Tukhachesvky,  1893-1937,  (St.  Petersburg,  1997),  pp. 
251-252. 
99  S.  T.  Minakov,  Sovelskaia  voennaia  elita  20-kh  godov,  (Orel,  2000),  p.  130. 
100  RGVý-I,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  p.  42. 
'01  See  p.  106,  Blagonravov's  wife  is  mentioned  as  being  in  the  train  in  which  Murav'ev's  accomplices 
fled  from  Simbirsk,  indicating  she  was  present  at  the  front. 176 
his  command-train  in  a  professional  condition  for  work  and  studying  most  nights, 
barely  sleeping.  This  was  echoed  by  Elizabeth  who  recalled  that  Tukhachevsky  hardly 
slept  during  offensives,  sometimes  for  only  half  an  hour  at  his  desk  in  two  weeks.  102 
As  has  been  shown,  Ist  Army  was  continuously  attacking  througout  1918,  giving 
little  time  for  Tukhachevsky  to  indulge  a  large  entourage,  although  "hangers-on"  may 
still  have  been  in  the  train. 
Kalnins,  with  whom  Tukhachevsky  had  already  clashed,  backed  Medvedev, 
criticising  Tukhachevsky  for  taking  decisions  and  making  alterations  with  which  the 
commissars  did  not  agree.  He  urged  Moscow  to  back  a  loyal  Bolshevik  over  someone 
who  had  only  joined  the  Party  in  August-  September  1918.  Although  Kalnins  was 
inaccurate  with  his  dates,  this  demonstrated  how  Tukhachevsky  was  still  viewed  by 
some  of  his  fellow  command  staff  and  vividly  illustrates  the  precarious  relationships 
generated  within  the  RVS  command  structure.  Samsonovich,  Penza  Division's 
political  commissar  also  backed  Medvedev.  However,  Sokolov  suggests 
Tukhachevsky  only  complained  about  Medvedev  once  he  had  secured  the  transfer  to 
Southern  Front.  1  03  This  suggests  Tukhachevsky's  transfer  was  not  a  punishment  and 
that  Trotsky  backed  him,  transferring  Medvedev  instead. 
A  clash  over  the  dual  command  structure,  a  common  occurrence  within  the  Red 
Army,  is  feasible  with  such  diametrically  opposed  viewpoints  within  I  st  Army  R  VS. 
It  is  also  likely  that  Trotsky  supported  Tukhachevsky  against  the  commissars,  given 
the  connections  between  the  two.  Trotsky  had  previously  backed  voenspetsy  against 
political  commissars,  knowing  the  conditions  they  were  fighting  under  and  that  the 
voenspetsy  were  the  military  experts  who  could  get  the  job  done. 
Soviet  biographies  unsurprisingly  fail  to  mention  the  dispute,  but  more 
surprisingly,  neither  do  Western  accounts.  104  The  latter  stick  with  the  formers'  version 
that  Tukhachevsky  was  transferred  because  Komuch  was  defeated  and  Kolchak  was 
just  emerging,  leaving  Southern  Front  as  the  greatest  threat  and  prioritised  by 
Moscow.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  was  transferred  because  he  had  accomplished  his 
task  on  Eastern  Front  so  well  and  was  now  needed  to  sort  out  the  next  trouble-spot. 
102  N.  1.  Koritskii,  "V  dni  voiny...  ",  pp.  61  &  65-66;  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  3,  p.  1. 
103  B.  Sokolov,  Mikhail  Tukhachevský,:  zhizn'i  smert'"Krasnogo  marshala",  (Smolensk,  1999),  pp.  81- 
85. 
104Spahr,  Butson  and  Kaufmann  all  fail  to  mention  the  dispute. 177 
This  version  is  also  possible  as  will  become  clearer  once  Tukhachevsky's  path 
through  the  whole  Civil  War  is  shown. 
However,  the  truth  perhaps  lies  somewhere  in  between.  It  is  very  likely  that  the 
disputes  between  Tukhachevsky  and  the  commissars  had  festered  away  for  weeks  or 
even  months  and  had  finally  escalated  to  a  level  that  necessitated  change.  Possibly 
Tukhachevsky  and  Medvedev  were  both  transferred  to  demonstrate  that  this  type  of 
bickering  was  not  acceptable.  However,  the  transfers  would  not  have  occurred  if 
Eastern  Front  was  still  prioritised.  Only  the  rise  of  Krasnov  and  Denikin  in  the  South 
and  the  relative  calm  of  the  East  spurred  Trotsky  to  take  action,  killing  two  birds  with 
one  stone.  He  relieved  the  tension,  but  in  doing  so,  moved  his  most  successful 
commander  to  the  trouble-spot.  It  is  very  likely  Tukhachevsky  was  appointed  Deputy 
Southern  Front  Commander  and  then  8th  Army  Commander  to  carry  out  the 
reorganisational  work  he  had  conducted  so  adeptly  already,  initially  on  a  front  level, 
but  then  with  an  army  which  required  rebuilding. 
Moscow  was  desperately  trying  to  pull  Southern  Front  together  at  this  time.  In 
January  1919  Vacietis  remarked  that  Southern  Front  troops  fled  the  field  of  battle  at 
the  slightest  reverse.  This  was  a  situation  comparable  to  Eastern  Front  in  June  1918, 
as  partisan  Red  Guard  forces  were  shown  to  be  no  match  for  slightly  organised  troops. 
However,  following  the  example  of  Eastern  Front's  installation  of  strict  discipline  by 
revolutionary  tribunal,  initiated  by  Tukhachevsky,  this  was  carried  to  new  lengths  on 
Southern  Front,  brutally  punishing  desertion  and  refusal  to  fight.  In  late  1918,2,000 
8th  Army  troops  had  been  sentenced  to  death.  However,  Vacietis  criticised  the  fact 
that  only  150  of  these  sentences  had  been  fulfilled,  leaving  a  shortfall  of  1,850  which 
"...  does  not  achieve  any  kind  of  military  work".  He  noted,  "That  discipline  which  we 
have  to  practise  on  the  fronts,  will  be  discernible  only  by  the  heroic  measures  of 
bringing  to  heel  the  military  mob  we  have  on  the  fronts  to  form  regiments,  divisions, 
t,  105  an-nies  . 
Who  better  to  carry  out  this  brutal  reorganisational  work  than  the  man  who  had 
inaugurated  the  practice  on  Eastern  Front.  Tukhachevsky  had  moulded  a  partisan 
rabble  into  the  best  army  on  Eastern  Front,  therefore  Trotsky  and  Vacietis  now 
wanted  him  to  do  the  same  in  the  South.  I  would  argue  that  this  is  the  most  likely 
'0'  J.  Vacietis,  "Grazhdanskaia  voina,  1918  god",  Pamiat'.  Istoricheskii  sbornik,  No.  2,  (Moscow, 
1977),  pp.  72-73. 178 
reason  for  Tukhachevsky's  transfer  South  and  possibly  the  truth  behind  the  dispute 
with  Medvedev  also  lies  in  Tukhachevsky's  readiness  to  utilise  these  methods,  which 
was  entirely  contrary  to  the  views  of  the  hard-left  Bolsheviks. 
However,  Tukhachevsky  apparently  either  did  not  enjoy  or  did  not  fit  into  the  post 
of  Deputy  Front  Commander.  An  ex-Tsarist  Colonel  P.  A.  Slaven  was  Front 
Commander  and  his  staff  comprised  17  ex-Tsarist  voenspetsy,  six  generals,  seven 
colonels  and  3  lieutenant-colonels.  Ivanov  suggests  a  great  enmity  emitted  from  these 
and  other  former  general  staff  officers  towards  former  2nd-Lieutenant  Tukhachevsky 
and  the  official  registering  of  his  new  post  was  delayed  by  one  and  a  half  months.  '  06 
There  are  also  suggestions  that  Stalin  did  not  like  or  trust  Tukhachevsky  either, 
which  would  be  plausible  after  the  Medvedev  episode,  and  kept  him  at  the  rear  where 
he  could  not  interfere.  Stalin  had  already  clashed  with  Trotsky  after  taking  it  upon 
himself  to  become  involved  with  Southern  Front  R  VS.  He  had  initially  been  posted  as 
Special  Plenipotentiary  for  Grain  Requisitioning,  but  had  manoeuvred  himself  and 
Sergei  Minin  into  the  RVS  as  political  commissars  and  tried  to  replace  an  ex-Tsarist 
Colonel  Sytin  with  Voroshilov  as  military  commissar  in  October  1918.  Trotsky  had 
Stalin  and  Co.  recalled  and  removed  and  Stalin  did  not  rejoin  Southern  Front  RVS 
until  3rd  October  1919.107  It  is  very  possible  he  would  have  not  taken  kindly  to 
Tukhachevsky,  another  ex-voenspetsy  appointed  by  Trotsky,  arriving,  but  it  is 
difficult  to  see  what  influence  he  could  have  had  on  R  VS  affairs  when  he  was  not  a 
member.  Whether  any  of  this  unsettled  Tukhachevsky  or  he  missed  commanding  in 
the  field,  it  is  suggested  he  applied  for  the  first  frontline  command  to  become 
available,  which  was  8th  Army.  '  08 
V.  M.  Gittis  had  commanded  8th  Army  since  Ist  July  1918,  but  on  15th  January 
Slaven  removed  him  for  not  fulfilling  orders  and  referred  him  to  a  revolutionary 
tribunal.  109  Evidently  appalled  at  Slaven  taking  such  an  unauthorised  decision, 
Trotsky  contacted  Southern  Front  R  VS  on  19th  January, 
I  utterly  and  completely  share  Supreme  Commander's  opinion  about  the 
intolerable  removal  of  Army  Commander  Gittis.  It  is  forbidden  to  throw 
away  people,  who  conscientiously  conduct  good  work.  Regarding 
106  V.  M.  lvanov,  Marshal  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  2nd  edition,  (Moscow,  1990),  p.  87. 
107  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  533;  For  the  "Tsaritsyn  Affair"  and  the  beginnings  of  the  Trotsky-Stalin  feud  see 
E.  Mawdsley,  The  Russian  Civil  War,  (Edinburgh,  2000),  pp.  88-91. 
108  V.  M.  lvanov,  Marshal  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  p.  88. 
109  DkJKA,  Toni  IV,  p.  538;  DkJKA,  Tom  I,  doc.  591,  pp.  626-627;  Vladimir  Mikhailovich  Gittis  (1881- 
1938),  a  former  Tsarist  colonel. 179 
Iskratsy,  he  has  declared  himself  ill  and  there  is  visibly  no  hope  of  his 
quick  return  to  Southern  Front.  The  question  about  a  temporary 
replacement  becomes  more  significant.  I  am  afraid  Tukhachevsky  may  not 
prove  to  be  for  this  post.  Is  it  not  better  to  appoint  Tukhachevsky  to  8th 
Army,  and  Gittis  to  the  front?  I  ask  for  a  report  on  the  front  position  at  the 
present  mornent.  '  10 
Evidently  Trotsky  had  removed  Slaven  for  his  actions,  but  it  appears 
Tukhachevsky  was  recommended  to  replace  him,  which  would  belie  any  notion  he 
was  treated  shoddily  by  Southern  Front  staff.  However,  Trotsky  intervened  personally 
to  prevent  this,  suggesting  Gittis  for  the  post  and  Tukhachevsky  to  replace  him.  It  is 
possible  Trotsky  felt  Tukhachevsky  did  not  have  the  experience  of  Gittis  for  the  Front 
Command  post,  which  was  probably  correct.  He  had  only  been  I  st  Army  Commander 
for  six  months.  However,  Trotsky  also  possibly  felt  Tukhachevsky's  talents  should  be 
utillsed  to  bring  8th  Army  back  into  line.  Gittis  was  perhaps  a  capable  commander, 
but  had  obviously  not  been  prepared  to  conduct  mass  repression  against  his  own 
troops  to  instill  iron  discipline,  with  the  earlier  executions  unfulfilled.  Tukhachevsky 
had  done  this  with  I  st  Army  and  would  do  so  again  with  8th  Army.  Trotsky's 
recommendations  were  confirmed  on  20th  January  and  Tukhachevsky  served  as  8th 
Army  Commander  until  15th  March.  "' 
However,  this  was  not  the  end  of  Southern  Front  squabbling.  The  actual  combat 
on  Southern  Front,  in  which  Tukhachevsky  successfully  led  8th  Army  for  two  months 
against  Krasnov,  is  not  as  important  in  assessing  him  overall  as  the  complete 
breakdown  in  working  relations  he  had  with  Gittis.  A  suspicion  clouds  this  episode.  It 
is  possible  that  the  vehemence  with  which  Tukhachevsky  complained  about  Gittis' 
command  was  simply  fuelled  by  a  resentment  over  Trotsky's  decision.  Tukhachevsky 
felt  he  should  have  been  appointed  Front  Commander  and  was  determined  to 
undermine  and  destroy  Gittis  for  receiving  the  post.  However,  this  was  not  necessarily 
the  case.  A  brief  summary  of  the  conduct  of  the  Southern  Front  fighting  sets  the  scene 
and  this,  combined  with  Tukhachevsky's  evolving  theories  of  civil  warfare,  set  him  on 
the  way  to  his  July  and  December  1919  analysis  of  the  conflict. 
110  RTsKhIDNI,  f,  325,  op.  1,  d.  479,  p.  2;  translation  of  document  contained  in  A.  B.  Murphy,  The 
Russian  Civil  War:  Primary  Sources,  (New  York,  2000),  p.  69. 
111  RGV,  4,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  1,  p.  9;  DkJKA,  Tom  IV,  pp.  533  &  538.  Khvesin  became  8th  Army 
Commander  and  Gittis  retained  his  post  until  13th  July  1919. 180 
8th  Army  Commander  -  Southern  Front:  January-March  1919 
Combat  in  the  Don 
The  withdrawal  of  the  Central  Powers  from  November  1918  had  opened  up 
European  Russia  down  to  the  Donbass  and  Don  Regions.  In  the  Don,  General 
Krasnov  commanded  the  Don  Cossack  Army  and  used  this  opportunity  to  secure  his 
grip  on  the  region,  although  he  had  to  fight  continuously  with  Red  forces  to  hold  onto 
his  home  territory.  However,  further  south  in  the  Kuban,  Denikin  had  used  the  barrier 
afforded  by  German  occupation  during  1918  to  secure  the  region.  He  built  up  the 
Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia  with  capable  commanders,  Generals  Mai-Maevskii 
and  Wrangel,  serving  under  him.  '  12  In  early  1919,  Denikin  launched  an  offensive 
against  the  Red  Caucasus-Caspian  Front.  This  was  a  disorganised  mass  of  around 
150,000  troops  riddled  with  typhus  and  Denikin  routed  it  completely  by  early 
February  with  only  25,000  men.  113  The  timing  was  crucial  for  the  Don  theatre  as 
Denikin  was  able  to  despatch  forces  here  as  Southern  Front  was  attacking,  greatly 
influencing  the  outcome. 
Southern  Front  comprised  from  east  to  west,  10th  Army  at  Tsaritsyn,  9th  Army  at 
Balashov,  8th  Army  at  Voronezh  and  Donets  Group  under  Kozhevnikov,  which 
became  13th  Army  on  5th  March-'  14  On  its  right  flank  operated  Ist-3rd  Ukrainian 
Partisan  Divisions  under  Nestor  Makhno,  fighting  for  the  Reds  at  this  point. 
Therefore,  in  Southern  Front's  offensive,  8th  Army  acted  with  9th  Army  on  its  left 
flank  and  Donets  Group  on  its  right. 
On  15th  February  1919,  midway  through  Tukhachevsky's  command,  8th  Army 
contained  22,700  infantry  and  1,250  cavalry  with  152  guns  and  730  machine-guns.  11  5 
He  was  commanding  slightly  more  troops,  but  with  less  weaponry  than  on  Eastern 
Front.  Inza  Division  under  Lacis  was  within  8th  An-ny's  complement  and 
Tukhachevsky  apparently  appointed  it  his  main  operational  force,  putting  his  trust  in 
his  former  Eastern  Front  colleague.  '  16 
112  Vladimir  Zenonovich  (Zinov'evich)  Mai-Maevskii  (1867-1920),  a  former  Tsarist  Lieutenant- 
General,  Baron  Petr  Nikolaevich  Wrangel  (1878-1928),  a  former  Tsarist  Major-General. 
113  E.  Mawdsley,  pp.  161-163. 
'"  DkJKA,  Toin  IV,  p.  542. 
115 
Ibid.  p.  56. 
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Altogether  on  15th  February,  Southern  Front  lined  up  99,400  infantry,  17,650 
cavalry,  460  guns  and  2,040  machine-guns,  16  armoured-trains  and  68  planes,  whilst 
neighbouring  Ukrainian  Front  fielded  43,600  infantry,  3,520  cavalry,  124  guns  and 
606  machine-guns,  giving  around  163,000  men  in  total.  Against  this  were  arrayed 
199,800  anti-Soviet  troops,  72,800  and  45,000  of  whom  were  in  the  Don  and  Kuban 
Cossack  hosts  respectively,  against  Southern  Front.  117 
Heavy  snow  during  January  made  transport  by  cartage  impossible  and  skis  had  to 
be  attached  to  facilitate  movement.  February  saw  heavy  rain  and  the  onset  of  the 
spring  thaw,  making  roads  impassable,  muddy  morasses.  The  Rivers  Don  and  Donets 
flowed  in  full  spate  by  the  end  of  the  month  making  crossing  perilous,  if  not 
impossible.  Temperatures  averaged  minus  10  degrees.  '  18 
Tukhachevsky  assumed  command  of  8th  Army  just  after  Slaven  had  ordered 
pursuit  of  the  retreating  Don  Army.  8th  Army  was  to  advance  south-east  down  both 
banks  of  the  River  Don,  but  with  most  troops  on  the  left  bank,  acting  with  9th  Anny 
to  secure  the  Povorino-Tsaritsyn  Railway  and  aid  10th  Army's  struggle  to  hold  the 
latter  town.  Donets  Group  was  to  leave  one  division  at  Lugansk  Station,  but  advance 
towards  Kantemirovka  Station  with  a  view  to  attacking  Millerovo.  119  The  latter  two 
were  stations  on  the  Voronezh-Novocherkassk-Rostov  Railway. 
The  Don  Army  at  Tsaritsyn  continued  to  fall  back  under  the  Red  offensive, 
leading  Vacietis  to  send  directives  on  lst  and  3rd  February  for  Southern  Front  to  take 
Novocherkassk  and  Rostov  on  the  Azov  Sea  coast,  with  the  ultimate  aim  of  pushing 
the  Whites  over  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Don.  120  He  criticised  Gittis  in  the  latter 
directive  for  not  giving  8th  Army  correct  tasks  under  pursuit  operations,  demanding 
Gittis  amend  this. 
To  fulfill  the  general  directives,  Gittis  proposed  10th  Army  advance  along  the 
lateral  Tsaritsyn-Likhaia  Railway  on  the  left  flank  and  Kozhevnikov  advance  further 
down  the  radial  Voronezh-Novocherkassk-Rostov  Railway  to  take  Likhaia  Station, 
the  junction  of  the  two  lines.  8th  and  9th  Armies  in  the  centre  were  to  advance  across 
the  Don  steppes  to  the  line  Kashary-Ust'-Medveditskaia-Kremenskaia  by  6th 
'"  DkfKA,  Toni  IV,  pp.  55-56  &  476-477. 
118  M.  Brawer,  Atlas  of  Russia  and  the  Independent  Republics,  (New  York,  1994),  p.  13. 
119  DkfKA  Tom  I,  docs.  592-596,  pp.  627-633. 
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February.  12  1  Tukhachevsky  was  to  proceed  across  open  grasslands,  frozen  with 
midwinter  snow  and  ice,  with  the  transport  and  climactic  difficulties  mentioned 
above.  Marching  on  foot  was  the  only  feasible  option,  but  attacking  through  Don 
Region's  heartland  gave  Tukhachevsky  no  secure  rear.  Constant  harassment  from 
cossack  bands  disrupted  communications  and  supply.  Attacking  under  these 
conditions,  Gittis  hoped  to  encircle  the  retreating  Don  Army  forces  in  the  Don. 
Southern  Front  initially  found  some  success  on  the  left  flank  as  10th  An-ny 
advanced  and  captured  7,000  prisoners  from  23rd  January-10th  February.  122 
However,  with  conditions  so  bad  in  the  centre,  Tukhachevsky  independently  decided 
to  advance  towards  Millerovo,  acting  outwith  Gittis'  demarcation  lines.  123  This  was  a 
more  direct  route  towards  the  Donbass,  cutting  the  distance  8th  Army  had  to  travel  in 
the  hostile  open  grasslands  and  taking  them  back  to  the  railway  lines  of  the  Donbass 
area  to  ease  movement. 
Possibly  because  of  this,  Gittis  demanded  that  Tukhachevsky  attack  with  his  right 
flank  to  help  Kozhevnikov  and  with  his  left  flank  to  aid  9th  Army's  right  flank  and 
centre,  which  were  under  threat.  Gittis  complained  the  Front  Staff  had  not  received 
Inza  Division's  position  for  six  days.  124 
Kakurin  suggests  8th  Army's  right  flank  did  not  advance  quickly  enough  from 
5th-  I  Oth  February,  losing  the  opportunity  to  encircle  Volunteer  Army  divisions  facing 
Kozhevnikov's  Group  and  failing  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  further  reinforcements.  125 
However,  the  difficult  conditions  perhaps  delayed  8th  Army's  movement  and  Vacietis 
had  already  criticised  Gittis  for  giving  out  incorrect  pursuit  orders  to  8th  Army,  which 
would  have  further  delayed  it. 
With  Inza  Division,  Lacis  had  actually  performed  a  spectacular  cavalry  raid  into 
the  White  rear  to  cut  the  Tsaritsyn-Likhaia  Railway  at  Morozovsk  Station,  blowing  up 
the  line  in  five  places  and  cutting  the  telegraph  wires.  This  prevented  5  White 
eshelons,  retreating  from  Tsaritsyn,  reaching  Likhaia,  8th  Army's  target,  and  probably 
contributed  to  10th  Army's  prisoner  haul.  Tukhachevsky  sent  Lacis  a  congratulatory 
telegram  on  I  Ith  February, 
12  1  DkfKA  Tom  I,  doc.  604,  pp.  639-640. 
122  N.  E.  Kakurin,  Kak  srazhalasrevoliutsiia,  Tom  II,  (Moscow,  1926),  p.  59. 
123  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al,  eds.,  Grazhdanskaia  voina  1918-192]gg.,  Tom  III,  (Moscow,  193  1),  p.  227. 
124  DkfKA  Toni  I,  doc.  609,  p.  646. 
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Congratulations  on  your  unexpected  high  successes.  By  order  No.  5  you 
were  given  the  task  which  decides  the  fate  of  the  whole  front,  -  cutting  of 
the  railway  and  telegraph.  I  recall  the  rules  of  cavalry  raids:  1)  unlimited 
bravery  of  commanders  and  subordinates,  2)  mobile  and  not  too  big 
detachments.  Fulfill  decisively.  '  26 
The  terrain  Tukhachevsky  had  to  advance  through  was  completely  different  from 
Eastern  Front  and  with  a  hostile  local  population,  recruitment  on  the  move  was  not 
possible.  Frontline  troops  had  to  be  used  to  secure  the  rear,  weakening  offensive 
strength  further.  By  his  independent  manoeuvre,  he  was  attempting  to  utilise  the 
railway  more,  as  Ist  Army  had  successfully  done  previously.  However,  whilst  Ist 
Army  had  also  used  alternative  transport  resources  to  retain  speed  of  movement,  this 
was  not  possible  in  the  Don,  as  bitter  winter  conditions  made  travel  much  more 
difficult.  The  use  of  cavalry  for  reconnaissance  and  raids  was  still  valid  though  and 
Tukhachevsky  had  used  it  well  again  to  aid  the  operation. 
With  the  pursuit  stalling,  Vacietis  intervened  on  I  Ith  February  and  instructed 
Gittis  to  redirect  the  attack  towards  the  Donbass  sector,  demanding  a  regrouping  of 
Southern  Front  forces  to  concentrate  its  main  forces  for  taking  the  area.  127  Gittis 
envisaged  regrouping  in  eight  days,  but  it  took  eighteen.  128  Travel  difficulties 
combined  with  an  inadequate  rail  network  and  the  Whites'  and  local  population's 
destruction  of  six  bridges.  However,  further  complications  resulted,  with  General 
Mai-Maevskii's  forces  reaching  the  Donbass  at  this  point,  to  reinforce  Krasnov's 
faltering  army.  A  White  counter-attack  in  mid-February  forced  Kozhevnikov  back, 
threatening  8th  Army's  right  flank,  but  fierce  defensive  battles,  with  the  aid  of  9th 
Army  and  Donets  Group,  prevented  this  setback  becoming  a  rout.  129  Southern  Front 
attempted  a  counter-offensive  at  the  end  of  February  into  the  Donbass,  pitting 
Tukhachevsky  against  Mai-Maevskii's  forces.  However,  further  White  reinforcements 
arrived  from  the  Caucasus  and  the  onset  of  the  thaw,  exacerbated  by  heavy  rain,  saw 
the  previously  ice-bound  River  Donets  flowing  in  full  spate.  Destruction  of  river 
crossings  by  the  Whites  created  a  natural  barrier  to  defend,  but  also  prevented  any 
quick  counters  by  them  and  the  fighting  became  bogged  down  with  neither  side 
making  any  headway. 
126RGT"4,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  1;  A.  S.  Popov,  Trud.  Talant.  Doblest',  (Moscow,  1972),  p.  35. 
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Vacietis  complained  to  Gittis  on  12th  March  that  the  latter  had  not  correctly 
followed  his  directive  to  pursue  the  Whites  over  the  River  Don  and  take 
Novocherkassk  and  Rostov,  and  had  been  unclear  in  his  orders  to  Front  armies. 
Vacietis  also  later  complained  about  Gittis'  fulfillment  of  set  tasks,  accusing  him  of 
being  "phlegmatic"  in  his  responses  to  his  orders.  '  30  Gittis  had  reported  on  4th  March 
that  weather  conditions  and  White  reinforcements  were  holding  up  the  offensive  and 
repeated  this  on  15th  March.  13  1  However,  he  also  reported  on  5th  March  that  Southern 
Front  had  been  attacking  continuously,  fighting  increasingly  heavy  battles  and  had 
suffered  heavy  losses.  These  were  increasingly  difficult  to  replace  as  reinforcements 
had  to  march  up  to  250  versty  to  reach  the  front  and  transfers  and  communications 
were  made  increasingly  difficult  under  manoeuvre  operations  because  of  the  river 
crossings.  1  32  Retaining  telegraph  cable  connections  would  have  been  increasingly 
difficult.  Southern  Front  was  overstretched  by  early  March  as  the  continuous 
offensive  through  extremely  harsh  territory  and  weather  conditions  left  its  supply 
bases  behind.  However,  although  Gittis  used  these  difficulties  to  explain  the  offensive 
stalling,  he  was  to  be  blamed  for  putting  Southern  Front  in  the  position  to  suffer  them, 
as  well  as  a  Don  Cossack  uprising  which  occurred  in  the  Red  rear,  adding  some 
30,000  to  the  White  ranks.  This  erupted  on  I  Ith  March,  but  spread  and  became  a 
major  factor  in  Southern  Front's  difficulties  in  the  months  to  come.  133 
Tukhachevsky  and  Gittis 
It  appears  that  Vacietis'  criticism  in  early  March  was  incited  by  Tukhachevsky, 
who  apparently  applied  for  another  posting  away  from  Gittis,  complaining  that  he 
could  no  longer  work  under  him.  '  34  Tukhachevsky  had  appealed  directly  to  Vacietis 
and  the  R  VSR  over  Gittis'  head, 
I  appeal  to  you  in  this  report  as  a  communist,  sending  it  not  as  a 
commander,  events  on  Southern  Front  have  forced  me  to  speak  out  not  as 
one  of  the  commanders  of  the  Red  Army,  as  I  would  usually  do,  but  as  a 
communist,  fearful  for  the  whole  failure  of  the  revolution... 
130  DGkKA,  docs.  367-368  &  370  pp.  407-408  &  409-410.  The  latter  complaint  came  on  22nd  March. 
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Being  well-acquainted  with  Gittis'  orders,  with  his  understanding  of 
war,  I  attest  completely  determinedly  that  Gittis  does  not  know  how  to 
lead  by  the  basic  laws  of  strategy... 
From  the  very  beginning,  Southern  Front  Commander  comrade  Gittis 
was  mistaken  in  his  choice  of  direction,  selecting  not  Rostov,  but 
Tsaritsyn... 
If  the  main  forces  had  attacked  through  Donets  Basin  to  Rostov  (by  the 
shortest  route)...  they  would  have  had  a  secure  Soviet  rear.  But  the  main 
forces  went  through  Don  Region  and  the  forward  line  is  weakened 
because  of  the  suppression  of  the  cossack  uprising... 
To  replace  Gittis  at  this  dangerous  moment  would  give  more  than 
sending  three  divisions... 
Of  course  amongst  the  old  spetsy  it  is  difficult  to  find  good 
commanders.  Already  it  is  time  to  replace  them  with  communists.  For 
example,  Eastern  Front  Southern  Group  Commander  comrade  Frunze  is  an 
exceptionally  talented  man  and  under  his  command  the  position  on  the 
front  would  quickly  change.  '  35 
This  report  displays  the  development  of  Tukhachevsky's  intertwining  of  military 
practice  and  theory  with  class  warfare.  He  was  complaining  about  a  strategical  error, 
a  military  matter,  but  by  relating  it  to  Gittis  failing  to  understand  class  warfare, 
Tukhachevsky  was  casting  doubt  upon  Gittis'  ability  to  command  in  the  Red  Army  at 
all.  However,  although  criticising  old  voenspetsy  in  his  telegram  and  possibly 
carrying  a  grudge  against  Gittis  for  obtaining  the  Front  Command  position, 
Tukhachevsky  was  complaining  from  military  necessity  and  a  genuine  belief  in  their 
inability  to  do  the  job.  He  was  in  the  midst  of  desperate  fighting,  trying  to  prevent  a 
White  breakthrough,  making  it  unlikely  he  was  thinking  in  career  terms,  trying  to  get 
ahead  of  senior  voenspetsy.  Besides,  with  clashes  with  authority  still  fresh  from 
Eastern  Front,  he  had  no  reason  to  court  controversy  again.  The  link  between  the 
military  shortcomings  of  the  old  voenspetsy  and  the  evolution  of  class  warfare  was 
made  in  action. 
Tukhachevsky  had  commanded  very  successfully  on  Eastern  Front,  leading  a 
continuous  offensive  under  both  Vacietis  and  Kamenev,  because  the  offensive  was 
carried  out  in  the  correct  manner.  The  offensive  passed  through  regions  with  a 
sympathetic  population,  allowing  mobilisation  whilst  advancing,  to  maintain 
momentum.  This  was  supplemented  by  uprisings  in  the  enemy  rear,  which  created 
disruption  and  possible  encirclments  and  ensured  a  secure  Red  rear,  preventing  hostile 
partisan  activity  or  overstretched  communication  and  supply  lines.  Tukhachevsky 
135 
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knew  this  worked  and  had  wanted  to  employ  the  same  strategy  on  Southern  Front.  He 
apparently  assessed  the  Southern  Front  situation  in  January  1919,  probably  whilst 
Deputy  Front  Commander,  before  Gittis  ordered  the  attack  through  the  Don. 
Tukhachevsky  advised  against  it,  but  was  overruled.  136  Having  carried  out  the  tour  of 
Don  Region  the  previous  year  and  fought  cossacks  here,  he  had  an  idea  of  the 
situation  and  was  proven  to  be  correct  the  following  year  in  Southern  Front's 
offensive  against  Denikin.  This  was  routed  through  the  Donbass,  following 
Tukhachevsky's  1919  recommendation.  The  credit  for  the  original  idea  of  this 
successful  offensive  must  go  to  Tukhachevsky,  although  Stalin  would  apparently  later 
claim  to  have  planned  the  strategy.  '  37  Perhaps  Tukhachevsky  even  envisaged  a 
workers'rising  in  Rostov. 
However,  Gittis  directed  Southern  Front  through  the  hostile  Don  region  instead  of 
the  sympathetic  Donbass  Region  which  would  have  secured  the  rear,  provided  fresh 
troops  and  allowed  communications  and  supply  lines  to  remain  open.  Gittis'refusal  to 
contemplate  the  offensive  through  the  Donbass  on  class  warfare  grounds  convinced 
Tukhachevsky  that  the  former  was  not  capable  of  commanding  under  new  conditions 
of  warfare.  Tukhachevsky  knew  old  strategic  principles  still  remained  valid,  but  he 
believed  new  strategic  forms  were  being  created  in  the  Civil  War  and  these  had  to  be 
utilised  immediately  to  win  the  conflict.  Failure  to  do  so  would  be  catastrophic. 
Tukhachevsky  was  not  just  criticising  older  voenspetsy  for  career  advancement  in  the 
Red  Army  as  has  been  suggested  he  did  in  his  later  career.  '  38  He  truly  believed  they 
could  not  adapt  and  do  the  job.  The  need  therefore  arose  to  rush  Red  Commanders 
through  the  courses. 
Tukhachevsky  believed  in  early  1919  that  the  old  voenspetsy  were  inadequately 
trained  and  unable  to  adapt  to  civil  warfare,  and  he  wrote  this  in  his  report  to  Lenin  in 
December.  However,  his  report  was  not  compiled  from  purely  5th  Army  experience 
as  stated  in  the  title.  He  was  calling  for  the  replacement  of  old  voenspetsy  already  in 
February  1919  and  probably  hoped  that  those  undergoing  the  training  courses  he  had 
drawn  up  in  June  1918  would  be  able  to  take  command  soon.  Tukhachevsky  recorded 
further  criticism  of  Gittis  in  July  1919  in  Vozniknovenie  grazhdanskoi  voiny,  when 
136  ]bid.  p.  36. 
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first  formulating  the  necessity  to  utilise  "living  centres"  and  avoid  "dying  centres"  in 
Civil  War,  routing  offensives  through  friendly  regions.  He  wrote, 
... 
in  certain  localities  with  hostile  class  population  it  is  impossible  not  only 
to  create  an  organised  rear,  but  this  also  distracts  troops  from  the  front. 
Such  rears  must  be  avoided. 
Our  Southern  Front  scorned  these  considerations  in  their  offensive  and 
now  are  severely  paying  for  these  errors.  '  39 
This  was  a  direct  reference  to  the  Don  Cossack  uprising  which  occurred  in  the 
Red  rear  in  February  1919  and  helped  wreck  the  offensive.  The  consequence  was  that 
by  July  1919,  Denikin  reached  Orel,  only  250  miles  from  Moscow.  Tukhachevsky 
intimated  this  could  have  been  avoided  if  the  correct  strategic  planning,  his  own,  had 
been  used  in  January. 
Tukhachevsky  returned  to  this  in  Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia  in 
December  1919,  noting  the  Don  as  a  prime  example  of  a  "dying  centre",  where  an 
offensive  would  have  to  fight  not  only  the  enemy  army,  but  also  opposing  "enemy 
centres",  (towns),  requiring  troops  to  hold  the  rear  in  check.  He  later  developed  this 
point  by  noting  lower  troop  numbers  and  wider  expanses  in  civil  war  meant  "dying 
centres"  should  be  avoided  as  protecting  the  rear  would  sap  the  strength  and 
momentum  of  offensive  action,  remarking, 
The  main  reason  for  our  failure  on  Southern  Front  in  spring  of  this  year 
consisted  of  the  fact  that  the  main  forces  of  the  front  were  moved  not  to 
where  we  would  have  had  a  Soviet  living  rear  in  Donets  Basin,  but  to 
where  we  had  a  "dying"  rear,  which  demanded  the  detailing  of  large 
garrisons  for  holding  for  us  the  wide  Don  steppes.  The  question  of  the 
relation  of  numbers  to  spaces  was  not  considered  and  our  army  was 
beaten.  1  40 
Tukhachevsky  saw  this  as  a  replication  of  national  war  conditions,  a  complete 
misunderstanding  of  fighting  a  class  war  and  another  reason  for  senior  voenspetsy  to 
be  replaced.  He  mentioned  Gittis'  shortcomings  once  more  in  his  lecture,  when 
describing  concentric  offensives,  saying, 
This  spring,  on  Southern  Front  our  army  launched  a  concentric  offensive, 
but  the  tactical  strength  we  had  was  minimal.  It  appeared  as  if  the  point  of 
concentration  appointed  for  the  armies  was  in  the  enemy  rear.  Denikin 
very  easily  tore  to  pieces  this  intricate  wisdom.  141 
139  RGV-1,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  1,  pp.  61-62. 
"0  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Strategila  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia",  Izbrannyeproizvedeniia,  pp.  37  &  39- 
40. 
"'  Ibid.  p.  47. 188 
Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  criticised  Gittis  for  shortcomings  in  military  planning 
and  misunderstanding  the  different  nature  of  class  warfare,  introducing  cutting 
sarcasm  to  the  argument.  Tukhachevsky  evidently  derided  Gittis,  which  may  have 
been  sparked  by  jealousy  at  the  latter  gaining  the  Front  Command  ahead  of  him. 
However,  this  displays  the  evolution  in  Tukhachevsky's  character  and  thought  process 
which  was  taking  place  during  the  Civil  War.  He  had  witnessed  the  positive  effects 
Marxism  had  on  capabilities  to  wage  civil  warfare:  mobilising  recruits  whilst 
attacking;  agitating  to  weaken  the  enemy;  and  uprisings  in  the  enemy  rear  to  help  the 
frontal  attack.  These  would  all  be  included  in  "Deep  Battle"  in  altered,  but  similar 
forms.  Combining  military  theory  with  Marxism  would  also  be  repeated  in  further 
debates  against  various  targets  throughout  his  life  as  he  strove  to  have  his  ideas 
accepted. 
This  chain  of  thought  would  develop  during  the  1920s  as  Tukhachevsky 
advocated  his  offensive  strategy  of  "annihilation"  over  "attrition".  He  saw  older 
voenspetsy  still  advocating  the  methods  and  positional  warfare  of  the  Great  War. 
Tukhachevsky  did  not  want  to  fight  such  a  war  so  he  created  "Deep  Battle"  to  avoid  it 
and  ensure  Red  Commanders  could  correctly  conduct  manoeuvre  operations  to 
completely  defeat  the  enemy.  Gittis'  incorrect  application  of  manoeuvre  further 
convinced  Tukhachevsky  that  people  like  him  must  be  replaced.  This  demonstrates 
how  Tukhachevsky's  advocacy  of  manoeuvre  warfare  in  civil  war  and  subsequent 
calls  for  new  ideas  to  be  adopted  brought  him  into  conflict  with  older  voenspetsy. 
Gaining  military  reform  and  arguing  against  those  of  different  views  became  the  same 
process  and  would  remain  so  throughout  his  life.  He  believed  it  was  a  matter  of  life 
and  death  during  the  Civil  War  and  as  Stalin  rose  to  power,  the  debates  over  military 
strategy  and  which  type  of  army  to  build,  eventually  became  a  matter  of  life  and  death 
for  those  involved,  as  imprisonment  and  ultimately  death  followed  for 
Tukhachevsky's  opponents  in  the  debates  of  the  late  1920s/early  1930s  and  himself  in 
1937.  These  debates  were  all  part  of  the  same  process  for  Tukhachevsky.  He  had  a 
vision  very  early  in  his  Civil  War  career  of  how  the  Red  Army  should  develop.  He 
had  come  to  his  vision  through  command  experience,  knew  that  the  methods 
envisaged  had  worked  and  was  determined  to  push  them  through.  As  the  1920s  wore 
on,  the  military  question  evolved  within  the  Soviet  state,  but  Tukhachevsky  evolved 189 
with  it  and  the  need  to  vehemently  argue  for  his  vision  of  the  Red  Army  remained. 
This  process  started  in  the  Civil  War  and  carried  on  throughout  his  lifetime,  with  his 
belief  in  the  underlying  Marxist  principles  emerging  during  his  Civil  War  career. 
The  ultimate  evolution  of  this  and  an  insight  into  Tukhachevsky's  character  and 
how  he  manipulated  the  system  throughout  his  career  is  demonstrated  by  the  account 
of  the  1919  Don  Operation  given  in  Grazhdanskaia  voina  v  1918-192]gg,  which 
Tukhachevsky  edited  with  Bubnov,  S.  S.  Kamenev  and  Eideman  in  1930.  Eideman 
also  fought  in  the  Don  Operation  with  9th  Army.  This  was  the  official  history  of  the 
Civil  War  and  it  related  the, 
... 
independent  movement  of  8th  Army  to  Millerovo  sector,  instead  of 
movement  into  the  depth  of  Don  oblast,  without  considering  demarcation 
lines,  that  showed  the  correct  evaluation  of  the  strategic  position,  in  the 
end  exposed  to  red  command  the  circumstances  and  they  ordered  Southern 
Front  Commander  comrade  Gittis  to  refrain  from  his  unreal  plan  of 
encircling  the  enemy  in  Donbass  steppes  and  unfortunately  were  very  late 
to  evaluate  the  significance  of  Rostov  sector  and  Donets  Basin,  as  the  vital 
political  and  economic  areas  for  the  proletarian  revolution.  142 
Therefore,  by  1930  Tukhachevsky's  version  was  "the  truth",  appearing  as  it  did  in 
the  official  Civil  War  history.  In  the  evolution  of  the  Stalinist  regime,  this  was  the 
vital  link  in  making  ideas  become  reality  and  defeating  those  who  argued  against 
them.  Gorelik  suggests  Tukhachevsky  did  not  want  to  co-edit  Grazhdanskaia  voina 
because  it  was  not  being  objective  about  Civil  War  history.  143  However,  he  did  co- 
edit  the  third  volume  and  it  does  paint  a  flattering  picture  of  him. 
Tukhachevsky's  first  two  commands  introduced  him  to  the  type  of  fighting 
involved  in  the  Russian  Civil  War  and  also  brought  to  his  attention  the  need  to 
employ  people  in  the  Red  Army  who  could  adapt  to  and  utilise  the  necessary 
methods.  In  chapter  IV,  I  shall  examine  how  he  used  these  early  experiences  to 
command  successfully  in  the  main  theatres  of  the  Civil  War  until  April  1920,  by 
which  time  he  had  evolved  into,  perhaps,  the  archetypal  Red  Commander. 
142  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al,  eds.,  Grazhdanskaia  voina  v  SSSR,  1918-1921gg.,  Tom  Iff,  pp.  227-228. 
143  Ia.  M.  Gorelik,  "Odin  iz  aktivnykh  stroitelel  sovetskoi  arm,,  ",  Istoricheskie  Zapiski,  105,  (1980),  pp. 
247-248. 190 
Chapter  IV:  Conventional  Commander  in  the  Class  War  -  11:  Development  of 
the  Red  Commander:  April  1919-April  1920. 
5th  Army  Commander  -  Eastern  Front:  April-December  1919 
Transfer  From  Southern  Front 
Whether  Tukhachevsky  requested  a  transfer  because  of  irreconcilable  differences 
with  Gittis  or  was  summoned  to  Moscow  for  reassignment  because  of  the  dispute 
remains  unclear.  Both  alternatives  are  suggested,  but  it  is  most  likely  that  events 
elsewhere  were  the  major  reason  behind  his  move.  Whilst  Southern  Front  had  reached 
an  impasse,  with  the  thaw  ending  the  Red  offensive  and  both  sides  jostling  for 
supremacy  on  an  equal  footing,  Kolchak  had  launched  a  general  offensive  on  4th 
March  against  Red  Eastern  Front,  which  was  falling  back  in  disarray,  surrendering  the 
territory  won  by  Tukhachevsky  et  al  in  1918. 
Tukhachevsky  was  the  perfect  man  to  command  on  Eastern  Front.  He  had 
previously  been  the  most  successful  commander  there  and  had  been  fighting  in  the 
same  theatre  of  operations  only  three  months  previously.  The  troops  knew  and 
respected  his  leadership  and  with  Red  forces  disintegrating,  his  reorganisational 
abilities  were  required  before  any  counter-offensive  could  be  envisaged.  He  had 
ftilfilled  Moscow's  expectations  in  the  East  in  1918  and  although  courting  dispute 
around  the  end  of  the  year  and  again  on  Southern  Front,  his  assessment  of  the  Don 
offensive  did  meet  with  approval, as  its  utilisation  to  win  there  later  in  the  year 
proves.  He  was  the  best  organiser  and  motivator  the  Red  Army  possessed  and  was 
needed  on  the  prioritised  front. 
Eastern  Front  was  officially  declared  the  main  operational  area  on  I  Ith  April,  '  but 
intense  work  had  been  conducted  from  Moscow  during  the  preceding  weeks  to  send 
all  available  forces,  resources  and  political  workers  East.  The  troubleshooter  was 
needed  in  the  next  trouble-spot  and  even  if  Tukhachevsky  had  not  criticised  Gittis,  he 
would  have  been  transferred. 
'Lenin  announced  this  in  his  Tezisy  TsKRKP(b)  vcvia,:  j,  spolozheniem  Vostochnogofronta,  RGVA,  f. 
37605,  op.  1,  kniga  5,  p.  27;  Vbr,  doc.  37,  pp.  68. 191 
5th  Army  was  the  worst  hit  Eastern  Front  force  and  it  is  no  surprise  that 
Tukhachevsky  received  this  most  difficult  of  postings.  He  travelled  to  Moscow  on 
15th  March,  received  his  new  post  on  23rd  March  and  reached  5th  Army  HQ  at 
Krotovka  Station  on  4th  April,  replacing  the  beleaguered  Zh.  K.  Bliumberg.  2 
It  has  been  shown  that  Tukhachevsky  had  already  formulated  definite  ideas 
concerning  civil  warfare  and  how  these  compared  to  previous  war,  based  on  his 
command  experience  with  I  st  and  8th  Armies.  He  knew  which  methods  were  likely  to 
succeed  and  had  grave  doubts  about  the  abilities  of  older  voenspetsy  to  adapt  to  these 
and  command  within  the  Red  Army.  What  occurred  during  his  5th  Army  command  to 
reinforce  or  develop  these  early  ideas  further? 
Early  Command  -  Reorientation  and  Remanisation 
Kolchak  launched  a  two-pronged  counter-offensive  against  Eastern  Front, 
advancing  on  sledges  through  the  sub-zero  snow-covered  terrain.  The  Siberian  Army 
under  GaJda,  a  former  Austrian  NCO,  advanced  in  the  north  against  2nd  and  3rd  Red 
3  Armies,  the  latter  holding  the  left  flank  of  Eastern  Front.  4th  Army  under  Frunze 
held  Eastern  Front's  right  flank  at  Orenburg  with  Tukhachevsky's  old  Ist  Army,  still 
commanded  by  Gai,  on  its  left  flank.  5th  Army  bore  the  brunt  of  Kolchak's  offensive, 
defending  the  central  sector  attacked  by  Western  Army  under  General  Khanzhin, 
Kolchak's  most  capable  and  senior  commander.  4  Eastern  Front  had  still  been  moving 
eastwards  when  Kolchak  launched  his  counter-offensive  and  if  not  completely 
strategically  overstretched,  was  weakened  by  continuous  combat  and  troop  transfers 
south.  With  just  83,000  men  facing  the  143,290  of  Kolchak's  Armies  and  cossacks, 
Eastern  Front  was  hopelessly  outnumbered  and  far  from  its  supply  bases.  5 
5th  Army  was  attacking  in  Zlatoust-Cheliabinsk  sector  in  the  Ural  Mountains 
when  Khanzhin's  counter-offensive  began.  By  I  Oth  March,  Kamenev  reported  that  it 
had  been  forced  back  by  deep  envelopments  and  had  to  abandon  Ufa,  withdrawing 
behind  the  River  Chermasan.  3rd  Army  was  retreating,  suffering  heavy  losses  from 
Kolchak's  I  st  Siberian  and  Perm'  Divisions,  which  left  2nd  Army  threatened  on  both 
2  RGUA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  1,  p.  9;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  IV,  p.  537. 
3  Rudolf  Geigl  Gajda  (Radola)  (1892-1948). 
4  E.  Mawdsley,  The  Russian  Civil  War,  (Edinburgh,  2000),  p.  145. 192 
flanks.  Kamenev  requested  that  Vacietis  postpone  the  Tashkent  Operation  to  allow 
Red  forces  to  turn  north  into  the  South  Urals  and  Orenburg  area  and  for  I  st  Army  to 
attack  Verkhneural'sk  and  Cheliabinsk  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Eastern  Front's 
centre  and  left  flank.  6 
The  Whites  captured  Ufa  on  14th  March  and  5th  Anny's  26th  and  27th  Rifle 
Divisions  retreated  along  the  Volgo-Bugul'ma  Railway  to  Bugul'ma  and  the  Samaro- 
Zlatoust  Railway  to  Belebei.  Receiving  reinforcements  from  I  st  Army,  5th  Army  held 
these  positions  for  twelve  days  before  Western  Army  pushed  them  back  once  more, 
7  capturing  Sterlitamak,  Belebei,  Bugul'ma  and  Buguruslan.  between  5th-  I  5th  April 
. 
Tukhachevsky  inherited  a  disintegrating  force,  demoralised  by  a  month's  constant 
retreat.  Facing  49,000  Whites,  5th  Army  had  been  outnumbered  nearly  5:  1,  suffering 
horrific  casualties,  which  were  augmented  by  troops  taken  prisoner  and  desertions. 
5th  Army  numbers  plummeted  from  11,000  on  I  st  March  to  6,500  on  19th  March  and 
8  5ý500  by  April 
. 
Therefore,  reorganisational  work  under  fire  was  Tukhachevsky's  first 
task  upon  arriving  on  Eastern  Front,  as  it  had  been  the  year  before,  attempting  to 
screen  the  front  to  allow  mobilisations.  9  With  Moscow  amassing  its  best  people  in  the 
East,  he  had  the  help  of  capable  figures. 
Influential  Fiswes 
On  I  st  April,  Ivan  Nikitovich  Smirnov  was  appointed  a  5th  Army  R  VS  member.  '  0 
He  became  the  vital  link  between  5th  Army  and  Red  partisans  in  Kolchak's  rear  in  the 
months  ahead.  On  8th  April,  at  Frunze's  request,  V.  V.  Kuibyshev  was  appointed  to 
Southern  Group  RVS  to  coordinate  the  work  of  local  Party  and  Soviet  organisations 
5  Direktivy  komandovaniiafrontov  Krasnoi  Armii  (1917-1922).  Sbornik  dokumentov  v  4-kh  tomakh. 
(Moscow,  1971-1978).  (hereafter  DkfK,  4),  Tom  IV,  pp.  56  &  477. 
6  DkJKA,  Tom  11,  docs.  585-586,  pp.  623-24. 
7V  boiakh  rozhdeniia,  1918-1920.  -  boevoi  put'5  armii  (1918-1920).  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (Irkutsk, 
1985),  (hereafter  Vbr),  p.  8;  M.  V.  Frunze  na  Vostochnom  Fronte:  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (Kuibyshev, 
1985),  (hereafter  Fn  Vj),  doc.  47,  pp.  92-95. 
8  A.  S.  Bubnov,  S.  S.  Kamenev,  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky  and  R.  P.  Eideman,  Grazhdanskaia  voina  1918- 
1921  v  3-kh  tomakh.  Tom  III,  (Leningrad,  1930),  p.  173;  Vbr,  doc.  33,  pp.  388  &  59-60;  A.  S.  Popov, 
Trud.  Talant.  Doblest',  (Moscow,  1972),  p.  40;  Kaufmann  quotes  a  figure  given  in  J.  Erickson,  The 
Soviet  High  Command:  a  military-political  history,  1918-1941,  (London,  1962),  p.  60,  of  "...  less  than 
5,500  men".  However,  the  table  provided  by  Erickson  gives  troop  numbers  for  the  period  25th 
January-  I  5th  February,  before  Kolchak's  offensive,  A.  F.  Kaufmann,  A  ristocratic-  Communist:  the  life 
of  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky  and  the  continuity  of  imperial  army  tradition  in  the  Soviet  military,  (Kansas, 
199  1),  p.  112. 
9  Vbr,  doc.  36,  pp.  64-65. 193 
reorganising  Eastern  Front  forces.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  worked  again  with  the 
man  who  had  provided  the  greatest  help  and  support  on  Eastern  Front  in  1918.11 
Concentrated  within  5th  Army  were  capable  divisional  command  staff,  including: 
26th  Division  Commissar  V.  K.  Putna,  27th  Division  Commander  A.  V.  Pavlov  and 
26th  Division  Commander  G.  K.  Eikhe,  all  voenspetsy;  25th  Division  Commander  V. 
1.  Chapaev,  a  former  NCO;  and  25th  Division  Commissar  Furmanov,  some  of  whom 
Tukhachevsky  would  also  work  with  later.  This  would  have  eased  the  initial 
reorganisational  burden.  12 
However,  the  most  important  figure  Tukhachevsky  encountered,  both  in  terms  of 
how  he  fought  during  1919  on  Eastern  Front  and  his  post-Civil  War  career,  was 
Mikhail  Vasil'evich  Frunze.  This  was  the  man  Tukhachevsky  had  praised  as  the  prime 
example  of  a  capable  Red  Commander  whilst  complaining  about  Gittis.  A  Bolshevik 
Party  member  since  1904,  Frunze  had  no  professional  military  training,  but  proved  a 
natural  in  command  under  Civil  War  conditions.  He  became  the  main  proponent  of  a 
new  revolutionary  doctrine  and  replaced  Trotsky  as  Narkomvoen  in  1925,  making 
Tukhachevsky  his  deputy,  before  dying  on  the  operating  table  amid  suspicions  of 
Stalin's  involvement.  Tukhachevsky  is  usually  associated  with  Frunze  and  credited 
with  carrying  on  his  ideas  after  his  death  and  Soviet  biographies  relate  Frunze  as 
having  a  major  influence  on  Tukhachevsky's  military  theory.  However,  as  has  already 
been  shown,  Tukhachevsky  had  already  identified  new  conditions  of  class  civil 
warfare  and  had  conducted  his  commands  under  these  beliefs  before  meeting  Frunze. 
I  would  argue  that  Tukhachevsky  and  Frunze  saw  in  each  other  someone  of  similar 
beliefs  and  this  is  why  they  worked  so  well  together.  Undoubtedly  Frunze  did 
influence  Tukhachevsky,  but  then  Tukhachevsky  undoubtedly  did  the  same  in  return. 
The  similarity  of  opinion  regarding  military  strategy  and  how  to  fight  the  Civil  War 
was  reflected  in  Frunze  making  Tukhachevsky  his  main  commander  on  Eastern  Front 
in  1919.  For  four  months  they  conducted  operations,  which  further  developed  the 
conclusions  Tukhachevsky  had  already  drawn,  to  move  him  closer  to  the  "Deep 
Battle"  theory.  This  cemented  a  lasting  comradeship  on  both  a  professional  and 
personal  basis. 
10  DkJKA,  Toin  IV' 
,  p.  537. 
11  Fn  P'/,  doc 
-27,  pp.  70-7  1. 
12  Vbr,  pp.  405-406;  Furmanov  wrote  the  book  Chapaev  in  1923,  upon  which  the  film  Chapaev  was 
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Beyond  the  Volga:  Buguruslan,  Bugullma  and  Belebei  Operations 
Eastern  Front's  counter-offensive,  which  began  with  the  Buguruslan  Operation,  to 
prevent  Kolchak  reaching  Simbirsk  and  Samara  on  the  Volga  and  push  him  back 
beyond  Ufa,  originated  with  Frunze.  It  was  then  discussed  on  10th  April  at  Simbirsk 
with  Kamenev,  Vacietis  and  other  Eastern  Front  staff.  Eastern  Front  was  divided  into 
Northern  and  Southern  Groups  to  face  Siberian  and  Western  Annies.  1  3  Southern 
Group,  comprising  Ist,  4th,  5th  and  Turkestan  Armies,  was  headed  by  an  RVS  of 
Frunze,  Novitskii  and  Kuibyshev.  14 
Frunze  envisaged  forming  an  attack  group  at  Buzuluk  on  Southern  Group's  right 
flank,  shielded  behind  I  st  and  Turkestan  Armies.  This  was  the  section  of  Eastern 
Front  against  which  Kolchak  had  not  concentrated  and  therefore  an  attack  group 
could  be  deployed  safely  and  secretly  there.  The  attack  group  would  advance  from 
south  to  north  into  Western  Army's  left  flank,  whilst  5th  Army  would  perform  a 
frontal  holding  operation  in  Samara  sector,  allowing  the  attack  group  to  punch 
through  at  Buguruslan  and  encircle  Western  Army.  To  enable  this,  whilst  reorganising 
5th  Army,  Tukhachevsky  was  to  screen  the  Buzuluk-Buguruslan-Bugul'ma  highway, 
the  main  intended  route  for  the  attack,  and  regroup  a  reserve  to  screen  his  left  flank 
from  Bugul'ma.  Turkestan  Army  Commander  Zinov'ev  was  given  command  of  the 
attack  group,  whilst  4th  Army  and  Gai's  I  st  Army  had  to  hold  screens  at  Ural'sk, 
Saratov  and  Orenburg,  reuniting  Gai  in  action  with  his  former  commander.  '  5 
Whilst  planning  the  counter-manoeuvre,  Eastern  Front  forces  were  still  trying  to 
halt  the  White  advance.  On  13th  April,  Tukhachevsky  reported  5th  Army  would 
probably  not  hold  Buguruslan  as  it  was  hopelessly  outnumbered,  but  described 
conditions  which  did  help  to  stem  the  tide.  Dirt  roads  were  virtually  impassable  as  the 
thaw  occurred,  later  on  the  Volga  than  in  the  Don,  and  destroyed  bridges  were 
13  Fn  Vf,  doc.  29,  pp.  72-74;  Vbr,  p.  8;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  II,  doc.  616,  pp.  648  &  799.  Northern  Group 
contained  all  forces  north  of  the  River  Kama,  2nd  and  3rd  Armies,  under  2nd  Army  Conunander 
Shorm,  but  this  only  lasted  in  practice  for  several  days. 
14  Fn  Vf,  docs.  30-3  1,  pp.  74-75.  Lazarevich  and  lakhovskii  became  Southern  group  Chief-of-Staff  and 
Head  of  Operational  Staff  respectively,  whilst  Avksent'ievskii  replaced  Frunze  as  Acting  4th  Army 
Commander. 
15  Fn  Vf,  docs.  33-34,37,50,56  &  58,  pp.  77-81,83,97-99,105-106  &  108;  Direktivy  Glavnogo 
komandovanda  Krasnoi  A  rmii  (1917-1920).  Sbornik  dokumentov,  (Moscow,  1969),  pp.  553  -5  5  5. 195 
hindering  White  artillery  advancing  up  the  railway.  16  This  slowed  the  White  advance, 
but  Frunze  delayed  his  attack  and  regrouped  his  forces  until  the  roads  had  firmed  up, 
by  which  time  he  hoped  to  have  stopped  Kolchak's  offensive.  17 
He  bombarded  Moscow  with  requests  for  more  political  workers  and  command 
staff  for  Southern  Group's  Armies,  to  enable  local  mobilisation  of  new  recruits  and 
political  work  amongst  existing  troops.  '  8  in  response,  the  Komsomol  Central 
Committee  instructed  local  organisations  to  mobilise  20%  of  their  members  for 
military  training,  posting  eastwards  and  political  agitation.  19  This  combined  with 
Eastern  Front  mobilisations,  which  raised  forces  including  Syzran'  Workers 
Regiment,  Samara  Internationalist  and  Volunteer  Detachments  and  4,000  armed 
workers  from  Orenburg.  20  Samara  area  was  fortified  by  workers  and  volunteers  led  by 
kursanty,  21  whilst  any  troops  were  sent  to  the  armies. 
Tukhachevsky's  experience  from  1918  undoubtedly  helped  with  this 
reorganisation.  He  would  have  known  workers  in  Party  organs  (Vareikis  still  headed 
the  Simbirsk  Province  Communists)  and  been  known  by  reputation  to  many  local 
inhabitants.  He  carried  out  the  rebuilding  and  reequiping  of  5th  Army  with  Smimov 
and  by  25th  April  numbers  had  risen  to  15,073  infantry  and  971  cavalry.  This 
included  25th  Division,  but  without  it,  26th  and  27th  Divisions  had  risen  from  the 
5,500  of  early  April  to  9,500  men.  22  By  I  st  May,  5th  Army  numbers  had  risen  to 
1,615  command  staff,  35,002  infantry,  and  1,633  cavalry.  2nd  Division  had  also  been 
added  for  the  offensive,  but  26th  and  27th  Divisions  had  themselves  increased  to 
14,338  in  total,  a  remarkable  rise  in  barely  three  weeks.  23  Given  these  conditions,  this 
was  perhaps  an  even  greater  achievement  than  I  st  Army. 
Whilst  regrouping  proceeded,  Siberian  Anny  continued  advancing  further  against 
2nd  and  3rd  Armies,  occupying  Chistopol'  on  25th  April  and  threatening  Kazan'  and 
Southern  Group's  left  flank 
. 
24  Frunze's  counter-manoeuvre  had  to  be  brought  forward 
16 
Fn  Vf,  doc.  40,  pp.  86-88. 
17  Dk:  IK4,  Tom  H,  doc.  614,  p.  647. 
18  Fn  Vf,  docs.  38&  41-42,  pp.  84  &  89. 
19  Ibid.  doc.  43,  p.  90. 
20  Ibid.  docs.  45  &  47,  pp.  91  &  93. 
21  Ibid.  doc.  39,  pp.  85-86. 
22  Vbr,  doc.  39,  pp.  69-72. 
23 
Ibid.  p.  388. 
24 
Dkj",  Tom  H,  p.  659. 196 
to  28th  April  before  all  reinforcements  had  arrived,  but  5th  Army  received 
reinforcements  to  secure  the  left  flank  against  Siberian  Army's  advances.  Kakurin 
suggests  that  5th  Army's  tasks  were  upgraded,  when  it  received  these  reinforcements, 
from  a  defensive  holding  operation  to  attacking  towards  Bugul'ma,  enveloping 
Western  Army's  forces  there.  However,  Tukhachevsky  had  actually  suggested  this  a 
week  earlier.  In  a  Hughes  Telegraph  conversation  with  Frunze  on  17th  April, 
Tukhachevsky  said, 
... 
it  seems  easier  to  me  to  coordinate  the  attack  on  Buguruslan  from  two 
sides.  Under  this  proposition,  it  would  be  necessary  for  these  two  groups 
to  guarantee  themselves  sufficient  forces.  If  the  Samaro-Zlatoust  road  has 
a  very  weak  group,  then  the  attack  from  Buzuluk  will  not  achieve  the 
desired  results,  it  is  essential  to  press  from  two  sides. 
Frunze  replied  that  he  did  not  agree  as  the  main  attack  should  come  from  Buzuluk. 
Tukhachevsky  said  that  he  also  thought  so,  but  without  the  second  attack,  the  Buzuluk 
group  would  face  all  enemy  forces.  However,  two  days  later,  Frunze  outlined 
Southern  Group's  tasks  for  the  Buguruslan  Operation, 
5th  Army,  strengthened  by  74th  and  75th  brigades  of  25th  Division,  is  not 
only  to  hold  the  enemy  and  its  further  movement  along  Bugul'ma  and 
Buguruslan  Railways,  but  counter-attack  to  press  it  back,  having  the  first 
25 
task  of  taking  Buguruslan  area.... 
On  the  same  day,  Tukhachevsky  requested  that  Frunze  inform  him  of  Eastern 
Front's  offensive  plan,  as  he  felt  the  counter-attack  to  defend  Samara  (5th  Army  and 
Buzuluk  attack  group)  had  insufficient  troops  and  did  not  address  the  problems  of  the 
whole  front.  He  reported  that  the  snow  had  almost  completely  melted  and  the  roads 
were  virtually  impassable,  but  might  improve  in  a  few  days,  continuing,  "...  a  very 
strong  concentration  is  needed,  moreover  it  is  necessary  to  even  consider  deploying 
those  forces  on  the  Volga".  He  expressed  concern  that,  although  Samara  was 
defended,  Simbirsk  and  Chistopol'  sectors  were  weak  and  could  threaten  the  whole 
front,  concluding, 
In  order  to  prepare  earlier  for  future  operations,  it  is  necessary  for  me  to 
know  about  Eastern  Front  plans  for  launching  an  offensive,  what  resources 
it  will  have,  from  where  and  when  these  resources  and  forces  will  be 
transferred  and  where  deployed,  and  also  which  will  be  the  main 
operational  sector,  moreover  I  personally  consider  this  Bugul'ma  Railway. 
I  consider  it  my  duty  to  report  and  await  your  rep  ly.  26 
25  Fn  Vf,  docs.  47  &  50,  pp.  92-95  &  97-99. 
26  Vbr,  doc.  38,  pp.  68-69. 197 
The  same  day  Frunze  demanded  reinforcements  from  Kamenev  for  5th  Army  and 
Zinov'ev's  attack  group  after  "...  discussions  with  all  army  commanders".  27  Also,  on 
23rd  April,  he  reported  to  Kamenev  that  5th  Army's  right  flank  was  to  attack  up  the 
strip  between  the  Rivers  Kinel'  and  Kutuluk  and  its  left  flank  up  Bugul'ma  Railway.  28 
When  Tukhachevsky  issued  operational  orders  to  5th  Army  on  25th  April,  he 
instructed  Eikhe's  26th  Division  to  concentrate  at  Tolkai  Station,  a  location  he  had 
also  suggested  to  Frunze  on  17th  April.  29 
Several  points  are  apparent  here.  Tukhachevsky  must  be  credited  with  having  a 
crucial  influence  on  the  Buguruslan  Operation  and  those  which  followed,  which  he 
has  not  previously  been  afforded.  He  suggested  the  double  envelopment  of  the  White 
Buguruslan  group  instead  of  the  tone  strike  from  Buzuluk  and  also  the  advance  up 
Bugul'ma  Railway.  It  shows  that  Frunze  was  willing  to  listen  to  suggestions  from 
those  under  him  and  his  working  relationship  with  Tukhachevsky  was  two-way. 
Tukhachevsky  was  suggesting  a  variant  to  his  successful  concentric  offensives  and  as 
in  1918,  when  the  double  envelopment  at  Simbirsk  allowed  a  continuous  flow  into  the 
same  at  Syzran',  in  1919  the  Buguruslan  Operation  led  directly  into  the  Bugul'ma 
Operation,  in  the  sector  Tukhachevsky  emphasised  as  the  principal  one.  It  is  very 
likely  that  he  considered  this  when  making  his  recommendations  and  that  he  chose  the 
Bugul'ma  railway  as  the  main  route  from  his  experience  of  the  pursuit  operations  he 
carried  out  in  this  exact  area  the  previous  year.  This  all  helped  him  to  formulate  a 
winning  plan.  His  close  involvement  in  operational  planning  at  this  early  stage 
probably  played  a  part  in  him  retaining  the  major  role  in  Southern  Group  and  Eastern 
Front  offensives  during  1919.  Frunze  regarded  him  as  his  main  commander,  valued 
his  advice  and  acted  upon  it. 
Frunze  had  originally  planned  a  regrouping  of  forces  to  concentrate  22-26,000 
troops  in  the  attack  group  and  11,000  in  5th  Army,  with  I  st  and  4th  Armies  shielding 
the  right  flank  with  20,000  troops.  30  However,  with  5th  Army  now  also  attacking, 
further  regrouping  gave  Tukhachevsky  24,000  men  to  face  the  18,000-22,000 
remaining  in  Khanzhin's  group.  Khanzhin's  left  flank  had  been  defeated  by  Gai  from 
22nd-25th  April,  losing  three  divisions,  one  of  which  defected  to  the  Reds,  and  a 
27  Fn  Vf,  doc.  5  1,  p.  100. 
28  Ibid.  doc.  56,  P.  105. 
29  Vbr,  doc.  39,  pp.  69-72;  FnVf,  doc.  47,  pp.  92-95. 198 
peasant  revolt  in  Khanzhin's  rear  lessened  the  effectives  he  could  put  in  the 
frontline.  31  By  this  point,  the  overall  White  offensive  was  overstretched  and  no 
reinforcements  were  likely  to  arrive  quickly,  as  a  hostile  rear  disrupted 
communications  and  supply  lines. 
However,  Khanzhin  still  attacked,  threatening  Kinel'  on  Southern  Group's  right 
flank,  which  would  have  cut  its  rear  lines  at  the  same  time  as  Chistopol'  fell.  The 
Buguruslan  Operation  was  therefore  launched  on  28th  April  to  prevent  this  and  seize 
the  offensive  initiative.  The  double-envelopment  operation  envisaged,  although  not 
encircling  the  Whites,  did  force  them  to  abandon  Buguruslan,  which  was  taken  on  4th 
May.  32  On  Ist  May  Tukhachevsky  had  requested  by  Hughes  Telegraph  that  Frunze 
commit  his  last  reserves,  2nd  Division,  for  the  final  assault,  which  Frunze  did.  This 
conversation,  which  followed  one  between  Frunze  and  KamenevI  illustrates  the 
workings  of  Eastern  Front  command  clearly. 
Frunze  explained  that  Kamenev  had  directed  him  to  continue  and  develop  the 
Buguruslan  offensive  by  attacking  Sergievsk,  Bugul'ma  and  Belebei,  outlined  the  plan 
and  asked  for  Tukhachevsky's  thoughts.  Tukhachevsky  agreed  with  the  general  plan, 
but  suggested  25th  Division,  which  had  been  operating  alongside  Turkestan  Army,  be 
transferred  to  5th  Army  to  move  against  Bugul'ma  and  then  south-east  to  take  Belebei 
with  Turkestan  Army,  the  latter  advancing  east  to  the  town.  This  would  allow  the 
offensive  to  "...  not  lose  any  time  and  develop  maximum  energy  ...... 
33  Frunze  ordered 
the  continuation  of  the  Buguruslan  Operation  into  the  Bugul'ma  Operation  on  4th 
May,  acting  on  Tukhachevsky's  suggestion,  and  the  offensive  proceeded.  25th 
Division  reached  Bugul'ma  on  I  Ith  May  after  a  two-day  battle  with  a  White  counter- 
attack  group  massed  behind  the  town,  comprising  1zhevsk  Brigade  and  4th  Ufa 
Division,  taking  2,000  prisoners,  various  hardware  and  securing  the  town  by  13th 
34  May.  By  12th  May,  Eastern  Front  had  taken  over  9,000  prisoners  from  Western 
Army,  many  of  whom  were  inducted  into  the  Red  forces.  Smirnov  reported  that  the 
seizing  of  White  carts  during  the  Buguruslan  Operation  had  quickened  5th  Army's 
30  N.  E.  Kakurin,  Kak  srazhalas'revoliutsda.  Tom  IT  1919-1920,  (Moscow,  1926  &  1990),  p.  17  1;  A. 
S.  Bubnov  et  al.  Tom  III,  p.  183.  Kakurin  gives  the  lower  figure. 
31A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al.  Tom  III,  pp.  184  &  190. 
32  DkfKA,  Tom  II,  p.  669. 
33  Fn  Vf,  doc.  64,  pp.  119-12  1;  Vbr,  doc.  40,  pp.  73  -75. 
34  Fn  Vf,  docs.  65  &  70-7  1,  pp.  122  &  125-127;  DkfY,  4,  Tom  II,  p.  677. 199 
ability  to  conduct  pursuit.  35  Mobilising  on  the  move  was  again  visibly  working, 
strengthening  the  advancing  Reds  at  the  expense  of  the  retreating  Whites  and 
illustrating  the  advantage  of  offensive  over  defensive  tactics  again. 
Pressing  on  for  Belebei,  Tukhachevsky  shielded  Turkestan  Army's  left  flank  by 
sending  a  division  up  the  Bugul'ma-Ufa  Railway  and  transferred  25th  Division  back 
to  Turkestan  Army  on  16th  May.  Belebei  was  taken  the  following  day.  36 
This  demonstrates  how  Eastern  Front  operated  and  the  trust  which  the  command 
staff  had  in  each  other.  Kamenev  was  Eastern  Front  Commander,  Frunze  Southern 
Group  Commander  and  Tukhachevsky  5th  Army  Commander.  However,  the  lower 
ranking  man  was  the  one  on  the  spot  and  closest  to  the  action.  Giving  out  general 
directives,  but  allowing  Tukhachevsky  a  vital  input  to  the  actual  operational  planning 
was  the  type  of  command  Tukhachevsky  had  wanted  when  he  complained  about 
interference  from  Murav'ev,  Vacietis,  Medvedev  and  Kalnins.  It  is  no  wonder 
Tukhachevsky,  Kamenev  and  Frunze  formed  lasting  working  relationships,  forged 
conducting  these  continuous  manoeuvre  operations,  which  they  all  agreed  were  the 
correct  way  to  win  civil  war  battles  and  were  all  able  to  utilise  effectively. 
The  Ufa  Operation 
The  capture  of  Bugul'ma  and  Belebei  cleared  both  the  Bugul'ma-Ufa  and  Syzran'- 
Ufa  railway  lines  for  pursuing  the  Whites  to  the  River  Belaia  and  taking  the  town  of 
Ufa,  which  lay  on  its  east  bank,  the  last  major  town  before  the  Urals.  Frunze  tried  to 
maintain  the  momentum  of  the  continuous  offensive  by  sending  plans  for  the  Ufa  and 
Orenburg  Operations  to  Samoilo,  the  new  Eastern  Front  Commander  on  19th  May. 
Frunze  wished  to  push  on  immediately,  whilst  Western  Anny  was  on  the  backfoot.  37 
I  st  Army  was  to  advance  towards  Orenburg,  whilst  Turkestan  Army  and  Chapaev's 
25th  Division  of  5th  Army  were  to  take  Ufa.  Turkestan  Army  was  to  cross  the  Belaia 
south  of  Ufa  and  attack  in  the  White  rear,  with  their  cavalry  raiding  deep  to  cut  the 
rail  lines  and  prevent  a  White  retreat  into  the  Urals.  25th  Division,  on  Turkestan 
An-ny's  left  flank,  again  received  the  toughest  task,  crossing  the  Belaia  and  launching 
35  RTsKhIDNI,  f  325,  op.  1,  d.  479,  p.  19. 
36  Fn  Pj,  docs.  73  &  75,  pp.  128-130  &  13  1;  DkfY-4,  Tom  II,  p.  677. 200 
a  frontal  pinning  attack  on  Ufa.  26th  Division  was  to  guard  the  left  flank  north  of  Ufa 
by  moving  to  the  front  Bazilevka-Birsk  and  capturing  the  crossing  at  Akhlystina,  to 
38  prevent  a  White  flotilla  attacking  the  other  Red  forces,  during  the  river  crossing. 
Tukhachevsky  had  been  advancing  with  26th  and  27th  Divisions  after  capturing 
Bugul'ma  because  Siberian  Army  was  still  pressing  2nd  Army  and  threatening  5th 
Army's  left  flank.  Samoilo  detached  5th  Army  from  Southern  Group  and  ordered 
Tukhachevsky  to  cross  the  River  Kama,  using  pontoons,  to  guarantee  Bugul'ma-Ufa 
and  Bugul'ma-Birsk  sectors.  39  When  Samoilo  ordered  Frunze's  offensive  to  proceed, 
he  instructed  5th  Army  to  cross  the  Kama  and  Belaia  at  their  confluence  and  attack 
Ufa  in  the  rear  from  the  north,  subordinating  the  Volga  Flotilla  to  Tukhachevsky,  to 
block  the  White  flotilla.  40  Tukhachevsky  ordered  this  on  21  st  May.  41 
Frunze  was  appointed  Turkestan  Army  Commander  on  23rd  May  and  took  direct 
command  of  the  Ufa  Operation.  42  Therefore,  he  and  Tukhachevsky  commanded  the 
two  armies  attacking  Ufa.  They  discussed  the  operation  by  Hughes  Telegraph  on  27th 
May  and  Tukhachevsky  advised  Frunze  to  direct  31  st  Division,  on  Turkestan  Army's 
left  flank,  further  left,  as  sizeable  enemy  forces  had  concentrated  before  26th  Division 
on  5th  Army's  right  flank.  43  This  endangered  the  juncture  between  5th  and  Turkestan 
Armies  and  Frunze  agreed  to  the  adjustment.  After  this  discussion,  Tukhachevsky 
ordered  5th  Army  to  attack  at  dawn  the  following  morning.  44 
The  attack  was  initially  to  be  launched  on  25th  May,  but  was  put  back  three  days, 
probably  because  of  reorganisation,  as  Frunze  replaced  Zinov'ev  as  Turkestan  Army 
Commander  and  the  latter  replaced  Gai  as  I  st  Army  Commander.  45  Machinations 
were  also  underway  to  bring  Kamenev  back  as  Eastern  Front  Commander  and 
relations  within  Eastern  Front  R  VS  were  not  good.  This  must  have  effected  the  pace  of 
operations.  It  was  this  delay  which  allowed  Western  Army  to  regroup  and  concentrate 
forces  before  26th  Division  and  along  the  whole  front,  entrenching  behind  the  Belaia 
37  DkJKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  638,  pp.  677-680;  Fn  VF,  doc.  76,  pp.  132-34.  Former  Tsarist  Major-General 
Aleksandr  Aleksandrovich  Samoilo  (1869-1963)  served  as  Eastern  Front  Commander  from  5th-29th 
May. 
38  Fn  Vf,  doc.  76,  pp.  132-134;  DkJK,  4,  Tom  H,  pp.  677-680. 
39  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  637,  p.  677;  DGkK,  4,  doc.  561,  p.  569. 
40  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  639,  pp.  680-68  1. 
41  Vbr,  doc.  49,  pp.  96-98. 
42  FnVf,  docs.  83-85,  pp.  142-145  &  258,  endnote  30. 
43  Vbr,  doc  52,  pp.  105-106. 
"  Ibid.  doc.  5  1,  pp.  103-104. 
45  Gai  was  apparently  demoted. 201 
with  artillery  and  machine-gun  emplacements,  giving  5th  and  Turkestan  Armies  a 
much  harder  task. 
5th  An-ny  numbers  for  the  Ufa  Operation  were  18,710  infantry,  429  cavalry,  53 
guns  and  337  machine-guns,  whilst  Turkestan  Arrny  fielded  28,430  infantry,  1,443 
cavalry,  39  guns  and  408  machine-guns  on  Ist  June.  Western  Army  numbers  had 
dwindled  as  it  retreated  with  casualties,  desertions,  defections  and  men  captured 
taking  their  toll.  Widely  varying  figures  are  given,  but  it  probably  numbered 
somewhere  between  15,000-28,500,  with  a  lower  number  more  likely.  46 
The  operation  was  launched  on  28th  May,  with  Sterlitamak  taken  by  I  st  Anny  en 
route  to  Orenburg,  on  25th  May.  47  On  29th  May,  Tukhachevsky  reported  that  27th 
and  35th  Divisions  had  routed  the  Whites  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Belaia,  taking  over 
800  prisoners  and  forcing  them  over  to  the  east  bank.  He  suggested  advancing 
towards  Birsk,  since  reconnaissance  had  detected  White  forces  there,  which  could 
threaten  the  Ufa  attack  force.  After  consultations  with  Frunze  and  Kamenev,  he 
ordered  26th,  27th  and  35th  Divisions  to  advance  and  take  up  positions  along  the 
River  Belaia  to  prepare  for  crossing  on  4th  June,  a  date  suggested  by  Frunze,  and 
prepare  to  take  Birsk,  preventing  the  Whites  retreating  to  lavgel'din.  48  Kamenev, 
restored  as  Eastern  Front  Commander,  confirmed  this  in  a  general  directive  to  Eastern 
Front  on  31  st  May  and  on  3rd  and  5th  June  instructed  the  Volga  Flotilla  to  cooperate 
with  5th  and  Turkestan  Armies,  as  they  would  be  attempting  crossings  of  the  Belaia 
on  6th  June.  49 
On  3rd  June,  Tukhachevsky  showed  that  he  was  thinking  ahead  again  when  he 
suggested  to  Kamenev  that  5th  Army,  whilst  covering  Turkestan  Army's  advance  on 
Ufa  by  driving  back  the  White  group  at  Birsk,  should  be  looking  to  attack  the  White 
Permsko-Krasnoufimsk  Group  in  the  flank  and  rear,  with  a  view  to  attacking  towards 
Zlatoust  in  the  Ural  Mountains.  Zlatoust  would  become  the  next  target  for 
Tukhachevsky  and  one  of  his  most  imaginative  victories  and  Kamenev  suggested  this 
to  Vacietis  on  6th  June 
. 
50  This  was  another  example  of  Tukhachevsky  taking  the  lead 
in  operational  planning  and  illustrates  how  he  operated  under  conditions  of 
46  E.  Mawdsley,  p.  146,  gives  the  lower  figure  and  N.  E.  Kakurin,  Tom  II,  p.  236  the  higher.  A  figure 
of  46-47,000  is  given  in  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al.  Tom  III,  p.  202,  but  this  is  almost  certainly  far  too  high. 
47  D  kfKA,  To  m  II,  p.  687. 
41  Vbr,  docs.  53-56,  pp.  107-112. 
49Dk)KA,  Tom  II,  docs.  646,648  &  650,  pp.  687-688,690-691. 
50  Vbr,  doc.  57,  pp.  113  &  378,  endnote  24. 202 
continuous  offensive,  always  thinking  of  the  next  target  and  planning  current  troop 
movements,  to  facilitate  a  smooth  transition  to  the  next  operation  quickly  afterwards. 
Back  on  the  Belaia,  on  5th  June,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  5th  Army  to  cross  the 
next  day  and  26th  Division  captured  Birsk  on  8th  June.  51  On  9th  June  he  ordered 
pursuit  of  the  Whites  down  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  keeping  pace  with  2nd  Army 
on  the  left  flank,  which  Kamenev  had  ordered  to  advance  on  6th  June.  Six  days  later 
the  two  men  discussed  5th  and  2nd  Armies  cooperating  to  attack  Krasnoufimsk 
sector,  the  next  operation  to  maintain  the  continuous  offensive.  52  5th  Army  was 
engaged  in  fighting  in  lavgeldin  and  Ufa  sectors,  cooperating  with  2nd  and  Turkestan 
Armies  for  the  next  week  until  they  were  secured,  holding  the  centre  of  Eastern  Front 
together  and  having  to  cooperate  with  both  flanks  simultaneously.  53  That 
Tukhachevsky  still  managed  to  plan  for  his  next  operation  a  month  ahead  was  quite 
remarkable  and  displays  the  level  of  work  he  put  in  to  his  command. 
26th  Division,  crossing  the  Belaia  on  6th  June,  secured  Frunze's  left  flank  for  the 
attack  towards  Ufa  and  he  ordered  2nd,  3  5th  and  31  st  Divisions  to  cross  the  Belaia  on 
the  night  of  7th-8th  June.  Crossing  proved  to  be  more  difficult  here  however,  as  the 
Whites  were  entrenched  along  the  river  bank  at  the  crossings  and  bridges  they  had  not 
destroyed.  The  Red  forces  were  met  with  machine-gun  and  artillery  fire  as  they  tried 
to  cross  and  aerial  bombardment  was  used  by  both  sides,  a  new  phenomenon  in  civil 
warfare.  54  Equipment  for  crossing  was  scarce  and  Karnenev  asked  Tukhachevsky  if  he 
had  any  which  could  be  sent  down.  Tukhachevsky  did  not,  but  suggested  Frunze  have 
the  local  peasantry  build  ferries.  55  On  9th  June,  Frunze  telegrammed  Tukhachevsky  to 
inform  him  that  25th  Division  had  crossed  the  Belaia  at  dawn  on  8th  June  and,  after 
bitter  fighting,  had  broken  through  the  White  trenches  and  occupied  several  villages. 
However,  the  Whites  had  moved  up  artillery  and  counter-attacked,  pinning  down  25th 
Division.  Frunze  requested  that  Tukhachevsky  swiftly  send  26th  Division  to  help. 
However,  the  following  day  he  reported  25th  Division  had  taken  Ufa  after  stubborn 
fighting.  56  Chapaev  had  captured  two  White  steamboats  and  secretly  crossed  the 
51  Ibid.  doc.  59,  pp.  10  &  114-116. 
52  Ibid.  does.  63-64,  pp.  119-123. 
53  Ibid.  does.  65-66,  pp.  123-126. 
54  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  5,  p.  40-41;  FnVf,  does.  96-98,  pp.  156-159. 
55  Vbr,  doc.  62,  pp.  117-119;  Tukhachevsky  wrote  in  early  1920  that  it  had  taken  12  days  to  construct  a 
workable  ferry  for  transporting  rail  stock  over  the  River  Ufa  and  River  Belaia,  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky, 
"Inzhenemoe  sorazmerenle  operatsil",  Voina  klassov,  (Moscow,  192  1),  p.  120. 
56  Fn  Vf,  does.  99-  100,  pp.  160-162. 203 
Belaia,  conducting  a  surprise  attack  on  the  White  left  flank.  25th  Division  suffered 
2,000  casualties  in  this  fighting,  almost  half  its  number,  whilst  Western  Army 
suffered  3  '000.57 
The  Ufa  Operation  and  associated  tasks  was  another  classic  manoeuvre  operation 
through  difficult  terrain  dissected  by  several  rivers.  Natural  obstacles  were  important 
lines  of  defence  in  the  Civil  War  and  engineering  work,  such  as  the  building  of 
temporary  bridges  or  ferries,  to  traverse  such  obstacles,  was  an  area  Tukhachevsky 
emphasised  as  crucial  in  conducting  successful  operations  in  the  Civil  War.  The 
swifter  engineers  could  reopen  transport  routes,  the  swifter  the  offensive  could 
proceed,  58 
Tukhachevsky  and  Frunze  had  jointly  led  Eastern  Front's  main  operations  and 
worked  well  together,  both  finding  in  the  other  someone  who  understood  their 
thoughts  and  vision  on  how  to  fight.  They  advanced  in  slightly  different  directions  for 
the  next  month,  but  would  work  together  again  in  July. 
As  already  mentioned,  Tukhachevsky  had  already  planned  ahead  for  5th  Army's 
next  Zlatoust  Operation.  Frunze  planned  a  parallel  advance  to  Ural'sk  further  south, 
whilst  2nd  and  3rd  Armies  were  moving  for  Ekaterinburg  on  5th  Army's  left  flank. 
However,  conflict  arose  with  Vacietis  and  Trotsky  at  this  point,  starting  a  process  of 
clique-fon-nation  within  the  Red  Army,  which  would  stretch  into  the  1920s  and  1930s. 
Tukhachevsky  was  involved  in  the  dispute,  but  the  way  he  approached  it  was  largely 
determined  by  the  ideas  we  have  witnessed  him  amass  so  far  on  civil  war  and  how  it 
should  be  fought. 
Army  Politics:  Kamenev  Versus  Vacietis 
The  dispute  was  preceded  by  another  incident  centring  around  Kamenev.  After 
jointly  planning  the  Buguruslan  Operation,  the  Kamenev-Frunze-Tukhachevsky  team 
was  broken  up.  The  following  Bugul'ma,  Belebei  and  Ufa  Operations  occurred  against 
the  background  of  bickering  amongst  the  Red  Army  hierarchy,  as  Vacietis,  backed  by 
Trotsky,  replaced  Kamenev  with  Samoilo,  after  tactical  disagreements  with  the 
former.  However,  Samoilo  only  lasted  from  5th-29th  May  as  Gusev,  Lashevich  and 
57  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  5,  p.  53;  N.  E.  Kakurin,  Tom  II,  p.  238. 204 
lurenev  of  Eastern  Front  R  VS  sent  a  telegram  to  Lenin,  requesting  Karnenev's 
reinstatement  and  accusing  Chief-of-Staff  F.  V.  Kostiaev  of  groundlessly  removing 
arrny  commanders,  and  Aralov  of  counter-signing  his  orders.  In  response,  Lenin 
informed  Trotsky  on  20th  May  that  he  was  reinstating  Kamenev,  removing  Kostiaev 
and  replacing  Aralov  with  Lashevich.  He  confirmed  this  to  Eastern  Front  R  VS  on  29th 
May, 
On  your  insistence  I  have  reappointed  Kamenev.  If  we  do  not  conquer  the 
Urals  by  winter,  then  I  consider  the  revolution  will  inevitably  perish.  Exert 
all  forces.  Follow  these  considerations  for  reinforcements;  mobilise  to  a 
man  the  front  area  population;  follow  up  with  political  work...  Turn 
deepest  attention  to  mobilising  Orenburg  cossacks.  59 
This  reflected  the  underlying  tactical  dispute  between  Kamenev  and  Vacietis 
which  had  led  to  Samoilo's  appointment.  Vacietis  was  concerned  at  Siberian  Army's 
advances  against  2nd  Army  and  wanted  5th  Army  to  cross  the  River  Kama  and  move 
north  to  help  2nd  Army's  right  flank.  However,  Kamenev  had  wanted,  along  with 
Frunze  and  Tukhachevsky,  to  press  on  and  destroy  Western  Army  in  front  of  Southern 
Group's  forces,  then  sweep  north  with  a  flanking  envelopment  of  Siberian  Army.  This 
was  a  similar  tactic  to  the  Buguruslan  Operation.  When  Samoilo  replaced  Kamenev, 
he  executed  Vacietis'  tactics  and  this  was  the  reason  he  directed  5th  Army  over  the 
Kama  towards  Birsk.  However,  between  I  lth-19th  May,  Samoilo  gave  Tukhachevsky 
four  successive  instructions,  directing  him  in  different  directions  and  preventing  any 
development  of  pursuit  after  the  Bugul'ma  Operation,  with  5th  Army  effectively 
turning  on  the  spot.  On  21st  May,  a  disillusioned  Tukhachevsky  sent  Samoilo  a 
stinging  telegram, 
Beginning  from  I  Oth  May,  probably  in  view  of  many  circumstances 
unknown  to  me,  five  tasks  were  sent  for  5th  Army,  each  one  changed  from 
the  last.  Firstly  it  was  given  the  task  to  attack  north  into  the  rear  of  the 
enemy,  acting  on  the  River  Viatka,  then  the  direction  of  attack  was 
deflected  130  degrees  to  Belebei,  followed  by  a  directive  which  ordered  to 
attack  partially  to  the  north,  partially  to  the  east,  then  was  allocated  a 
crossing  point  over  the  River  Kama  close  to  the  River  Viatka  estuary,  then 
I  was  asked  to  choose  a  crossing  point  and  finally,  was  ordered  to  cross 
not  the  River  Kama,  but  the  River  Belaia.  These  changes  of  order  have 
completely  exhausted  the  divisions  and  units  are  completely  confused, 
communications  are  broken  etc. 
58  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Inzhenemoe  sorazmerenie  operatsii",  pp.  116-133;  Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, 
Toni  1,1919-1927,  pp.  59-72. 
59  L-ip,  docs.  267  &  284,  pp.  145-146,153-154  &  347,  endnote  173. 205 
Tukhachevsky  concluded  by  referring  Samoilo  to  article  19  of  the  1918  Field 
Regulations  which  stated  "...  before  giving  an  order,  it  is  necessary  to  think.  60 
The  first  two  orders  had  been  sent  on  II  th  and  14th  May  and  Tukhachevsky 
replied  to  the  first  on  12th  May,  saying  he  could  not  send  his  troops  north  as  they 
were  still  engaged  in  the  Bugul'ma  battle,  but  that  he  would  direct  them  there  as  soon 
as  this  was  over.  On  15th  May,  Tukhachevsky  replied, 
Your  directive  No.  02003,  which  changed  my  order  No.  920/n,  is  fulfilled, 
but  I  consider  it  my  duty  as  a  conscientious  army  commander  to  add  that  I 
do  not  agree  with  your  directive  since  I  consider  that  your  decision  is  not 
the  most  energetic...  In  taking  your  decision  the  enemy  will  perhaps  only 
be  pressed,  that  will  not  allow  our  task  to  guarantee  on  the  right  for  an 
attack  to  the  north.  If  General  Kappel's  corps  is  directed  at  one  point,  then 
it  is  more  necessary  to  annihilate  it,  not  press  it.  I  considered  it  my  duty  to 
report  to  you  about  your  view  of  what  is  occurring  since  I  considered  it 
intolerable  to  remain  silent  about  holding  a  difference  in  views.  61 
Tukhachevsky  disgreed  with  Samoilo's  operational  plan,  but  was  also  infuriated 
by  the  constant  direction  changes.  His  telegrams  to  Samoilo  have  a  completely 
different  tone  than  his  communications  with  Kamenev  or  Frunze.  It  displays  again  the 
hostility  he  displayed  towards  those  with  whom  he  disagreed  over  military  matters. 
In  his  memoirs,  Samoilo  wrote  that  he  had  taken  the  posting  against  his  will  and 
did  not  know  the  course  of  events  at  the  front  or  the  troops,  commanders  or  staff 
there  . 
62  He  also  wrote  of  intransigence  and  deliberate  non-cooperation  by  Eastern 
Front  R  VS,  who  invented  reasons  to  complain  about  him  and  get  Kamenev  back.  This 
was  very  likely  the  case.  As  has  been  shown,  a  good  working  relationship  had 
evolved  between  Eastern  Front  command,  within  the  RVS  and  between  the 
commanders.  They  wanted  Kamenev  back  to  revert  to  the  original  operational  plan, 
but  personal  loyalty  also  played  a  part  and  Samoilo  was  doomed  to  fail  from  the  start, 
although  his  indecisive  command  did  not  help.  He  was  appointed  6th  Army 
Commander,  but  did  not  display  any  bitterness  in  a  report  of  7th  June  on  Eastern 
Front  Operations  under  his  command  . 
63  However,  this  in-fighting  was  most  likely  the 
main  reason  for  delaying  the  Ufa  Operation. 
60  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Na  Vostochnorn  Fronte",  Izbrannye  proizvedennia,  Tom  11,1928-193  7,  pp. 
224-225. 
61A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al.  Tom  III,  p.  195;  Vbr,  docs.  47-48,  pp.  95-96. 
62  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Na  Vostochnorn  Fronte",  p.  224,  editonial  footnote. 
63  DkfK,  4,  Toin  II,  doc.  654,  pp.  697-700. 206 
The  Kamenev-Vacietis  rift  erupted  again  in  June.  With  the  routes  to  the  Urals  now 
open,  Eastern  Front  wanted  to  pursue  Western  Army,  preventing  it  reinforcing  and 
rebuilding  in  the  Urals.  If  the  Whites  dug  in  to  defend  the  wooded  mountainsides, 
conducting  guerilla  tactics  to  hold  the  mountain  passes  against  larger  forces,  Eastern 
Front  could  be  bogged  down  indefinitely.  However,  Denikin  had  launched  an 
offensive  in  the  South  and  ludenich  was  beginning  to  threaten  at  Petrograd.  Vacietis 
wanted  Eastern  Front  to  dig  in  before  the  Urals  and  concentrate  on  Denikin, 
transferring  forces  southwards,  and  gave  a  directive  to  this  effect  on  6th  June.  64 
Eastern  Front  RVS  again  appealed  to  Lenin  on  9th  June,  complaining  bitterly  about 
Vacietis'  directive,  stating  that  they  wished  to  continue  the  offensive,  whilst  he  was 
65  advocating  defensive  tactics  . 
Tukhachevsky,  anxious  to  press  on  to  Zlatoust,  as  he 
had  already  outlined  to  Kamenev,  would  have  supported  this  as  he  believed  the 
offensive  was  stronger  than  the  defensive.  He  also  believed  the  Red  Army  were 
incapable  of  defending  static  emplacements  as  it  did  not  have  enough  men  for  this  and 
the  existing  troops  were  not  confident  of  using  them.  66  Eastern  Front's  argument  was 
actually  an  early  case  of  the  new  revolutionary  military  doctrine  being  presented  over 
Great  War  bourgeois  positional  defensive  doctrine,  exactly  as  Tukhachevsky  would 
outline  in  Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia. 
Lenin,  having  already  stated  his  intention  to  clear  the  Urals  before  winter,  replied 
on  9th  and  II  th  June  that  he  understood  the  difficulty  of  Eastern  Front's  position,  but 
the  worsening  of  the  position  at  Petrograd  and  Denikin's  breakthrough  in  the  South 
67 
necessitated  more  transfers  from  the  East.  Kamenev  complained  to  Vacietis  about 
the  "intolerability"  of  ending  Eastern  Front's  offensive  action,  but  Lenin  sided  with 
Eastern  Front,  an  RVSR  decree  on  17th  June  ordering  Eastern  Front's  offensive  to 
continue,  but  with  troops  transferred  to  other  fronts.  68  Southern  Front  was  perhaps 
under  threat,  but  Eastern  Front  was  also  crucial,  as  Moscow  looked  to  knock  one  of 
their  opponents  out  of  the  war.  Lenin  confinned  this  on  9th  July  in  "All  Out  For  the 
Struggle  With  Denikin"  in  which  he  wrote  that  all  forces  were  to  be  mobilised  to 
64  DGkKA,  doc.  565,  pp.  571-572. 
65  DkfKA,  Toni  II,  doc.  657,  pp.  701-702. 
66  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Ukreplennye  raiony",  Voina  klassov,  pp.  89-90. 
67  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  docs.  655  &  658,  pp.  700  &  703. 
68  DGkKA,  doc.  573,  p.  584. 207 
defeat  Denikin  "...  whilst  not  ending  the  victorious  offensive  of  the  Red  Anny  into 
Ural  and  Siberia.  In  this  consists  the  basic  task  of  the  moment".  69 
Kamenev  replaced  Vacietis  as  Supreme  Commander  on  8th  July  to  bring  the 
dispute  to  an  end  . 
70  The  latter  and  other  voenspetsy  such  as  Kostiaev  were  in  fact 
arrested  in  July  under  dubious  circumstances,  but  later  released  without  charge.  This 
was  a  blow  for  Trotsky  and  he  offered  his  resignation  as  Narkomvoen,  but  was 
refused.  Stalin  became  involved,  backing  Karnenev,  and  after  the  Tsaritsyn  incident 
of  1918,  his  feud  with  Trotsky  was  well  under  way.  However,  it  would  be  wrong  to 
suggest  that  Tukhachevsky  moved  apart  from  Trotsky  at  this  time.  Tukhachevsky 
became  involved  in  the  dispute  primarily  from  the  strategical  angle,  but  also  perhaps 
through  personal  loyalty  to  Kamenev.  Military  success  was  Tukhachevsky's  major 
motivation  though  and  if  Vacietis  had  proposed  a  continuation  into  the  Urals, 
Tukhachevsky  would  have  backed  him.  His  relationship  with  Trotsky  remained 
sound,  but  his  doubts  in  older  voenspetsy  waging  civil  war  had  been  reinforced  by 
Samoilo's  actions  and  Vacietis'  call  for  a  defensive  strategy.  Tukhachevsky  and 
Vacietis  never  seemed  to  enjoy  a  good  working  relationship  and  military  and 
personality  differences  combined  again,  as  with  Gittis,  to  become  the  same  problem 
for  Tukhachevsky.  He  wrote  Vozniknovenie  grazhdanskoi  voiny  and  Sootnoshenie  sil 
v  grazhdanskoi  voine  on  4th  and  II  th  July,  with  these  disputes  firmly  in  mind  and  it  is 
clear  the  central  tenets  of  his  Civil  War  theories  were  based  directly  on  his  personal 
command  experiences. 
Into  the  Urals:  Zlatoust 
Frunze  served  as  Eastern  Front  Commander  from  19th  July-  I  5th  August,  when  he 
became  Turkestan  Front  Commander.  71  The  latter  front  was  created  because  Eastern 
Front  had  split  Kolchak's  forces  into  two  groups,  under  Frunze's  direction,  but  with 
Tukhachevsky's  5th  Army  playing  the  major  operational  role.  Working  closely  with 
Kamenev  before  his  departure  and  again  with  Frunze  after  19th  July,  Tukhachevsky 
69  Vbr,  doc.  77,  pp.  139-140. 
70  DkJKA,  Toni  IV,  p.  529. 
71  Ibid.  pp.  529  &  532.  Pavel  Pavlovich  Lebedev  (1872-1933),  served  as  Acting  Eastern  Front 
Commander  from  8th-  19th  July. 208 
planned  5th  Army's  Urals  operations,  achieving  victories  by  applying  the  methods  he 
had  seen  work  so  far  -  manoeuvre,  speed,  stealth  and  concentration  of  forces. 
Gaining  the  go-ahead  for  the  Zlatoust  Operation  on  6th  June,  Tukhachevsky  set 
about  securing  his  route.  As  2nd  Army  was  still  pressed  back  behind  the  River  Kama 
on  his  left  flank,  he  decided  to  attack  the  White  group  at  lavgel'din  to  secure  it. 
Discussing  this  with  Kamenev  on  12th  June,  Tukhachevsky  attacked  with  26th  and 
27th  Divisions  and  2nd  Army's  35th  Division,  taking  lavgeldin  on  14th  June.  72  2nd 
Army  could  now  advance  to  fight  its  way  through  Krasnouflmsk  and  Kungur  to  join 
at  Ekaterinburg  with  3rd  Army,  which  retook  Perm'  as  Tukhachevsky  advanced  to 
Zlatoust  and  Cheliabinsk.  These  two  axes  followed  the  main  rail  routes  through  the 
Urals  which  then  carried  on  eastwards  to  Omsk,  Kolchak's  capital.  Kamenev  planned 
pushing  the  Whites  all  the  way  back,  capturing  territory  and  troops  as  they 
advanced.  73 
Zlatoust  sat  on  a  plateau  within  the  Ural  Mountains  on  the  Ufa-Cheliabinsk 
Railway.  Advancing  up  the  rail  line  would  have  been  a  prolonged  costly  exercise,  so 
Tukhachevsky  devised  another  direction  of  attack.  On  13th  June,  he  suggested 
moving  a  division  secretly  north-east  up  the  ravine  of  the  River  luriuzan',  to  reach  the 
Zlatoust  plateau  and  launch  a  surprise  flank  attack  to  envelop  the  Whites,  whilst  the 
remainder  of  5th  Army  attacked  frontally.  74 
With  Kamenev's  final  approval,  Tukhachevsky  planned  the  operation,  giving 
Eikhe's  26th  Division  the  flanking  manoeuvre.  75  Tukhachevsky  communicated  the 
orders  in  person,  not  transmitting  them,  as  secrecy  was  regarded  as  the  key  for  the 
flanking  movement  to  succeed.  From  south  to  north  troop  positions  for  the  advance 
had  I  st  Army's  24th  Division  covering  the  right  flank.  On  its  left  flank  26th  Division's 
3rd  Brigade  and  a  cavalry  division  advanced  up  the  narrow  defile  of  the  Ufa-Zlatoust 
Railway.  Starting  in  the  centre,  the  main  group  of  26th  Division  secretly  advanced 
swiftly  up  the  luriuzan'  ravine,  which  twisted  to  the  south-east  and  then  back  up  to  the 
north-east,  to  bring  them  onto  Zlatoust  plateau  in  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Whites. 
27th  Division  advanced  on  the  left  flank  in  a  15-regiment  attack  group  north  of  the 
impassable  Kara-Tau  Ridge,  skirting  round  the  Birsk-Zlatoust  highway.  2nd  Army's 
72  Vbr,  docs.  64-66,  pp.  121-126. 
73  DkfY,  4,  Tom  II,  doc.  665,  pp.  709-716. 
"  Vbr,  doc.  65,  pp.  123-125. 209 
3  5th  Division  guarded  27th  Division's  left  flank  and  joined  the  attack  after  2nd  Army 
captured  Krasnoufimsk  on  4th  July.  Therefore,  most  troops  were  grouped  on  the  left 
of  the  front  to  draw  the  Whites  away  from  26th  Division's  flanking  manoeuvre.  No 
forces  advanced  directly  along  the  Birsk-Zlatoust  highway,  the  shortest  route  to 
Zlatoust.  Most  White  troops  guarded  this  road,  giving  a  great  element  of  surprise  to 
the  Red  attack  and  helping  with  the  envelopment. 
After  transfers,  mobilisations  and  reorganisation,  which  all  continued  whilst 
taking  lavgel'din  and  preparing  for  the  operation,  5th  Army  strength  in  early  July  was 
16,000-23,000  infantry  and  820-1,400  cavalry,  50-70  guns  and  328-545  machine- 
guns.  76  Whichever  figures  are  most  accurate,  Tukhachevsky  was  commanding  a 
similar-sized  force  as  previously.  Khanzhin's  forces  by  now  numbered  around  18,000, 
but  perhaps  lower.  77 
Eikhe's  flanking  group  crossed  the  River  Ufa  on  the  night  of  25th  June  and  moved 
undetected  into  the  luriuzan'  Ravine.  27th  Division  crossed  the  Ufa  the  next  night  and 
began  its  advance.  Upon  gaining  the  ravine,  Eikhe's  group  advanced  along  the  40  cm 
deep  riverbed,  dragging  their  artillery  and  machine-guns.  In  three  days,  they  covered 
120  kms  (110  versty),  lowering  and  lifting  guns  by  hand  as  they  climbed  through  the 
ravine.  The  main  column  of  troops  stretched  20  kms  and  engineers  worked  ahead, 
building  bridges  where  necessary  from  logs.  On  Ist  July,  26th  Division  reached  the 
plateau  and  advanced  north-east  towards  Zlatoust.  Tukhachevsky  gave  further  orders 
on  7th  and  10th  July  to  develop  the  attack  into  the  foothills  and  take  the  Eastern 
slopes  of  the  Urals.  On  13th  July,  Eikhe's  troops  launched  a  surprise  attack,  capturing 
the  town  from  Western  Army,  which  was  apparently  holding  a  troop  inspection  when 
the  attack  arrived.  Over  3,000  prisoners  and  vast  stocks  of  materiel  were  taken.  78 
The  Zlatoust  Operation  was  a  crucial  point  in  Eastern  Front's  offensive  and 
Tukhachevsky's  career.  Zlatoust  was  the  key  to  holding  the  Urals  and  its  loss  flung 
the  renamed  3rd  White  Army  back  to  Cheliabinsk  and  opened  the  way  to  Siberia.  79 
75  Ibid.  doc.  68,  pp.  128-130;  G.  Kh.  Eikhe,  "Na  glavnom  napravlenii"  Razgrom  Kolchaka. 
Vospominaniia,  (Moscow,  1969),  p.  15  1. 
76  DkfK,  4,  Tom  H,  p.  71  gives  the  lower  figures;  Vbr,  pp.  388-389,  gives  the  higher  numbers. 
77  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al.  Tom  III,  p.  206. 
78  RGV4,  f  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  5,  p.  12;  Vbr,  docs.  76-79,  pp.  138-142;  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  672,  pp. 
722-723;  M.  B.  Zabolotnyi,  Tiataia  armiia  v  bor'ba  za  luzhnyi  Ural",  Iz  Istorii  Iuzhnogo  Urala  i 
Zaural'ia,  5,  (197  1),  pp.  114-118;  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia  interventsiia  v  SSSR. 
Entsiklopediia,  (Moscow,  1983),  p.  220.26th  Division  was  named  the  ZIatoust  Division  for  its  role  in 
the  operation. 
79  Siberian  Army  facing  2nd  and  3rd  Red  Annies  was  divided  into  I  st  and  2nd  White  An-nies. 210 
The  Urals  were  the  final  line  upon  which  Kolchak  could  hope  to  hold  the  Reds  and, 
with  their  loss,  ended  any  hope  of  another  advance  towards  Moscow.  The  operation  to 
take  Zlatoust  had  been  conceived,  planned  and  conducted  by  Tukhachevsky  and  had 
been  a  stunning  manoeuvre  success  in  terribly  difficult  terrain.  He  had  been 
recognised  as  a  capable  commander  already,  but  after  Zlatoust  he  must  have  been 
rated  as  one  of  the  top  army  commanders  in  the  Red  Army. 
Tukhachevsky  had  little  time  to  rest  on  his  laurels  as  Kamenev  and  Lebedev 
80  directed  the  general  offensive  to  continue.  On  5th  Army's  right  flank,  Ural'sk  had 
been  captured  on  II  th  July  by  I  st  and  4th  Armies,  which  Frunze  immediately  directed 
to  advance  towards  Orenburg.  On  the  left,  Lebedev  ordered  2nd  and  3rd  Armies  to 
take  Ekaterinburg,  which  was  captured  on  14th  July  by  2nd  Army.  81 
Tukhachevsky's  next  task  was  to  take  Troitsk  and  Cheliabinsk  sectors.  He  ordered 
5th  Army  to  assume  launching  positions  for  the  Cheliabinsk  Operation,  which  began 
on  17th  July,  two  days  before  Frunze  became  Eastern  Front  Commander.  82  The  latter 
decision  was  taken  after  Lenin  consulted  Lashevich  and  lurenev  of  Eastern  Front  R  VS 
if  they  thought  they  could  work  with  Frunze,  perhaps  showing  that  Lenin  was  still 
mindful  of  the  Samoilo  episode.  83 
Cheliabinsk 
On  20th  July,  Frunze  ordered  Novitskii  to  prepare  for  transferring  troops  to 
Southern  Front  and  3rd  and  5th  Armies  to  continue  pursuit  operations  eastwards,  with 
Tukhachevsky  to  base  his  advance  around  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway.  84 
Tukhachevsky  received  5th  Division  on  22nd  July  and  commanded  24th  Division 
on  his  right  flank,  giving  5th  Army  overall  numbers  for  taking  Troitsk  and 
Cheliabinsk  of  834  command  staff,  29,638  infantry  and  1,578  cavalry,  with  108  guns 
and  664  machine-guns.  85  Kolchak  threw  his  last  reserves  into  the  defence  of 
Cheliabinsk,  giving  3rd  White  Army  27,600  men  in  total,  110  guns  and  345  machine- 
80  DGkKA,  doc.  58  1,  pp.  592-593;  DkfKA,  Tom  II,  doc.  673,  pp.  723-725. 
81  Dk)X4,  Tom  II,  doc.  672,  pp.  722-723;  FnVf,  p.  261,  endnote  56;  FnVf,  doc.  137,  pp.  207-208. 
82  1'1?  r,  doc.  80,  pp.  142-143.  Novitskii  became  Southern  Group  Commander. 
83  Fn  1j,  doc.  141  pp.  214-215;  L-  Vp,  doc.  357,  p.  188. 
84  Fn  J,  "/'  docs.  142-143,  pp.  215-216;  DkfKA,  Tom  II,  doc.  674,  pp.  725-726. 
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guns.  86  Tukhachevsky  therefore,  had  a  slightly  larger  force  than  previously,  but  only  a 
small  advantage  in  numbers,  and  there  was  no  element  of  surprise  this  time. 
24th  Division  advanced  on  the  right  flank  towards  Troitsk.  On  its  left  flank,  26th 
Division  advanced  along  the  south  side  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  whilst  27th 
Division  moved  along  the  north  side.  On  its  left  flank,  35th  Division  advanced  down 
the  Ekaterinburg-  Cheliabinsk  lateral  railway  and  5th  Division  covered  the  left  flank. 
As  a  preliminary  task,  24th  Division  took  Verkhneural'sk  on  25th  July  and 
advanced  on  Troitsk.  26th  Division  advanced  to  40  versty  from  Troitsk  by  26th  July 
and  27th  Division  moved  into  Cheliabinsk  on  25th  July,  with  no  fighting. 
3rd  White  Army  pulled  out  of  Cheliabinsk  in  an  effort  to  trap  5th  Army  in  the 
town  and  attack  it  from  three  sides,  cutting  it  off  from  its  rear  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Urals.  Therefore,  whilst  Frunze  congratulated  Tukhachevsky  on  26th  July  for  taking 
the  town,  a  battle  ensued.  27th  Division  was  pinned  in  the  town  after  the  centre  3rd 
White  Army  group  attacked  it  frontally,  whilst  General  Voitsekhovskii's  right  flank 
3rd  White  Army  group  drove  a  wedge  between  27th  and  35th  Divisions.  26th 
Division  was  attacked  frontally  by  3rd  White  Army's  left  flank  group  under  Kappel'. 
Tukhachevsky  ordered  that  the  White  counter-offensive  be  eliminated  on  28th  July.  87 
Amid  three  days  fierce  fighting,  the  battle  was  turned  by  an  8,500-strong  workers' 
rising  in  3rd  White  Army's  rear,  combined  with  Tukhachevsky  regrouping  5th  Arrny's 
troops.  The  White  forces  found  themselves  in  the  very  trap  they  had  laid  for  5th 
Army.  By  I  st  August,  the  town  was  secured  and  on  4th  August,  26th  Division,  aided 
by  partisans,  took  Troitsk,  bringing  the  Cheliabinsk  Operation  to  a  close.  88  3rd  White 
Army  lost  4,500  killed  and  8,000  prisoners  at  Cheliabinsk,  whilst  5th  Army  suffered 
2,900  killed  and  wounded  and  900  missing.  89 
The  capture  of  Cheliabinsk  secured  the  Urals  for  Eastern  Front  and  importantly 
secured  the  lateral  Ekaterinburg-Cheliabinsk  railway,  which  linked  3rd  and  5th 
Army's  rear  areas.  The  victory  broke  the  back  of  3rd  White  Army,  its  remnants 
retreating  eastwards  and  Kolchak's  last  sizeable  reserves  being  wiped  out.  On  5th 
August,  the  first  anniversary  of  5th  Army's  creation,  Tukhachevsky  was  awarded  the 
Order  of  the  Red  Banner,  as  was  5th  Army  itself.  The  RVSR  telegram  read, 
86  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia  interventsiia  v  SSSR.  Entsiklopediia,  p.  649. 
87  Vbr,  doc.  83,  pp.  146-147. 
88RGIA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  kniga  5,  p.  13;  Vbr,  doc.  87,  pp.  151-152. 212 
Brave  troops  of  5th  Army  under  the  artful  leadership  of  army  commander 
comrade  Tukhachevsky,  overcoming  stubborn  resistance  of  the  enemy  and 
defeating  it,  has  crossed  the  Urals. 
Buguruslan,  Bugul'ma,  Birsk,  Zlatoust  and  the  gates  of  Siberia  - 
Cheliabinsk  fell  under  the  blows  of  the  glorious  red  eagles  of  5th  Army... 
[Eastern]  Front  RVS  is  confident  that  the  red  eagles  of  5th  Army  under 
the  leadership  of  the  heroic  army  commander  comrade  Tukhachevsky  will 
cover  its  weapons  with  new  glories  and  return  the  working  Siberia  to 
workers'-peasants'  Russia.  90 
Tukhachevsky's  stock  was  at  great  heights. 
Siberian  Pursuit:  Petro  pavlovsk-0  m  sk 
Again,  however,  no  respite  was  allowed  for  Eastern  Front.  Frunze  had  pressed 
Novitskii,  Tukhachevsky  and  3rd  Army  Commander  Mezheninov  on  26th  July,  the 
day  after  Cheliabinsk  was  reached,  to  continue  the  offensive  into  the  Southern  Urals 
and  up  to  the  River  Tobol,  the  next  natural  barrier  and  possible  line  of  defence  for 
Kolchak's  forces.  He  did  so  again  in  early  August.  91  With  Cheliabinsk  secured,  on  3rd 
August  Tukhachevsky  ordered  5th  Army  to  cut  3rd  White  Army's  route  of  retreat  to 
Siberia  and  annihilate  it.  He  then  ordered  pursuit  of  the  Whites  over  the  River  Tobol 
on  II  th  August.  92  The  crossing  of  the  Tobol  on  20th  August  began  the  Petropavlovsk 
Operation,  a  prolonged  campaign  which  lasted  until  13th  October,  but  set  up  the  final 
assault  on  Kolchak's  Omsk.  However,  before  the  operation  was  underway, 
fundamental  changes  occurred  on  Eastern  Front.  As  the  overall  Civil  War  situation 
changed,  Moscow  prioritised  Southern  Front  as  Denikin  advanced  and  threatened  to 
link  with  the  Ural'sk  Cossacks. 
On  14th  August,  Frunze  renamed  Southern  Group,  containing  I  st,  4th  and  11  th 
Armies,  as  Turkestan  Front.  Under  his  command,  it  acted  against  the  Ural'sk 
Cossacks.  V.  A.  01'derogge  became  Eastern  Front  Commander  with  only  3rd  and  5th 
89  Fn  Vf,  doe.  153,  pp.  223-224;  M.  B.  Zabolotnyi,  pp.  120-123;  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia 
interventsiia  i,  SSSR.  Entsiklopediia,  pp.  649-650. 
90  Vbr,  doe.  16  1,  pp.  23  1-232. 
91  Fn  doe.  160,  pp.  230-23  1;  DkfKA,  Tom  II,  does.  681-682,  pp.  731-732. 
92  DkJK,  4,  Toni  H,  doe.  678,  pp.  728-729;  Fn  Vf,  doe.  154,  pp.  224-225;  DkJX4,  Tom  IV,  p.  535. 
Mezheninov  commanded  until  26th  August  when  Alafuzo  took  over  temporarily  until  6th  October 
when  MatiiaseNich  assumed  command;  Vbr,  does.  85  &  90,  pp.  149-150  &  153-154. 213 
Armies.  93  Kolchak's  forces  had  been  split  in  two  with  the  capture  of  Cheliabinsk  and 
Troitsk.  Eastern  Front  pursued  Western  Army  eastwards,  whilst  Turkestan  Front 
pursued  Southern  Army  south-east  to  Turkestan.  94 
This  was  the  first  time  in  the  Civil  War  that  Tukhachevsky  did  not  fight  on  the 
prioritised  front.  Smirnov  reported  that  5th  Army  Communists  wanted  to  fight  in  the 
South  on  the  most  threatening  and  dangerous  front,  but  they  remained  in  the  East  with 
Tukhachevsky.  95  Why  was  he  not  sent  to  the  prioritised  front  as  he  had  been 
throughout  the  Civil  War  and  why  was  Frunze  chosen  ahead  of  him? 
Frunze  was  the  natural  choice  to  lead  Turkestan  Front,  having  commanded 
successfully  at  Front  level  on  prioritised  fronts,  with  Southern  Group  and  Eastern 
Front,  by  July  1919.  He  was  the  ideal  Red  Commander,  a  Party  member  since  1904 
with  no  professional  military  education,  who  nevertheless  had  proved  to  be  a  natural 
at  leading  civil  warfare.  He  also  originated  from  Pishpek,  Kirgizia  and  local 
knowledge  was  valuable,  as  had  been  evident  with  Tukhachevsky  in  1918. 
Tukhachevsky  was  a  lower  rank,  but  became  a  front  commander  in  January  1920  and 
was  not  far  behind  Frunze  in  terms  of  Moscow's  trust.  He  had  only  been  a  Communist 
for  seventeen  months,  but  had  shown  his  capabilities  and  continued  loyalty  to  the 
regime  and  was  making  all  the  right  noises  in  his  assessment  of  class  civil  warfare. 
His  retention  on  Eastern  Front,  despite  it  losing  its  prioritised  status,  was  an  indication 
of  his  high  standing.  Frunze  and  Tukhachevsky  were  the  two  top  men  Moscow  could 
rely  upon.  Therefore,  whilst  Frunze  led  Turkestan  Front,  Tukhachevsky  remained  in 
the  East  to  finish  off  the  task  to  which  he  had  contributed  most  of  all  the  Eastern  Front 
personnel  to  achieve.  5th  Army  had  operated  virtually  independently  since  June, 
capturing  the  main  targets  in  the  most-fiercely  defended  central  sector.  As  indicated 
in  the  congratulatory  RVSR  telegram,  Moscow  needed  it  to  continue  east  and  finish 
off  Kolchak  and  it  was  most  likely  to  achieve  this  with  its  "heroic"  commander  still  at 
the  helm.  There  is  a  possibility  that,  as  in  January  1919,  Red  Command  felt 
Tukhachevsky  was  still  better  suited  to  army  command,  but  this  is  less  likely  by  now 
and,  once  he  had  led  the  final  rout  of  Kolchak,  he  would  be  awarded  with  front 
command. 
93  Fn  Vf,  doc.  165,  pp.  235-236;  Vladirnmir  Alekseevich  01'derogge  (1873-193  1),  a  fonner  Tsarist 
Major-General. 
94  RGIA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  6. 
95  DkfK,  4,  Tom  II,  pp.  800-801,  note  139. 214 
The  Petropavlovsk  Operation 
On  15th  August,  Kamenev  instructed  Ol'derogge  to  advance  3rd  and  5th  Armies 
to  the  line  Tobol'sk-Kurgan,  to  begin  the  Petropavlovsk  Operation.  96  Ol'derogge 
relayed  this  to  3rd  and  5th  Armies.  5th  Army's  right  flank  was  to  move  down  the 
Cheliabinsk-Troitsk-Kustanai  branch-line  to  occupy  the  latter  town,  then  advance 
with  all  forces  along  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  and  the  Troitsk-Petropavlovsk 
highway  to  occupy  Kurgan,  the  next  main  rail  station  which  lay  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  Tobol.  3rd  Army,  on  its  left  flank,  was  to  advance  along  the  Ekaterinburg-Omsk 
Railway,  occupying  Tiumen  and  lalutorovsk  as  a  prelude  to  capturing  Tobol'sk,  which 
lay  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tobol,  just  north  of  its  confluence  with  the  River  Irtysh'. 
lalutorovsk  was  occupied  on  17th  August  and  Kustanai,  by  35th  Division,  two  days 
later.  97 
For  the  Petropavlovsk  Operation,  5th  Army  contained  5th,  26th,  27th  and  35th 
Divisions,  having  lost  21st  Division  through  transfer  to  Southern  Front.  It  numbered 
1,204  command  staff,  22,400  infantry,  1,946  cavalry,  with  91  guns  and  565  machine- 
guns  against  3rd  White  Army's  19,640  infantry  and  4,130  cavalry,  with  122  guns  and 
356  machine-guns.  3rd  Army  comprised  29th,  30th,  51st  and  10th  Divisions, 
numbering  33,512  infantry,  3,595  cavalry,  107  guns  and  612  machine-guns,  against 
I  st  and  2nd  White  Armies'  2  8,140  infantry  and  5,640  cavalry,  with  117  guns  and  4  10 
machine-guns.  98 
However,  on  16th  August,  5th  Division,  numbering  618  command  staff,  4,037 
infantry  and  124  cavalry  with  12  guns  and  86  machine-guns,  was  withdrawn  into 
reserve.  On  19th  August,  N.  D.  Tomin's  combined  cavalry  detachment  containing 
3,411  cavalrymen  and  44  machine-guns  transferred  from  3rd  to  5th  Army  to  aid  in 
operations  at  Kurgan.  99 
5th  Army  began  attempts  to  cross  the  Tobol  on  18th  August.  35th  Division  on  the 
right  flank,  advanced  via  Kustanai  along  the  Zverinologovskaia-Petropavlovsk 
highway,  with  26th  Division  on  its  left  flank  advancing  between  the  highway  and 
96  DGkKA,  doc.  583,  pp.  593-594. 
97  DkJKA,  Tom  II,  docs.  683-684,  pp.  732-734;  Vbr,  doc.  91,  pp.  154-163. 
98  DkJKA,  Tom  IV,  pp.  93  &  490;  Vbr,  pp.  388-389. 
99  DkJKA,  Toin  II,  docs.  684  &  686,  pp.  733-734,735-736  &  800,  endnote  138. 215 
Trans-Siberian  Railway.  27th  Division  advanced  north  of  the  Railway,  holding  5th 
Army's  left  flank  after  5th  Division,  initially  positioned  there,  was  withdrawn  into 
reserve.  3rd  Army's  right  flank  30th  Division  advanced  north  of  5th  Army. 
Conditions  along  the  River  Tobol  were  good  for  defence.  A  high  east  right-bank 
was  lined  by  shrubbery  amongst  which  3rd  White  Army  entrenched  with  machine- 
gun  nests  and  barbed  wire  entanglements.  Only  by  20th  August  did  5th  Army  manage 
to  fight  its  way  across,  breaking  through  the  White  positions  and  launching 
immediately  into  a  pursuit  operation.  By  28th  August,  5th  Army  had  covered  180  kms 
to  reach  the  approaches  to  Petropavlovsk,  which  sat  on  the  east  bank  of  the  River 
Ishim.  3rd  White  Army  had  suffered  15,000  casualties.  100  Garf  and  Ol'derogge 
ordered  Tukhachevsky  to  force  the  river  on  Ist  September.  101  However,  3rd  White 
Army  had  withdrawn  behind  the  river,  regrouped  and  reinforced,  and  launched  a 
counter-offensive  on  2nd  September. 
5th  Army's  rapid  advance  had  not  been  matched  by  Turkestan  Front's  I  st  Army  on 
its  right  flank,  leaving  the  former  exposed  to  the  open  steppeland  southwards.  3rd 
White  Army  and  Siberian  Cossacks  launched  infantry  and  cavalry  flanking 
manoeuvres,  with  artillery  support,  in  a  surprise  attack  and  5th  Army,  overstretched 
and  far  from  its  supply  bases,  had  to  retreat  to  avoid  encirclement.  5th  Division  was 
rushed  forward  from  front  reserve  to  plug  the  gaps.  01'derogge  repeatedly  ordered 
Tukhachevsky  and  3rd  Army  Commander  Alafuzo  to  stop  the  White  offensive  and 
counter-attack  and  Tukhachevsky  launched  26th  and  27th  Divisions  into  fierce 
meeting  battles.  However,  5th  Army's  outnumbered  troops  were  forced  to  constantly 
retreat  to  avoid  envelopment.  This  threatened  3rd  Army's  right  flank  and  it  also  had  to 
withdraw. 
By  28th  September,  01'derogge  was  ordering  5th  and  3rd  Armies  to  prevent  the 
Whites  reaching  the  River  Tobol,  the  starting  point  for  the  Petropavlovsk  Operation 
on  20th  August,  but  the  Reds  were  forced  to  withdraw  behind  the  river  the  next  day 
and  dug  in  on  the  west  bank  to  hold  the  defensive  line.  Ol'derogge  expressed  dismay 
that  26th  and  27th  Divisions  had  destroyed  the  river  crossings  and  not  dug  in  on  the 
100  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  87. 
101  DkfY,  4,  Tom  II,  docs.  687-688,  pp.  736-737.  Garf  was  Eastern  Front  Chief-of-Staff,  but  served  as 
Acting  Eastern  Front  Commander  in  late  August.  No  indication  is  given  why. 216 
east  bank  before  the  river,  holding  both  banks  as  he  had  ordered,  but  this  appears  to 
have  not  been  possible.  '  02 
However,  Kolchak's  forces  were  unable  to  advance  any  further.  Just  as  5th  Army 
had  been  overstretched  before  Petropavlovsk,  3rd  White  Army  had  no  reserves  to 
bolster  its  attack  and  it  petered  out  at  the  Tobol.  This  was  another  classic  instance  of 
Civil  War  toing  and  froing,  but  was  also  Kolchak's  final  offensive  in  the  Civil  War. 
In  the  first  two  weeks  of  October,  Tukhachevsky  reorganised  and  rebuilt  5th 
Army  for  a  renewed  offensive  to  Petropavlovsk,  whilst  holding  defensive  positions 
behind  the  Tobol.  Regrouping  was  completed  on  13th  October  and  3rd  and  5th 
Armies  attacked  the  next  day.  '  03 
Differing  figures  are  available  for  troop  strength.  Tukhachevsky  estimated  5th 
Army  to  have  30,500  against  3rd  White  Anny's  22,200.  Other  sources  give  5th  Army 
as  2,106  command  staff,  17,021  infantry  and  4,522  cavalry  with  134  guns  and  511 
machine-guns  against  3rd  White  Army's  21,610  infantry  and  11,970  cavalry,  with  136 
guns  and  546  machine-guns.  On  10th  September,  3rd  Army  numbered  3,262 
command  staff,  47,796  infantry  and  4,186  cavalry,  with  86  guns  and  642  machine- 
guns  facing  Ist  and  2nd  White  Armies'  26,530  infantry  and  5,180  cavalry,  with  90 
guns  and  439  machine-guns.  '  04  Tukhachevsky  noted  5th  Army  had  a  superiority  of 
forces,  but  was  perhaps  including  the  Siberian  partisan  movement,  which  numbered 
an  estimated  40,000  in  Kolchak's  rear.  105 
5th  Army  advanced  with  35th  Rifle  Divison  on  the  right  flank  and  5th  Division  on 
its  left,  moving  up  the  Zverinogolovskaia-Petropavlovsk  highway.  54th  Division 
joined  the  right  flank  group  after  crossing  the  Tobol.  26th  and  27th  Divisions 
advanced  either  side  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  27th  Division  holding  5th 
Army's  left  flank,  and  3rd  Army's  30th  Division  on  its  left.  The  right  wing  group  was 
the  strongest  with  16,500  men  and  4,600  in  reserve.  It  was  to  gradually  move  tighter 
to  the  railway  group,  narrowing  the  front,  as  5th  Army  approached  Petropavlovsk,  and 
envelop  the  town  from  the  right. 
Fighting  raged  around  the  Tobol  for  a  week  before  the  Reds  finally  battled  over 
and  broke  through.  The  stronger  right-wing  group  advanced  ahead,  turning  3rd  White 
102  DAfKA,  Tom  H,  docs.  689-697,  pp.  738-745;  Vbr,  doc.  91,  pp.  154-163. 
103  DkJKA  Toni  H,  docs.  698-699,  pp.  745-746. 
104  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Kurgan-Omsk",  Izbrannyeproizvedennia,  Tom  1,1919-1927,  pp.  266-267; 
DkJKA,  Tom  IT',  pp.  92-93  &  496;  Vbr,  pp.  390-391. 217 
Army's  left  flank  northwards  as  it  retreated  and  shortening  5th  Army's  front  as 
planned.  The  weaker  railway  group  progressed  more  slowly,  but  by  21st  October  all 
divisions  had  crossed  the  Tobol.  3rd  Army  captured  Tobol'sk  on  22nd  October.  '  06 
The  fierce  battles  now  turned  into  a  continuous  pursuit  operation  as  Kolchak's 
Armies  retreated  back  to  Petropavlovsk.  The  right-wing  group  pushed  on  ahead, 
turning  the  White  left  flank  inside  more  as  it  advanced  and  by  29th  October,  35th 
Division  fought  its  way  over  the  River  Ishim  and  into  Petropavlovsk  beyond.  With 
27th  Division  approaching  to  reinforce  the  right-wing,  3rd  White  Army  pulled  out  of 
Petropavlovsk  on  30th  October.  3rd  Army  occupied  Ishim,  further  north  upriver  on 
4th  November,  to  maintain  the  offensive  across  Eastern  Front.  Kolchak's  forces 
retreated  east  towards  Omsk.  107 
The  recently-  formed  13th  Siberian  Cavalry  Division  failed  in  two  deep 
enveloping  manoeuvres  to  cut  off  3rd  White  Army's  HQ  at  Lebiazh'a  Station  behind 
the  Tobol  and  then  to  cut  the  rail  line  behind  Petropavlovsk,  allowing  3rd  White 
Army  to  twice  escape  encirclements.  1  08  Tukhachevsky  despatched  infantry  in  carts  to 
gather  intelligence  and  this  revealed  3rd  White  Army  was  planning  to  regroup  in  the 
Isil'kul'  area  before  Omsk.  Therefore,  the  offensive  had  to  continue  unabated  to  catch 
the  Whites  before  they  could  regroup  and  dig  in  again.  However,  5th  Army  was  so 
exhausted  and  overstretched,  the  divisional  commanders  met  in  the  Field  HQ  in 
Petropavlovsk  and  declared  that  the  troops  must  recuperate  for  several  days.  This  was 
not  allowed  though,  as  the  day  after  the  capture  of  Petropavlovsk,  Ol'derogge  ordered 
the  development  of  the  offensive  towards  Omsk.  Tukhachevsky  outlined  5th  Army's 
tasks  on  I  st  November  and  launched  the  operation  on  4th  November.  109 
105  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Kurgan-Omsk",  p.  265. 
106  DkfKA,  Tom  11,  docs.  702  &  704,  pp.  751-752;  Vbr,  docs.  97  &  99,  pp.  171-175  &  176-177. 
107  DkJKA,  Tom  II,  doc.  705,  pp.  753  &  754;  Vbr,  docs.  100-105,  pp.  177-188;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky, 
"  Kurgan-  Omsk",  pp.  266-269;  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia  interventsda.  Entsiklopediia,  pp.  454- 
455;  The  future  World  War  11  general  Konstantin  Konstantinovich  Rokossovskii  (1896-1968)  was 
Commander  of  2nd  Cavalry  Division  of  30th  Rifle  Division  and  received  the  Order  of  the  Red  Banner 
for  action  on  4th  November  1919,  RGVA,  f.  37,605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  79;  Vbr,  p.  357. 
108  13  th  Siberian  Cavalry  Division  was  formed  on  21  st  September  and  served  until  20th  November 
1919.  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  592. 
109  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  796,  p.  754;  Vbr,  docs.  107-108,  pp.  188-192. 218 
Omsk 
5th  and  3rd  Armies  had  swollen  by  I  st  November  to  contain  91,402  infantry  and 
7,296  cavalry,  with  304  guns  and  1,211  machine-guns.  However,  5th  Army's  actual 
frontline  strength  was  probably  2,109  command  staff,  24,822  infantry  and  3,209 
cavalry  with  116  guns  and  303  machine-guns  and  3rd  Army  was  probably  around  the 
same  size.  Kolchak's  Armies  fielded  36,600  infantry  and  17,100  cavalry,  with  126 
guns  and  908  machine-guns.  110  Red  numbers  were  supplemented  by  the  vast  partisan 
movement  and  the  White  forces  conversely  disintegrated  as  they  retreated  further 
east,  constantly  defeated  by  Eastern  Front  before  them  and  partisans  behind. 
5th  Army  advanced  with  26th  Division  on  the  right  flank  moving  north-east  up  the 
dirt  road  to  take  Omsk  from  the  south.  35th  Division  and  27th  Divisions  advanced 
either  side  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway.  5th  Division  held  the  left  flank,  advancing 
by  road,  but  attempting  to  manoeuvre  north-east  to  link  with  3rd  Anny's  29th 
Division  and  block  the  retreat  of  Ist  and  2nd  White  Armies"  elements  from  Ishim, 
down  the  Ishim-Ornsk  Railway. 
By  8th  November,  as  Eastern  Front  advanced,  27th  Division  occupied  Isil'kul' 
Station  and  prevented  3rd  White  Army  concentrating  there.  Tukhachevsky  initially 
sent  13th  Cavalry  Division  towards  Omsk,  hoping  to  cut  the  railway  and  envelop  3rd 
White  An-ny.  However,  5th  Army's  advance  opened  up  its  right  flank  to  a  possible 
attack  from  Kokchetav-Akmolinsk  area  to  the  south.  On  6th  November,  Ol'derogge 
ordered  13th  Cavalry  Division  to  clear  this  area,  pulling  it  back  from  the  Omsk 
attack.  "'  On  9th  November,  01'derogge  ordered  the  final  assault  on  Omsk  and 
Tukhachevsky  authorised  this  two  days  later.  Kokchetav  was  taken  on  12th 
November,  which  secured  the  right  flank,  and  Omsk  was  captured  on  14th 
November.  1  12 
5th  Army  had  advanced  600  versty  and  crossed  three  rivers  in  30  days  from  the 
River  Belaia  to  Omsk.  40,000  prisoners,  over  100  guns,  500,000  shells,  5  million 
110  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  pp.  III&  50  1. 
111  DkfK,  4,  Toni  H,  pp.  754-755. 
112  RGVA,  f  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  49,  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  708,  pp.  755-757;  Vbr,  doc.  109,  pp.  192- 
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cartridges  and  3  armoured-trains  were  captured  in  the  town,  finishing  Kolchak  as  a 
force  in  the  Civil  War.  113 
Although  Kolchak's  capital  was  captured,  he  escaped,  and  on  18th  November 
Tukhachevsky  ordered  pursuit  of  the  scattered  remnants  of  the  White  forces,  with 
Kolchak  the  main  target.  This  eventually  led  to  the  further  capture  of  Tomsk, 
Novonikolaevsk  and  Krasnoiarsk,  but  this  was  Tukhachevsky's  last  instruction  to  5th 
Army  before  he  was  recalled  to  Moscow  amid  more  transfers,  as  Eastern  Front  had  all 
but  completed  its  task.  '  14 
Tukhachevsky  and  01'deroue 
Tukhachevsky's  command  would  not  have  been  complete  without  an  altercation 
with  his  superior  and  this  duly  occurred.  Tukhachevsky  recalled  the  argument  in  his 
essay  Na  Vostochnom  fronte  (On  Eastern  Front),  written  in  1935,  when  the  terror 
process  was  starting  to  take  hold  in  the  USSR.  This  probably  explains  his  statement, 
"It  is  hard  to  understand  where  Trotsky  sought  out  such  people!  ",  but  the  dispute 
Tukhachevsky  had  with  Ol'derogge  was  again  over  military  matters.  115  It  centred 
around  the  first  attack  on  Petropavlovsk  which  led  to  3rd  White  Army's  counter- 
offensive.  Tukhachevsky  related  that  he  had  opposed  Ol'derogge's  plan  for  the  main 
attack  group  to  move  up  the  railway,  as  this  left  the  right  flank  road  open  to  the 
Siberian  Cossack  counter-attack.  He  noted  that  he  had  wanted  to  conduct  the  first 
offensive  using  the  plan  of  the  second,  a  strong  right-wing  group,  which  could  have 
protected  against  flank  attack,  but  was  overruled  by  01'derogge.  Ultimately 
Tukhachevsky  was  proven  correct.  He  also  complained  about  01'derogge  pulling  back 
the  cavalry  from  the  Omsk  Operation,  hinting  that  Kolchak  may  have  been  captured  if 
they  had  been  allowed  to  cut  the  rail  line  behind  Omsk.  '  16 
113  RGVA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  pp.  49  &  63. 
114  Vbr,  doc.  110,  pp.  193-194;  5th  Army  pursued  Kolchak,  capturing  Novonikolaevsk  on  14th 
December.  5th  Steppe  Partisan  Regiment,  which  had  been  active  in  Kolchak's  rear,  met  up  with  227th 
and  228th  Regiments  on  12th  December  and  fought  alongside  them  afterwards.  Kolchak  handed 
responsibility  for  the  fight  in  Siberia  to  Ataman  Semenov  and  made  Denikin  Supreme  Ruler  of  Russia 
on  5th  January  1920.  On  the  same  day,  partisans  took  over  the  town  of  Irkutsk.  Kolchak  arrived  here 
on  15th  January  and  was  arrested  by  the  partisans,  tried  and  executed  on  7th  February.  Kappel'  also 
died  at  Irkutsk,  retreating  to  here  and  dying  in  action  on  25th  January,  RTsKhIDNI,  f.  71,  op.  35,  d. 
984,  pp.  171  &  413-420. 
115  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Na  Vostochnom  fronte",  p.  227. 
116  RGJA,  f.  37605,  op.  1,  d.  11,  p.  49. 220 
This  essay  was  written  in  1935  amid  growing  tension  and  Tukhachevsky  possibly 
had  to  justify  his  role  in  the  offensive  at  this  time.  Other  sources  do  not  reveal 
arguments  over  orders  or  strategy,  as  with  Tukhachevsky's  other  disputes,  and  there 
appears  to  be  no  reply  by  01'derogge.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  cavalry  would 
have  encircled  and  cut  off  Kolchak  as  it  had  failed  to  complete  similar  operations 
twice  already.  As  for  the  strategic  argument,  the  second  offensive  was  a  great 
manoeuvre  success,  but  there  is  no  way  to  tell  if  Tukhachevsky  did  plan  this  in 
September. 
However,  if  this  disagreement  did  occur  and  Tukhachevsky  had  suggested  the 
successful  strategy  and  later  complained  about  01'derogge's  rebuff,  it  would  have 
benefited  Tukhachevsky's  reputation  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Don  incident  with 
Gittis.  Also,  despite  withdrawing  150  kms  in  September,  this  was  not  a  rout,  but  a 
fairly  orderly  retreat.  It  gave  Tukhachevsky  another  chance  to  display  his 
reorganisational  skills  and  5th  Army  attacked  successfully  afterwards.  Tukhachevsky 
had  shown  himself  to  be  strategically  astute,  but  also  adaptable  and  able  in  command, 
demonstrating  initiative  to  act  independently  and  quickly  under  great  pressure  to  save 
the  situation.  This  would  have  gone  in  his  favour  as  far  as  further  promotion  was 
concerned.  The  01'derogge  episode  would  again  have  reinforced  his  belief  that  old 
voenspetsy  did  not  understand  class  warfare,  as  the  tactic  Tukhachevsky  proposed  was 
based  on  the  presence  of  hostile  class  elements  on  the  right  flank,  but  01'derogge  did 
not  seem  to  grasp  this.  When  the  second  offensive  worked  because  of  the  same  tactic, 
it  would  have  confirmed  Tukhachevsky's  belief  in  his  class  warfare  methods. 
A  definite  pattern  is  evident  throughout  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  army 
commands  of  him  working  well  and  having  good  relations  with  one  superior,  but  not 
the  next.  Murav'ev  can  be  discounted  as  Tukhachevsky  did  not  fight  a  campaign 
under  his  command,  but  we  can  begin  with  Vacietis.  Tukhachevsky  never  worked 
easily  with  him,  registering  complaints  about  interference,  but  relations  with 
Kamenev  as  Eastern  Front  Commander  went  very  smoothly.  Transferred  to  Southern 
Front,  Tukhachevsky  fell  out  completely  with  Gittis.  Eastern  Front  in  1919  is  slightly 
different  in  that  Kamenev  was  Eastern  Front  Commander,  but  Frunze  commanded 
Southern  Group.  In  this  way,  Tukhachevsky  served  under  both,  but  relations  were 
excellent  and  operations  planned  jointly,  as  has  been  shown.  However,  the  pattern 
reemerges  with  Samoilo's  appearance  and  bitter  complaints  lodged  by  Tukhachevsky 221 
again.  With  Kamenev  restored,  Tukhachevsky  served  happily  under  him  and  Frunze 
until  August.  Only  when  Frunze  was  replaced  by  Ol'derogge  did  a  dispute  arise  again. 
What  lay  behind  this  pattern? 
The  basic  reason  was  a  clash  in  military  outlook  and  how  operations  should  be 
waged.  Frunze  and  Kamenev  fought  the  same  way  as  Tukhachevsky  and  so  they 
worked  well  together,  discussing  tactics  and  acting  upon  advice  from  each  other.  This 
comes  across  in  the  tenor  of  their  communications.  However,  Gittis,  Samoilo  and 
01'derogge  were  three  men  who  failed  to  come  up  to  the  standards  of  Kamenev  and 
Frunze  in  Tukhachevsky's  eyes,  mainly  because  they  thought  differently,  but  also 
because  they  did  not  appreciate  the  changes  in  class  warfare  that  Tukhachevsky  saw 
as  crucial  to  not  only  winning  the  Russian  Civil  War,  but  also  other  civil  and  class 
wars  to  come.  The  Russian  Civil  War  could  be  turned  into  a  European  conflict  and 
perfecting  the  proper  methods  to  fight  it  was  essential,  as  they  would  be  replicated  in 
war-torn  Europe.  Tukhachevsky  wrote  in  cutting  and  sarcastic  terms  about  those  he 
disagreed  with,  but  the  arguments  were  over  military  matters  and  the  nastier  tone, 
which  is  visible  in  the  clipped,  efficient  communications  he  had  with  them,  was  part 
of  this.  No  personal  vendetta  was  aimed  at  these  people,  but  they  were  old  voenspetsy 
who  could  not  adapt  to  civil  warfare  and  so  had  to  be  removed  before  they  did  any 
more  damage.  Vacietis  is  slightly  different  in  that  Tukhachevsky  disagreed  with  his 
defensive  strategy  for  Eastern  Front  in  1919,  but  in  1918,  although  they  had  disagreed 
and  Vacietis  forced  him  to  attack  before  I  st  Army  was  ready,  Tukhachevsky  did  seem 
to  respect  him  and  relations  appear  wanner  in  their  communnications  than  with  Gittis, 
Samoilo  or  01'derogge.  Tukhachevsky  retained  these  types  of  relationships 
throughout  his  life,  unable  to  respect  those  he  disagreed  with  over  fundamental 
military  concepts  and  having  friendships  only  with  those  with  whom  he  readily 
agreed  and  worked  well. 
Partisans  in  Siberia 
A  central  tenet  of  Tukhachevsky's  military  concepts  emerged  in  Siberia  with  5th 
Army.  The  aid  given  by  partisans  in  Kolchak's  rear  caused  a  major  evolution  in  his 
idea  of  the  possibility  of  continuous  offensives  because  of  the  ability  to  mobilise 
class-friendly  troops  along  the  way.  Uprisings  in  the  enemy  rear  had  already  played 222 
an  important  part  in  Samara  in  1918,  forcing  Komuch  troops  to  flee  the  town  to 
prevent  encirclement  as  Ist  Army  approached  from  the  front,  and  adding  1,000  men 
to  Ist  Army  in  addition  to  those  mobilised  en  route  through  Simbirsk  and  Syzran'. 
This  had  been  replicated  in  a  spectacular  manner  at  Cheliabinsk  in  August  1919,5th 
Army's  victory  only  secured  because  8,500  workers  rose  in  the  White  rear,  to  ruin  the 
trap  laid  for  the  Red  troops.  However,  in  the  pursuit  operations  after  this,  a 
completely  new  phenomenon  emerged  which  altered  Tukhachevsky's  thinking 
fundamentally. 
Whilst  conducting  the  continuous  pursuit  of  Kolchak's  forces  to  Kurgan, 
Petropavlovsk  and  Omsk,  Tukhachevsky  had  to  constantly  give  up  troops  for  transfer 
to  Southern  and  Petrograd  Fronts.  However,  5th  Army  numbers  remained  constant 
and  even  rose  as  he  progressed  eastwards  because  of  mobilisation  carried  out  on  the 
move.  Partisan  formations  fought  alongside  5th  Army  formations  and  also  secured  5th 
Army's  rear  and  flanks,  allowing  Tukhachevsky  to  keep  his  regular  troops  in  the  front 
line.  He  wrote  in  January  1920  that  5th  Army  had  successfully  defended  the  open 
steppelands  on  its  flanks  and  rear  by  creating  fortified  areas  under  the  authority  of 
local  military  commissariats.  These  contained  lines  of  separate  blockhouses 
garrisoned  by  small  units  of  platoon  or  company  size,  which  cooperated  with  partisan 
detachments  operating  in  the  countryside  to  defend  against  White  raids,  especially  by 
cavalry.  In  this  way,  5th  Army's  rear  was  secured,  whilst  "not  expending  one  regiment 
of  the  field  army  on  this  matter".  '  17 
Such  support  was  available  because  of  the  vast  Siberian  partisan  movement  which 
rose  against  Kolchak  during  1919.  This  was  encouraged  by  Moscow  from  early  in  the 
year.  The  Siberian  oblast'  Bolshevik  Conference,  on  20th-21st  March  1919,  passed  a 
resolution  to  organise  the  peasantry  for  the  struggle  with  Kolchak,  but  the  partisan 
movement  which  emerged  was  far  more  widespread  than  they  could  have 
anticipated.  '  18  The  Siberian  partisan  composition  differed  from  the  earlier  workers' 
risings  in  Samara  and  Cheliabinsk,  which  Tukhachevsky  had  witnessed  and  used  to 
his  advantage.  The  Siberian  partisans  were  almost  predominantly  peasants  who  were 
rising  against  the  corruption  and  violence  in  the  rear  of  the  Kolchak  regime.  These 
117  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Ukreplennye  raiony",  pp.  89-94. 
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partisans  originated  from  the  section  of  society  not  normally  supportive  of  and 
ambivalent  at  best  towards  the  Bolsheviks.  '  19 
Moscow  jumped  at  this  support,  coordinating  the  partisans  with  the  Siberian 
Revolutionary  Committee,  formed  on  27th  August  by  CEC  decree  under  1.  N. 
Smirnov.,  20  The  Sibrevkom  gained  power  over  all  organs  of  civil  administration  in 
Siberia  and  all  resources,  bar  foodstuffs  and  played  an  integral  part  in  5th  Army's 
success  on  Eastern  Front.  The  peasant  and  Red  partisan  movements  had  been  active  in 
Siberia  for  much  of  Kolchak's  reign,  but  at  this  point  in  many  ways  acted  as 
replacements  for  the  regular  troops  Eastern  Front  lost  to  Southern  and  Petrograd 
Fronts,  crucially  reinforcing  the  depleted  Red  forces  when  the  Red  offensive  began  to 
stall  in  early  September.  As  5th  Army  moved  further  east  and  came  into  closer  contact 
with  the  partisan  formations,  reorganisation  of  the  irregular  troops  was  conducted.  On 
9th  October,  West  Siberian  Peasant  Red  Army  was  created,  with  a  command  staff  and 
military  revolutionary  tribunals.  It  was  commanded  by  a  Siberian  partisan  leader  E. 
M.  Mamontov  and  grew  to  15,000  partisans.  12  1  This  replicated  Tukhachevsky's  Red 
Army  formation  process  in  summer  1918  and  regulated  cooperation  between  5th 
Army  and  partisan  forces. 
G.  V.  Smimov  suggests  the  credit  for  5th  Army's  successful  cooperation  with  Red 
partisans  should  go  solely  to  1.  N.  Smirnov  as  Tukhachevsky  did  not  know  about  the 
secret  work  undertaken  by  his  fellow-RVS  member,  but  this  can  be  discounte 
. 
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Tukhachevsky  and  Smirnov  were  based  together  in  5th  An-ny  HQ  for  virtually  the 
whole  campaign  and  worked  together  on  all  operational  aspects,  including  the  raising 
of  uprisings  and  partisan  activity  in  Kolchak's  rear. 
The  success  of  the  40,000-strong  partisan  forces  in  helping  maintain  5th  Army's 
advance  to  victory  convinced  Tukhachevsky  of  the  efficacy  of  class  warfare.  These 
were  peasants  who  had  rebelled  against  the  bourgeois  Whites  and  supported  the 
advance  of  socialism  and  Tukhachevsky  saw  it  as  one  of  the  major  factors  in  his 
ability  to  maintain  the  continuous  offensive.  He  stated  clearly  in  Strategiia 
natsional'naia  i  klassovaia  that  the  use  of  partisans  in  the  rear  must  be  researched  and 
119  For  a  detailed  study  of  the  Kolchak  regime  see,  J.  Smele,  Civil  War  in  Siberia:  the  anti-Bolshevik 
government  ofAdmiral  Kolchak,  1918-1920,  (Cambridge,  1996). 
120Sibirskaia  Vandeia:  Tom  1,1919-1920.  Dokumenty.  (Moscow,  2000),  doc.  1,  p.  13. 
12  'RTsKhIDNI,  f.  71,  op.  35,  d.  984,  pp.  166-167  &  444;  Efim  Mefod'evich  Mamontov  (1888-1922) 
became  Deputy  Inspector  of  5th  Army  infantry  in  February  1920,  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia 
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utilised  to  the  full  and  he  never  lost  belief  in  its  effectiveness,  stressing  the  point  in 
the  1929  article  on  the  Red  Army  Field  Regulations  which  introduced  "Deep 
Battle".  123  The  ability  to  have  sizeable  forces  in  the  enemy  rear  was  evident  to  him  in 
1919  as  a  vital  method  by  which  to  attack  the  enemy  in  depth,  disrupting 
communications  and  the  ability  to  move  reserves  to  the  front  line.  In  later  years,  with 
technological  developments  and  imagination,  he  tried  to  replicate  the  conditions  he 
had  seen  work  so  well  in  Siberia,  by  introducing  the  notion  of  paratroopers  into  "Deep 
Battle". 
Tukhachevsky  was  the  first  to  experiment  with  dropping  sizeable  formations  of 
lightly-equipped  men  behind  enemy  lines  to  disrupt  the  rear  and  take  out  vital  points 
to  help  the  attack  from  the  front.  The  need  to  reach  these  troops  quickly  because  of 
their  light  armament  was  paramount  to  avoid  their  annihilation  and  so  quick  strike 
tank  formations  were  developed  to  do  so.  These  ideas  all  stemmed  from  what 
Tukhachevsky  had  seen  work  in  action  against  Kolchak.  Partisans  were  crucial  for 
maintaining  offensive  momentum,  disrupting  Kolchak's  rear,  cutting  communications 
and  preventing  reserves  reaching  the  frontlines  with  sabotage  of  transport  and 
transport  routes.  However,  they  could  also  combine  with  infantry  forces  attacking 
from  the  front  travelling  quickly  by  cart,  or  cavalry  conducting  deep  raids  to  the 
enemy's  depth,  and  in  this  way  added  troops  to  the  regular  formations.  The  basic 
operational  ideas  for  "Deep  Battle"  originated  from  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War 
commands.  He  believed  these  were  the  true  methods  to  win  class  war  under  the 
changing  conditions  of  socialism  against  capitalism  and  he  was  determined  from  the 
outset  to  achieve  a  class-based  army  utilising  these  methods.  This  underlay  his 
disagreements  with  those  wishing  to  follow  defensive  or  "national"  warfare  methods. 
It  is  also  possible  that  he  saw  the  development  of  paratroopers  as  either  a  way  to  help 
foment  risings  in  the  rear  of  enemy  armies  or  conversely,  with  the  hopes  for  uprisings 
in  Western  countries  perhaps  fading  by  the  end  of  the  1920s,  this  was  an  alternative  to 
the  help  provided  by  partisans  in  the  rear.  Loyal  troops  dropped  into  the  enemy  rear 
would  do  the  job  instead. 
122  G.  V.  Smimov,  pp.  254-257. 
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From  late  November,  Tukhachevsky  had  the  opportunity  to  disseminate  his  ideas 
as  a  cogent  theory  when  he  was  recalled  to  Moscow  and  then  had  the  chance  to 
practise  them  on  a  front  command  level  in  early  1920. 
Moscow  Interlude 
On  25th  November,  Tukhachevsky  was  recalled  to  Moscow.  '  24  He  was  appointed 
Southern  Front  13th  Army  Commander  on  22nd  December,  but  did  not  leave 
immediately,  delivering  his  lecture  on  24th  December.  On  4th  February,  having 
apparently  not  taken  up  13th  Army  command,  he  was  appointed  Acting  Caucasian 
Front  Commander,  a  post  he  held  until  22nd  April.  Various  stories  and  suggestions 
surround  this  period,  the  only  time  during  the  Civil  War  Tukhachevsky  was  not 
commanding  in  the  field. 
Gul'  suggests  Tukhachevsky  was  recalled  to  Moscow  for  investigation  after  Cheka 
personnel,  tipped  off  by  "enemies",  discovered  Tukhachevsky  had  given  his  wife, 
Marucia,  extra  food  from  his  command  train  to  take  home  to  her  parents.  As  this  was 
illegal  she  shot  herself  on  his  train  to  avoid  disgrace  for  her  husband.  125  Gul'  is  the 
only  source  containing  this  story.  None  of  the  Soviet  biographies  reproduce  it,  but  this 
is  to  be  expected,  whether  it  occurred  or  not.  Post-Soviet  biographies  do  not  mention 
it  either,  not  even  Smimov,  but  of  the  Western  accounts,  Spahr  does  not  mention  it, 
Butson  again  reproduces  it  as  fact  without  question,  whilst  Simpkin  and  Erickson  and 
Kaufmann  question  its  validity.  126  As  previously  mentioned,  Tukhachevsky's  wife  and 
his  family  visited  him  on  the  command  train  and  his  brothers  worked  in  his  staff.  It  is 
possible  to  tendentiously  link  this  story  to  the  arguments  Tukhachevsky  had  with 
Medvedev  about  the  former  using  army  supplies  for  family  and  friends.  However, 
ultimately  Gul's  story  must  be  dismissed  as  more  emigre  gripes.  In  Tukhachevsky's 
personal  file  in  RGVA,  his  sister  Elizabeth  explains  what  happened  to  Marucia.  She 
did  commit  suicide,  but  it  was  nothing  to  with  being  caught  with  contraband 
foodstuffs.  Tukhachevsky  had  an  affair  with  another  woman  whom  he  eventually 
married  and  this  was  the  reason  his  first  wife  committed  suicide.  She  had  taken  drugs 
124  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  Krasnyi  marshal,  (Moscow,  1990),  p.  122. 
125  R.  Gul',  Tukhachevsky.  -  krasnyi  marshal,  (Berlin,  1932),  pp.  112-113. 226 
to  "scare  him"  previously,  but  took  a  large  dose  of  a  sleeping  draught  and  died.  127 
This  explains  the  absence  of  this  seedier  side  to  his  life  in  the  Soviet  biographies.  It 
does  not  sit  well  with  the  image  of  the  Communist  hero.  However,  it  is  unlikely  that 
Tukhachevsky  was  recalled  in  disgrace  because  this  occurred,  although  perhaps  he 
was  given  compassionate  leave. 
Ivanov  suggests  Tukhachevsky  arrived  in  Moscow  at  the  end  of  November,  and 
visited  the  R  VSR  repeatedly,  which  was  based  in  his  old  Aleksandrovskii  Military 
Academy  building,  to  receive  a  new  posting.  However,  he  received  nothing,  probably 
because  of  his  July  statements  about  older  voenspetsy  and  the  need  to  replace  them 
with  communist-commanders.  128  Therefore,  did  the  hierarchy  block  his  appointment? 
Daines,  in  an  archival  ly-based  essay,  writes  the  R  VSR  took  the  decision  to  appoint 
Tukhachevsky  13th  Arrny  Commander  on  6th  November,  when  13th  Army 
Commander  A.  1.  Gekker  fell  ill  and  an  urgent  replacement  was  required.  However, 
once  recalled  (after  the  fall  of  Omsk),  the  ruined  transport  system  prevented 
Tukhachevsky  returning  quickly.  '  29  Gekker  was  not  replaced  until  18th  February 
1920  by  1.  Kh.  Pauka  and  Tukhachevsky  is  not  recorded  as  ever  holding  this 
position. 
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The  ruin  of  the  railways  was  a  major  obstacle  to  travel.  The  situation  worsened  as 
the  Civil  War  progressed  and  also  the  further  from  the  centre  one  travelled. 
Tukhachevsky  was  hundreds  of  miles  away  in  Omsk  when  he  was  recalled.  He 
handed  over  command  to  Eikhe  on  25th  November,  but  evidently  did  not  depart  for 
Moscow  immediately,  signing  an  order  as  a  member  of  5th  Army  RVS  on  3rd 
December.  131  It  appears  the  transport  chaos  delayed  Tukhachevsky  in  Omsk  until  at 
least  this  date  and  it  is  unlikely  he  arrived  in  Moscow  long  before  he  met  Sklianskii. 
Taking  into  account  time  lost  because  of  the  ruined  Civil  War  rail  network  cuts  down 
the  period  Tukhachevsky  was  in  Moscow,  which  is  variously  referred  to  as  "shrouded 
126  T.  Butson,  The  Tsar's  Lieutenant.  The  Soviet  Marshal,  (New  York,  1984),  p.  66;  A.  F.  Kaufmann, 
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in  mystery"  or  a  period  in  which  he  was  "cooling  his  heels".  In  fact,  this  was  not  a 
long  mysterious  gap  in  his  Civil  War  career  at  all.  132 
Tukhachevsky  was  simply  recalled  to  become  13th  Army  Commander  because  he 
had  accomplished  his  task  in  the  East  with  the  capture  of  Omsk  and  Kolchak  was 
finished  as  a  force.  However,  Southern  Front  was  still  locked  in  battle  with  Denikin 
and,  since  Tukhachevsky  was  no  longer  needed  in  the  East,  Moscow  wanted  to  use  its 
best  army  commander  in  the  prioritised  South.  However,  with  the  delays,  it  appears 
Lenin  and  Sklianskii  decided  to  keep  Tukhachevsky  in  Moscow  for  a  few  days  longer 
to  deliver  his  lecture  and  compile  his  report.  G.  V.  Smirnov  suggests  Trotsky  seized 
the  chance  to  "...  bring  his  creature  into  the  light"  and  this  was  why  Tukhachevsky  was 
in  Moscow  for  so  long.  1  33  We  have  already  established  he  was  not  in  Moscow  very 
long  and  although  Trotsky  did  describe  Tukhachevsky  as  "...  one  of  our  best  army 
commanders"  on  12th  December,  it  was  Lenin  who  requested  Tukhachevsky's  report 
and  lecture.  134  The  Red  hierarchy  no  doubt  were  all  anxious  to  hear  what  the 
commander  who  had  chased  Kolchak  back  from  the  Volga  had  to  say. 
1.  N.  Smirnov  had  sent  a  report  to  the  RVSR,  which  Lenin  received  on  15th 
November,  describing  the  command  courses  which  Tukhachevsky  had  formed  to 
recruit  and  train  command  staff  for  5th  Army.  50  battalion  and  company  level  officers 
had  been  produced  and  800  more  were  currently  completing  the  courses.  '  35  This  was 
how  Tukhachevsky  could  claim  5th  Army  had  Red  Commanders  who  were 
communists  and  make  a  case  for  unified  command  in  his  19th  December  report. 
Smirnov's  report  and  Tukhachevsky's  assertions  in  Vozniknovenie  grazhdanskoi  voine 
in  July  1919,  about  the  need  to  replace  old  voens  etsy  with  Red  Commanders,  were  P 
probably  the  catalyst  for  Lenin  requesting  Tukhachevsky's  report  in  December. 
Lenin's  response  to  Tukhachevsky's  report  is  illustrated  by  a  telegram 
Tukhachevsky  sent  on  Lenin's  request  to  1.  N.  Smirnov  on  19th  December,  the  same 
day  Tukhachevsky  submitted  his  report  to  Sklianskii  and  Lenin.  After  reading  the 
report  and  probably  discussing  Eastern  Front  with  Tukhachevsky,  Lenin  instructed 
him  to  ask  Smirnov  to  prepare  the  best  command  staff  of  5th  Army  for  transfer  to 
Southern  Front  "within  a  month"  because  of  the  "severe  insufficiency  of  reliable 
132  A.  F.  Kaufmann  Jr.,  pp.  127-128;  T.  Butson,  p.  66. 
133  G.  V.  Smirnov,  p.  258. 
134  L.  D.  Trotsky,  How  the  Revolution  Armed,  Volume  II.  -  The  Year  1919,  (London,  1979),  p.  113. 
135  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  Izbrannyeproizvedeniia,  Tom  I,  pp.  6-7. 228 
command  staff'  there  and  the  fact  that  "Transfer  of  units  of  5th  Army  is  impossible  in 
a  short  time  because  of  the  state  of  transport".  These  were  the  young  commanders 
from  5th  Army's  military  courses,  the  people  Tukhachevsky  praised  so  highly  and 
recommended  for  promotion  in  his  report.  If  5th  Army  en  masse  could  not  be  quickly 
transferred  south,  at  least  its  commanders  could  be,  to  organise  the  forces  there.  After 
relaying  this  instruction  from  Lenin,  Tukhachevsky  wrote  to  Smirnov, 
I  do  not  know  now  the  circumstances  in  Siberia,  but  if  Kolchak  is  already 
annihilated,  then  this  measure  would  bring  great  advantages.  I  propose  this 
is  fulfilled  as  fully  as  possible  to  boldly  move  for  the  transfer  of  the 
command  staff  of  good  military  commanders  and  excellent  kursanty  and 
to  give  promotion  to  the  young  command  staff.  136 
It  is  interesting  to  see  Tukhachevsky  expressing  his  ignorance  of  the  situation  in 
the  East  and  allowing  Smirnov  to  decide  if  transfers  were  possible,  a  courtesy  he 
probably  wished  had  been  shown  to  himself  previously.  Whether  this  transfer  en 
masse  from  the  East  to  the  South  would  be  greeted  as  well  by  those  already  there  was 
another  matter  and  one  perhaps  influential  in  the  treatment  Tukhachevsky  initially 
received  when  sent  southwards. 
Transfer  to  Caucasian  Front 
Some  uncertainty  lingers  over  the  early  January  1920  period.  Tukhachevsky  was 
apparently  informed  on  22nd  December  that  he  was  still  to  become  13th  Army 
Commander  as  Gekker's  health  had  not  improved.  137  He  delivered  his  lecture  on  24th 
December  and  four  days  later  was  awarded  a  golden  revolver  for  his  command  of  5th 
Army.  138  He  departed  for  Caucasian  Front  shortly  after  this.  Two  essays  in  Voina 
klassov  are  dated  5th  and  18th  January  1920  at  Southern  Front  HQ  in  Kursk,  and  two 
more  were  written  during  this  period,  so  he  spent  much  of  this  time  writing.  '  39 
However,  his  patience  had  evidently  ended  by  19th  January,  as  he  telegrammed 
Trotsky, 
136 
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I  earnestly  ask  you  to  release  me  from  having  nothing  to  do.  I  have  been 
or  almost  three  sitting  around  aimlessly  at  South-Western  Staff  HQ  f 
weeks  and  I  have  been  without  work  for  two  months  in  all.  I  can  neither 
elucidate  the  reason  for  the  delay  nor  obtain  a  further  posting.  If  I  should 
have  any  services  to  my  credit  over  almost  two  years  in  command  of 
various  armies,  I  request  that  I  may  be  given  an  opportunity  of  getting 
down  to  some  active  work  or,  if  this  cannot  be  found  at  the  front,  I  request 
that  I  may  be  given  it  in  the  transport  field  or  military  commissariats. 
Trotsky,  upon  receiving  this,  noted  at  the  bottom  of  the  telegram,  "Inform  Comrades 
Lenin  and  Stalin".  140  It  is  evident  from  this  that  Tukhachevsky  arrived  at  Kursk  in 
early  January,  but  did  not  actively  become  13th  Army  Commander. 
Butson  relates  this  telegram  to  Tukhachevsky  being  punished  for  his  wife's 
indiscretion  with  the  contraband  foodstuffs,  but  this  has  been  shown  not  to  be  the 
case.  He  does  also  mention  Trotsky  blaming  Stalin  for  Tukhachevsky's  idleness  at 
Kursk.  Ivanov  also  stresses  this,  suggesting  Stalin  blocked  Tukhachevsky  taking  up 
the  position,  as  he  looked  on  him  as  either  a  voenspetsy  or  an  outsider  with  whom  he 
did  not  want  to  share  the  defeat  of  Denikin.  This  is  feasible  and  could  have  been 
exacerbated  by  the  transfer  of  5th  Army's  command  staff.  Did  Stalin  feel  the  success 
gained  in  the  south  was  in  danger  of  being  undermined  and  taken  over  by  those 
transferred  from  the  East  who  would  look  to  Tukhachevsky  for  leadership?  As 
Southern  Front  political  commissar,  Stalin  had  the  position  to  block  Tukhachevsky. 
However,  if  he  did  so  initially,  Stalin  played  a  part  in  Tukhachevsky  becoming  Acting 
Caucasian  Front  Commander  on  24th  January. 
Stalin  telegrammed  Voroshilov  and  Budennyi  on  3rd  February, 
Eight  days  ago,  during  my  visit  to  Moscow,  I  achieved  the  replacement  of 
Shorin  and  appointment  of  a  new  Front  Commander  Tukhachevsky  -  the 
conqueror  of  Siberia  and  victor  over  Kolchak.  He  arrived  in  Saratov  only 
today  and  any  day  now  will  join  the  front  command.  141 
Whether  Stalin  did  originally  block  Tukhachevsky's  appointment  as  13th  Army 
Commander,  events  on  Caucasian  Front  worsened  during  January,  forcing  Stalin  to 
demand  a  replacement  for  Front  Commander  Shorin.  Therefore,  perhaps 
Tukhachevsky  was  in  the  right  place  at  the  right  time  again.  However,  I  would 
suggest  this  is  an  instance  in  which  Stalin  has  simply  been  pinned  with  the  blame,  as 
he  is  for  most  things  which  went  wrong  in  the  Soviet  Union  during  his  time.  He 
sounded  delighted  in  the  telegram  to  have  secured  Tukhachevsky's  posting  and  by  this 
140  j.  M.  Meijer,  ed.  The  Trotsýy  Papers,  Volume  II,  doc.  43  9,  pp.  10-  13. 
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point  I  do  not  think  he  doubted  Tukhachevsky's  credentials.  Stalin  later  described 
Tukhachevsky  as  the  "Demon  of  the  Civil  War"  and  with  Caucasian  Front  falling 
apart  in  January  he  was  glad  to  have  him  there.  142  It  is  also  possible  Tukhachevsky 
was  kept  inactive  on  Caucasian  Front  because  the  voenspetsy  there  did  not  take  kindly 
to  him  after  his  December  comments  and  Shorin  blocked  his  posting.  This  is  probably 
the  most  likely  scenario. 
Lenin  sent  a  telegramm  to  Trotsky  asking  "...  2)  Where  is  Tukhachevsky?  3)  How 
are  things  on  Caucasian  Front?  ".  143  This  has  been  dated  as  after  7th  February  because 
of  a  reference  to  Kolchak  which  could  have  been  about  his  execution,  but  it  is 
possible  this  was  written  when  he  was  under  arrest  and  before  the  execution  had 
occurred.  Either  way,  Lenin  was  curious  as  to  what  Tukhachevsky  was  doing  and  the 
reference  to  Caucasian  Front  suggests,  if  it  was  sent  earlier,  Lenin  wanted 
Tukhachevsky  to  go  there.  Trotsky  had  informed  Lenin  and  Stalin  of  Tukhachevsky's 
19th  January  telegram  and  Lenin,  Trotsky  and  Stalin  evidently  met  and  decided  to 
appoint  Tukhachevsky.  Tukhachevsky's  telegram  also  negates  the  suggestion  that  he 
was  previously  under  investigation  in  Moscow,  as  he  would  not  have  written  he  could 
not  "elucidate"  the  reasons  for  the  delay  in  his  receiving  a  posting,  if  he  had  been. 
For  Tukhachevsky  to  be  deemed  capable  of  handling  front  command,  which 
Trotsky  had  advised  against  a  year  earlier,  shows  he  must  have  impressed  during  his 
time  in  Moscow.  Perhaps  an  element  of  luck  was  still  involved,  being  in  right  the 
place  at  the  right  time  to  replace  Shorin,  but  Tukhachevsky  again  had  to  prove  himself 
capable  of  fulfilling  this  higher  role.  However,  as  Stalin  recognised,  he  was  the  man 
who  infamously  led  5th  Army  to  the  final  rout  of  Kolchak.  Therefore,  when  Denikin 
was  threatening  to  regain  the  initiative  in  the  South,  the  boost  to  morale  for  Caucasian 
Front  of  gaining  the  leadership  of  a  now  renowned  military  commander  would  have 
been  tangible  and  was  probably  considered  in  Moscow's  decision. 
Caucasian  Front  Commander:  February-April  1920 
Tukhachevsky  assumed  the  post  of  Caucasian  Front  Commander  on  2nd  February 
1920  and  held  it  until  24th  April,  by  which  time  he  had  completely  routed  the  Armed 
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Forces  of  South  Russia,  and  for  the  second  time  in  six  months  forced  the  Supreme 
Ruler  of  Russia  to  flee  the  oncoming  Red  Army-144Unlike  Kolchak  however,  Denikin 
managed  to  escape  with  his  life,  leaving  Russia  for  Turkey  on  an  Allied  transport  on 
4th  April,  handing  over  command  of  the  remaining  White  troops  in  the  Crimea  to 
Baron  Petr  Wrangel.  Disagreements  between  the  two  Southern  White  supremos 
contributed  to  the  disintegration  of  the  White  forces.  Denikin  removed  Wrangel  from 
his  command  after  learning  of  a  plot  by  the  latter  to  replace  him  as  Supreme 
Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia.  Also,  the  Kuban  Government 
refused  to  help  Denikin,  not  recognising  his  authority,  which  led  him  to  threaten  the 
abandonment  of  the  Kuban.  145  This  bickering  was  symptomatic  of  the  White 
movement  and  weakened  it,  easing  the  path  of  the  Red  Caucasian  Front,  as  did  the 
fact  that  Denikin's  rear  collapsed  rapidly  around  him  amid  partisan  activity.  However, 
this  was  encouraged  by  the  major  factor  in  the  White  defeat,  the  February-April  Red 
North  Caucasus  Operation,  Tukhachevsky's  meticulously  planned  and  executed 
offensive,  which  in  hindsight  was  perhaps  the  apogee  of  his  wartime  command  career. 
Its  stunning  success,  kickstarting  the  Red  offensive  in  the  Caucasus  which  had 
completely  stalled  in  mid-January,  led  to  Kamenev  recommending  him  as  Western 
Front  Commander  in  March  to  take  on  Poland.  Was  the  North  Caucasus  Operation 
influenced  by  Tukhachevsky's  earlier  campaigns,  did  it  reflect  his  Moscow  analysis 
and  are  there  any  pointers  towards  why  the  Polish  campaign  failed  afterwards? 
Circumstances  on  Southern  Front  had  radically  changed  between  November  1919 
and  January  1920,  with  Denikin  pushed  back  from  whence  he  came.  The  rising  Polish 
threat  in  the  West  led  to  the  reorganisation  of  Southern  and  South-Eastem  Fronts  into 
South-Westem  and  Caucasian  Fronts,  in  accordance  with  the  geographical  areas  in 
which  they  now  operated.  South-Westem  Front  under  A.  1.  Egorov  was  based  at 
Kharkov  and  Caucasian  Front  under  V.  1.  Shorin  was  based  at  Rostov.  146 
After  the  reorganisation,  Shorin  ordered  a  renewed  offensive.  The  direction  of  the 
attack,  the  Don-Manych'  Operation,  and  his  choice  of  troops  for  the  main  sector  led  to 
a  collapse  in  Red  morale,  retreat  before  a  White  counter-attack  and  Shorin's  removal. 
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By  mid-January  1920,  the  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia  had  split  into  three 
groups.  Red  South-Western  Front  formed  screens  against  Polish  incursions  into 
Ukraine,  whilst  pushing  on  to  Odessa  and  Crimea,  pursuing  and  routing  the  two 
smaller  White  groups  retreating  here.  Caucasian  Front  faced  the  largest  White  group 
under  Denikin,  containing  Don  Army,  the  remnants  of  Kuban  Army  and  the 
Volunteer  Corps.  Wrangel  had  reorganised  and  reduced  the  Volunteer  Army  to  corps 
size  in  early  December  as  losses  sustained  through  battle,  disease  and  desertion  were 
not  replaced.  Continued  retreat  through  a  hostile  peasant  rear  prevented  mobilisation 
of  reinforcements.  147  Retreating  down  the  left  bank  of  the  River  Don,  the  Whites, 
numbering  around  11,000  cavalry  and  13,000  infantry,  headed  for  the  North 
Caucasus.  By  mid-January  the  Volunteer  Corps  occupied  Azov  Sea-Bataisk  area,  with 
the  fortified  zone  of  Bataisk  on  its  left  flank.  The  Don  Cavalry  (3  Cavalry  Corps) 
were  positioned  around  Ol'ginskaia  Station  area  and  south  of  Bataisk  were  3  Kuban 
Cavalry  Corps  in  reserve. 
Facing  the  largest  White  force,  Caucasian  Front  was  prioritised  by  Moscow  and 
allocated  more  troops,  gaining  8th  Army  and  Ist  Cavalry  Army  from  South-Western 
Front  and  a  further  five  divisions  to  complement  its  9th,  I  Oth  and  II  th  Armies.  This 
occurred  on  9th  January,  and  Shorin  continued  South-Eastem  Front's  offensive, 
concentrating  on  the  Volunteer  Corps,  to  clear  Rostov-on-the-Don  area.  148  This  task 
was  allocated  on  14th  January  to  Ist  Cavalry  Army  under  Semen  Budennyi  and  8th 
Army  under  G.  Ia.  Sokol'nikov.  149  On  15th  January,  the  former  comprised  9,000 
cavalry  and  9th  and  12th  divisions'  5,000  infantry.  Positioned  along  the  front  Rostov- 
on-the-Don-Novocherkassk-Aksai',  8th  Army  comprised  11,000  infantry  and  2,022 
cavalry,  with  1,681  light  and  heavy  guns.  9th,  I  Ith  and  10th  Armies,  the  latter  of 
which  recaptured  Tsaritsyn  on  2nd  January,  were  to  advance  with  supporting 
operations.  1  50 
Therefore,  the  Reds  had  numerical  superiority  and  with  morale  high,  especially 
amongst  the  unstoppable  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  prospects  for  a  further  Red  victory  were 
favourable.  However,  Shorin,  disregarding  Budennyi's  request  to  cross  the  frozen 
River  Don  and  envelop  the  Bataisk  stronghold  in  the  rear,  ordered  a  frontal  attack  by 
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I  st  Cavalry  Army  over  the  Don  from  Rostov  to  Bataisk,  through  a  low-lying  marshy 
plain  intersected  by  streams  and  lakes.  This  prevented  rapid  advance  and  forced  the 
Red  cavalry  together  as  they  attempted  to  cross  the  mainly  impassable  land  before 
Bataisk,  allowing  the  Whites  to  concentrate  fire  on  the  bunched  cavalrymen  -  hardly 
the  ideal  offensive  situation  for  a  cavalry  force  requiring  freedom  of  movement  and 
swift  manoeuvrability  to  succeed. 
Shorin  authorised  the  operation  on  15th  January  and  ordered  its  continuation  on 
17th  and  19th,  despite  the  failure  of  I  st  Cavalry  Army  and  8th  Army  to  make  any 
ground  on  Bataisk.  15  1  The  repeated  frontal  attacks  by  Ist  Cavalry  Army  cost  it  almost 
half  its  number  in  casualties  and  a  collapse  in  morale  and  provoked  stinging  rebukes 
from  Budennyi,  backed  by  10th  Army  Commissar  Voroshilov,  a  powerful  figure  in 
the  Red  South. 
Kamenev  tried  to  salvage  the  offensive,  submitting  a  report  on  22nd  January  to 
Trotsky,  demanding  more  troops  for  Caucasian  Front.  He  reported  that  8th  and  9th 
Armies  and  I  st  Cavalry  Army  had  successfully  pushed  Denikin's  forces  over  the  Don, 
but  a  crossing  was  impossible  with  all  bridges  destroyed  except  the  rail  crossing  at 
Rostov.  This  was  defended  by  entrenched  Whites  on  the  southern  bank,  who  had 
reinforced  and  regrouped,  rendering  a  boat  crossing  impossible.  Commenting  on 
Caucasian  Front's  low  quality  troops  and  poorly-trained  command  staff,  the  majority 
of  whom  were  not  capable  of  manoeuvre  warfare,  Kamenev  stressed  the  need  to 
quickly  transfer  troops  from  all  over  the  Soviet  Republic  -  40,000  initially,  then 
60,000,  even  up  to  100,000.  Quantity  rather  than  quality  would  break  through  the 
entrenched  White  forces. 
152 
Also  on  22nd  January,  Kamenev  directed  9th  Army  to  postpone  its  attack,  as  8th 
Army  and  I  st  Cavalry  Army  had  failed  to  cross  the  Don  the  previous  day  and  would 
not  do  so  under  present  conditions.  9th  and  10th  Armies  were  to  manoeuvre  for  a 
breakthrough  of  the  River  Manych'  line  with  Dumenko's  cavalry,  into  the  rear  of 
Volunteer  An-ny,  which  was  entrenched  in  front  of  8th  Army  and  Ist  Cavalry 
Army.  153  Changing  the  direction  of  the  attack  hinted  at  what  Tukhachevsky  would  do 
the  next  month.  However,  Shorin  relayed  Kamenev's  directive,  ordering  9th  and  10th 
Armies  to  manoeuvre  across  the  Manych'  into  the  White  rear,  but  did  not  alter  Ist 
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Cavalry  Army's  and  8th  Army's  tasks.  154  8th  Anny,  I  st  Cavalry  Army  and  Dumenko's 
Cavalry  Corps  were  pushed  back  to  Rostov  by  a  counter-attack  on  29th  January  by  a 
20,000  strong  cavalry  force  led  by  Mamontov.  155  Shorin  flung  the  Red  forces  into 
another  frontal  attack  on  31  st  January,  which  despite  isolated  breakthroughs,  was 
pushed  back  again.  This  was  the  last  straw  for  Budennyi  who  wrote  to  Lenin  on  Ist 
February, 
... 
I  have  to  inform  you  comrade  Lenin  that  the  Cavalry  Army  is  going 
through  a  difficult  time.  Never  yet  has  anyone  beaten  my  cavalry,  like  the 
Whites  have  beaten  it  now.  And  they  have  beaten  it  because  the  Front 
Commander  has  positioned  the  Cavalry  Army  in  such  conditions,  that  it 
might  perish  altogether.  It  is  shameful  for  me  to  speak  to  you  about  this, 
but  I  love  the  Cavalry  Army,  yet  I  love  the  Revolution  still  more.  And  the 
cavalry  is  still  very  necessary  to  the  Revolution.  Front  Commander  Shorin 
first  positioned  the  cavalry  in  the  Don  swamp  and  obstructed  the  crossing 
of  the  River  Don.  The  enemy  profited  by  this  and  nearly  wiped  out  all  our 
cavalry.  And  when  the  RVS  demanded  that  the  line  of  advance  of  the 
Cavalry  Army  be  changed,  comrade  Shorin  deprived  me  of  the  army 
infantry  entrusted  to  me...  the  Cavalry  Army  was  thrown  alone  against  the 
enemy  and  for  a  second  time  ended  up  being  severely  knocked  about. 
During  the  whole  of  my  command  there  were  never  any  tragic  events  like 
these.  And  since  only  Shorin  had  the  right  to  decide  on  the  disposition  of 
the  anny  entrusted  to  me,  so  calamities  poured  out.  As  far  back  as  26th 
October  1919  when  I  was  subordinate  to  comrade  Shorin,  he  gave  me  a 
task  which  damaged  our  prospects  and  was  beneficial  to  the  enemy.  Then 
I  told  him  about  this  by  telegraph  and  he,  evidently,  was  hurt  and 
remembered  it,  and  now  all  that  is  being  reflected  in  our  revolutionary 
work.  Today  I  got  the  assignment  of  beating  the  enemy  and  moving  on  60 
versty,  but  the  neighbouring  armies  are  stationed  according  to  Shorin's 
directive  in  the  place  and  in  such  a  way  they  give  the  enemy  the  chance  of 
removing  his  units  from  the  front  and  throwing  them  in  against  the 
Cavalry  Army.  That  is  a  patent  crime.  I  beg  you  to  turn  your  attention  to 
the  Cavalry  Army  and  other  armies,  else  they  lay  down  their  lives  in  vain 
because  of  such  criminal  command.  156 
The  similarity  in  tone  and  invective  to  Tukhachevsky's  telegram  to  Lenin  about 
Gittis  is  striking.  Evidently  Budennyi  felt  little  sympathy  towards  this  old  voenspets 
either. 
Stalin  was  instructed  to  travel  from  South-Westem  to  Caucasian  Front,  to  join  its 
RVS,  taking  political  workers  and  reinforcements  with  him  to  restore  the  situation. 
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However,  he  sent  a  reply  to  Lenin  and  Trotsky  stating  he  was  unwell  and  should  not 
travel  and  did  not  think  one  man  would  make  any  difference  anyway.  He  continued, 
... 
it  is  not  journeys  by  individuals  that  are  needed  but  the  transfer  of 
cavalry-reserves,  the  South-West  being  without  them.  Moreover  the  delay 
in  taking  the  situation  in  hand  has  absorbed  precisely  as  much  time  as  that 
wasted  by  us  in  standing  still  on  the  line  Rostov-Manych',  for  which 
thanks  to  Shorin.  Budennyi  and  Ordzhonikidze  consider  the  unskilful 
command  exercised  by  Shorin  to  be  the  reason  for  our  failures....  '  57 
On  3rd  February  Kamenev  directed  Caucasian  Front  RVS,  "Military  action  of  the 
combined  cavalry  on  the  Front's  right  flank  again  failed  on  I  st  February  because  there 
was  no  support  from  8th  and  9th  Armies'  infantry".  He  halted  all  attacks  on  Bataisk 
and  declared  a  new  plan  of  attack  should  be  formulated, 
regrouping  forces  to  enable  attacks  with  a  concentration  of  forces,  well 
coordinated  in  terms  of  time  and  direction  to  achieve  the  generally  laid 
down  tasks.  Special  attention  should  be  paid  to  newly-arriving  divisions 
and  steps  quickly  taken  to  restore  order  to  the  front  and  relaunch  the 
offensive.  158 
Therefore,  when  Tukhachevsky  relieved  Caucasian  Front  Chief-of-Staff 
Afanas'ev,  who  had  apparently  taken  over  as  Acting  Caucasian  Front  Commander  on 
24th  January,  although  Shorin  still  signed  the  orders,  he  again  had  to  reorganise 
crumbling  troops,  but  a  front,  not  just  an  army.  159  9th  Army  R  VS  member 
Beloborodov  telegrarnmed  Moscow  on  3rd-4th  February  after  Mamontov's  counter- 
attack,  noting, 
The  situation  that  has  developed  so  unfavourably  for  us  was  brought  about 
by  the  extreme  reduction  in  strength  of  our  regiments,  which  have  not 
been  made  up  in  numbers  since  the  very  beginning  of  the  general  advance 
and  have  thinned  out  in  the  fighting  and  been  devastated  by  typhus.  The 
enemy,  by  means  of  general  mobilisation  and  rounding  up  all  horses,  has 
been  able  to  get  his  cavalry  back  into  shape,  after  putting  all  Cossack 
deserters  into  the  line;  and  at  present  has  at  his  disposal  more  man-power 
than  us.  Absence  of  reinforcements,  which  were  despatched  too  late  or 
held  up  in  transit  on  the  railway,  threatens  to  turn  our  individual  failures 
into  a  general  crisis  on  the  whole  Caucasian  Front.  '  60 
Reorganisation  of  Caucasian  Front,  especially  the  demoralised  8th  Anny  and  I  st 
Cavalry  Army,  was  essential  to  bring  them  back  up  to  fighting  strength. 
157  j.  M.  Meijer,  ed.,  The  Trotsky  Papers,  Vol.  II,  doc.  447,  pp.  26-29. 
158  DGkKA,  doc.  73  1,  pp.  730-73  1. 
159  DkfKA  Toni  IV,  p.  530;  lu.  A.  Shchetinov  &  B.  A.  Starkov,  p.  126. 
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Simultaneously,  to  seize  back  the  initiative  in  the  North  Caucasus,  a  successful 
offensive  was  required.  Shorin's  attempts  with  the  Don-Manych'  Operation  had 
wholly  failed.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  decided  on  a  change  of  direction  and  target, 
as  suggested  by  Kamenev's  directive,  to  achieve  the  breakthrough. 
Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  now  worked  in  higher  positions  than  on  Eastern 
Front  in  1919,  but  retained  the  same  working  relationship.  The  plan  for  the  North 
Caucasus  Operation  followed  Kamenev's  general  directive,  but  Tukhachevsky  worked 
it  out  by  local  conditions  and  the  two  men  discussed  it.  It  was  a  brilliantly-calculated 
combined  arms  operation,  concentrating  the  majority  of  Caucasian  Front  forces  for 
large  enveloping  manoeuvres  by  cavalry  and  infantry  to  outflank  Denikin's  forces  on 
their  right  and  push  back  their  centre.  Meanwhile,  a  frontal  infantry  screen  pinned 
down  the  strongpoint  of  Bataisk  on  the  White  left  flank,  which  had  previously  proved 
impossible  to  penetrate  with  the  cavalry.  This  was  the  plan  to  encircle  and  annihilate 
Denikin's  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia  in  the  Caucasus.  It  was  the  archetypal  Civil 
War  strategic  combat  operation  as  formulated  by  Tukhachevsky  in  Voina  klassov,  and 
its  success  vindicated  at  this  time  his  military  writings  on  the  conflict. 
The  operational  success  was  even  more  remarkable  because  of  several  new  factors 
for  Tukhachevsky.  He  had  never  previously  fought  in  the  Northern  Caucasus  and  was 
not  familiar  with  local  conditions  for  planning  his  operation.  More  significantly 
however,  Tukhachevsky  commanded  a  sizeable  cavalry  force  for  the  first  time.  I  st 
Cavalry  Army  is  the  Red  formation  most  often  mentioned  in  writings  on  the  Red 
Army  in  the  Civil  War  and  the  role  of  cavalry,  because  of  its  ability  to  manoeuvre 
quickly,  is  often  presented  as  a  key  factor  in  Civil  War  combat.  However, 
Tukhachevsky  had  achieved  his  success  with  virtually  no  cavalry  formations  under 
his  command,  3-4,000  at  most.  He  had  fought  a  manoeuvre  war  with  infantry.  This 
had  forced  him  to  use  any  resources  available,  motorised  vehicles  and  boats  when 
possible,  but  mainly  railways  and  carts.  Caucasian  Front  was  the  only  time  in  his 
command  career  he  commanded  a  cavalry  army. 
Therefore,  he  could  be  expected  to  have  struggled  to  employ  this  correctly. 
However,  a  major  difference  he  brought  to  Caucasian  Front  was  to  end  Shorin's 
incorrect  employment  of  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and  prove  remarkably  astute  in  using 
cavalry.  The  result  was  a  combined  arms  operation  which  Tukhachevsky  planned  and 
coordinated  to  achieve  the  type  of  encirclement  he  had  so  often  attempted  on  Eastern 237 
Front.  Smimov  criticises  Tukhachevsky  for  consistently  failing  to  execute 
encirclements  successfully  on  Eastern  Front,  "'  but  the  bare  facts  are  he  did  not  have 
enough  mobile  troops  to  do  so.  Infantry  in  carts  were  not  as  mobile  or  quick  as 
cavalry  and  were  more  restricted  by  rough  terrain.  Tukhachevsky  finally  had  some 
cavalry  from  September  1919,  but  they  were  raw  and  inexperienced  and  were 
withdrawn  at  Omsk  when  he  thought  an  encirclement  was  possible.  He  had  employed 
cavalry  successfully  for  reconnaissance  and  raiding,  to  disrupt  communications  and 
transport  resources  in  the  White  rear,  but  on  Caucasian  Front  he  achieved  success 
with  I  st  Cavalry  Army  in  a  full-scale  operation. 
The  fact  that  Tukhachevsky  did  not  use  cavalry  in  1919  must  have  influenced  his 
thought.  He  mainly  had  to  use  carts,  but  saw  the  advantage  of  motorised  vehicles  to 
transport  infantry  and  would  develop  this  into  tank  formations  later.  Whilst  Budennyi 
and  Voroshilov  remained  loyal  to  the  horse  with  which  they  had  found  victory, 
Tukhachevsky  benefited  from  his  need  to  improvise  and  innovate  to  use  the  most 
effective  means  available.  The  openness  to  varied  ideas  he  developed  allowed  him  to 
broaden  his  theories  to  incorporate  mechanised  formations. 
Influential  Fi2ures 
As  with  previous  commands,  Tukhachevsky  worked  in  the  Caucasus  with  figures 
who  were  important  at  the  time,  but  also  in  later  life.  Perhaps  the  most  notable  of 
these  was  Grigorii  Konstantinovich  (Sergo)  Ordzhonikidze,  a  Communist  Party 
heavyweight  and  member  since  1903  who  had  become  Caucasian  Front  R  VS  political 
162 
commissar  on  3rd  February  and  held  this  position  until  29th  May  1921 
. 
Tukhachevsky  and  Ordzhonikidze  formed  a  lasting  working  and  personal  relationship 
in  the  Caucasus,  remaining  close  friends  and  collaborating  during  the  1930s,  when 
Ordzhonikidze  served  as  Commissar  for  Heavy  Industry,  when  Tukhachevsky  was 
Deputy  Defence  Commissar.  They  cooperated  in  forming  the  Military-Industrial 
Complex  which  dominated  the  Soviet  Union  for  its  duration.  The  untimely  suicide  in 
1937  of  Ordzhonikidze  in  an  NKVD  cell  removed  the  last  major  Party  figure 
16  1  G.  V.  Smirnov,  pp.  253-255. 
162  Sergo  Ordzhonikidze  (1886-1937)  served  as  political  commissar  in  the  Don  Soviet  Republic  and  at 
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protective  of  Tukhachevsky  and  paved  the  way  for  Stalin  to  conduct  the  military 
purge  in  May-June  1937. 
The  other  Caucasian  Front  RVS  members,  V.  A.  Trifonov  and  1.  T.  Smilga,  had 
comprised  South-Eastern  Front  RVS,  so  provided  continuity  for  the  Front. 
Tukhachevsky  had  previously  met  the  final  RVS  member,  S.  1.  Gusev,  at  Sviiazhsk 
with  Trotsky  in  1918. 
Tukhachevsky  had  Gai  under  his  command  again  in  the  Caucasus,  leading  2nd 
Cavalry  Corps  after  Dumenko's  arrest.  163 
Reor$!  anisation  and  Preparation 
Tukhachevsky  quickly  acted  upon  Kamenev's  3rd  February  directive  and  on  6th 
February  ordered  Caucasian  Front  Armies  to  prepare  for  an  offensive  into  the  North 
Caucasus.  The  first  step  was  to  stabilise  the  line  in  Rostov  sector  at  the  juncture  of  8th 
and  9th  Armies,  where  Mamontov  had  counter-attacked  from  Bataisk  and  the  Whites 
were  "most  active".  Therefore,  I  st  Cavalry  Army  was  instructed  initially  to  remain  in 
position,  ready  to  aid  8th  Army's  left  flank  and  9th  Army's  right  flank,  with  a  rifle 
division  to  transfer  to  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and  supply  the  infantry  support  denied  by 
Shorin.  Demarcation  lines  between  the  frontline  forces  were  marked  out,  but  also 
between  the  rear  and  front  of  the  annies.  Tukhachevsky  instructed  army  commanders 
to  recognise  their  rear  as  separate  from  their  front  area  within  a  ten-day  period,  thus 
allowing  them  to  mobilise  reinforcements  within  their  areas  and  maintain  supply  and 
communication  lines.  All  resources  were  to  be  used  for  reinforcing.  164  Tukhachevsky 
was  stressing  the  importance  of  the  rear  in  strategic  terms  for  planning  offensive 
operations  and  impressing  this  on  the  army  commanders  under  him,  a  crucial  part  of 
operational  art  which  would  be  developed  after  the  Civil  War. 
On  7th  February,  Tukhachevsky  informed  8th  Army  Commander  Sokol'nikov, 
...  the  enemy  is  regrouping  and  concentrating  cavalry  units  in  Azov- 
Bataisk  area,  possibly  with  the  aim  of  active  action  in  Rostov- 
Novocherkassk  area. 
163  Boris  Mokeevich  Dumenko  (1888-1920),  a  foriner  Tsarist  cavalry  sergeant-major.  He  was  arrested 
and  executed  under  military  tribunal  after  authorising  the  execution  of  his  political  commissar  V.  N. 
Mikeladze,  Grazhdanskaia  voina  i  voennaia  interventsiia  v  SSSR.  Entsiklopediia,  p.  20  1. 
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...  take  all  measures  for  holding  the  positions  your  army  now  occupies, 
since  enemy  success  could  hinder  the  proposed  operation.  '  65 
From  reconnaissance,  Tukhachevsky  calculated  Denikin  was  planning  to 
breakthrough  in  Rostov  area  to  prevent  a  renewed  Red  Caucasian  Front  offensive, 
seize  the  initiative  and  throw  the  Reds  back.  To  prevent  this,  Tukhachevsky  decided 
to  launch  a  pre-emptive  strike,  despite  Caucasian  Front  not  being  reorganised  or  ready 
in  every  sector.  He  gambled  that  by  creating  a  strong  enough  attack-group,  a  quick 
breakthrough  could  be  achieved,  which  would  offset  any  gains  made  by  Denikin  in 
the  weaker  section  of  the  Red  line  at  Rostov.  By  instructing  8th  Army  to  hold  fast,  he 
played  for  time  to  regroup  his  other  forces  to  bypass  and  envelop  the  Bataisk 
strongpoint  and  enable  an  advance  across  the  whole  Front  and  envelopment  with  the 
powerful  Red  left  flank.  This  placed  8th  Army  in  a  precarious  position,  but 
Tukhachevsky  was  willing  to  cede  ground  here,  as  it  would  actually  draw  the 
Volunteer  Army  forward  and  allow  the  envelopment  to  perhaps  become  an 
encirclement. 
On  9th  February,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  Caucasian  Front  annies  to  regroup 
within  four  days.  8th  Army  was  to  increase  its  frontage  to  cover  from  the  Sea  of  Azov 
to  the  River  Manych',  to  screen  the  areas  it  and  I  st  Cavalry  Army  currently  occupied, 
allowing  the  latter  to  withdraw  from  the  frontal  attack  on  Bataisk  and  transfer  to  the 
centre  of  the  Red  Front  between  9th  and  10th  Armies.  The  plan  was  to  drive  a  wedge 
between  Don  and  Kuban  Armies  with  Ist  Cavalry  Army,  which  would  also  cut  off 
Don  Army's  path  of  retreat  at  Tikhoretskaia  Station  and  form  concentrated  attack 
groups  with  9th  and  I  Oth  Army.  9th  Anny  guarded  8th  Army's  left  flank  and  had  I  Oth 
Army  on  its  left.  9th  Army  was  to  cross  the  Manych'  and  press  Don  Army  from  the 
front,  whilst  I  Oth  Army  was  advance  to  Armavir  and  cut  Kuban  Army's  path  of  retreat 
there.  II  th  Army  was  to  send  an  Expeditionary  Force  to  clear  the  western  shore  of  the 
Caspian  Sea.  With  its  main  forces,  it  was  to  hold  Caucasian  Front's  left  flank  and 
sweep  down  to  secure  Stavropol',  cutting  the  White  path  of  retreat  south-east  down 
the  railways  from  Tikhoretskaia,  through  Stavropol'  and  Armavir  to  Kavkazkaia- 
Vladikavkaz-Petrovsk.  166  In  this  way,  the  White  forces  were  to  be  split,  enveloped  on 
their  right-flank  and  driven  south-west  towards  the  Sea  of  Azov.  8th  Army  with 
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16,327  troops  was  to  bear  the  main  White  attack,  whilst  the  other  four  armies 
numbering  65,171  troops  were  to  envelop  and  crush.  Therefore,  a  bare  frontal  screen 
was  to  hold  the  strongest  White  sector,  whilst  the  majority  of  Red  forces  were  to 
bypass  the  White  strongpoint  and  effect  an  enveloping  and  encircling  manoeuvre  to 
breakthrough  in  the  weak  sector,  despite  being  outnumbered  over  the  whole  front.  167 
On  12th  February,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  the  attack  to  begin  in  two  days  time 
emphasising,  "Begin  offensive  simultaneously  with  all  available  forces,  not 
weakening  yourselves  with  excessive  reserves.  Act  with  compact  attack  groups".  168 
Strategic  reserves  were  not  to  be  retained,  with  all  troops  used  in  the  initial  attack,  as 
Tukhachevsky  remained  loyal  to  his  previous  tactics. 
This  also  reflected  the  limited  time  and  troop  numbers  Tukhachevsky  had  at  his 
disposal.  The  Western  Front  situation  with  Poland  was  deteriorating  and  Lenin 
instructed  Stalin  on  I  Oth  February,  "...  the  troops  now  freed  after  taking  Odessa  are  not 
to  remain  on  the  Dnestr,  but  move  to  Western  Front  to  guarantee  it  from  the  Poles".  169 
On  19th  February,  Lenin  instructed  Trotsky  and  5th  Army  Commander  Smimov  that 
in  Siberia  there  should  be, 
11 
...  not  a  step  further  east,  all  forces  to  be  exerted  for  the  swift  movement 
of  troops  and  steamships  to  the  west  to  Russia".  We  shall  be  idiots  if  we 
distract  ourselves  with  a  deep  movement  into  the  depths  of  Siberia,  and  in 
this  time  Denikin  revives  and  the  Poles  attack.  This  would  be  a  crime.  170 
Tukhachevsky  knew  the  liklihood  of  an  armed  conflict  with  Poland  was  rising  and 
he  would  lose  resources.  With  Western  Front  being  strengthened,  despite  Caucasian 
Front  still  being  prioritised,  he  did  not  necessarily  have  first  refusal  on 
reinforcements.  This  made  a  swift  victory  in  the  Caucasus  essential  and  illustrates  the 
dual  process  behind  the  development  of  continuous  offensives  as  the  Red  method  in 
the  Civil  War.  They  were  used  to  keep  the  enemy  in  constant  retreat,  disallowing 
regrouping  and  reinforcing,  but  also  campaigns  had  to  be  conducted  as  quickly  as 
possible  to  release  resources  for  the  next  front.  This  idea  never  disappeared  from 
Soviet  military  thinking  as  the  Soviet  Union  was  Permanently  surrounded  by 
167  Ibid.  Tom  IV,  pp.  120-123. 
168  Ibid.  Tom  11,  doc.  450,  pp.  482-483. 
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Irkutsk,  DGkKA,  doc.  593,  p.  600.  This  was  achieved  on  7th  March. 241 
capitalism  and  would  have  to  defeat  different  foes  successively  to  survive,  as 
Tukhachevsky  noted  in  1926.171 
On  15th  February,  Caucasian  Front  comprised  overall  214,783  and  97,082  men 
and  horses  respectively.  By  I  st  April,  when  the  operation  was  almost  over,  this  had 
risen  to  378,316  and  147,696.172  Transfers  from  other  fronts,  mobilisations  within 
Caucasian  Front  areas,  incorporation  of  partisans  into  Red  Armies  as  they  advanced, 
and  deserters  from  the  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia,  all  contributed  to  the  increase, 
replacing  casualties. 
On  15th  February,  frontline  Caucasian  Front  forces  numbered  11,876  command 
staff,  47,560  infantry  and  22,759  cavalry,  with  591  guns,  2,732  machine-guns  and  8 
armoured-trains,  against  the  60,520  infantry  and  31,560  cavalry,  451  guns  and  1,185 
machine-guns  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia.  173  Superiority  of  numbers  lay 
with  the  Whites  early  in  the  campaign  and  Denikin  introduced  reinforcements  before 
the  Red  offensive  began.  However,  by  I  st  May,  the  Whites  numbered  60,000  infantry 
in  Sochi  sector,  but  had  no  cavalry  and  by  Ist  June  White  resistance  in  the  Caucasus 
had  disappeared  as  Wrangel  fled  into  Crimea.  174  Superior  Red  ability  to  reinforce,  as 
Denikin's  rear  crumbled  in  the  same  manner  as  Kolchak's,  was  crucial  to  the  outcome 
of  the  North  Caucasus  Operation  and  further  reinforced  Tukhachevsky's  beliefs  in  the 
efficacy  of  class  warfare. 
Following  Tukhachevsky's  Front  directives,  the  operation  can  be  divided  into 
phases.  Phase  I  started  with  the  pre-emptive  strike  to  launch  the  offensive  on  14th 
February  and  lasted  until  21st  February,  when  Denikin  recaptured  Rostov  and 
Nakhichevan'.  Phase  2  from  22nd  February-2nd  March,  saw  the  Red  frontline 
restored,  but  the  offensive  still  struggling  as  several  of  Tukhachevsky's  orders  were 
not  fulfilled  correctly.  He  rectified  this  to  accelerate  the  offensive  and  manoeuvre  for 
the  vital  breakthrough  at  Egorlykskaia,  throwing  the  Whites  into  retreat.  Phase  3  from 
2nd  March-7th  April,  saw  the  offensive  develop  along  the  whole  front  with  further 
breakthroughs  and  Caucasian  Front  launching  a  continuous  pursuit  operation, 
advancing  to  the  Caspian  and  Black  Seas  to  rout  the  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia. 
171  See  chapter  111,  pp.  140-14  1. 
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Overall  the  operation  followed  a  similar  pattern  to  previous  offensives.  A  quick 
strike  was  attempted  before  the  Front  was  ready,  which  achieved  mixed  results, 
before  correct  organisation  set  up  an  envelopment  victory  followed  by  strategic 
pursuit.  Speed,  surprise,  concentration  and  manoeuvre.  These  were  the  keys  identified 
by  Tukhachevsky  and  he  used  them  here. 
Phase  1:  Pre-Emptive  Strike 
With  timing  of  the  essence,  Tukhachevsky  pressed  home  the  need  for 
reorganisation,  regrouping  and  starting  positions  to  be  achieved  by  14th  February. 
However,  Ist  Cavalry  Army,  with  the  furthest  to  move  to  reach  Shara-Bulutskii- 
Platovskaia,  did  not  make  it  by  this  date.  Denikin  meanwhile,  learning  of  Ist  Cavalry 
Army's  movement,  pressed  ahead  with  his  Rostov  offensive,  encouraged  by  the  lone 
8th  Army  occupying  the  sector.  Expecting  this,  Tukhachevsky  launched  the  Red 
offensive  on  14th  February  without  Ist  Cavalry  Army.  This  was  a  very  risky  decision 
since  it  had  the  pivotal  role  in  the  operation,  cutting  between  Don  and  Kuban  Armies 
to  split  the  two  White  forces  and  allow  8th,  9th  and  I  Oth  Armies  to  act  against  the 
separated  groups.  Without  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  this  was  not  possible,  but  with  the 
White  offensive  imminent,  Tukhachevsky  took  the  gamble  of  attacking,  believing  I  st 
Cavalry  Army  could  catch  up  and  make  its  manoeuvre  down  to  Tikhoretskaia  station, 
to  cut  the  rail  line  and  White  retreat  route.  Therefore,  8th,  9th  and  I  Oth  Armies 
advanced  at  dawn  on  14th  February  to  cross  the  River  Manych'  and  attack  Don  and 
Kuban  Armies,  whilst  I  Ith  Army  advanced  south-east  against  Kuban  Army  towards 
Stavropol'  and  Armavir  railway  junction,  to  cut  off  retreat  into  the  South-East 
Caucasus  by  the  Volunteer  Corps  and  Don  Army. 
By  17th  February,  the  mixed  results  of  the  offensive  led  Lenin  to  telegram  Smilga 
and  Ordzhonikidze, 
I  am  extremely  worried  about  the  state  of  our  troops  on  Caucasian  Front, 
Budennyi's  complete  demoralisation,  the  weakness  of  all  our  troops, 
weakness  of  the  general  command,  spaces  between  the  armies,  the 
strength  of  the  enemy.  It  is  essential  to  use  all  efforts  and  conduct  a  series 
of  extraordinary  measures  with  revolutionary  energy.  Telegraph  encoded 
in  detail  exactly  what  is  being  done.  175 
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The  fluctuating  progress  of  the  offensive  was  echoed  by  Tukhachevsky  in  his 
order  of  the  same  day  to  Caucasian  Front.  10th  Army  had  defeated  the  enemy  in  its 
sector,  but  the  Whites  had  attacked  on  16th  February  along  8th  Army's  front  and  was 
pushing  back  9th  Army's  right  flank  and  centre.  This  was  the  White  offensive 
Tukhachevsky  had  anticipated,  but  with  Ist  Cavalry  Army  not  yet  fully  engaged  and 
behind  schedule,  8th  and  9th  Armies  were  struggling  to  hold  position.  The  White  left- 
wing  attack  group  based  around  2nd  and  4th  Don  Cavalry  Corps,  under  General  A.  A. 
Pavlov,  was  threatening  to  break  through  the  Red  infantry  forces. 
Tukhachevsky  attempted  to  restore  his  right  flank,  instructing  8th  Army  to  form 
an  attack  group  to  aid  the  crumbling  9th  Arrny  right  flank  in  Tuzulukovskii  sector. 
10th  Army,  clearing  the  defeated  Whites  in  its  sector,  was  to  concentrate  in  zimov,  e 
Popova-zimov'e  K.  Korol'kova  sector,  to  help  9th  Army  attack  in  Gudovskii  area, 
cooperating  with  Blinov's  Cavalry  Division,  attacking  from  zimove  S.  Zherebkova  to 
zimov'e  K.  Korol'kova.  I  st  Cavalry  Army  was  to  "decisively  continue  the  offensive  to 
Kruchenaia  Balka-Lopanka-Sredne-Egorlykskoe-Tikhoretskaia",  whilst  II  th  Army 
was  to  continue  as  before.  176 
Don  Army  was  pushed  back  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Manych'  in  9th  Army's  sector 
by  the  following  day.  However,  Pavlov's  three-division  White  cavalry  group  was 
moving  towards  Torgovaia  to  cut  off  Ist  Cavalry  Army's  delayed  advance  and  now 
threatened  the  juncture  between  9th  Army's  left  flank  and  10th  Army's  right  flank  in 
Platovskaia-lanov  area.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  9th  Army  to  organise  a  raid 
by  Dumenko's  cavalry  corps  into  Pavlov's  rear  area  in  Korol'kova-Zherebkova  area, 
supporting  this  with  a  left  flank  infantry  attack.  Budennyi  was  ordered  to  halt  the 
Whites  in  K.  Korol'kova-S.  Zherebkova  area,  cut  them  off  and  rout  them,  whilst  10th 
Army  was  to  attack  Pavlov  with  its  right  flank  group  in  a  north-westerly  direction.  177 
However,  whilst  Tukhachevsky  dealt  with  the  centre  threat,  8th  Army  again  came 
under  sustained  attack  on  the  Red  right  flank.  The  Volunteer  Corps  and  3rd  Don 
Corps  broke  through  the  weakened  screen  to  reach  Rostov  and  Nakhichevan'  on  21st 
February,  forcing  8th  An-ny  to  withdraw.  The  Reds  recaptured  them  two  days  later, 
but  this  threatened  Caucasian  Front's  position.  '  78 
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The  danger  to  Rostov  and  Novocherkassk  prompted  Lenin  to  instruct  Stalin  on 
18th  and  20th  February  to  send  reinforcements  to  Caucasian  Front.  Stalin  replied,  "It 
is  not  clear  to  me  why  Caucasian  Front's  troubles  are  laid  first  of  all  on  me...  The 
troubles  about  reinforcing  Caucasian  Front  lie  wholly  on  the  RVSR,  the  members  of 
which,  by  my  infori-nation,  are  fully  well,  and  not  on  Stalin  who  is  so  overloaded  with 
work".  Lenin  responded,  "On  you  lies  the  troubles  about  quickly  moving 
reinforcements  from  South-Western  to  Caucasian  Front.  It  is  necessary  to  help  in  any 
way  possible  and  not  squabble  about  departments'  competency".  179 
This  provides  an  excellent  insight  into  Stalin's  idea  of  how  a  combined  war  effort 
worked.  If  not  impacting  negatively  in  the  Caucasus,  it  is  a  preview  of  things  to  come 
in  the  Polish-Soviet  War,  where  he  had  a  greater  influence. 
Tukhachevsky  stressed  the  threat  to  Novocherkassk  on  20th  February,  ordering 
8th  and  9th  Armies  to  hold  it,  8th  Army  to  regroup  and  push  the  Whites  back  over  the 
Don  and  9th  Army  to  send  Dumenko's  cavalry  into  the  White  flank  and  rear  in  the 
Starocherkasskaia-Krasnodborskii  area.  '  80 
Tukhachevsky  had  to  justify  his  actions  in  a  Hughes  Telegraph  discussion  with 
Kamenev  on  21st  February,  whilst  the  White  advance  continued  and  the  loss  of 
Rostov  and  Nakhichevan'  loomed.  Discussing  the  perilous  state  of  the  front  and 
stating  that  regrouping  of  forces  was  not  near  to  completion  when  the  offensive 
began,  Tukhachevsky  explained  to  Kamenev  about  reconnaissance  reports  and  the 
need  to  launch  the  pre-emptive  attack.  Kamenev  had  initially  commented, 
After  your  explanation  I  am  completely  lost  as  to  why  you  could  launch  an 
offensive  on  14th  February,  if  by  26th  February  you  will  in  fact  have  been 
able  to  concentrate  two  divisions  on  this  front  and  precisely  18  regiments, 
not  considering  five  regiments,  moving  from  Voronezh.... 
However,  he  conceded  after  Tukhachevsky's  explanation,  "I  consider  that  even 
without  preliminary  discussions  with  me  you  were  correct  in  this  matter  and  now  can 
only  say  that  the  circumstances  were  correctly  evaluated  by  you  ... 
11.181 
Tukhachevsky  had  evidently  launched  the  offensive  without  consulting  Kamenev, 
illustrating  the  need  for  immediate  action  that  Denikin's  attack  caused.  He  had  taken  a 
huge  risk,  but  had  avoided  being  forced  on  the  defensive.  It  makes  an  interesting 
comparison  with  his  attitude  as  Ist  Army  Commander  in  1918,  appealing  to  Moscow 
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for  time  to  completely  reorganise  1  st  Army  before  attacking,  against  the  wishes  of  his 
Front  Commander,  who  demanded  he  attack  immediately  and  prevent  the 
Czechoslovaks  seizing  the  initiative.  One  and  a  half  years  later,  Tukhachevsky  was  a 
Front  Commander  demanding  exactly  the  same  from  his  subordinates.  His  experience 
gained  between  these  two  dates  had  shown  him  the  necessity  and  advantages  a  pre- 
emptive  attack  could  offer,  but  there  was  also  possibly  an  element  of  over-confidence 
in  Tukhachevsky's  actions.  He  had  previously  taken  risks  on  several  occasions,  indeed 
gambling  was  a  characteristic  of  his  command  and  in  the  North  Caucasus,  he  took  the 
biggest  yet.  He  got  away  with  it  here,  but  his  luck  could  not  last  forever. 
The  pre-emptive  attack  to  seize  the  initiative  was  another  case  of  utilising 
offensive  rather  than  defensive  tactics  whenever  possible,  with  8th  Army  defending 
merely  to  allow  the  offensive  and  even  when  sufficient  troops  were  not  available  to 
ensure  success.  It  had  been  vital  to  seize  the  initiative  with  both  sides  weakened  and 
the  next  victory  crucial  in  deciding  the  whole  campaign.  This  was  a  similar  method  to 
that  employed  on  Eastern  Front,  continually  pushing  to  retain  the  initiative,  and  was 
indicative  of  his  later  theories,  but  also  tactics  in  Poland.  A  definite  continuity  and 
development  ran  through  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  commands. 
By  22nd  February,  the  Red  offensive  had  not  progressed  as  well  as  Tukhachevsky 
had  planned.  He  had  been  forced  to  begin  without  the  force  required  to  make  the  vital 
manoeuvre  to  split  the  White  forces  and  as  a  result  the  White  cavalry  under  Pavlov 
had  been  able  to  manoeuvre  instead,  initially  cutting  between  8th  and  9th  Armies, 
then  moving  swiftly  to  Torgovaia  to  prevent  the  delayed  Ist  Cavalry  Anny  offensive 
and  I  Oth  Army's  advance.  This  was  the  same  method  by  which  Denikin  had  foiled  the 
Don-Manych'  Operation  and  was  reminiscent  of  the  Czechoslovaks  on  the  Volga  in 
1918  -  utilising  a  mobile  cavalry  defence  group.  It  was  effective,  but  only  if  the  Red 
offensive  was  not  coordinated  along  the  whole  front  simultaneously.  However,  by 
22nd  February,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  the  offensive  to  continue,  with  Ist  Cavalry 
Army  in  position  and  acting  alongside  the  advancing  10th  Army,  providing  the 
mobility  required  to  create  the  breach  for  the  infantry  to  exploit. 
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Phase  2:  Manoeuvre  and  Combined  Arms  Operation  for  the  Breakthrough 
The  tasks  of  Tukhachevsky's  12th  February  directive  were  still  largely  unfulfilled 
by  22nd  February.  II  th  Army  advanced  towards  Stavropol'  and  Armavir  and  I  Oth 
Army  approached  Kavkazkaia,  but  neither  had  reached  its  target.  To  the  north-west, 
9th  and  8th  Armies  crossed  the  Rivers  Don  and  Manych',  but  were  pushed  back  again, 
with  8th  Army  abandoning  Rostov  and  barely  holding  Novocherkassk.  Ist  Cavalry 
Army  had  barely  advanced  at  all,  struggling  to  complete  its  regrouping  manoeuvre. 
However,  Tukhachevsky's  aim  of  preventing  a  White  advance  had  been  achieved  and 
Ist  Cavalry  Army,  using  the  extra  time  provided  by  the  other  forces,  was  now  in 
position  to  attack.  It  proved  its  worth  in  the  next  phase  of  the  offensive,  carrying  out 
the  Tikhoretskaia  Operation  and  cooperating  with  10th  Army  in  the  decisive 
Egorlykskaia  Battle  from  25th  February-2nd  March,  defeating  Pavlov's  Cavalry 
Group. 
The  Reds  benefited  from  disaster  striking  Pavlov  on  18th  February.  After 
manoeuvring  to  Torgovaia  to  block  I  Oth  Army  and  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  but  suddenly 
facing  a  joint  offensive  by  these  two  forces,  Pavlov  retreated  towards  Sredne- 
Egorlykskaia.  However,  caught  in  a  snowstorm  on  the  exposed  steppeland,  Pavlov 
lost  half  his  12,000-strong  attack  group  overnight.  '  82  This  devastated  Denikin's  most 
potent  force  and  was  a  major  factor  in  the  Red  victory. 
On  22nd  February,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  Caucasian  Front  to  continue  the 
offensive.  Aided  by  South-Western  Front's  13th  Army  on  its  right  flank,  8th  Army 
recaptured  Rostov,  pushing  the  Volunteer  Corps  back  over  the  Don  on  23rd  February. 
9th  Army,  guarding  10th  Army's  right  flank,  attacked  towards  Mechetinskaia  Station, 
north-west  of  Egorlykskaia.  Ist  Cavalry  Army  assisted  10th  Army's  right  flank  to 
occupy  Egorlyskaia,  before  continuing  to  Novoelizavetinskii-Novoleushkovskaia 
area.  10th  Army's  main  group  continued  towards  Tikhoretskaia,  garrisoning  villages 
to  guarantee  its  flanks.  I  Ith  Army  was  to  quicken  the  taking  of  Armavir- 
Nevinnomysskaia-Stavropol'  sector.  1  83 
This  order  resulted  in  the  meeting  battle  at  Egorlykskaia  involving  Ist  Cavalry 
Army  (4th,  6th  and  II  th  Cavalry  Divisions)  and  10th  Army  attack  group  (20th,  34th 
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and  50th  Rifle  Divisions),  against  Pavlov's  Group  (2nd  and  4th  Don  Cavalry  Corps 
and  a  small  number  of  infantry).  Pavlov  was  moving  towards  Belaia  Glina,  to  attack 
I  st  Cavalry  Army  and  I  Oth  Army  which  he  thought  were  advancing  to  Tikhoretskaia. 
However,  Tukhachevsky  flung  his  attack  group  at  Egorlykskaia-Sredne  Egorlykskoe 
area,  from  where  Ist  Cavalry  Army's  right  flank  had  been  forced  to  retreat  the 
previous  day.  This  took  Pavlov  by  surprise  10  kms  south  of  Sredne-Egorlykskoe, 
pushing  him  back  in  disarray.  Ist  Cavalry  Army  enveloped  Pavlov's  Group's  right 
flank,  whilst  20th  and  50th  Divisions  of  10th  Army  attacked  it  head-on. 
Ist  Cavalry  Army  had  been  highly  successful  carrying  out  deep  raids  and 
sweeping  manoeuvres  characteristic  of  White  and  Red  Civil  War  cavalry.  However, 
Egorlykskaia  was  a  wel  I  -coordinated  combined  infantry  and  cavalry  operation,  with 
cooperation  between  the  two  different  arms  the  key  to  victory.  Credit  goes  to 
Tukhachevsky  for  directing  and  to  Budennyi  and  A.  V.  Pavlov  for  conducting  the 
operation.  1  84  Tukhachevsky  displayed  his  experience  of  civil  warfare  here,  utilising 
his  most  effective  force,  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  to  remove  the  Whites'  mobility,  allowing 
the  infantry  to  plough  in.  This  was  the  vital  battle  in  the  North  Caucasus  Operation 
and  a  crushing  blow  for  Denikin,  almost  wiping  out  Pavlov's  White  mobile  cavalry 
formation,  which  had  successfully  defended  against  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign. 
Tukhachevsky  had  finally  completed  an  encirclement  operation  now  that  he  had  the 
correct  troops  to  do  so  and  it  validated  the  methods  he  endorsed  for  fighting  the  Civil 
War.  I  st  Kuban  Cavalry  Corps  was  captured  with  over  1,000  prisoners,  29  guns,  100 
machine-guns  and  three  armoured-trains.  Budennyi  reoccupied  Egorlykskaia  as 
Pavlov  reeled  southwards  towards  Sredne-Egorlykskoe.  Denikin  was  forced  to 
withdraw  the  bulk  of  his  troops  from  Bataisk  to  reinforce  Pavlov  with  the  Volunteer 
Corps,  3rd  Cavalry  Corps  and  part  of  the  Kuban  brigades.  185 
Tukhachevsky  gave  further  orders  on  25th  and  28th  February  to  develop  the 
offensive.  With  Bataisk  weakened,  8th  and  9th  Armies  were  to  break  through  the 
White  screen  left  against  them  and  8th  Army  was  to  advance  to  Kaisur- 
Khomutovskaia  area.  10th  Army  was  to  occupy  Tikhoretskaia  and  Kavkazkaia  areas, 
transferring  sufficient  infantry  to  Ist  Cavalry  Army  for  liquidating  the  White  cavalry 
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regrouping  in  Sredne-Egorlykskaia  area  and  joining  the  attack  with  the  rest  of  its 
forces  afterwards.  II  th  Anny  was  to  move  swiftly  to  Stavropol'  and  Armavir.  1  86 
Acting  on  these  orders,  8th  Army  finally  took  Bataisk  on  Ist  March  and  crossed 
the  Manych'  with  9th  Army.  Budennyi  attempted  to  take  Egorlykskaia,  but  found 
himself  and  Velikanov's  10th  Army  attack  group  70  kms  south-east  of  8th  and  9th 
Armies  and  in  danger  of  being  encircled  by  the  White  troops  transferring  from  Rostov 
and  Bataisk.  Tukhachevsky  informed  Kamenev  by  Hughes  Telegraph  that  I  st  Cavalry 
Army  and  10th  Army  had  let  their  right  flank  unravel  and  become  isolated  from  the 
main  attack  sector,  but  he  hoped  the  15,000  cavalry  and  infantry  of  Ist  Cavalry  Army 
would  still  secure  the  area,  since  the  Whites  at  Egorlykskaia  had  only  10,000,  after 
the  reinforcements  from  Rostov.  The  attempt  to  take  Egorlykskaia  without  infantry 
support  from  26th-28th  February  failed,  but  once  the  other  Armies  caught  up  with  Ist 
Cavalry  Army,  the  general  offensive  resumed.  10th  Army  took  Kavkazskaia  on  29th 
February  and  II  th  Army  occupied  Stavropol'  on  the  same  day.  187 
Kamenev's  views  of  Budennyi  and  Gai,  the  two  Red  Cavalry  leaders,  are 
interestingly  shown  in  the  Hughes  Telegraph  conversation.  He  criticised  Budennyi  for 
not  fulfilling  Tukhachevsky's  directive  to  move  to  Egorlykskaia,  but  moving  to  Belaia 
Glina  instead.  Then,  ordered  to  go  directly  west,  significantly  north  of  Tikhoretskaia, 
Budennyi  advanced  straight  on  Tikhoretskaia,  completely  against  the  directive,  and 
greatly  increased  the  risk  involved.  Kamenev  also  criticised  Gai  for  "dancing  to  his 
own  tune".  This  was  typical  of  cavalry  on  both  sides,  acting  independently  and 
recklessly,  with  tales  of  pillage  and  looting  following  them  around.  However, 
Tukhachevsky  and  Ordzhonikidze  defended  Ist  Cavalry  Army  in  a  telegram  to  the 
RVSR  on  25th  March  against  "false  information"  Lebedev  had  received,  through 
which  the  "RVSR  has  gained  a  mistaken  impression  of  Cavalry  Army  and  especially 
its  commander,  Budennyi".  They  described  Ist  Cavalry  Army  as  "beyond  praise"  in 
battle  and  "Not  one  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  units  can  withstand  a  head-on  attack  by... 
Cavalry  An-ny".  Budennyi  was  described  as  having, 
186  DkfKA,  Tom  11,  docs.  45  8&  46  1,  pp.  492  &  495. 
187  DkJK.  4,  Tom  I!,  docs.  460-463,  p.  493-496;  Mikhail  Dmitrievich  Velikanov  (1892/93-1938)  was 
20th  Division  Commander  from  17.7.19-29.2.20  and  4.5.20-13.10.2  1,  with  Divisional  Chief-of-Staff 
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...  exceptional  natural  talent  both  in  operational  and  other  respects.  None  of 
the  other  commanders,  except  comrade  Uborevich,  can  surpass  him. 
Regarding  the  brilliant  manoeuvre  and  victory,  when  the  enemy  moved 
into  our  rear  in  Sredne-Egorlykskoe  area,  credit  must  be  given  to 
Budennyi  rather  than  10th  Army  Commander  Pavlov,  since  the  latter  was 
a  long  way  off  from  the  troops  and  had  lost  touch  with  them,  so  that  units 
of  I  Oth  Army  were...  led  by  the  cavalry  commander.  Politically  Budennyi 
is  an  unsophisticated  Communist,  but  he  is  absolutely  devoted  to  the  cause 
of  Soviet  power. 
They  continued  that  I  st  Cavalry  Army  had  received  no  pay  for  months  and  had  to 
fend  for  itself  supply-wise.  1  88 
Tukhachevsky  valued  I  st  Cavalry  Army  as  his  main  arm  and  Budennyi 
personally,  despite  an  apparent  coldness  between  the  pair.  189  This  also  illustrates 
clearly  that  the  supply  system  for  the  Red  Armies  had  not  perceptibly  improved  since 
1918.  The  reference  to  Uborevich  is  intriguing  as  Tukhachevsky  would  take  him  to 
Tambov  in  1921  to  lead  motorised  formations  against  Antonov.  Beside  Triandafillov, 
Uborevich  was  Tukhachevsky's  closest  collaborator  in  the  mechanisation  of  the  Red 
Army  in  the  1920s  and  1930s  and  indeed  may  have  been  the  expert  in  this  field. 
Friendships  with  the  ma  or  figures  in  the  team  Tukhachevsky  worked  closely  with  for 
the  rest  of  his  life  were  formed  during  the  Civil  War. 
Phase  3:  Continuous  Pursuit  Operation 
On  I  st  March,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  the  next  stage  of  the  North  Caucasus 
Operation,  liquidating  the  White  group  in  Mechetinskaia-Egorlykskaia  area  and 
launching  the  offensive  to  Ekaterinodar.  This  was  the  main  town  in  the  south-west  of 
the  North  Caucasus  and  the  communications  hub  for  Denikin's  rear,  sitting  above  the 
River  Kuban  and  on  the  railway  to  Novorossiisk  on  the  Black  Sea  coast,  the  point 
from  which  the  Whites  could  escape.  Tukhachevsky  allowed  no  respite  for  the 
Whites,  maintaining  momentum  by  launching  the  familiar  continuous  pursuit 
operations  he  had  employed  in  previous  commands.  The  character  of  the  remainder  of 
the  North  Caucasus  Operation  was  a  sustained  pursuit  of  the  routed  Armed  Forces  of 
South  Russia. 
188  A.  B.  Murphy,  The  Russian  Civil  War,  pp.  203-204. 
189  Ordzhonikidze  apparently  informed  Budennyi  that  Tukhachevsky  was  not  well-disposed  towards 
I  st  Cavalry  Army  or  him  especially,  S.  M.  Budennyi,  Proidennyi  put',  (Moscow,  1965),  pp.  434-436. 250 
9th  Army  had  broken  through  in  Kagal'nitskaia  area,  taking  over  2,000  prisoners, 
and  the  remainder  were  retreating  to  Khomutovskaia-Kagal'nitskaia,  with  the  main 
White  force  grouped  around  the  towns  of  Mechetinskaia  and  Egorlykskaia.  These  lay 
south-east  of  8th  and  9th  Armies  down  the  railway  line  and  north-west  of 
Kavkazskaia  and  Stavropol',  occupied  by  I  Oth  and  II  th  Armies  respectively.  An 
opportunity  existed  to  encircle  the  main  White  force  and  wipe  it  out.  Tukhachevsky 
ordered  this,  but  it  was  not  completed  and  the  general  White  retreat  towards 
Ekaterinodar  and  Novorossiisk  continued.  This  phase  of  the  operation,  moving  along 
the  railway  lines,  was  reminiscent  of  the  eshelonnaia  voina  of  early  1918.  The  Whites 
had  lost  their  mobility  with  their  cavalry,  leaving  the  railways  as  their  final  hope  for 
swift  retreat  and  escape  from  the  Red  trap.  The  capturesof  railway  stations  and 
junctions  were  now  the  important  points  for  the  Reds  to  trap  the  fleeing  Whites.  190 
The  White  forces  routed  at  Bataisk  were  retreating  before  8th  Army,  behind  the 
River  Eia  to  Eisk  on  the  Azov  Sea  coast,  and  on  3rd  March  Tukhachevsky  ordered 
their  pursuit  and  encirclement.  Again  it  was  not  achieved,  but  8th  Army  occupied 
Eisk  on  9th  March  and  10th  Army  captured  Tikhoretskaia  on  10th  March.  191 
This  progress  was  marked  by  Caucasian  Front  HQ  advancing  from  Millerovo  to 
Rostov  on  4th  March,  following  the  pursuit  operation.  192  Denikin's  rear  was 
collapsing  around  him  as  partisan  activity  increased,  but  the  Reds  could  not  encircle 
the  routed  White  forces,  only  catching  them  at  the  Black  Sea,  when  the  Whites  had 
nowhere  to  run.  Why  was  this  the  case? 
On  II  th  March,  Kamenev  directed  Tukhachevsky  to  take  Groznyi,  but  asked  for 
his  thoughts  on  the  course  of  events  on  his  front  as  "...  already  it  is  necessary  to  carry 
out  regrouping.  "  193  Kamenev  was  referring  to  the  deteriorating  situation  in  the  West 
with  Poland.  Trotsky  had  been  appointed  Commissar  for  Transport  on  7th  March  to 
oversee  the  swift  transfer  of  as  many  troops  as  possible  to  the  West  from  other  fronts 
and  Moscow  was  moving  towards  prioritising  Western  Front,  especially  since 
Caucasian  Front  was  developing  well.  194  Time  was  of  the  essence  as  the  need  to 
dispense  with  Denikin  to  enable  a  full  concentration  against  Poland  was  paramount. 
190  DkfK,  4,  Tom  II,  docs.  462-463,  pp.  495-496. 
19,  Ibid.  doc.  464,  pp.  495  &  497. 
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Ibid.  doc.  465,  p.  498. 
193 
DGkKA,  doc.  733,  p.  73  1. 
194  L-Vp,  doc.  465,  p.  238. 251 
On  12th  March,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  II  th  Army's  Expeditionary  Group  to 
move  towards  Groznyi  and  its  main  group  to  take  the  Vladikavkaz  railway  around 
Armavir-Nezlobnaia.  With  the  Whites  only  active  in  Kavkazkaia-  Stavropol'  area, 
Tukhachevsky  urged  a  general  offensive  to  attempt  encirclement  again.  8th  Army  was 
to  attack  in  Novorossiisk  area  to  cut  off  the  retreat.  10th  Army  was  to  swing  round  on 
the  left  flank  and  occupy  Ekaterinodar  with  its  right  flank  group  by  18th  March, 
whilst  directing  its  left  flank  group  southwards,  to  take  Petropavlovskaia-Kurgannaia 
station-Ubezhenskaia  area.  Ist  Cavalry  Army  was  to  cooperate  with  10th  Army, 
whilst  9th  Army  was  to  press  forwards  in  the  central  sector,  forcing  the  Whites  back 
into  the  enclosing  8th  and  10th  Army  pincers.  Tukhachevsky  stressed  the  importance 
of  seizing  intact  the  railway  bridges  over  the  River  Kuban,  illustrating  again  that  time 
was  of  the  essence  and  no  delays  in  crossing  the  river  could  be  tolerated,  but  also 
lessons  learned  from  previous  campaigns.  195 
On  15th  March,  Kamenev  expressed  some  concern  about  Tukhachevsky  swinging 
I  Oth  Army  southwards,  as  this  endangered  the  weak  left  flank  of  I  st  Cavalry  Army 
and  I  Oth  Army  attacking  towards  Ekaterinodar.  The  Whites  were  regrouping  in 
Ekaterinodar  and  Armavir-  Stavropol'  areas  which  introduced  the  possibility  of  a 
counter-attack  into  the  gap.  Kamenev  advised  forming  an  attacking  fist  of  several 
divisions,  beyond  the  left  flank  on  the  Ekaterinodar-Tikhoretskaia  Railway,  to  guard 
against  this.  196  Kamenev  was  watching  over  the  operation  and  ready  to  give  advice  to 
the  young  Front  Commander  if  necessary. 
However,  Ekaterinodar  and  Annavir  were  taken  on  17th  March  by  I  Oth  and  II  th 
Armies  respectively.  '  97  Piatigorsk,  south-east  down  the  Vladikavkaz  railway  line,  was 
taken  the  same  day  by  II  th  Army's  Expeditionary  Corps  with  Prokhladnaia  reached 
on  20th  March.  198 
On  18th  March,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  the  final  push,  with  the  Whites  desperately 
seeking  the  shores  of  the  Black  and  Caspian  Seas  to  escape  the  oncoming  Red  hordes. 
Caucasian  Front  was  now  advancing  in  two  completely  different  directions,  the 
195  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  467,  p.  499. 
196  DGkKA,  doc.  734,  p.  732. 
197  D  kfKA,  To  m  H,  p.  499. 
198  Ibid.  p.  501. 252 
Expeditionary  Corps  moving  for  Petrovsk  on  the  Caspian  Sea,  whilst  the  main  forces 
closed  on  Novorossiisk  and  Tuapse  on  the  Black  Sea.  199 
Following  this  order,  I  st  Cavalry  Army  occupied  Labinskaia  and  Maikop  on  20th 
and  22nd  March  and  the  Expeditionary  Force  occupied  Groznyi  and  Petrovsk  on  24th 
and  30th  March,  encouraging  Daghestani  partisans  to  take  Derbent  on  25th  March, 
another  instance  of  partisans  in  the  rear  activated  by  Red  Amy  offensive  success.  200 
However,  the  shift  from  Caucasian  to  Western  Front  was  evident  in  Kamenev's 
instruction  of  19th  March,  indicating  Ist  Cavalry  Army  should  only  advance  to  the 
Armavir-Tuapse  Railway  and  not  exceed  Maikop  and  Tuapse  areas,  to  avoid  creating 
"difficulties  for  its  allocated  transfer  to  the  Polish  Front".  Tukhachevsky  had  to  select 
one  division  from  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and  position  it  in  the  Kavkazskaia-Rostov 
railway  sector,  to  reinforce  and  re-equip  it  for  transfer  West.  201  Moscow  wasted  no 
time  reinforcing  Western  Front  with  troops  from  the  Caucasus  and  Tukhachevsky  was 
pressurised  to  quickly  complete  the  North  Caucasus  Operation. 
This  was  underlined  by  Kamenev's  report  to  Lenin  on  20th  March  in  which  he 
asked  for  instructions  on  what  action  to  take  when  Caucasian  Front  reached  the 
border  with  Georgia  and  Azerbaijan.  The  main  body  of  his  report  was  taken  up  with 
transfer  details  for  the  majority  of  Caucasian  Front  troops  to  Western  Front.  He 
concluded, 
... 
in  view  of  the  importance  of  the  Polish  Front  and  the  seriousness  of 
planned  operations  here,  Supreme  Command  recommends  for  the  moment 
of  decisive  operations,  to  transfer  to  Western  Front  the  present  Caucasian 
Front  Commander  comrade  Tukhachevsky,  who  capably  and  decisively 
conducted  the  final  operations  for  routing  General  Denikin's  army,  and  in 
his  place  in  the  Caucasus  to  appoint  current  Western  Front  Commander 
202  comrade  Gittis.... 
Novorossiisk  was  captured  on  27th  March,  with  thousands  of  White  troops 
stranded  in  the  town,  ending  Denikin's  involvement  in  the  Civil  War.  203  The 
remainder  of  the  North  Caucasus  Operation  occurred  against  a  background  of 
constant  demands  for  troop  transfers  to  Western  and  South-Western  Fronts  and  the 
remaining  Caucasian  Front  forces  advancing  in  three  different  directions.  9th  Army 
199  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  469,  pp.  500-0  1. 
200  Ibid.  pp.  499,  &  502-504. 
20  1  DGkKA,  doc.  736,  p.  733. 
202  Ibid.  doc.  737,  pp.  733-35. 
203  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  471,  p.  502;  docs.  740-741,  DGkKA,  p.  737. 253 
moved  south-east  down  the  Black  Sea's  eastern  coast,  towards  Tuapse  and  Taman' 
Peninsula,  pursuing  White  forces  retreating  from  Novorossiisk,  10th  Army  advanced 
directly  westwards  towards  Taganrog,  and  I  Ith  Army  moved  south-east  down  the 
Caspian  Sea's  west  coast  towards  Derbent  and  Baku.  On  30th  March,  Tukhachevsky 
ordered  regrouping  to  achieve  these  targets  and  create  the  Caucasus  Labour  Army 
from  8th  Army  units,  administration  and  rear  institutions,  reflecting  Caucasian  Front's 
changing  role  . 
204  With  Denikin  defeated,  the  Caucasus,  the  main  oil-supplying  region 
of  Russia,  would  fuel  the  Red  Army's  advances  on  other  fronts. 
9th  Army  captured  Tuapse  on  7th  April,  then  received  the  remainder  of  8th 
Army's  units  and  was  directed  with  the  Don-Azov  Flotilla  to  attack  Crimea,  assisting 
South-Western  Front's  13th  Army.  This  was  the  start  of  action  against  Wrangel  in 
Crimea.  205 
White  forces  were  attempting  to  make  the  short  crossing  from  Taman'  to  Kerch', 
on  the  Crimean  peninsula,  to  join  Wrangel.  Moscow  wanted  to  prevent  this  and 
Tukhachevsky  ordered  9th  Army  to  wipe  them  out.  If  the  Poles  launched  an  attack  in 
the  West,  Wrangel  would  pose  a  danger  to  South-Westem  Front's  underbelly.  This 
became  crucial  in  the  Polish-Soviet  War  and  the  need  to  allow  as  few  Whites  as 
possible  to  reach  Crimea  would  quicken  the  final  resolution  of  the  overall  conflict. 
The  weakened  9th  Army  made  slow  progress  and  Kamenev  voiced  concerns  that  a 
White  counter-attack  may  defeat  it,  but  it  eventually  captured  Sochi  on  29th  April, 
clearing  the  eastern  Black  Sea  coastline  and  completing  this  part  of  Caucasian  Front's 
tasks.  206 
Events  on  the  Caspian  shores  panned  out  more  successfully,  with  the  eastern  shore 
fort  of  Aleksandrovskii  taken  by  the  Volga-Caspian  Flotilla  on  5th  April,  opening  the 
way  eastwards.  II  th  Army,  reinforced  by  I  Oth  Army  elements,  reached  the  Russo- 
Azerbaijani  border  and  Tukhachevsky  ordered  it  to  begin  an  offensive  for  Baku  and 
Azerbaijan  on  27th  April.  207  Tukhachevsky  was  to  have  led  this,  meeting  with 
204  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  docs.  472-475,  pp.  503-507;  DGkK,  4,  doc.  743,  pp.  739-740;  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  p. 
746,  endnote  58. 
205  DkfKA,  Tom  H,  doc.  475,  pp.  506-507,  DGkKA,  doc.  746,  p.  741;  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  363,  p.  305. 
206  Ibid.  doc.  366,  pp.  307-308  &  314;  DGkKA,  doc.  747,  pp.  741-742. 
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Ordzhonikidze  and  Sergei  Kirov  in  Vladikavkaz  on  30th  March  to  formulate  plans, 
but  Western  Front  events  took  over.  208 
Kamenev  had  suggested  that  Tukhachevsky  replace  Gittis  as  Western  Front 
Commander  because  of  the  former's  perforinance  against  Denikin.  After  Poland's 
invasion  of  Belorussia  on  25th  April  began  the  Soviet-Polish  War  (in  Soviet  eyes), 
Kamenev  gained  approval  for  this,  and  appointed  Tukhachevsky  Front  Commander  of 
the  prioritised  Western  Front 
. 
209  How  Tukhachevsky's  star  had  risen  to  eclipse  his 
erstwhile  Southern  Front  superior,  Gittis.  Western  Front  Commander  was  the  most 
important  active  frontline  position,  completing  Tukhachevsky's  rapid  Civil  War  climb 
up  the  promotional  ladder.  Caucasian  Front  was  the  culmination  of  a  quite  stunning 
Civil  War  career  in  which  he  had  served  on  every  major  front,  almost  always  at  the 
most  crucial  time,  playing  the  role  of  troubleshooter  or  "fireman"  for  Moscow,  taking 
on  the  most  difficult  tasks  and  each  time  turning  them  round. 
Conclusion 
Tukhachevsky  was  now  one  of  the  Red  Army's  top  two  military  commanders  and 
the  only  former  junior  officer  from  the  Tsarist  Army  to  command  at  army  level  and 
above.  He  had  constantly  improved  as  a  military  leader,  risen  to  meet  the  challenges 
before  him  and  striven  to  understand  the  conflict  in  which  he  was  involved,  the 
methods  to  be  employed  to  win  it  and  who  should  be  employed  to  utilise  the  methods. 
The  level  of  responsibility  and  trust  shown  in  him  increased  with  each  posting  and  as 
he  moved  further  from  his  former  Tsarist  superiors,  he  moved  closer  to  the 
Communist  Party  hierarchy.  This  was  the  way  in  which  to  be  successful  in  the  Red 
Army,  but  Tukhachevsky  did  not  profess  to  believe  in  Communism  because  of  career 
ambition,  although  he  did  harbour  this. 
Fighting  in  the  Civil  War,  working  with  those  of  similar  outlook  as  well  as  those 
who  differed,  convinced  Tukhachevsky  that  the  methods  he  was  using  were  correct 
for  victory  in  a  class  war.  From  the  outset,  the  Red  Command  had  no  real  army  and 
only  a  vague  idea  of  how  to  build  one  and  fight.  Tukhachevsky  had  shown  it  was 
208  R.  Pipes,  The  Formation  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Communism  and  Nationalism  1917-1923, 
(Cambridge,  Mass.,  1964),  p.  224;  Sergei  Mirinovich  Kirov  (1886-1934)  became  Leningrad  Party 
boss,  but  was  murdered  in  1934.  Stalin  has  been  implicated,  but  no  concrete  evidence  exists. 255 
possible  to  do  these  simultaneously  in  1918  and  continued  to  do  so  during  the  next 
two  years.  Swift,  continuous  operations,  using  whatever  technical  resources  were 
available  and  political  agitation  to  raise  partisan  support  to  compensate  for  low  troop 
numbers,  accompanied  by  strict  revolutionary  discipline,  were  the  general  methods. 
Constantly  mobilising  whilst  on  the  move  and  fighting  was  how  Tukhachevsky 
started  out  in  1918  and  this  was  the  methodology  used  by  the  Red  Army  throughout 
the  Civil  War.  It  was  a  methodology  born  out  of  necessity  under  Civil  War  conditions 
and  prompted  by  constant  Moscow  demands  for  swift  task  fulfillment,  but  one 
Tukhachevsky  proved  particularly  adept  in  using.  However,  by  April  1920,  the 
support  Tukhachevsky  saw  these  methods  generating  at  the  expense  of  the  White 
Armies,  which  simply  disintegrated  under  the  pressure,  convinced  him  they  were 
correct.  His  absolute  belief  had  led  to  several  confrontations  with  superior  officers, 
but  this  actually  made  him  stand  out  as  the  capable  leader  in  the  midst  of  the  rapidly- 
evolving  mass  which  was  the  Red  Army.  He  had  been  recognised  to  have  this 
potential  early  on  by  the  Red  leadership  and  had  fulfilled  it  throughout  the  conflict. 
The  ideas  he  had  formulated  met  with  Moscow  approval,  as  did  the  formation  of 
courses  to  create  Red  Commanders,  the  ultimate  aim  for  the  class-based  army. 
Tukhachevsky  himself,  a  former  Tsarist  officer,  had  joined  the  Bolshevik  Party  and 
risen  to  become  the  epitome  of  the  many  former  voenspetsy,  loyally  serving  the 
Communists.  He  had  remained  faithful  to  the  tenets  of  manoeuvre,  pursuit  and 
continuous  offensive  and  had  taken  this  to  a  new  level  in  the  North  Caucasus 
Operation,  when  able  to  command  the  mobile  I  st  Cavalry  Army  for  the  first  time,  in 
combined  operations  with  infantry  and  artillery.  The  North  Caucasus  Operation, 
Tukhachevsky's  first  as  Front  Commander,  illustrated  that  the  lessons  learned  and 
experience  gained  from  previous  commands,  which  he  had  formulated  into  Voina 
klassov,  were  accurate  portrayals  of  Civil  War  conflict  and  effective  methods  for 
achieving  victory. 
Tukhachevsky  was  now  to  lead  the  Red  Army  against  Poland  in  the  first  Soviet 
invasion  of  Europe,  the  extension  of  the  Civil  War  about  which  he  had  written. 
Tukhachevsky  had  reached  this  position  on  merit  and  with  a  good  measure  of  luck. 
However,  for  various  reasons  this  luck  deserted  him  at  the  most  crucial  and  dangerous 
209  Gittis  moved  in  the  opposite  direction,  serving  as  Caucasian  Front  Commander  from  15th  May 
1920-29th  May  192  1,  when  the  front  was  disbanded,  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  530. 256 
moment  and  his  Civil  War  achievements  were  in  danger  of  being  all  but  forgotten  by 
a  rout  and  messy  retreat  back  to  Soviet  soil. 257 
Chapter  V:  Front  Comander  -  Polish-Soviet  War.,  1920 
Polish  and  Soviet  historiography  record  varying  starting  dates  for  the  Polish- 
Soviet  War.  For  Poland,  the  conflict  began  in  1919  with  the  first  clashes  over  areas 
vacated  by  Germany  after  the  Great  War  -  Ukraine,  Belorussia,  Galicia  and  the  Baltic 
States.  However,  the  Soviets  dated  the  conflict  from  the  Polish  offensive  into  Ukraine 
on  25th  April  1920  and  did  not  regard  it  as  a  separate  war  at  all,  but  another  front  in 
the  Civil  War,  with  the  "White  Poles"  allies  of  the  interventionary  Entente.  As  has 
been  shown  in  chapters  III  and  IV,  Moscow  fought  the  Civil  War  through  a  process  of 
threat  determination,  concentrating  the  majority  of  men  and  resources  on  the 
prioritised  front.  Therefore,  although  the  Soviets  wished  to  secure  European  Russia 
and  had  originally  formed  the  Red  Army  to  meet  the  threat  of  Germany  in  this  area, 
Western  Front  remained  a  system  of  screens  once  the  Civil  War  began  in  the  East  and 
South.  ludenich's  advance  on  Petrograd  saw  Northern  Front  activity  intensify  in 
autumn  1919,  but  Western  Front  was  never  the  centre  of  attention,  despite  Poland 
occupying  much  of  the  area. 
Moscow  avoided  open  war,  whilst  trying  to  recover  as  much  as  possible  of  the 
territory  surrendered  at  Brest-Litovsk,  and  the  Western  theatre  was  only  prioritised 
after  Poland  attacked  South-Western  Front.  1  Kamenev  had  recommended 
Tukhachevsky  as  Western  Front  Commander  in  March  and  as  the  Western  situation 
deteriorated,  this  was  approved  days  before  Poland  attacked.  Tukhachevsky 
performed  the  "fireman"  role  again,  taking  on  the  most  difficult  and  responsible  post 
on  29th  April.  2 
Tukhachevsky's  success  on  Caucasian  Front  made  him  the  prime  candidate  for  the 
post.  He  was  also  closer  geographically  than  Frunze,  the  other  leading  candidate,  who 
was  leading  the  drive  into  Turkestan.  Kamenev  later  lamented  not  also  having  Frunze 
in  the  European  theatre,  indicating  he  would  have  liked  to  reunite  the  team  which  had 
This  was  decided  at  a  Central  Committee  meeting  of  4th  May  and  officially  declared  on  23rd  May 
with  the  publication  of  the  Central  Committee  theses,  Pol'skiifront  i  nashi  zadachi.  V.  M.  Ivanov, 
Marshal  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  (Moscow:  1990),  p.  15  1;  Direktivy  komandovaniiafrontov  Krasnoi 
Arinii,  1917-1922,  Tomy  I-IV.  (Moscow,  1971-1978),  (hereafter  DkfY,  4),  Tom  III,  doc.  1,  pp.  II-  14. 
2  Dk  I 
. 
fY-4,  Tom  IV.  (Moscow:  1978),  p.  529,  gives  29th  April  as  the  date  Tukhachevsky  assumed  the 
post,  but  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al,  eds.  Grazhdanskaia  voina,  1918-1921,  Tom  III,  (Moscow,  1930),  p.  319, 
gives  30th  April.  However,  from  the  evidence  of  a  Hughes  Telegraph  conversation  between 
Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  taking  place  on  29th  April,  it  is  apparent  that  Tukhachevsky  had  assumed 
the  Western  Front  Command  no  later  than  this  date,  DkJX4,  Tom  III,  pp.  21-22. 258 
worked  so  well  on  Eastern  Front,  and  that  these  were  the  two  top  Red  commanders  by 
1920.  Tukhachevsky  was  confident  within  himself  and  with  the  methods  he  had  used 
to  emerge  victorious  so  far.  Now  he  would  face  the  Polish  Army  united  under  JoS'ef 
Pilsudski  and  intent  on  regaining  Poland's  historical  pre-partition  borders.  3 
By  Tukhachevsky's  definition  in  Strategiia  natsional'naia  i  klassovaia,  the  Polish- 
Soviet  War  appears  to  be  a  "national"  conflict  rather  than  a  "class"  one.  However, 
Tukhachevsky  and  the  majority  of  the  Red  leadership  saw  it  differently.  Moscow 
viewed  the  clash  with  Poland  as  another  Civil  War  front,  but  did  not  wish  to  clash 
with  Poland  in  the  spring  of  1920,  prioritising  Wrangel's  defeat  in  Crimea.  However, 
once  Poland  had  attacked  and  large-scale  clashes  were  unavoidable,  the 
internationalist  Bolsheviks  viewed  it  as  a  chance  to  spread  revolution  into  Europe. 
Post-war  Germany,  on  Poland's  western  border,  seemed  ripe  for  revolution,  as  the 
effects  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  began  to  be  felt.  Eastern  Europe  had  already 
witnessed  revolutionary  attempts  in  the  wake  of  the  Great  War  and  Russian 
Revolution,  but  these  had  failed,  through  lack  of  force,  to  defeat  the  established 
regimes.  By  1920,  the  Red  Army  had  emerged  as  the  force  to  ensure  that  the  next 
uprising  in  Eastern  Europe  succeeded.  If  this  was  in  Germany,  from  where  Marx 
originated  and  an  industrialised  state  in  which  Marxism  could  blossom,  it  could 
provide  the  industrial  base  and  educated  proletariat  absent  in  peasant  Russia. 
Therefore,  spreading  "Revolution  on  the  point  of  bayonets"  became  the  Bolshevik 
4  catchphrase  for  summer  1920 
. 
Did  Tukhachevsky  believe  this? 
Whilst  in  Ingolstadt,  Tukhachevsky  had  reportedly  stated  to  Fervacque  that 
Poland  should  be  within  the  Russian  Empire.  By  April  1920,  he  still  believed  this,  but 
now  within  the  context  of  the  class  struggle  he  had  been  waging  since  early  1918.  In 
the  essay  Revoliutsiia  izvne  (Revolution  From  Without),  written  in  early  1920, 
Tukhachevsky  wrote  of  revolutions  being  caused  by  internal  uprisings  or  introduced 
by  force  from  without  and  he  believed  the  Red  Anny  could  perform  the  latter  in 
Poland.  5  The  transformation  Tukhachevsky  had  undergone  during  the  Civil  War,  by 
3  Poland  was  divided  between  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria  in  1772,1793  and  1795. 
'  Lenin  used  this  phrase  in  a  speech  on  22nd  September  1920,  assessing  the  defeat  in  Poland,  A. 
Richardson,  ed.,  Nikolai  Bukharin,  Lev  Kamenev,  Vladimir  Lenin,  Karl  Radek,  Leon  Trotsky,  Mikhail 
TukhachevsA:  y  and  Grigotý,  Zinovev:  In  Defence  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  A  Selection  of  Bolshevik 
Writings,  1917-1923,  (London:  1995),  p.  14  1. 
5  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Revoliutsila  izvne",  Voina  klassov,  pp.  50-59. 259 
which  he  now  believed  in  the  possibility  of  a  conquering  revolutionary  doctrine  to 
spread  Russian  influence  to  Europe  and  the  world,  manifested  itself  in  his  Western 
Front  Command.  The  clash  with  Poland  was  not  a  different  war,  but  an  extension  of 
the  Civil  War  between  Communist  Russia  and  Western  capitalism,  and  should  be 
fought  the  same  way.  Tukhachevsky  wrote, 
This  ability  of  the  Red  Army  to  carry  revolution  by  offensive  and 
infinitely  reinforce  at  the  expense  of  the  revolutionary  masses  of  all 
nations  and  peoples,  -  gives  extraordinary  possibilities  of  socialist,  class 
strategy.  It  with  full  belief  can  consider  its  future  victory  over  world 
capitaliSM.  6 
Tukhachevsky  believed  the  Polish  workers  and  peasants  would  support  a  Red 
Army  advance  into  Poland.  This  matched  the  view  of  Lenin  and  the  majority  of  the 
Communist  Party,  with  dissenting  voices  such  as  Dzierzyn'ski,  Julian  Marchlewski 
and  Trotsky  ignored.  7 
To  study  the  Polish-Soviet  War  around  Tukhachevsky,  it  is  essential  to  realise  this 
was  how  he  viewed  and  fought  it.  His  performance  can  only  be  considered  as  part  of 
his  Civil  War  campaigns.  This  is  how  I  shall  examine  his  conduct  of  the  Polish  Front, 
taking  into  account  conditions  he  fought  under,  numbers  involved,  his  opponent  and 
the  type  of  fighting  involved. 
Patterns  have  emerged  running  through  his  Civil  War  commands.  Under  Civil 
War  conditions  and  in  the  role  of  "troubleshooter",  Tukhachevsky  consistently  arrived 
in  new  postings  which  required  the  initial  reorganisation  and  reformation  of  broken 
forces  to  fight  with.  Whilst  conducting  this  work,  he  was  pressurised  into  offensive 
action  before  his  troops  were  ready,  which  achieved  little  or  mixed  results,  although 
in  his  pre-emptive  attack  against  Denikin  he  fared  better  with  early  military  action 
than  during  previous  commands.  This  stage  was  followed  by  the  completion  of 
reorganisation  and  regrouping  and  an  all-out  offensive  to  gain  victory.  This  pattern 
which  developed  throughout  Tukhachevsky's  commands  was  how  the  Reds  generally 
fought  the  Civil  War  -  urgent  appeals,  mobilisations  and  hurried  attacks  -  but 
Tukhachevsky  had  mastered  it  by  the  time  of  the  North  Caucasus  Operation.  When  he 
arrived  at  Western  Front,  precisely  the  same  pattern  unfolded  and  it  is  little  wonder  he 
used  the  same  methods. 
6  Ibid.  p.  56. 
7  Julian  Marchlewski  (1866-1925)  was  a  Polish  member  of  the  Communist  Party  and  was  Chairman  of 
the  Polish  Revolutionary  Committee  set  up  in  Bialystok  in  July-August  1920. 260 
He  inherited  a  weak,  disorganised  front,  low  in  morale,  which  required  instant 
reorganisation  under  fire,  as  Poland  had  already  attacked.  Two  weeks  into  his 
command,  Tukhachevsky  had  to  launch  a  pre-emptive  strike  which  lasted  until  early 
June,  producing  the  same  apparently  mixed  results,  although  actually  as  effective  as 
in  the  Caucasus.  The  rest  of  June  saw  him  complete  reorganisation  of  Western  Front 
for  the  main  Belorussian  offensive  in  July,  which  was  again  a  stunning  success, 
developing  into  continuous  manoeuvre  pursuit  operations  into  Lithuania  and  Poland. 
However,  offensive  success  slowed  under  strategic  overstretch  and  Poland  launched 
an  all-or-nothing  counter-offensive  in  mid-August  from  behind  the  River  Wisla  at 
Warsaw,  similar  to  Kolchak  from  behind  the  Ishim  at  Petropavlovsk.  The  pattern 
deviated  here  though,  as  the  counter-strike  became  an  irrecoverable  defeat  and  rout 
for  Tukhachevsky's  forces,  the  first  time  this  had  occurred. 
As  with  his  previous  Civil  War  commands,  Tukhachevsky  recorded  his  thoughts 
on  the  Polish  campaign,  both  at  the  time  and  later.  Voina  klassov  contains  writings 
completed  during  or  just  after  the  conflict  and  these  compare  well  to  a  series  of 
lectures  Tukhachevsky  delivered  to  the  Red  Army  General  Staff  Academy  in  1923, 
under  the  title  Pokhod  za  Vislu  "March  Beyond  the  Wisla".  8  This  provides  an 
excellent  insight  into  his  command  of  the  Polish  campaign,  why  decisions  were  made 
and  why  it  went  wrong.  It  was  written  with  hindsight,  but  the  conclusions  drawn  show 
his  views  remained  remarkably  consistent  three  years  later.  The  conclusions 
Tukhachevsky  drew  became  part  of  the  heated  debate  within  the  Red  Army  and 
Communist  Party  over  who  or  what  was  to  blame  for  the  failure  of  the  Polish 
offensive,  a  debate  which,  it  has  been  suggested,  was  linked  to  the  military  purges  in 
1937.  The  question  must  be  asked  why  Tukhachevsky  was  defeated  at  Warsaw  after 
conquering  so  completely  elsewhere  and  I  shall  examine  this  later  in  the  chapter.  To 
do  so  accurately,  it  is  first  necessary  to  examine  Tukhachevsky's  conduct  of  the  Polish 
campaign  in  close  comparison  to  his  Civil  War  commands,  to  determine  why  his 
success  and  luck  finally  ran  out  and  why  the  methods  applicable  to  Civil  War  thus  far, 
were  not  as  suitable  for  a  "War  of  the  Classes"  in  Poland.  At  the  end  of  the  chapter  I 
shall  return  to  the  debate  over  the  genesis  of  "Deep  Battle",  introduced  at  the 
8  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  Izbrannyeproizvedeniia,  Tom  1,1919-1927,  pp.  114-168; 
This  is  translated  into  English  and  published  as  an  appendix  in  J.  Pilsudski,  Year  1920  and  its  climax: 
Battle  qf  lVarsaw  during  the  Polish-Soviet  War,  1919-1920.  (London:  1972),  pp.  223-275. 261 
beginning  of  Chapter  111,  and  demonstrate  why  the  Polish  campaign  in  defeat 
provided  a  crucial  part  of  the  operational  theory. 
The  Western  Theatre 
European  Russia  was  guarded  by  two  Fronts  separated  by  the  Pripet  Marshes  - 
Western  and  South-Western  -  similar  to  Russia's  approach  to  the  Great  War.  While 
Tukhachevsky  commanded  the  former,  the  latter  was  headed  by  A.  1.  Egorov.  Ten 
years  older  than  Tukhachevsky  and  an  ex-Tsarist  colonel,  Egorov  appeared  to  be  the 
exception  which  made  the  rule  for  Tukhachevsky's  assessment  of  older  voenspetsy 
and  makes  an  interesting  comparison  to  him.  He  commanded  Southern  Front's  9th  and 
10th  Armies,  receiving  the  Order  of  the  Red  Banner  at  Tsaritsyn  in  May  1919,  before 
assuming  Southern  Front  command  in  October  1919.  He  was  the  most  prominent  Red 
Commander  in  this  area,  working  well  with  Stalin,  despite  his  background.  Formerly 
a  Left  SR,  9  he  joined  the  Communist  Party  in  1918  and  was  another  of  the  few 
commander-communists  in  the  country,  who  made  the  transition  to  the  Red  Army 
easily.  Egorov  was  probably  regarded  as  the  next  most  capable  Red  Commander  after 
Frunze  and  Tukhachevsky  and  his  career  after  1920  is  also  comparable  with  the 
latter's.  They  were  two  of  the  first  five  Marshals  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1935,  but 
were  both  executed  in  1937.  These  were  the  two  men  who  led  the  Soviet  campaign 
against  Poland. 
Kamenev  prepared  a  general  plan  of  offensive,  which  the  Politburo  passed  on 
28th  April,  eannarking  Western  Front's  Belorussian  theatre  as  the  main  sector.  10 
Poland  had  attacked  in  Ukraine,  therefore  this  would  allow  a  Soviet  attack  into  the 
weaker  sector.  Besides,  whilst  facing  Poland  in  Ukraine,  South-Western  Front  had  to 
guard  against  possible  Rumanian  incursions  from  Bessarabia  and  Wrangel  in  Crimea, 
three  fronts. 
Ukraine  was  the  main  sector  for  Poland,  targeting  Kiev,  with  a  supplementary 
attack  aiming  for  Odessa  on  the  Black  Sea  to  open  an  Entente  supply  line.  Fielding 
39,300  infantry  and  cavalry,  they  found  immediate  success  against  the  14,209  troops 
of  South-Western  Front's  12th  and  14th  Armies.  13th  Army,  fielding  only  4,456  men, 
9  L.  D.  Trotsky,  (trans.  and  annotated  B.  Pearce),  How  the  Revolution  Armed:  The  Miltary  Writings 
and  Speeches  ofLeon  Trotsky,  Volume  III:  The  Year  1920,  (London:  198  1),  p.  2  10. 262 
was  trying  to  prevent  Wrangel's  retreat  to  Crimea,  but  did  not  succeed,  meaning  that 
18,000  infantry  and  5,200  cavalry  faced  South-Western  Front's  underbelly.  South- 
Western  Front's  troops  had  little  experience  of  the  victorious  campaigns  on  other 
fronts  and  were  generally  low  in  confidence  and  morale.  However,  although  the  Poles 
occupied  the  Ukrainian  capital  Kiev  on  6th  May,  South-Western  Front  managed  to 
stem  the  advance,  12th  Army  limiting  the  Poles  to  a  small  bridgehead  on  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  River  Dnepr  opposite  Kiev  by  mid-May.  11 
Western  Front  was  not  attacked,  but  on  the  day  he  arrived,  Tukhachevsky 
discussed  launching  an  attack  to  aid  South-Western  Front,  with  Kamenev.  Kamenev 
had  previously  ordered  Mozyr'  to  be  attacked  on  29th  April,  but  this  had  not  occurred. 
However,  Kamenev  asked  Tukhachevsky's  opinion  on  the  best  course  of  action  now 
he  had  arrived  to  take  command  and  said  he  would  support  whatever  decision 
Tukhachevsky  made,  as  the  latter  was  now  the  man  on  the  spot  and  conditions  may 
well  have  changed  since  Kamenev  himself  was  in  Smolensk.  12  This  reflects  the  trust 
Kamenev  had  in  Tukhachevsky,  giving  him  the  plan  to  assess  and  amend  as  he  saw 
fit,  to  local  conditions. 
Western  Front's  theatre  of  operations  was  bisected  by  the  River  Beresina  running 
diagonally  from  south-east  to  north-west.  The  River  Dvina  joins  the  Beresina  between 
the  towns  of  Zhlobin  and  Gomel',  just  north  of  the  eastern  end  of  the  Pripet  Marshes 
and  the  town  of  Mozyr'  on  the  River  Pripiat.  Mozyr'  formed  the  juncture  point  of 
Western  and  South-Westem  Fronts  and  was  an  important  target  to  secure  Western 
Front's  left  flank  and  South-Western  Front's  right  flank.  The  banks  of  the  Beresina 
were  marshy  and  wooded  and  its  upper  course  in  the  north  was  surrounded  by  forest- 
covered  swampland,  difficult  for  manoeuvre.  The  south  of  the  river  was  surrounded 
by  marshy  woodland  and  sparsely  populated.  Three  railway  crossings  existed  over  the 
river  at  Borisov,  Bobruisk  and  Shatsilki  in  the  south.  The  only  area  of  dry  ground, 
around  the  town  of  Igumen,  had  no  road  or  rail  communications.  North  of  the  Upper 
Beresina  marshes  lay  a  belt  of  dry  ground  between  the  River  Dvina  and  railway 
junction  of  Polotsk  -  the  "Gates  of  Smolensk".  Tukhachevsky  assessed  the 
10  V,  M.  Ivanov,  pp.  152-153. 
11  DkJKA,  Toni  III,  p.  149-,  N.  Kakurin,  Russko-Pol'skaia  kampaniia,  1918-1920.  Politiko- 
strategicheskii  ocherk,  (Moscow:  1922),  p.  4  1. 
12 
DkJKA,  Toni  III,  pp.  21-22. 263 
Belorussian  operational  theatre  and  decided  on  the  "Gates  of  Smolensk"  and  Igumen 
as  the  best  routes  of  attack.  13 
Remanisation 
On  1  st  May,  Tukhachevsky  directed  16th  Army  Commander  N.  I.  Sollogub  to 
attack  with  his  left  flank  towards  Domanovichi-Mozyr',  to  relieve  South-Westem 
Front's  12th  Army.  14  However,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  limit  the  attack  to  this,  but 
proposed  a  similar  tactic  to  that  used  in  the  Caucasus,  reorienting  his  troops  for  a  pre- 
emptive  attack  into  the  northern  sector  of  Belorussia  to  pre-empt  a  second  Polish 
offensive,  which  he  correctly  estimated  would  be  made  in  the  Belorussian  theatre.  He 
intended  to  use  offence  as  the  best  forrn  of  defence,  to  gain  the  offensive  initiative  and 
aid  South-Westem  Front,  but  it  was  another  gamble. 
When  Tukhachevsky  launched  the  attack  on  14th  May,  Western  Front  was  not 
fully  reorganised.  Many  reinforcements  earmarked  for  the  general  offensive  had  not 
arrived  and  the  Front  was  short  of  signal  and  rail  troops.  Supplies  and  equipment, 
especially  communications  and  signalling  equipment  and  transport  resources,  were 
scarce.  15  Therefore,  whilst  reorganising  for  the  general  offensive,  Tukhachevsky 
planned  and  launched  the  pre-emptive  attack  with  scarce  numbers  on  a  new  Front 
working  with  new  people,  in  the  knowledge  that  time  was  at  a  premium  to  forestall 
the  Polish  attack. 
Gittis  had  apparently  planned  to  attack  through  the  "Gates  of  Smolensk", 
advancing  straight  towards  Minsk  to  take  the  Belorussian  capital,  a  good  target  in 
political  terms,  16  but  Tukhachevsky  altered  this.  He  envisaged  a  right  flank 
envelopment  and  encirclement  through  the  "Gates  of  Smolensk",  supported  by  a 
central  frontal  attack  through  Igumen,  with  the  left  flank  guarded  at  Mozyr',  pinning 
down  and  wiping  out  the  Polish  forces.  This  was  similar  to  the  North  Causcasus 
Operation  and  was  the  tactic  employed  by  the  Soviets  in  1944  in  this  area  against 
Germany.  For  the  general  offensive,  more  formations  were  required  than  the  15th  and 
16th  Armies  which  currently  existed,  but  Tukhachevsky  used  the  same  plan  on  a 
13  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  p.  115. 
14  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  10,  pp.  22-23;  Former  Tsarist  Colonel  Nikolai  Pavlovich  Sollogub  (1883- 
193  7)  commanded  16th  Army  from  14th  August  1919-2  1  st  September  1920,  DkXA,  Tom  IV,  p.  543. 
15  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  225-226. 264 
smaller  scale  for  the  pre-emptive  strike.  On  Ist  May,  he  instructed  15th  Army 
Commander  A.  1.  Kork  to  attack  from  Polotsko-Vitebsk  sector  on  the  fight  flank, 
whilst  16th  Army,  already  moving  towards  Mozyr',  would  hold  from  the  front.  17  Kork 
was  to  use  seven  rifle  divisions  and  make  every  effort  to  use  horses  and  automobiles 
for  transporting  units  during  the  operation,  whilst  Sollogub  was  to  use  four  rifle 
divisions  for  the  supplementary  attack,  concentrating  on  the  main  flanking  movement 
and  supplying  speed,  echoing  previous  Civil  War  operations. 
Already  beginning  reorganisation,  Tukhachevsky  created  a  fight  flank  Northern 
Group,  comprising  two  divisions  and  a  brigade  of  15th  Army,  for  which  Kork  formed 
a  field  HQ  using  Velikolutskii  Fortified  Zone  HQ.  This  was  formed  on  5th  May  under 
E.  N.  Sergeev,  becoming  4th  Army,  on  2nd  June.  '  8  On  25th  June,  it  received  3rd 
Kavkor  (Cavalry  Corps),  formed  in  June  from  10th  and  15th  Cavalry  Divisions  and 
commanded  by  Tukhachevsky's  old  comrade  Gai.  19  Unsurprisingly,  Tukhachevsky 
entrusted  Gai  with  the  vital  role  during  the  summer  offensive. 
Tukhachevsky  also  created  a  separate  16th  Army  left  flank  group  on  18th  May, 
comprising  two  divisions  and  a  brigade  of  16th  Army,  for  which  Sollogub  created  a 
field  HQ  using  Gomel'  Fortified  Zone  HQ.  This  became  Mozyr'  Group  under  T.  S. 
Khvesin.  20 
Finally,  Tukhachevsky  created  Southern  Group  on  18th  May,  which  became  3rd 
Army  on  2nd  June  under  V.  S.  Lazarevich 
.21 
Therefore,  by  early  June,  Tukhachevsky 
16  V.  M.  Ivanov,  p.  153. 
17  Direktivy  Glavnogo  komandovaniia  Krasnoi  Armii  (1917-1920),  Sbornik  dokumentov.  (Moscow, 
1969),  (hereafter  DGkKA),  doc.  619,  pp.  632-633;  Fon-ner  Tsarist  Lieutenant-Colonel  Avgust 
Ivanovich  Kork  (1887-1937)  commanded  15th  Army  from  31  st  August-  I  5th  October  1919  and  22nd 
October  1919-16th  October  1920,  DkJK,  4,  Tom  IV,  p.  543. 
18  Lieutenant-Colonel  Evgenii  Nikolaevich  Sergeev  (1887-1937)  commanded  Northern  group  and  4th 
Army  until  31  st  July,  DGkK,  4,  pp.  805  -806,  note  108;  Aleksandr  Dmitrievich  Shuvaev  commanded 
4th  Army  until  17th  October,  when  former  Tsarist  Colonel  Nikolai  Evgen'evich  Kakurin  (1883-1936) 
replaced  him  on  17th  October,  DkfK,  4,  Tom  IV,  p.  536;  Both  Sergeev  and  Kakurin  wrote  accounts  of 
the  Polish-Soviet  War,  with  Kakurin  also  completing  a  two-volume  history  of  the  Russian  Civil  War. 
These  are  two  early  and  invaluable  sources  on  the  conflicts:  E.  N.  Sergeev.  Ot  Dvinska  k  Visle, 
(Smolensk,  1923).  N.  E.  Kakurin.  Russko-Pol'skaia  Kampaniia,  1918-1920.  Politiko-strategicheskii 
ocherk.  (Moscow,  1922),  and  Kak  srazhalas'revoliuaiia,  Tomy  1-11,  (Moscow/Leningrad,  1925  & 
1926). 
'9  Dk)X4,  Tom  III,  p.  739,  note  12.15th  Cavalry  Division  was  headed  by  Borevich,  another  Pole,  who 
had  fought  with  Tukhachevsky  and  Gai  in  24th  Simbirsk  Iron  Division  in  1918. 
20  DGkKA,  p.  806,  note  109.  Tikhon  Serafimovich  Khvesin  (1894-193  8),  a  former  Tsarist  NCO, 
commanded  Mozyr'group  until  its  disbandment  in  September  1920. 
21  Southern  Group  was  commanded  by  29th  Division  Commander  Vladislav  Flonanovich  Grushetskii, 
DGkKA,  p.  806,;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  IV,  pp.  568-69;  Vladimir  Salamanovich  Lazarevich  (1882-1938) 
commanded  3  rd  Army  from  12th  June-  I  8th  October  when  N.  E.  Kakurm  took  over  until  31  st 
December,  DkfKA  Tom  IV,  pp.  530  &  535. 265 
had  on  paper  reorganised  Western  Front,  although  in  practice  it  was  not  fully  ready 
until  July.  In  early  May  however,  Tukhachevsky  was  only  beginning  this  when  he  had 
to  launch  the  pre-emptive  offensive,  which  gives  some  indication  of  how  unprepared 
Western  Front  was  and  how  much  of  a  risk  Tukhachevsky  was  taking. 
The  comparison  to  Tukhachevsky's  Civil  War  commands  are  apparent,  as  he  spent 
the  first  half  of  May  moving  around  Western  Front,  issuing  orders  to  15th  and  16th 
Armies  and  preparing  for  the  offensive.  He  instructed  Sollogub  on  3rd  and  8th  May  to 
concentrate  at  Borisov  and  Igumen  by  13th  May  for  crossing  the  Beresina  and 
22  attacking  towards  Minsk 
. 
This  would  allow  an  advance  directly  up  the  railway  and 
via  Igumen,  the  shortest  route  over  dry  land  through  the  marshes,  allowing  15th  and 
16th  Armies  to  arrive  at  Minsk  simultaneously.  Mozyr'  was  to  be  occupied  before 
this  to  secure  the  left  flank,  but  by  6th  May  Kamenev  had  directed  16th  Army  to  only 
screen  the  sector  south  of  the  Beresina  and  advance  to  BoriSOV.  23  This  was  a  reaction 
to  the  Polish  advance  on  Kiev,  which  was  captured  on  6th  May.  With  South-Western 
Front  retreating  so  rapidly,  there  was  no  time  for  the  preparatory  attack  on  Mozyr', 
which  would  also  have  brought  16th  Army  into  direct  contact  with  the  Polish  forces 
advancing  against  12th  Army  and  prevented  its  concentration  in  Borisov  sector. 
Therefore,  securing  Mozyr'  and  the  left  wing  had  to  be  sacrificed,  which  proved 
important  to  the  outcome  of  the  pre-emptive  attack  and  planning  for  the  general 
offensive. 
On  5th  May,  Tukhachevsky  directed  Kork  to  attack  at  dawn  on  14th  May,  using 
all  rifle  divisions,  with  none  kept  in  reserve  and  the  "most  urgent"  measures  to  be 
taken  to  prepare  the  rear  and  communications  in  the  attack  area.  24  Tukhachevsky 
recognised  that  bad  communications  between  frontline  and  rear  areas  and  between 
neighbouring  frontline  areas  would  be  problematic  and  urged  his  commanders  to 
solve  any  problems  as  quickly  as  possible,  as  he  had  done  in  the  Caucasus.  With 
communications  "unreliable",  he  decided  to  lead  operations  from  Vitebsk  which  was 
closer  than  Smolensk.  25 
22  DkfKA,  Tom  Iff,  docs.  II&  14,  pp.  23  &  25. 
23  Ibid.  docs.  II&  13,  pp.  23-24. 
24 
Ibid.  doc.  12,  p.  24. 
25 
Ibid.  doc.  15,  pp.  25-27. 266 
As  Mozyr'  was  not  secure,  the  weakness  of  the  left  flank  was  another  problem.  A 
Polish  attack  towards  Bobruisk  could  threaten  Zhlobin  and  Gomel  and  the  Poles  had  a 
3:  1  advantage  in  Mozyr'  sector.  They  had  pushed  the  Soviets  behind  the  Dnieper  en 
route  to  Kiev  by  10th  May,  but  Tukhachevsky  calculated  they  would  not  advance 
north  towards  Mozyr',  reporting  to  Kamenev, 
... 
Altogether,  if  we  consider  not  men,  but  bayonets,  then  the  enemy  has 
65,000  and  we  have  in  thousands  up  to  ten  less,  apart  from  that,  many 
badly  reinforced.  In  view  of  this  for  creating  a  strong  attack  group  we 
have  to  take  several  risks  in  other  sectors,  otherwise  it  is  difficult  to  hope 
26  for  success  . 
This  clearly  illustrates  Tukhachevsky's  tactical  thinking.  Troop  shortages  led  him 
to  concentrate  the  majority  of  his  troops  on  the  right-wing  and  centre  for  the 
envelopment  and  front  holding  groups,  but  weakly  screen  the  left  flank  despite  the 
Polish  offensive  against  South-Western  Front.  This  was  a  risk,  but  Tukhachevsky  felt 
it  was  worth  taking,  if  it  allowed  concentration  elsewhere. 
Kamenev  pressed  for  reinforcements  for  the  pre-emptive  strike  and  on  12th  May 
Lenin  emphasised  to  Smilga,  "It  is  necessary  to  energetically  help  Western  Front", 
asking  him  to  personally  ensure  all  divisions  asked  for  by  Kamenev  reached  Western 
Front  without  delay  with  their  full  compliment,  (ie.  with  no  desertions).  27 
Reinforcements  were  on  the  way,  although  Kamenev  informed  Tukhachevsky  that  he 
must  take  his  share  of  the  blame  for  12th  and  21st  Divisions  arriving  in  an 
unbattleworthy  state.  As  Caucasian  Front  Commander,  Tukhachevsky  had  argued 
about  transferring  them  from  Caucasian  Front  and  had  insisted  that  they  be  equipped 
at  Western  Front.  28  He  must  therefore,  have  stripped  them  of  a  good  deal  of  their 
equipment  before  they  were  transferred,  retaining  the  equipment  on  Caucasian  Front. 
This  decision  was  now  backfiring  because  he  had  to  equip  them  on  Western  Front. 
However,  this  illustrates  the  supply  problems  and  shortages  which  persisted 
throughout  the  Civil  War. 
26  Ibid. 
27  V.  1.  Lenin,  Voennaiaperepiska,  1917-1922gg.  (hereafter  L-Vp),  docs.  475  &477,  pp.  243-244  & 
365,  note  286;  DGkK-4,  docs.  749  &  75  1,  pp.  743-744  &  744-45;  Ivar  Smilga  was  Temporary 
Caucasian  Front  Commander  until  20th  May  1920,  DkfK,  4,  Tom  IV,  p.  530. 
28  DkfKA  Tom  III,  doc.  15,  pp.  25-27. 267 
Pre-emptive  Strike 
On  15th  May,  Western  Front  comprised  49,474  infantry  and  3,993  cavalry  facing 
50,700  Polish  infantry  and  5,800  cavalry.  South-Western  Front  fielded  49,676 
infantry  and  29,633  cavalry  against  30,800  and  7,900  Polish  infantry  and  cavalry. 
45,000  infantry  and  6,200  cavalry  were  positioned  in  Bessarabia  and  Wrangel  fielded 
28,400  infantry  and  11,500  cavalry.  29  Even  without  action  from  Bessarabia,  South- 
Western  Front  was  outnumbered. 
31,230  infantry  and  2,644  cavalry  were  concentrated  by  Tukhachevsky  in 
Northern  Group  and  15th  Army  in  the  "Gates  of  Smolensk"  sector  for  the  quick 
envelopment,  with  18,244  infantry  and  1,349  cavalry  in  the  southern  sector  to  pin 
down  frontally,  displaying  the  concentration  on  the  right.  30 
With  the  Poles  already  attacking  at  Borisov,  on  12th  May,  Tukhachevsky  ordered 
Northern  Group  to  force  the  Western  Dvina  in  Disna-Polotsk  area  and  attack  in 
Zagat'e  station  area.  15th  Army  was  to  take  Sharkovshchizna  station-Novodrutsk 
station-Dokshitsy-River  Serguch'  estuary  area  on  18th  May.  16th  Army  was  to  push 
the  Poles  back,  force  the  Beresina  in  Borisov-Beresina  (the  town)  area  by  17th  May, 
for  a  further  offensive  in  Minsk  sector,  involving  screening  the  Beresina  and  Dnieper 
Rivers,  whilst  guaranteeing  the  left  flank  with  its  remaining  forces.  31  Therefore,  15th 
Army  was  to  rapidly  envelop  in  its  sector,  whilst  16th  Army  was  to  cross  the  Beresina 
and  pin  the  Poles  down,  to  prepare  an  attack  on  Minsk. 
The  offensive  began  on  14th  May  with  Northern  Group  crossing  the  Western 
Dvina.  Tukhachevsky  directed  Sollogub  that  Polish  forces  had  dug  in  along  the  River 
Dnieper  and  that  he  should  guard  against  an  attack  in  Mozyr'-Zhlobin  area  on  the  left 
flank.  He  agreed  with  Sollogub  that  he  should  use  air  squadrons  to  "ease  the  crossing 
for  the  troops  by  a  massive  raid  and  attacks  from  the  air  on  the  enemy  positions  on  the 
bank".  The  crossing  would  be  difficult  with  poor  engineering  resources,  so  an  aerial 
bombardment  was  to  be  used,  reminiscent  of  the  Ufa  Operation  in  May  1919  and 
another  combined  operation.  32 
29  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  119-120,  Dk)KA,  Tom  IV,  pp.  152-155  &  522. 
30  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  119-120. 
31  Dýý,  Tom  III,  doc.  16,  p.  28. 
32  Ibid.  docs.  17-18,  pp.  28-29. 268 
15th  Army  and  Northern  Group  advanced  successfully,  with  Northern  Group's  left 
flank  aiding  15th  Army's  right  flank,  to  force  the  Western  Dvina  River  and  attack 
33 
along  its  left  bank.  However,  16th  Army  and  the  Poles  both  attacked  in  Borisov  and 
Zhlobin  sectors,  with  neither  side  making  headway.  34  Tukhachevsky  urged  Sollogub 
to  attack  towards  Minsk  on  17th  May,  to  aid  15th  Army,  before  the  Poles  could  attack 
further  in  Borisov  sector  and  Sollogub  launched  the  Borisov  Operation  that  day.  35 
Tukhachevsky's  confidence  in  his  class  warfare  methods  is  illustrated  by  his  order 
to  Kork  on  18th  May,  urging  him  to  develop  4th  Rifle  Division's  breakthrough,  by 
advancing  15th  Cavalry  Division  into  the  Polish  rear  to  encircle  and  wipe  them  out. 
Tukhachevsky  said  that  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  cavalry  would  be  secured  because 
36 
Minsk  Province  was  rife  with  uprisings  and  partisans.  He  was  utilising  the  presence 
of  pro-Soviet  forces  in  his  enemy's  rear  as  he  had  done  against  Kolchak  and  Denikin. 
With  15th  and  16th  Armies  across  the  Beresina,  Tukhachevsky  directed  the  next 
stage  of  the  offensive  to  "...  be  decisively  developed"  on  19th  May.  Northern  Group 
was  to  clear  the  Western  Dvina's  left  bank,  not  crossing  the  Latvian  border,  and  move 
to  Sharkovshchizna  area  to  guard  15th  Army's  right  flank  by  24th  May.  15th  Army, 
screening  Sventsiany  area,  was  to  take  Molodechno  (the  railway  station  after  Minsk) 
on  25th  May.  16th  Army  was  to  screen  Rogachev  and  Gomel',  whilst  advancing  to 
Minsk-Ruvnopol'  area  by  25th  May.  37  In  this  way,  Minsk  would  be  encircled  by  the 
right  flank  envelopment  and  frontal  attack. 
Kamenev  directed  South-Western  Front  to  inunediately  attack  to  support  Western 
Front  and  Egorov  directed  14th  Anny  and  I  st  Cavalry  Anny  to  attack  into  the  Right- 
38 
Bank  Ukraine  and  12th  Army  to  encircle  and  wipe  out  the  Polish  Kiev  Group.  The 
opportunity  provided  by  Western  Front's  breakthrough,  forcing  Polish  troops  to 
transfer  northwards,  was  seized  by  South-Westem  Front. 
By  23rd  May,  16th  Anny  held  a  bridgehead  on  the  Beresina  right  bank.  Following 
advice  from  Kamenev,  Tukhachevsky  directed  15th  Army  to  occupy  Zembin  area, 
then  advance  to  Smolevichi  and  occupy  Lake  Velikoe-Lake  Maloe  area  by  25th  May. 
16th  Army  was  to  occupy  Zhodzina  sector,  whilst  screening  south  of  Borisov 
33  Ibid.  docs.  19-20,  pp.  29-30. 
34  Ibid.  doc.  2  1,  p.  3  1. 
35  Ibid.  doc.  22,  p.  32. 
36  Ibid.  doc.  23,  p.  32. 
37  Ibid.  doc.  24,  p.  33. 
38  DGkKA,  doc.  678,  pp.  682-683;  DkfKA,  Toni  III,  docs.  184-186,  pp.  156-159. 269 
bridgehead.  With  Zembin  and  Zhodzina  occupied  to  the  south-west  and  north-west  of 
Borisov  respectively,  15th  and  16th  Armies  could  then  encircle  it,  cut  rail 
communications  and  capture  the  town  and  the  Polish  troops  within  it,  another  case  of 
screening  one  sector  to  allow  a  pincer  manoeuvre  operation  in  the  main  sector.  39 
However,  by  25th  May  Polish  reinforcements  had  been  introduced.  15th  Army 
had  been  engaged  in  battle  for  three  days  around  Polotsk-Molodechno  Railway, 
slowing  its  envelopment  manoeuvre,  and  Tukhachevsky  urged  Kork  to  take 
Molodechno  in  3-4  days  to  aid  16th  Army.  The  latter  had  also  encountered  stiff 
resistance,  but  both  Kork  and  Sollogub  advanced  the  next  day,  towards  Molodechno 
and  Zhodin  respectively.  At  this  point,  Tukhachevsky  asked  Kamenev  for  more  staff, 
telegraph-construction  companies  and  workers  columns  to  be  hurried  to  the  front,  as 
communications  were  poor,  especially  with  15th  Army,  whose  messages  were 
incomprehensible.  Kamenev  said  staff  and  reinforcements  would  arrive,  but,  clearly 
displeased,  asked  Tukhachevsky  if  he  had  absolutely  no  reserves  left.  However, 
Tukhachevsky  had  used  all  available  troops  in  the  offensive,  instructing  his  army 
commanders  to  hold  none  back  and  was  counting  on  reinforcements  in  transit  as 
reserves. 
This  was  not  the  first  time  he  had  clashed  with  superiors  over  this  tactical  measure 
and  it  would  not  be  the  last.  However,  Tukhachevsky  had  launched  the  pre-emptive 
attack  with  barely  enough  troops  and  resources  and  as  Polish  reinforcements  arrived, 
the  offensive  slowed  . 
40  This  was  demonstrated  on  26th  May,  when  Polish 
reinforcements,  advancing  north  from  Ukraine,  attacked  16th  Army's  left  flank, 
forcing  it  back  over  the  Beresina  the  following  day.  41 
In  a  27th  May  Hughes  Telegraph  discussion,  Tukhachevsky  reported  the  Poles 
had  drafted  in  great  numbers  of  reinforcements  and  stated  that  15th  and  16th  Annies 
had  suffered  serious  losses  and  required  reinforcement  and  reformation  to  retain 
battleworthiness.  He  stressed  the  need  for  more  staff  and  communications  resources 
for  the  new  divisions  now  on  Western  Front. 
Tukhachevsky  also  criticised  Sollogub  for  continually  conducting  small  attacks 
(instead  of  presumably  forming  a  concentrated  attack  group  for  a  breakthrough  -  NQ, 
but  he  believed  Kork  ".  Jully  can  and  must  win  the  operation,  if  only  he  wasn't 
39  DGkKA,  doc.  620,  p.  633;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  III,  doc.  25,  pp.  33-34. 
40  DkfK,  4,  Toni  III,  docs.  26-27,  pp.  34-36. 270 
nervous.  iiQ  Sollogub  evidently  was  not  following  Tukhachevsky's  instructions  on 
concentration,  but  Kork  was  manoeuvring  well  on  the  right  flank. 
By  the  end  of  May,  the  Poles  had  gained  the  upper  hand.  A  counter-offensive  was 
launched  on  31  st  May  by  Polish  Reserve  Army  under  General  Sosnkowski,  attacking 
between  Northern  Group  and  15th  Army,  and  by  I  st  Polish  Army  in  Molodechno  and 
Zembin  areas  against  16th  Army.  43 
Kamenev  and  Tukhachevsky  urged  Northern  Group  and  15th  Army  to  advance  on 
the  right  flank  and  16th  Army  to  cross  the  Beresina  once  more,  aided  by  the  now- 
active  Mozyr'  group  on  its  left  flank.  44  However,  little  progress  was  made  and  by  4th 
June  Tukhachevsky  ordered  Sollogub  and  Head  of  Western  Front  Air  Fleet,  E.  1. 
Tatarchenko, 
...  on  beginning  a  second  crossing  with  all  air  resources,  in  full  tactical 
cooperation  with  the  crossing  infantry,  attack  the  opposite  bank  of  the 
River  Beresina  at  the  points  of  crossing  and  by  this  guarantee  the 
fulfillment  of  the  crossings.  Aeroplanes  must  not  be  spread  out,  but  must 
be  used  in  mass  squadrons.  The  task  of  land  forces  command  must  be  to 
give  the  air  fleet  deten-ninedly  clear  points  for  attacks  from  the  air,  they 
must  not  be  very  scattered.  45 
Tukhachevsky  was  demanding  concentrated  strikes  to  provide  air  cover  for  the 
infantry,  targeted  by  spotters  on  the  ground,  a  combined-arms  operation  again. 
Explaining  it  in  such  detail  suggests  that  Sollogub  had  never  carried  out  such  an 
operation  before  or  had  done  so  poorly.  Tukhachevsky  also  gave  detailed 
topographical  advice  to  Kork  and  Sergeev,  telling  them  which  areas  of  land  to  use 
amongst  the  marshy  areas  of  the  Upper  Beresina  and  River  Servech'.  Knowledge  of 
the  area,  amassed  during  the  Great  War,  would  have  been  invaluable  to 
Tukhachevsky,  but  he  would  also  have  been  aided  by  his  Civil  War  command 
46  experience,  and  this  was  another  area  he  wrote  about  . 
However,  he  did  not  always 
listen  to  advice  from  Kamenev  so  easily. 
On  2nd  June,  Kamenev  voiced  his  concerns  over  Tukhachevsky  apparently 
nervily  throwing  reserves  from  one  sector  to  another,  when  using  neighbouring  units 
"  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al.  Tom  X.  p.  347. 
42  DkfKA  Tom  III,  doc.  29,  pp.  37-40. 
43  A.  S.  Bubnov  et  al.,  pp.  347-348. 
4'DkfK,  4,  Tom  III,  docs.  28  &  30-36,  pp.  37  &  40-43;  DGkKA,  doc.  622,  p.  634. 
4'  DkJKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  3  8,  p.  45. 
46  Ibid.  doc.  39,  p.  46;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Statistika  v  grazhdanskoi  voine",  "Inzhenemoe 
sorazmerenie  operatsii",  Voina  klassov,  pp.  78-88  &  116-134. 271 
to  help  each  other  would  be  more  effective.  Tukhachevsky  replied,  "That  is  why  I 
don't  like  reserves  which  are  scarcely  able  to  be  used,  I  personally  always  help  with 
neighbours".  Kamenev's  reply,  "Yes,  only  without  reserves  it  is  difficult  to  develop 
success  and  gives  no  breathing-space  to  exhausted  units"  may  well  have  fallen  on 
deaf  ears,  with  no  reply  to  this  forthcoming  from  Tukhachevsky.  47 
Tukhachevsky  hoped  to  stop  the  Polish  counter-offensive  by  re-launching 
Western  Front's  offensive.  15th  Anny  could  ease  the  pressure  on  16th  Army,  whilst 
Mozyr'  Group  could  take  Mozyr'  to  secure  the  left  flank. 
However,  concerns  in  Moscow  about  Western  Front's  position  are  shown  by  a  2nd 
June  telegram  from  Lenin  to  Stalin  noting, 
On  Western  Front  the  position  is  worse  than  Tukhachevsky  and  Supreme 
Commander  think,  therefore  it  is  necessary  to  ask  you  to  send  divisions 
there,  as  it  is  impossible  to  take  any  more  from  Caucasian  Front  because 
an  uprising  there  would  make  the  position  ultra-worrysome.  Trotsky  is 
working  on  sending  you  reinforcements  from  Crimean  Division  that 
perhaps  will  give  you  the  possibility  to  take  two-three  divisions  from  these 
for  Kiev  sector.  Try  to  pressure  the  units  at  all  costs  to  continue  beginning 
the  offensive  energetically.  You  of  course  remember  that  the  Politburo 
decision  to  attack  Crimea  is  postponed  until  a  new  Politburo  decision.  48 
South-Western  Front  was  to  attack  to  relieve  Western  Front,  but  Lenin  seemed  to 
doubt  that  Kamenev  appreciated  the  seriousness  of  the  situation.  49  However, 
Kamenev  was  trying  to  direct  reinforcements  to  Western  Front  and  his  appraisal  of 
the  Front  situation  is  shown  in  a  4th  June  directive  to  Tukhachevsky  noting, 
The  circumstances  on  your  front  clearly  underline  the  following  three 
facts,  which  in  my  opinion,  must  be  placed  as  the  basis  of  any  further 
directives:  1)  The  inability  of  16th  Army  to  cross  the  Beresina  and  by  this 
render  help  to  15th  Army;  2)  the  complete  insecurity  of  15th  Army 
Southern  Group's  left  flank,  without  which  15th  Army  is  not  able  to  risk 
wide  operations;  3)  in  view  of  the  strength  of  resistance  by  enemy  troops 
in  Molodechno  area,  the  decision  of  this...  sector...  can  be  achieved  by 
developing  the  success  in  Vilensk  sector,  with  actions  further  on  the  flank 
of  the  enemy  Molodechno  Group. 
He  urged  quick  regrouping  and  conducting  an  attack  into  Molodechno  sector  to 
prevent  further  Polish  action  and  seize  back  the  initiative.  50 
47  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  37,  pp.  44-45. 
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South-Western  Front  launched  an  attack  on  6th  June  and  Tukhachevsky  urgently 
issued  orders  to  support  it,  stating,  "Only  by  energetic  and  brave  tasks  will  you  stop 
the  retreat  of  your  troops",  again  indicating  his  belief  in  attack  being  the  best  form  of 
defence.  51 
The  reason  for  launching  the  May  offensive  was  to  pre-empt  the  Poles  in 
Belorussia  and  to  relieve  South-Westem  Front  in  Ukraine.  This  had  been  achieved  by 
early  June  because  the  Poles  had  not  been  able  to  launch  their  Belorussian  attack  and 
had  transferred  the  ma  ority  of  their  forces  from  the  Ukrainian  to  the  Belorussian 
theatre  to  halt  Tukhachevsky,  thus  relieving  the  pressure  on  Egorov.  However, 
Western  Front  now  faced  vastly  superior  Polish  forces,  with  only  depleted,  exhausted 
troops  still  awaiting  reinforcement  and  resupply.  To  add  to  the  general  problems 
facing  the  Soviets,  Wrangel  launched  an  offensive  from  Crimea  into  the  Tauride  on 
6th  June,  taking  advantage  of  the  Red  decision  to  delay  offensive  action  against  him. 
This  put  pressure  on  Egorov,  just  as  he  was  beginning  his  offensive  into  Ukraine  to 
regain  Kiev. 
Soviet  forces  were  back  at  their  starting  points  for  the  May  offensive  by  8th  June 
and  Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  discussed  a  new  Western  Front  offensive  to  support 
South-Western  Front's  attack.  Tukhachevsky  stressed  that  the  main  problem  was  the 
quality  and  organisation  of  Polish  reinforcements,  compared  to  Western  Front,  and 
said  he  hoped  to  raise  30,000  reinforcements,  but  that  he  would  accept  any  help 
Kamenev  could  give.  He  then  stated, 
The  war  with  Poland,  as  you  have  already  noted,  is  significantly  closer  to 
regular  forms  of  war  of  big  armies,  in  connection  with  this  I  have  prepared 
calculations,  so  to  speak,  for  a  plan  for  a  summer  offensive.  Figures  are 
important  and  perhaps  for  the  first  time,  can  allow  us  to  wage  war  not  with 
just  what  there  is,  but  to  create  what  is  demanded  for  the  war. 
Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  arranged  to  meet  in  person  to  discuss  it 
. 
52 
Both  Kamenev  and  Tukhachevsky  knew  that  a  different  approach  was  necessary. 
The  pre-emptive  offensive,  although  quickly  planned  and  unprepared,  had  served  its 
purpose,  but  now  the  Poles  had  reacted  and  with  their  superior  ability  to  reinforce 
formations,  prevented  the  Soviets  making  further  gains.  Both  men  realised  that 
operations  were  on  a  larger  scale  on  Western  Front  than  previous  Civil  War  fronts  and 
51  DkJK.  4,  Tom  III,  docs.  40-44,  pp.  47-49. 
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therefore  required  careful  planning,  for  which  time  would  be  needed.  Northern  Group 
and  15th  An-ny  had  advanced  some  100-130  kms  and  secured  the  use  of  the  Polotsk- 
Molodechno  Railway  for  the  general  offensive,  but  16th  Army's  lack  of  progress  had 
exposed  15th  Army's  left  flank  and  forced  Kork  to  spread  his  men  over  an  ever- 
widening  front,  eroding  his  attacking  impetus.  Therefore,  the  time  had  come  to  dig  in 
and  prepare  for  the  general  offensive  in  the  summer.  Tukhachevsky  pulled  his  forces 
behind  the  Rivers  Auta  and  Beresina  to  stabilise  the  Soviet  line  and  using  the  time 
won  by  the  May  offensive,  reinforced  and  reorganised  Western  Front  in  June. 
Kamenev  ordered  regrouping  to  begin  and  Mozyr'  Group's  operation  to  take  Mozyr' 
was  postponed,  although  Western  Front  forces  were  to  keep  the  Poles  in  their  sector 
53  occupied,  to  prevent  forces  being  transferred  back  to  face  South-Western  Front. 
Build-Up  of  Western  Front 
The  rest  of  June  followed  a  similar  pattern  to  the  first  two  weeks  of  May. 
Tukhachevsky  reorganised  Western  Front  for  the  general  offensive,  prevented  Polish 
advances  with  defensive  measures  and  limited  advances,  and  supported  South- 
Western  Front's  right  flank.  Tukhachevsky  had  tremendous  experience  in 
reorganisational  work  under  fire,  having  conducted  it  on  every  Civil  War  front.  His 
command  record,  but  also  probably  the  military  ideas  he  had  already  formulated  and 
command  courses  he  had  created,  were  recognised  on  22nd  May  when  he  was 
appointed  a  member  of  the  Red  Army  General  Staff,  despite  being  too  young  to  have 
attend  Nikolaevskii  General  Staff  Academy.  54 
To  begin  reorganisation,  on  9th  and  10th  June,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  15th  and 
16th  Armies  to  dig  in  behind  the  Dvina  and  Beresina  Rivers  to  hold  the  Polish 
advance,  allow  reinforcements  to  be  introduced  and  begin  regrouping.  55  On  II  th  June, 
he  formed  3rd  and  4th  Armies  from  Southern  and  Northern  Groups,  reorganising 
Western  Front  for  the  summer  offensive.  56  Tukhachevsky  infon-ned  Sollogub  on  12th 
June  that  in  the  forthcoming  operation,  he  was  to  cross  the  Beresina  and  attack  Minsk 
sector,  whilst  the  three-army  Northern  Group  attacked  on  the  right  flank.  He  was  to 
53  Ibid.  doc.  46,  p.  52;  DGkKA,  doc.  624,  p.  636. 
54  N.  1.  Koritskii,  ed.,  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  soratnikov  i  druzei,  (Moscow:  1965),  p. 
231. 
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attack  with  four  divisions  and  prepare  beforehand  all  resources  for  crossing, 
communications  and  transport  in  his  selected  crossing  area.  57  Therefore,  the  offensive 
was  planned  well  beforehand,  using  the  same  areas  of  operations,  but  this  time 
ensuring  enough  men  and  resources  were  available  to  exploit  any  breakthrough. 
Whilst  reorganising  however,  Tukhachevsky  was  forced  to  attack  with  Mozyr' 
Group.  South-Western  Front's  offensive  continued  and  Mozyr'  was  as  important  for 
the  security  of  its  right  flank  as  for  Western  Front's  left  flank.  On  I  Ith  June, 
Tukhachevsky  ordered  Mozyr'  Group  to  cross  the  River  Dnieper  and  occupy  Rechitsa, 
to  guarantee  the  railway  bridge  on  the  river's  right  bank,  aiding  12th  Army  and 
opening  up  an  advance  to  Mozyr'.  58 
The  Poles  were  still  active  against  Western  Front,  anxious  to  use  their  numerical 
superiority  and  advance  as  far  as  possible  before  the  Soviets  reinforced.  Therefore,  on 
14th  June,  Tukhachevsky  was  forced  to  order  3rd,  15th  and  16th  Armies  to  launch 
limited  counter-attacks  to  secure  their  areas.  59 
Whilst  the  northern  forces  held  position,  Mozyr  Group's  attack  in  support  of 
South-Western  Front  developed  into  an  operation  to  occupy  Mozyr',  with  16th  Army 
advancing  to  support  its  right  flank  on  18th  June.  Khvesin  supported  12th  Army, 
which  was  attacking  along  the  River  Pripiat',  by  moving  towards  Mozyr'  area.  60 
Khvesin  had  already  learned  of  a  Polish  retreat  from  Rechitsa  and  attacked  on  his 
own  initiative,  crossing  the  River  Dnieper  and  capturing  Rechitsa  station-Derazhnia 
area.  61  On  19th  June,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  him  to  develop  this  further  by  taking 
Vasilevichi-Khoiniki  area.  16th  Army  was  to  cross  the  Beresina  in  its  left  flank  area 
no  later  than  21st  June  and  advance  to  take  Evtushkevichi-Domanovichi- 
Novosovichi-Zolotukha  area.  62  12th  Army  pushed  on  with  24th  Division  and  the 
Dnepr  Flotilla,  to  aid  the  occupation  of  Mozyr'.  63 
As  well  as  guarding  12th  Army's  right  flank,  occupying  Mozyr'  was  a  vital 
precondition  for  the  summer  offensive  into  Belorussia,  guarding  Western  Front's  left 
flank.  The  Poles  knew  the  tactical  importance  of  the  town  and  transferred  troops  from 
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the  northern  sector  to  try  to  hold  Mozyr'.  On  27th  June,  Kamenev  instructed 
Tukhachevsky  and  Egorov  to  take  all  possible  measures  to  occupy  Mozyr'.  64  The  two 
Front  Commanders  relayed  these  instructions  and  12th  Army  and  Mozyr'  Group 
pressed  on,  taking  the  town  on  29th  June.  Tukhachevsky  directed  Khvesin  and 
Sollogub  to  secure  the  town  and  area  the  next  day.  This  linked  Western  and  South- 
Western  Front  and  provided  the  security  for  Western  Front's  left  flank,  which  had 
been  missing  during  the  pre-emptive  attack,  clearing  the  way  for  the  general 
offensive.  65 
Whilst  offensive  action  was  encouraged  in  southern  sector,  on  22nd  June 
Tukhachevsky  had  ordered  15th  and  4th  Armies,  which  were  involved  in  protracted 
battles  along  their  front,  to  withdraw,  dig  in  and  conduct  energetic  reconnaissance  to 
seize  prisoners.  Troops  were  to  be  withdrawn  to  reinforce  divisions  for  the 
forthcoming  offensive,  which  was  to  be  completed  by  28th  June,  for  the  offensive  to 
begin  along  the  front  of  4th,  15th  and  3rd  Armies  on  5th  July.  66  On  26th  June,  the 
urgency  to  attack  and  again  relieve  South-Western  Front  was  underlined  by  Kamenev 
stressing,  "...  the  circumstances  taking  shape  on  South-Westem  Front  demand  action 
begins  on  your  front  to  achieve  general  results,  the  circumstances  for  which  already, 
visibly  are  favourable.  167  Tukhachevsky  was  to  attack  as  soon  as  possible,  whilst  the 
situation  remained  so.  South-Western  Front  had  retaken  Kiev  on  12th  June  and 
Novograd-Volynskii  fortified  zone  further  west  and  maintained  pressure  on  Poland, 
relieving  Western  Front  and  allowing  Tukhachevsky  to  reinforce  and  prepare  for  the 
general  offensive.  68  Now  Western  Front  had  to  attack  to  retain  the  initiative  won  in 
Ukraine  and  wrest  this  back  from  Poland  in  Belorussia. 
By  early  July,  Tukhachevsky  had  successfully  conducted  his  reorganisational  and 
reformational  work  on  Western  Front,  forming  3rd  and  4th  Armies  and  Mozyr'  Group 
to  compliment  15th  and  16th  Armies.  Whilst  doing  this,  he  had  also  directed  Mozyr' 
Group's  occupation  of  Mozyr',  cooperating  with  12th  Army,  and  had  stabilised  the 
line  in  the  other  sectors.  He  had  transformed  a  weak  front,  manned  by  troops  low  in 
morale,  into  a  strong  eager  fighting  force.  Numbers  had  risen  from  49,474  infantry 
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and  3,993  cavalry  in  early  May  to  80,912  infantry  and  10,569  cavalry  by  4th  JUly.  69 
The  30,000  recruits  Tukhachevsky  had  informed  Kamenev  he  was  hopeful  of  raising, 
was  exceeded  as  deserters  were  rounded  up  or  voluntarily  surrendered,  to  supplement 
those  mobilised.  100,000  people  were  mobilised  and  entered  the  Reserve  Army  and 
frontline  reinforcement  groups,  but,  as  with  previous  fronts,  no  time  existed  for 
intensive  training.  New  pontoon  bridges  were  constructed  to  cross  the  Dvina  at 
Polotsk  and  the  Beresina  at  Borisov,  providing  railway  crossings  and  ensuring 
communications  for  the  Belorussian  offensive.  Reminiscent  of  the  Civil  War,  local 
transport  resources  were  mobilised.  4th  Army  mobilised  8,000  carts,  15th  and  3rd 
Armies  15,000  each,  and  16th  Army  10,000.  Tukhachevsky  recalled  that  the  local 
population  reacted  well  to  this  as  they  were  afraid  of  the  Polish  invasion.  70 
Belorussian  12umen-Minsk  Operation 
If  the  North  Caucasus  Operation  was  the  archetypal  Civil  War  operation,  the 
Belorussian  campaign,  which  started  with  the  Igumen-Minsk  Operation  does  not  lag 
far  behind.  If  the  Polish-Soviet  War  had  ended  after  this  campaign,  Tukhachevsky 
would  have  been  remembered  as  an  undefeated,  victorious  commander  who  led 
sweeping  manoeuvre  campaigns  througout  the  Russian  Civil  War.  The  Igumen-Minsk 
Operation  was  on  a  bigger  scale  than  the  North  Caucasus  Operation  and  against  an 
arguably  more  effective  force  than  the  Armed  Forces  of  South  Russia  in  early  1920. 
The  Poles  were  relatively  inexperienced,  but  were  well-equipped  and  supported  by 
the  Entente,  especially  France.  They  were  fighting  for  their  new  nation  with  a 
nationalism  which  united  them  more  effectively  than  Denikin's  notion  of  "Russia,  One 
and  Indivisible"  had  for  the  lower  class  troops  in  his  forces. 
As  with  earlier  commands,  the  pre-emptive  May  offensive  gave  Tukhachevsky  an 
example  to  follow,  when  planning  the  Igumen-Minsk  Operation.  The  capture  of 
Mozyr'  secured  Western  Front's  left  flank  and  the  friendly  Lithuanian  and  Latvian  and 
neutral  Prussian  borders  secured  the  right.  This  enabled  Tukhachevsky  to  again  plan  a 
strong  envelopment  by  the  right  flank,  but  with  three  armies  this  time  -  15th,  3rd  and 
4th,  whilst  launching  a  powerful  frontal  attack  with  an  enlarged  16th  Army  guarded 
69  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  119-120  &  129-13  1. 
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on  the  left  by  Mozyr'  Group.  In  this  way,  Minsk  area  and  the  Poles  positioned  there 
were  to  be  encircled  and  wiped  out. 
In  the  right-wing  "Gates  of  Smolensk"  Northern  Group,  Tukhachevsky  placed:  4th 
Army,  including  3rd  Kavkor  (Cavalry  Corps)  -  9,715  infantry  and  4,119  cavalry;  15th 
Army  -  23,174  infantry  and  2,762  cavalry;  3rd  Army  -  17,893  infantry  and  2,255 
cavalry;  in  total  50,692  infantry  and  9,133  cavalry  facing  32,600  and  2,200  Polish 
infantry  and  cavalry. 
In  southern  sector,  Tukhachevsky  placed  16th  Army  -  24,045  infantry  and  953 
cavalry;  Mozyr'  Group  -  6,105  infantry  and  483  cavalry,  in  total  30,150  infantry  and 
1,436  cavalry  facing  26,800  and  5,200  Polish  infantry  and  cavalry.  71 
Tukhachevsky  had  concentrated  almost  twice  the  number  of  troops  on  the  right 
wing  as  the  Poles  could  muster  and  planned  a  double  envelopment  by  4th  and  3rd 
Armies  on  the  right  and  left  flanks,  whilst  15th  Army  pressed  from  the  front  to 
encircle  the  Poles  in  the  northern  sector.  3rd  Army  would  then  turn  south  to  cut  the 
Minsk-Molodechno  Railway,  preventing  a  Polish  retreat  from  Minsk  and  encircling 
the  Polish  group  there,  as  16th  Army  pressed  from  the  front,  covered  by  Mozyr' 
Group  advancing  on  the  left  flank. 
Tukhachevsky  gave  final  directives  on  30th  June  and  2nd  July  for  the  offensive  to 
begin  on  4th  July.  To  encircle  the  Poles  in  Dokszyce-Glqbokie-Germanovichi  area,  on 
the  right  flank  4th  Army  was  to  cross  and  attack  with  its  main  forces  south  of  the 
Western  Dvina  River  and  north  of  Lake  Belaia  El'na  to  reach  Sharkovshchina-Luzhki 
by  5th  July,  whilst  3rd  Kavkor  advanced  north  of  the  river,  deep  into  the  Polish  rear, 
to  cut  the  path  of  retreat  at  Swienciany.  15th  Army  was  to  attack  down  the  Polotsk- 
Molodechno  Railway,  reaching  Parafianowo  Station  by  6th  July,  cutting  the  retreat 
from  Germanovichi  to  Glqbokie.  3rd  Army  was  to  attack  along  the  Kasari-Dokszyce 
highway,  attacking  the  Dokszyce-Parafianowo  Station  sector,  before  turning  down 
towards  Pleshchenitsy-Minsk. 
In  Southern  sector,  16th  Army  Commander  was  to  cross  the  Beresina  on  the  night 
of  5th-6th  July  at  the  River  Bobr  estuary-River  Kleva  area,  to  attack  Igumen-Minsk 
area.  Mozyr'  Group,  after  an  intervention  by  Kamenev,  had  its  main  task  changed 
from  pursuing  the  Poles  along  both  banks  of  the  River  Pripiat'  to  aid  South-Westem 
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72  orces  were  to  Front's  right  flank 
. 
This  remained  a  secondary  task,  but  its  main  f 
advance  north-west  along  the  Beresina  right  bank  to  aid  16th  Army's  left  flank. 
Tukhachevsky's  final  instruction  was  to  not  retain  many  reserves,  but  attack 
"...  immediately  with  maximum  forces" 
. 
73  Evidently  the  earlier  conversation  with 
Kamenev  had  not  changed  his  mind  on  this  tactic. 
By  5th  July,  16th  Army  had  crossed  the  River  Beresina  and  reached  Baranowicze 
area  and  Mozyr'  Group,  also  making  good  ground,  was  instructed  to  alter  its  direction 
again,  from  north-west  towards  Slutsk  area,  to  directly  west  towards  Pinsk,  to  cover 
16th  Army's  left  flank.  74  4th  Anny  had  achieved  its  initial  targets  and  was  ordered  to 
cut  off  the  Polish  path  of  retreat  to  Swieciany  at  Glqbokie  area  by  the  night  of  6th-7th 
July.  15th  Army  was  to  continue  pushing  forwards,  whilst  3rd  Army  was  to  take  all 
measures  to  cut  off  the  Polish  retreat  route  along  the  railway  in  Parafianowo  area  no 
later  than  6th  July.  75 
3rd  Kavkor  occupied  Glqbokie  on  5th  July,  taking  prisoners,  whilst  15th  Army's 
33rd  Division  reached  the  line  Zhuki-Seslavino  and  15th  Division  reached  the  line 
Glqbokie-Lawrinowka-Matiqsy,  but  suffered  heavy  casualties  to  command  staff  and 
line  troops  from  a  Polish  counter-attack.  3rd  Army  occupied  its  initial  target  of 
Dokszyce  on  6th  July,  a  day  behind  schedule,  but  cut  the  railway  line  and  forced  the 
Poles  northwards,  as  planned.  76 
Tukhachevsky  reported  on  7th  July  that  16th  Army  was  just  beginning  its 
offensive,  whilst  Mozyr'  Group  had  repelled  Polish  attacks  at  Kowalewichi  and 
Katsury  station  and  was  engaged  in  battle  at  the  River  Ptich'.  Weaponry  and  3,000 
prisoners  had  been  taken,  and  he  felt  that  4th  Army's  envelopment  was  developing 
successfully  and  that  the  general  operation  was  proceeding  well,  but  did  not  know 
which  railway  the  Poles  were  primarily  retreating  along.  Although  agreeing  that  the 
first  three  days  of  the  offensive  had  developed  excellently,  Kamenev  suggested  that 
4th  Army's  envelopment  could  have  been  deeper,  since  moving  to  Germanowichi 
would  not  result  in  an  envelopment.  He  noted  that  Tukhachevsky  had  made 
72  1  st  Cavalry  Army  occupied  Rovno  on  4th  July,  DkfY,  4,  Tom  Iff,  p.  202. 
73  DkfKA,  Toni  111,  docs.  60-62,  pp.  60-62;  DGkKA,  doc.  629,  pp.  638-639  &  806,  note  112. 
"  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  docs.  63-64,  pp.  62-63. 
75 
Ibid.  doc.  65,  pp.  63-64. 
76  Ibid.  docs.  62  &  66,  pp.  61-62  &  64-66;  16th  Division  is  mentioned  as  part  of  15th  Army's 
complement  in  doc.  66,  but  is  not  listed  in  either  DkfKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  142  or  in  M.  N.  Tuhkachevsky, 
"Pokhod  za  Vislu",  p.  273.  This  could  be  an  error  and  should  possibly  be  15th  Division.  33rd  division 
is listed  in  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  but  not  Dk)KA,  Tom  IV. 279 
corrections  already,  but  said  he  felt  the  tasks  involved  were  unfeasible  because  it 
expected  infantry  to  cover  35-40  versty  in  24  hours.  If  half  of  this  was  achieved,  the 
envelopment  would  still  be  deeper.  He  also  asked  about  16th  Army  and  remarked  that 
Mozyr'  Group  should  be  pushed  as  it  had  "disgraced  itself  a  little  today". 
Tukhachevsky  replied  that  he  expected  great  success  from  16th  Army  because 
Sollogub  had  22,000  troops  against  3,000  Poles,  who  could  only  be  reinforced  to 
around  8-9,000,  and  that  Mozyr'  Group  was  engaged  with  the  greater  part  of  14th 
Polish  Division.  They  also  discussed  Latvia's  attitude  and  agreed  that  it  would  view 
Soviet  success  favourably  and  do  nothing.  77 
Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  were  working  well  as  a  team  again,  with  the  latter 
ready  with  suggestions,  but  leaving  the  ultimate  decision  to  Tukhachevsky  as  the  man 
on  the  spot. 
On  9th  and  10th  July,  Tukhachevsky  outlined  the  next  stage  of  the  operation.  4th 
Army  was  to  cut  down  with  its  enveloping  manoeuvre  towards  Vilno-Grodno  area, 
behind  the  Polish  troops  retreating  through  Molodechno,  and  to  use  the  Molodechno- 
Wilno  Railway,  as  the  Poles  may  have  cut  the  Wilno-Swiqcany-Postawy  Railway. 
15th  and  3rd  Armies  were  to  occupy  Molodechno,  from  where  3rd  Army  should  help 
16th  Army  southwards  at  Minsk  and  15th  An-ny  should  advance  south-east  to  cross 
the  River  Nieman  towards  Grodno.  16th  Army  was  to  take  Minsk  from  the  north  and 
east,  then  move  down  the  Aleksandrovsk  Railway  to  Baranowicze,  whilst  Mozyr' 
Group  cleared  Slutsk  and  Bobruisk  areas  south  of  Minsk  and  advanced  to 
Baranowicze.  78  Shvarts  outlined  the  next  phase  of  the  operation, 
Western  Front  Commander's  basic  idea  is  that  the  main  mass  of  Western 
Front  forces  must  be  grouped  on  the  right  flank  and  we  must  conduct  our 
offensive  guaranteeing  our  right  flank  with  the  friendly  attitude  of 
Lithuania  and  further  along  of  Eastern  Prussia.  If  the  enemy  resists  mainly 
in  Baranowicze  sector,  then  the  enveloping  movement  of  15th  and  3rd 
Armies  must  bring  the  full  rout  of  the  enemy  forces,  concentrated  in  that 
sector.  If  the  enemy  intends  to  hold  us  at  the  line  Krevo-River  Beresina, 
then  4th  Army  moving  to  Oszmiana  must  assist  the  offensive  of  15th  and 
3rd  Armies.  Concerning  Mozyr'  Group,  its  task  remains  as  before  -  leave 
for  Slutsk  and  a  further  attack  to  Pinsk. 
77  Ibid.  doc.  66,  pp.  64-66. 
78  Ibid.  doc.  68,  p.  67. 280 
Army  commanders  were  to  base  future  actions  on  this  and  organise  their  rear 
accordingly.  79 
Tukhachevsky  was  unsure  where  the  Poles  would  make  a  stand,  therefore  he 
issued  the  general  directive  and  entrusted  his  army  commanders  with  their  own  zones. 
Operational  lines  were  lengthening  and  an  advanced  front  base  was  established  at 
Molodechno,  as  the  base  of  operations  advanced  to  keep  up  with  the  frontline,  after 
Molodechno  and  Minsk  were  occupied  on  I  Ith  July.  This  successfully  concluded  the 
Igumen-Minsk  Operation  and  began  a  period  of  continuous  pursuit  operations  to  clear 
Belorussia  and  advance  to  the  Polish  border.  80 
Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  discussed  this  on  II  th  July  and  Kamenev  warned 
that,  after  Minsk,  the  way  eastwards  from  Lida  was  an  area  like  Polesia,  limiting 
movement  between  Lida  and  Slonim  and  perhaps  temporarily  separating  Western 
Front  in  two.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  should  consider  local  natural  conditions. 
Tukhachevsky  replied  that  4th,  15th  and  3rd  Armies  were  guaranteed  on  the  right 
flank  by  Lithuania  and  Eastern  Prussia  and  were  moving  north  of  the  Nieman- 
Beresina  marshes.  However,  until  Grodno,  the  Nieman  was  not  a  serious  obstacle  in 
many  places.  16th  Anny  was  advancing  along  the  Aleksandrovsk  road,  but  for  the 
main  attack  Tukhachevsky  considered  this  latter  to  be  disadvantageous  because  it 
would  have  to  advance  with  inverted  flanks.  81 
On  12th  July,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  the  pursuit  and  annihilation  of  Polish  forces, 
who  were  retreating  along  the  whole  front,  setting  targets  to  be  reached  by  17th  July. 
4th  Army  was  to  take  Orana  railway  junction;  15th  Army,  Zyrmuny  area;  3rd  Army, 
Lida-Lake  Glukhoe  area;  16th  An-ny,  Baranowicze  area;  Mozyr'  Group,  Timkovichi- 
Semezhevo-Wyzna-Starobino  area,  continuing  to  attack  with  the  left  flank  along  the 
River  Pripiat'.  Deep  raids  by  cavalry  to  secure  communications  and  maintain 
offensive  momentum  were  used  again  as  the  cavalry  of  4th,  15th  and  3rd  Armies 
moved  forwards  to  take  the  crossings  over  the  River  Nieman.  82 
79  Ibid.  doc.  69,  pp.  67-68.  Nikolai  Nikolaevich  Shvarts  was  Western  Front  Chief-of-Staff  from  25th 
February-30th  September  1920,  DkfK,  4,  Tom  IV,  p.  530. 
80 
Dk)X4,  Toni  III,  pp.  66  &  67. 
81  DGkKA,  doc.  630,  pp.  639-640. 
82  DkfK,  4,  Tom  III,  doc.  70,  pp.  68-69. 281 
Diplomatic  Influences 
On  12th  July,  the  RSFSR  and  Lithuania  signed  a  peace  agreement  which  gave 
Vilno  to  Lithuania  and  secured  the  Lithuanian  Army's  cooperation  against  Poland. 
This  was  crucial  for  the  Western  Front  offensive  as  it  secured  the  right  flank  of  the 
northern  sector  until  East  Prussia. 
Diplomatic  affairs  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  Polish-Soviet  War  at  this  point. 
Protracted  peace  negotiations  had  continued  throughout  the  conflict.  The  Soviets  had 
offered  terms  as  the  Poles  advanced  in  late  May/early  June,  but  now  the  Poles, 
retreating  rapidly  in  both  Belorussia  and  Ukraine,  pressed  for  a  peaceful  settlement. 
The  British  Foreign  Secretary  Lord  Curzon,  intervened  at  this  point  with  the 
suggestion  for  a  border  to  be  drawn  and  hostilities  to  end.  What  became  known  as  the 
Curzon  Line  ran  along  the  border  of  the  ethnic  Poland  Congress  Kingdom  and  the 
Tsarist  Empire.  83  Curzon's  note  was  wired  to  Moscow,  leading  to  the  pivotal  political 
decision  whether  or  not  to  continue  attacking  into  ethnic  Polish  territory  or  stop 
advancing,  pull  back  to  this  line,  and  sign  a  peace  treaty  with  Poland.  With  hindsight, 
the  Soviets  should  perhaps  have  sought  peace  to  end  the  six  years  of  the  Great  War 
and  Civil  War,  but  this  is  where  the  Soviet  view  of  the  conflict  comes  into  focus.  Had 
the  Soviets  viewed  it  as  a  national  war,  they  would  perhaps  have  halted,  settling  their 
national  border  and  gaining  a  chance  to  re-build  the  Soviet  state.  However,  the  Polish- 
Soviet  War  was  not  viewed  in  these  terms  by  Lenin,  the  majority  of  the  Communist 
hierarchy  or  by  Tukhachevsky  and  the  Red  Army  leadership.  They  were  engaged  in  a 
war  with  the  "bourgeois"  Polish  Government  and  wanted  to  spread  revolution  on  the 
point  of  bayonets  into  Europe.  However,  indecision  still  existed. 
On  12th-  13  th  July,  Lenin  contacted  Stalin  in  Kharkov,  infon-ning  him  of  Curzon's 
note  and  that  a  peace  conference  could  be  held  in  London  between  representatives  of 
Soviet  Russia,  Poland,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Finland  and  East  Prussia.  Wrangel  was  also 
invited  to  London  to  meet  Curzon  separately  to  discuss  the  fate  of  his  army  and  a 
suggested  peace  settlement  between  Wrangel  and  Soviet  Russia.  By  this  point 
Wrangel  was  looking  to  evacuate  the  remnants  of  the  White  movement  from  Crimea. 
83  The  border  was  to  run  through  Grodno,  lalovka,  Nemirov,  Brest-Litovsk,  Dorogusk,  Ustilug  and 
Krylov  with  Poland  receiving  Galicia  between  Przemy§I  and  Rava-Russkaia  to  the  Carpathian 
Mountains  and  Russia  gaining  everything  to  the  east,  but  having  to  withdraw  the  Red  Arrny  a  ftirther 
50  kms  east  of  the  line. 282 
He  knew  his  forces  would  stand  little  chance  once  the  Polish-Soviet  War  was  over 
and  the  Red  Army  could  concentrate  against  him.  Lenin  asked  Stalin  how  the 
offensive  was  progressing  against  Wrangel,  adding  that  he  felt  Curzon  was  trying  to 
cheat  the  Soviets  out  of  gaining  Crimea.  84  Lenin  was  canvassing  the  opinions  of  those 
in  the  frontline  areas  to  aid  discussions  in  Moscow.  He  also  telegrammed  Sklianskii, 
Comrade  Sklianskii!  International  circumstances,  especially  the  proposal 
of  Curzon  (annexation  of  Crimea  for  peace  with  Poland,  line  Grodno- 
Bialystok),  demandsfurious  quickening  of  the  offensive  into  Poland. 
Is  this  happenning?  Everything?  Energetically?  85 
From  this,  it  is  clear  that  Lenin  wished  the  offensive  to  be  driven  on  as  quickly  as 
possible  against  Poland.  The  more  territory  the  Soviets  could  conquer,  the  better 
terms  they  could  demand  in  peace  negotiations,  but  this  also  reflected  the  mistrust  of 
the  Communists  towards  the  Curzon  Note  and  Polish  peace  proposals.  The  Soviets 
were  worried  these  were  delaying  tactics  to  allow  the  Poles  to  regroup,  receive  new 
equipment  and  weaponry  from  the  Entente,  and  renew  their  offensive.  The  Soviets 
were  advancing  across  the  whole  European  theatre,  but  Moscow  and  the  Supreme 
Command  knew  that  this  would  become  more  difficult  as  they  progressed  further 
towards  Poland  and  away  from  their  supply  bases  and  secure  rear.  If  the  Soviets  were 
to  defeat  Poland  and  foment  European  revolution,  as  well  as  securing  the  Soviet 
Western  border,  they  would  have  to  press  on  as  vigorously  as  possible.  This  matched 
the  need  for  the  continuous  offensive  theory  which  Tukhachevsky  had  utilised  so 
successfully  during  the  Civil  War.  The  Soviets  had  to  keep  pushing,  giving  the  Poles 
no  respite,  but  would  the  Red  Army  receive  the  support  of  the  workers  and  peasants 
in  the  areas  they  conquered,  to  gain  the  supplies  and  recruits  necessary,  to  keep  the 
offensive  moving?  This  was  the  crucial  question  surrounding  the  Red  Army's  military 
capabilities.  However,  the  political  decision  was  the  one  which  governed  whether  or 
not  the  offensive  proceeded,  not  Tukhachevsky  acting  independently,  as  suggested  by 
Fiddick.  86 
The  final  decision  was  taken  in  Moscow  and  Lenin  informed  Stalin  and  Smilga  on 
South-Western  and  Western  Fronts  by  telegram  on  17th  July.  Peace  negotiations  were 
"  L-Vp,  doc.  490,  pp.  248-249. 
85  Ibid.  doc.  49  1,  p.  249;  DkfK,  4,  Tom  III,  doc.  7  1,  p.  69. 
86  T.  Fiddick,  Russia's  Retreat  From  Poland,  1920.  -  from  permanent  revolution  to  peaceful coexistence, 
(London:  1990),  p.  141-142. 283 
rejected  by  the  Central  Committee  on  Lenin's  recommendation  and  the  offensive 
continued.  87 
Pursuit  Operations 
There  had  been  no  break  in  the  offensive,  despite  the  diplomatic  manoeuvres.  On 
13th  July,  Kamenev  directed  Tukhachevsky  and  Egorov  that  current  circumstances 
demanded  they  push  on,  seizing  as  much  territory  as  possible,  whilst  pursuing  the 
Polish  troops  and  preventing  them  establishing  "favourable  lines".  88 
By  favourable  lines,  Kamenev  was  referring  to  the  German  Great  War  trenches 
and  the  Rivers  Nieman  and  Szczara,  to  which  the  Poles  had  retreated.  On  14th  July, 
Tukhachevsky,  on  Kamenev's  advice,  directed  3rd  and  16th  Armies  through  the 
forested-marshy  areas  of  the  River  Nieman  running  through  the  German  trenches, 
since  the  area  was  similar  to  the  Polesian  marshes,  and  passable.  Sollogub  was  to 
mass  reserves  on  his  right  flank  and  cooperate  with  3rd  Army  to  breakthrough  the 
German  trenches,  bypassing  and  enveloping  the  fortified  areas.  89 
This  was  an  ideal  opportunity  to  try  out  manoeuvre  warfare  against  entrenched 
positions  to  achieve  a  swift,  decisive  breakthrough,  avoid  positional  warfare  and 
allow  the  continuous  offensive  to  develop.  Tukhachevsky  had  sufficient  troops  for 
such  an  operation  and  an  envelopment  of  the  Polish  left  flank  by  4th  Army,  combined 
with  the  above  movements,  forced  the  Poles  back  from  the  German  trench  line,  which 
had  endured  for  so  long  in  the  Great  War.  90  Its  defensive  potential  was  much  lower 
than  before,  but  the  principle  of  allowing  no  time  for  organising  defence  or 
reinforcement  was  working. 
On  17th  July,  3rd  Army  occupied  Lida,  the  railway  junction  connecting  the  lines 
from  Wilno  and  Molodechno  to  Baranowicze  and  an  important  target  before  Grodno. 
The  next  day,  Tukhachevsky  directed  the  next  stage  of  the  Belorussian  Operation.  4th 
An-ny  was  to  cross  the  River  Nieman  with  its  main  forces  south  of  Grodno  no  later 
than  21st  July  and  15th  Army  was  to  cross  the  Nieman  a  day  later,  with 
Tukhachevsky's  reserve,  5th  Rifle  Division,  to  concentrate  by  21st  July  in  Myto-Lida 
87  L-  Vp,  doc.  492,  p.  250;  Lenin  said  the  decision  had  been  taken  in  a  Central  Committee  meeting 
called  after  receiving  the  Curzon  Note,  A.  Richardson,  p.  139. 
88  DGk-KA,  doc.  63  1,  p.  640. 
89  Ibid.  doc.  632,  p.  64  1;  DkfK,  4,  Toni  III,  doc.  72,  pp.  69-70. 284 
area.  3rd  An-ny  was  to  cross  the  Nieman  on  22nd  July  with  its  main  forces  at  Mosty- 
Orlia  and  with  its  left  flank  take  Vseliub,  continuing  its  attack  south  of  the  Nieman. 
16th  An-ny,  breaking  through  the  German  trenches,  was  to  pursue  the  Poles,  cross  the 
River  Szczara  with  its  main  forces  north  of  Slonim  no  later  than  22nd  July  and  use 
2nd  Rifle  Division  from  Tukhachevsky's  reserve,  for  attacking  Korelichi-Novogrudok 
sector.  Mozyr'  Group  was  to  take  Pinsk  in  the  next  few  days.  91  Conducting  these 
movements,  3rd  Kavkor  and  16th  Army  occupied  Grodno  and  Baranowicze  on  19th 
July  and  Mozyr'  Group  captured  Pinsk  on  23rd  July.  92 
Acting  on  the  political  decision  of  17th  July,  three  days  later  Kamenev  directed  all 
other  Soviet  Fronts  to  render  all  possible  help  to  South-Western  and  Western  Fronts. 
He  directed  Tukhachevsky,  Egorov  and  Northern  Front's  7th  Army  to  pursue  the 
Poles  and  maintain  the  pressure,  ignoring  border  constraints  suggested  by  the  Curzon 
Note.  Egorov  was  to  prepare  reserves  in  case  of  Rumanian  intervention,  but  ensure  no 
measures  were  taken  which  Rumania  could  interpret  as  aggressive,  whilst 
Tukhachevsky  and  Odintsov  were  to  block  Latvian  and  Finnish  troops  if  they 
attempted  to  intervene.  93  All  measures  were  to  be  taken  to  reinforce  armies  with  men 
and  horses,  and  cavalry  was  to  be  prepared  for  operations  for  the  next  three  months.  94 
This  signalled  the  end  of  the  Belorussian  Operation  and  the  beginning  of  the  push 
beyond  the  Curzon  Line  into  ethnographic  Poland. 
The  Drive  for  Warsaw 
The  swift  execution  of  the  Belorussian  Operation  ensured  that  Western  Front 
routed  the  Polish  forces  and  pushed  them  back  to  Poland  within  three  weeks. 
Tukhachevsky  had  regained  the  territory  lost  to  Poland  since  1919.  As  Western  Front 
advanced,  mobilisation  was  again  conducted  on  the  move.  The  addition  of  30,000 
new  recruits  from  liberated  Belorussia  showed  support  for  the  Red  Army  advance,  as 
did  German  Spartacists  and  workers  crossing  the  Prussian  border  to  join  the  advance, 
who  were  formed  into  a  German  infantry  brigade.  This  would  have  convinced 
90  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  p.  140. 
91  DkfKA,  Toni  III,  doc.  74,  pp.  68  &  70-71. 
92 
Ibid.  pp.  69-71. 
93  Former  Tsarist  Major-General  Sergei  Ivanovich  Odintsov  (1874-1920)  commanded  7th  Army  of 
Northern  Front  from  17th  November  1919-30th  July  1920. 
94  DGkKA,  docs.  633-634,  pp.  641-643. 285 
Tukhachevsky  and  the  Red  leadership  that  class  warfare  methods  were  working,  with 
the  international  working  class  joining  the  Red  Army  to  fight.  95 
However,  the  Belorussian  Operation  was  not  an  unmitigated  success.  Despite  3rd 
Kavkor  rapidly  advancing  on  the  right  flank,  the  movement  of  the  other  forces  had  not 
been  quick  enough  to  complete  encirclement  and  annihilation  of  the  Polish  troops  - 
Tukhachevsky's  ultimate  objective.  The  Poles  had  been  able  to  retreat,  holding  the 
Soviets  temporarily  at  the  German  trench  line  and  behind  the  Rivers  Nieman  and 
Szczara.  Although  routed  again  by  envelopments  of  their  positions,  they  managed  to 
extricate  most  of  their  troops.  It  became  a  matter  of  where  the  Poles  would  stand  and 
fight. 
Conducting  continuous  pursuit  operations  from  mid-July  to  mid-August, 
Tukhachevsky  reached  the  outskirts  of  the  Polish  capital  of  Warsaw  and  seemed  on 
the  cusp  of  another  momentous  victory,  but  a  massive  Polish  counter-offensive 
completely  split  and  routed  Western  Front,  pushing  it  back  to  its  4th  July  starting 
positions.  Various  factors  combined  to  cause  the  Soviet  offensive  to  fail  and,  whilst 
examining  the  conduct  of  the  operation,  I  shall  highlight  these  to  show  where  it  went 
wrong,  before  discussing  which  factors  were  more  significant. 
Kamenev's  strategy  for  the  campaign  against  Poland  involved  Western  and  South- 
Western  Fronts  advancing  independently  within  their  theatres  until  the  capture  of 
Brest-Litovsk,  which  occurred  on  Ist  August.  96  At  this  point,  Tukhachevsky  was  to 
take  command  of  all  Soviet  forces  in  a  massed  offensive  to  wipe  out  the  Polish 
Armies.  The  Western  Front  operation  to  swing  around  Warsaw  from  the  right, 
encircling  and  wiping  out  the  Polish  forces,  was  the  main  operation.  Egorov  was  to 
support  Western  Front's  left  flank  with  12th  Army  and  draw  Polish  forces  to  the 
Ukrainian  theatre,  but  to  be  prepared,  upon  switching  to  Tukhachevsky's  command,  to 
move  north-westwards  towards  Warsaw,  to  protect  Western  Front's  northern 
envelopment,  from  the  south. 
The  operation  eventually  centring  on  Warsaw  was  due  to  the  Poles  withdrawing 
and  grouping  their  troops  there,  not  because  the  Soviets  planned  to  take  the  political 
95  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "The  March  Beyond  the  Vistula",  J.  Pilsudski,  The  Year  1920,  pp.  242-243. 
Section  8  of  "Pokhod  za  Vislu"  entitled  "Exporting  the  revolution"  is  omitted  from  Izbrannye 
proizvedeniia.  It  was  also  apparently  omitted  from  the  Polish  version,  also  published  in  1964.  It  is 
included  in  the  version  published  in  "The  Year  1920",  pp.  241-244.  The  Soviets  must  have  found  the 
idea  of  exporting  revolution  on  the  points  of  bayonets,  which  underlay  the  Warsaw  offensive,  too 
sensitive  to  include  in  the  1964  edition. 286 
target  of  Warsaw.  Kamenev  and  Tukhachevsky  aimed  to  destroy  the  Poles  militarily 
in  the  field,  wiping  out  their  annies. 
For  the  Soviet  strategy  to  work,  Tukhachevsky  and  Egorov  had  to  cooperate  fully, 
having  confidence  in  each  other  and  a  belief  in  the  joint  strategy.  In  July  however, 
this  appeared  stretched  already.  Budennyi  had  been  unhappy  at  the  delay  in  launching 
the  Belorussian  offensive,  whilst  Tukhachevsky  conducted  reorganisation.  On  19th 
July,  however,  Tukhachevsky  informed  Kamenev  that  Ist  Cavalry  Army  was  perhaps 
being  employed  wrongly  by  Egorov.  This  was  reminiscent  of  Budennyi  complaining 
about  Shorin  on  Caucasian  Front.  Tukhachevsky  stated, 
Before  leaving  I  wanted  to  share  several  thoughts  with  you.  Circumstances 
on  South-Western  Front  concern  me  -I  wonder  how  South-Western  Front 
has  not  tattered  Budennyi's  army.  Budennyi  occupies  a  front  of  80-100 
versty  that  is  totally  unusual  and  altogether  disadvantageous  for  the  action 
of  cavalry.  Continuous  stubborn  battle  can  break  up  this  mighty  cavalry 
force.  It  seems  to  me  that  it  would  follow  immediately  to  swap  some 
infantry  units  for  Budennyi  and  give  the  Cavalry  Army  three-five  days 
rest,  after  that  throw  it  into  battle  in  one  sector  without  specifying 
demarcation  lines.  Apart  from  that,  learning  of  the  difficulties  which  the 
cavalry  has  met  in  breaking  through  the  German  trenches,  it  would  be 
possible  to  think  about  a  Cavalry  Army  attack  in  a  south-western  direction 
in  order  to  bypass  the  fortified  area,  weakly  defended  by  the  Poles  and 
further  to  take  the  flanks  of  the  Poles,  similar  to  Gai's  Cavalry  Corps.  97 
Kamenev  replied  that  24th  Rifle  Division  had  already  swapped  with  I  st  Cavalry 
Army  and  the  latter  would  be  used  in  a  south-westem  direction  without  limit  of  area 
or  demarcation  lines. 
98 
Whether  this  decision  had  anything  to  do  with  Tukhachevsky's  telegram  is 
unclear.  If  the  decision  had  already  been  taken,  it  probably  did  not.  However,  because 
I  st  Cavalry  Army  was  transferred  further  south  to  attack  south-westwards,  this  moved 
it  away  from  Western  Front  towards  Lwow  area,  where  it  was  involved  when 
Tukhachevsky  demanded  its  transfer  to  help  Mozyr'  Group  later.  He  evidently  did  not 
have  this  in  mind  at  this  point,  but  perhaps  regretted  speaking  up  about  it  later.  It  also 
raises  questions  about  Tukhachevsky's  and  Egorov's  relationship.  Egorov  would  not 
have  been  impressed  to  learn  that  Tukhachevsky  was  questioning  his  decision-making 
and  this  possibly  gives  some  indication  of  the  level  of  trust  Tukhachevsky  held  in 
Egorov's  abilities.  Did  this  effect  their  cooperation? 
96  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  p.  73,  note. 
97  Ibid.  doc.  75,  pp.  71-72. 287 
On  22nd  and  23rd  July,  Kamenev  directed  the  offensive  to  continue,  stressing  that 
current  circumstances  demanded  an  energetic  pursuit  towards  Warsaw  and  the  final 
defeat  of  the  Poles.  The  line  of  Lon-i2a-Brest-Litovsk  was  to  be  reached  no  later  than 
4th  August  and  the  line  of  Przasnysz-Novogeorgiewsk  and  south  along  the  River 
Wisla  to  Novo-Aleksandrov,  including  the  capture  of  Warsaw,  no  later  than  12th 
August.  Western  Front's  right  flank  should  not  cross  the  Eastern  Prussian  border  and 
12th  Army  should  advance  to  the  front  Kovel'-Wladimir-Wolynski  by  4th  August, 
protecting  Western  Front's  left  flank.  Ist  Cavalry  Anny  and  14th  Army  were  to  take 
LwOw-Rava-Russkaia  by  29th  July  and  the  River  San  crossings  at  Siniawa-PrzemyS'l 
area.  99  These  set  the  tone  for  Kamenev's  directives  over  the  next  few  weeks, 
constantly  urging  swift  and  energetic  action,  whilst  conditions  were  ripe  to  attack. 
By  23rd  July,  4th  Army  had  crossed  the  River  Nieman  and  3rd  and  16th  Armies 
had  crossed  the  River  Szczara.  Tukhachevsky  directed  the  offensive  to  continue  with 
the  line  Ostrolqnka-Ostrow-Kossow-Droginin-Bela-Wlodava  to  be  reached  no  later 
than  3rd  August.  He  ordered  his  reserve,  5th  Division,  to  return  to  3rd  Army, 
indicating  that  all  forces  were  to  be  thrown  into  the  attack  again.  '  00 
Kamenev  and  Tukhachevsky  had  met  in  Minsk  on  23rd  July  to  discuss  operations. 
The  former  reported  to  Sklianskii  that  troop  morale  was  high,  the  breakthrough  of  the 
line  of  the  Rivers  Nieman  and  Szczara  meant  the  Poles  had  no  more  natural  defensive 
lines  upon  which  to  hold  the  Soviets  and  the  operation  could  be  completed  within 
three  weeks.  10  1  Therefore,  the  target  for  defeating  the  Polish  armies  was  mid-August. 
From  27th  July-Ist  August,  16th  Army  and  Mozyr'  Group  advanced  on  Brest- 
Litovsk.  Tukhachevsky  directed  16th  Army  to  isolate  Brest-Litovsk  from  Piszczats 
area  to  the  north  and  Mozyr'  Group  to  isolate  it  from  WIodava  area  and  occupy  it, 
whilst  12th  Army  supported  in  Kovel'  area  on  the  left  flank.  102 
Brest-Litovsk  was  captured  on  Ist  August  and  the  same  day  Tukhachevsky 
directed  Northern  Group  to  encircle  and  annihilate  the  Polish  forces  dug  in  before  the 
River  Narew  marshes.  4th  Army  was  to  press  down  from  the  north  and  3rd  Arrny  to 
98 
Ibid.  p.  740,  endnote  14. 
99  DGkKA,  doc.  635,  pp.  643-644;  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  260,  p.  227. 
loo  DkfK,  4,  Tom  III,  doc.  76,  p.  72. 
101  DGkKA,  doc.  636,  p.  644. 
102  DkfKA  Tom  III,  docs.  77-78  &  273,  pp.  73  &  238. 288 
push  up  from  the  south,  whilst  15th  Army  continued  to  move  forwards.  '  03 
Tukhachevsky  had  ordered  a  double  envelopment,  which  succeeded  in  forcing  the 
River  Narew  by  3rd  August,  as  the  Poles  had  to  retreat  again  to  avoid  encirclement. 
South-Western  Front's  advance  was  slowing,  with  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and  14th 
Army  encountering  fierce  resistance  in  Lwow  area.  '  04  However,  Kamenev  urged  both 
Fronts  onwards  on  30th  July,  insisting  the  Poles  were  on  the  brink  of  collapse  and 
could  sue  for  peace.  He  stated  that  this  would  only  be  accepted  if  they  could  be  sure 
the  Poles  would  not  use  the  breathing-space  to  rebuild  their  forces  for  further  action 
and  stressed  that  the  Polish  forces  must  be  annihilated  before  any  negotiations 
started.  105  This  was  the  typical  attitude  shown  to  peace  negotiations  by  both  sides 
during  the  conflict. 
The  military  offensive  was  augmented  from  2nd  August,  when  Northern  Group 
captured  the  town  of  Bialystok.  The  warm  welcome  for  the  Red  Army  from  the 
inhabitants  of  the  town  and  area  encouraged  the  creation  of  a  Polish  Revolutionary 
Committee  (Polrevkom).  This  was  to  oversee  the  political-agitational  side  of  the 
offensive  now  that  the  Soviets  were  on  Polish  Soil.  106  It  became  very  influential  in 
determining  the  reaction  of  the  Polish  population  to  the  Soviet  advance  and  levels  of 
support.  The  Polrevkom  issued  a  "Manifesto  to  the  Polish  Working  Peoples  of  the 
Towns  and  Countryside"  on  30th  July  and  on  3rd  August,  Lenin  instructed  Smilga 
and  Tukhachevsky  to  use  all  measures  possible  for  distributing  this,  including 
aircraft.  107  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  Polrevkom's  agitation  offensive  and 
illustrates  one  of  the  more  common  uses  for  aircraft  in  the  Russian  Civil  War  -  the 
dropping  of  political  literature. 
With  Brest-Litovsk  captured,  Kamenev  directed,  "...  the  administration  for  all 
armies  continuing  to  move  towards  the  River  Wisla,  to  be  in  the  hands  of  Western 
Front  Conu-nander,  ie,  transfer  in  the  next  few  days  of  12th  and  Ist  Cavalry  Armies 
from  South-Western  Front  to...  Western  Front  Commander.  "  Tukhachevsky  and 
103  Ibid.  doc.  79,  p.  74. 
104  Ibid.  docs.  269  &  272,  pp.  235  &  237-238. 
105  DGkK,  4,  doc.  638,  p.  645 
106  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  275,  p.  239.  On  30th  July,  Egorov  reported  Western  Front  had  occupied 
Bialystok,  suggesting  that  it  was  taken  the  previous  day.  Members  of  the  Polrevkom  included  several 
influential  Polish  Bolsheviks,  including  J.  Marchlewski,  F.  Dzierzyfiski,  Head  of  the  Cheka,  F.  Kon,  E. 
Pr6chniak  and  I-  Unszlicht.  Dzierzyfiski  and  Unszlicht  were  also  members  of  Western  Front  R  VS  from 
9th  August-  I  Oth  September  1920  and  II  th  December  1919-12th  April  1921  respectively,  DkfKA,  Tom 
IV,  p.  530. 
107  L-  Vp,  doc.  498,  p.  254. 289 
Egorov  were  to  ensure  the  close  cooperation  of  Mozyr'  Group  and  12th  Army,  whilst 
Tukhachevsky  was  to  send  enough  forces  to  Lublin-Kholm  area  to  help  12th  Army 
reach  the  River  Bug.  Tukhachevsky  was  to  establish  communications  with  12th  Army 
and  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  whilst  Egorov  was  to  transfer  them  quickly.  108  Therefore,  the 
order  for  all  forces  to  come  under  Tukhachevsky's  overall  command  had  clearly  been 
given  on  2nd  August. 
Kamenev  also  instructed  Tukhachevsky  to  transfer  two  divisions  from  12th  Army 
to  the  Wrangel  Front  to  relieve  the  pressure  there.  Tukhachevsky  insisted  this  was 
impossible  "...  in  view  of  strengthening  enemy  resistance  and  its  constant 
strengthening  by  units  of  the  volunteer  army  formed  in  Warsaw  area  and  also  losses 
which  have  resulted  from  continuous  battles  and  general  tiredness  of  the  troops".  109 
Despite  assuming  overall  conunand,  Tukhachevsky  had  to  fight  to  retain  his  forces. 
Western  Front  was  still  advancing  well,  but  moving  further  from  its  supply  bases  and 
reinforcements  each  day,  whilst  the  retreating  Poles  were  now  within  their  heartland 
and  gaining  fresh  forces  daily.  Tukhachevsky  did  not  want  to  give  up  any  troops, 
indeed  he  wanted  and  needed  more. 
Fiddick  suggests  this  episode  was  the  beginning  of  Tukhachevsky's  "independent 
actions"  which  led  to  the  Battle  of  Warsaw  and  that  he  disobeyed  direct  orders  by  not 
transferring  the  divisions.  110  However,  this  was  just  another  case  of  Supreme 
Commander  and  Front  Commander  haggling  over  troops,  which  had  occurred  on 
every  front  with  every  commander,  during  the  Civil  War.  Nothing  unusual  stands  out 
about  this  exchange  and  Kamenev  took  no  action  because  Tukhachevsky  said  he 
needed  the  divisions.  Fiddick  appears  to  have  viewed  events  purely  from  the 
perspective  of  the  Polish  campaign  without  taking  into  account  Red  Army  leadership 
dynamics. 
South-Westem  Front  was  also  struggling  by  this  point,  as  its  advance  stuttered  at 
Lwow,  and  Egorov  tried  to  coordinate  the  Wrangel  Front  simultaneously.  On  2nd 
August,  the  Politburo  decided  to  split  South-Westem  Front  in  two,  leaving  South- 
Western  Front  under  Egorov  to  fight  Poland  and  creating  South-Eastem  Front  against 
108  DGkK,  4,  doc.  639,  p.  646. 
109  Ibid.  p.  806,  endnote  115. 
110  T.  Fiddick,  pp.  141-142. 290 
Wrangel.  "'  This  sparked  some  debate  between  Lenin  and  Stalin,  with  the  latter 
disputing  the  decision.  '  12  The  Front  did  not  split  until  September  when  Frunze 
became  Southern  Front  Commander,  113  but  this  was  too  late  to  allow  Egorov  to 
concentrate  on  Poland.  Vital  time  and  resources  were  diverted  to  the  Wrangel  Front 
which  could  have  been  used  against  Poland. 
Meanwhile,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  Western  Front  to  press  on.  With  Polish 
reinforcements  being  introduced  against  Northern  Group's  right  flank,  on  3rd  and  4th 
August  Tukhachevsky  directed  4th  Army  to  attack  north  of  the  River  Narew  with  at 
least  three  rifle  divisions  and  3rd  Army  to  attack  north  of  the  River  Bug  with  its  main 
forces.  Pushing  the  armies  north-eastwards  would  take  on  the  stronger  Polish  sector 
and  with  Mozyr'  group  attacking  westwards  to  assist  12th  Army,  Western  Front  was 
to  reach  the  line  Przasnysz-Wyszkow-Siedlce-Parczew,  no  later  than  8th  August.  1'  4 
Tukhachevsky  was  expecting  12th  Army  to  continue  advancing  westwards  and  I  st 
Cavalry  Army  to  move  north-westwards  to  aid  Western  Front's  left  flank,  but  on  3rd 
August,  Kamenev  advised  Egorov  to  direct  12th  Army  to  Wladimir-Wolynski  area 
north  of  Lwow  to  help  lst  Cavalry  Army,  which  was  involved  in  heavy  fighting. 
Therefore,  on  4th  and  7th  August,  whilst  instructing  12th  Army  and  lst  Cavalry  Army 
to  establish  communications  with  Mozyr'  Group,  Egorov  directed  12th  Army  to  attack 
Wladimir-Wolynski  area  and  then  southwards  to  Kholm,  Rava-Russkaia  and 
Tomashov.  This  meant  12th  Army  was  moving  away  from  Mozyr'  Group  and  not 
covering  its  left  flank.  Ist  Cavalry  Army  was  to  be  withdrawn  into  reserve  and 
regroup  for  transfer  to  Western  Front,  once  12th  Army  relieved  it,  and  14th  Army  was 
to  transfer  northwards  with  it,  but  this  all  delayed  Tukhachevsky  receiving  any  forces 
to  guard  the  weak  left  flank.  '  15 
Egorov  was  complying  with  Kamenev's  directives  at  this  point,  but  was  in  the 
difficult  position  of  trying  to  transfer  troops  which  were  engaged  in  combat.  Ist 
Cavalry  Army  was  the  formation  which  Tukhachevsky  wanted  on  his  left  flank  as  this 
would  have  given  him  a  cavalry  force  on  each  wing,  but  for  this,  12th  Army  had  to 
1"  This  had  previously  been  undertaken  by  South-Western  Front's  13th  Army  and  Caucasian  Front 
under  Gittis  in  Kuban. 
112 
L-Vp,  docs.  496-497,  pp.  252-253. 
113  DkJKA,  Tom  IV,  p.  533.  Frunze  oversaw  the  final  defeat  of  Wrangel  from  21  st  September-  I  Oth 
December  1920. 
'"  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  docs.  81-82,  pp.  75-76. 
115  DGkKA,  docs.  701  &  640,  pp.  707  &  647;  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  docs.  284-285  &  289-290,  pp.  245-246 
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swap  with  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  moving  away  from  Mozyr'  Group,  leaving  an  uncovered 
gap. 
Moscow's  concern  at  South-Western  Front's  faltering  progress  was  shown  on  4th 
August  when  Lenin  asked  Stalin  why  Budennyi  was  "hesitating".  Stalin  reported  that 
the  Polish  Lithuanian,  Lutsk  and  Galician  Groups  had  attacked  in  Brody  area, 
preventing  Ist  Cavalry  Army  moving  on  Lwow,  and  the  latter  was  fatigued  and  in 
need  of  rest.  '  16 
Another  problem  associated  with  the  transfers  was  the  providing  and  setting-up  of 
sufficient  communications.  On  7th  August,  Tukhachevsky  informed  Kamenev  that  he 
would  need  help  to  organise  the  rear  and  communications  for  the  three  South-Western 
Front  armies  transferring  to  Western  Front.  He  asked  for  a  supply  base  to  be 
established  and  for  the  three  armies  not  to  be  stripped  of  depot  battalions  and 
communications  resources  upon  leaving  South-Western  Front  jurisdiction,  especially 
telegraph  construction  and  work  companies.  An  operational  Point  would  be  needed  in 
South-Western  Front  area  to  provide  communications  until  direct  links  with 
Tukhachevsky  in  Minsk  could  be  established,  which  could  take  ten  to  fourteen  days. 
Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  expected  Egorov  to  send  all  communications  resources  with 
the  armies.  The  lengthening  of  supply  lines  is  also  shown  by  Tukhachevsky  asking  for 
South-Western  Front  to  provide  equipment  until  it  could  be  brought  from  the  depots 
to  the  intermediate  bases.  "  7 
The  next  day,  Kamenev  agreed  to  these  conditions,  but  said  an  entire  operational 
group  might  be  better  than  an  operational  point,  interestingly  conu-nenting  that  he 
wished  Frunze  could  have  reached  the  area  quickly  enough  to  lead  this,  but  not 
indicating  he  wanted  Frunze  to  replace  Tukhachevsky,  as  Fiddick  suggests.  118  He 
instructed  Tukhachevsky  to  pick  a  group  leader  from  his  army  commanders. 
However,  Egorov  stated  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  provide  all  these 
communication  resources.  He  needed  them  for  the  remainder  of  South-Western  Front 
against  Wrangel  and  did  not  have  the  apparatus  to  set  up  an  operational  point,  but 
agreed  that  each  army  must  retain  its  reserve  units  and  apparatus  and  South-Western 
Front  could  be  an  intermediary  point  for  armies  transferring  from  the  centre.  119 
116  L-Vp,  doc.  499,  pp.  254  &  368,  endnote  303. 
117  DkfKA  Tom  III,  doc.  83,  pp.  76-77. 
118  T.  Fiddick,  p.  207. 
119  DGkKA,  doc.  642,  pp.  648-649;  DkfKA,  Toin  III,  doc.  292,  p.  250. 292 
Insufficient  communications  was  a  problem,  especially  since  Tukhachevsky 
would  not  have  the  ten  to  fourteen  days  necessary  for  proper  organisation,  even  if  all 
resources  were  available  immediately.  Communications  failures  were  to  contribute  to 
the  Soviet  defeat. 
To  compound  this,  renewed  offensive  action  by  Wrangel  into  South-Western 
Front's  underbelly  forced  Kamenev  to  cancel  the  transfer  of  units  from  Caucasian 
Front,  cutting  reinforcements  available  for  Western  Front  later.  120 
With  these  problems  mounting,  Kamenev  and  Tukhachevsky  disagreed  over  the 
latter's  direction  of  attack.  Tukhachevsky  ordered  15th  An-ny  to  advance  north- 
westwards,  moving  north  of  the  River  Bug  along  with  3rd  and  4th  Armies,  to  create  a 
strong  right-wing  group  to  envelop  the  Polish  forces  behind  the  Bug,  before  Warsaw. 
This  placed  only  16th  Army  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Bug  and  Mozyr'  Group  on  its  left. 
Tukhachevsky  was  acting  further  against  the  Polish  reinforcements  he  had  said  were 
being  introduced  against  the  right  flank  and  calculating  on  help  from  South-Western 
Front's  forces,  but  on  6th  and  8th  August  Kamenev  pointed  out  that  16th  Army  could 
not  depend  on  help  from  12th  Army  because  of  the  latter's  forced  move  towards 
Wladimir-Wolynskii-Tomashov  area.  He  continued  that  Tukhachevsky's  grouping  for 
crossing  the  Bug  was  incorrect  and  wondered  if  Tukhachevsky  had  considered  how 
serious  an  obstacle  it  posed  with  the  Poles  dug  in  behind  it.  He  stressed  the  taking  of 
the  Bug  was  more  important  than  the  right  wing  achieving  an  even  deeper  and  longer 
envelopment  and  warned  that  the  concentration  of  Northern  Group  north  of  the  Bug 
endangered  16th  Army  to  a  similar  fate  as  during  the  first  Minsk  Operation,  when  it 
gained  the  bridgehead  over  the  Beresina,  but  couldn't  hold  it  through  lack  of  support. 
He  recommended  that  3rd  Army  helped  16th  Army,  in  Siedlce  area  and  that 
Tukhachevsky  should  bear  in  mind  that  16th  Army  advancing  under  his  current 
demarcation  lines,  would  come  up  against  Ivangorod  fortress.  He  also  disagreed  with 
Tukhachevsky's  notion  that  the  transfer  of  the  South-Western  Front  armies  would 
produce  more  decisive  action  and  better  results,  as  he  did  not  believe  South-Western 
Front  had  held  Tukhachevsky  up  or  lagged  behind  his  line,  which  had  not  acted 
decisively  enough  anyway.  121 
120  DGkK,  4,  doc.  758,  pp.  748-749. 
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Kamenev  had  doubts  over  Tukhachevsky's  tactics  and  felt  he  should  concentrate 
on  moving  his  own  forces,  instead  of  complaining  about  South-Western  Front's 
progress.  However,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  heed  Kamenev's  advice.  In  final 
discussions  on  10th  August,  he  informed  Kamenev  that  between  3rd  and  9th  August 
the  Poles  had  increased  their  troops  from  50,000  to  an  estimated  70,000,  but  had 
grouped  most  of  them  in  the  north,  transferring  them  away  from  South-Western  Front. 
He  reported  he  had  decided  to  group  16th  Army  further  north,  as  he  did  not  want  to 
cross  the  Wisla  with  two  attack  groups,  meaning  that  he  had  acted  contrary  to 
Kamenev's  advice.  The  four  Western  Front  armies  were  now  attacking  north  of 
Warsaw,  with  16th  Army  acting  alone,  whilst  the  other  three  swept  round  to  envelop 
from  the  right.  Mozyr'  Group  was  acting  on  the  left  flank  in  a  very  isolated  position, 
but  58th  Division  was  transferred  to  it. 
Kamenev  reiterated  his  warning  about  leaving  16th  Army  to  face  70,000  Polish 
troops  alone  and  that  no  help  would  be  forthcoming  from  South-Western  Front,  as 
Polish  forces  remained  there.  He  stated  that  a  quick  rout  over  the  Bug  would  be  better 
than  a  long  manoeuvre,  was  worried  about  16th  Army's  exposure  and  did  not  agree 
that  Polish  forces  had  transferred  northwards.  However,  Tukhachevsky  insisted  that 
the  main  Polish  forces,  up  to  40,000  troops,  were  north  of  the  Bug,  with  captured 
prisoners  confirming  this.  Kamenev  said  he  felt  more  inclined  to  believe  the  Poles  had 
retreated  behind  the  Bug  because  of  the  overhanging  Western  Front  right  flank,  but 
concluded  that,  since  Tukhachevsky  was  so  categorically  insistent  on  this  point  and 
had  more  detailed  knowledge,  although  he  could  not  agree  with  this  from  infon-nation 
he  had  at  Western  Front  HQ  in  Smolensk,  Kamenev  would  give  Tukhachevsky 
freedom  of  action.  Kamenev  still  instructed  Tukhachevsky  to  quickly  rout  the  Poles, 
wiping  out  their  main  forces,  but  said  he  was  not  keen  on  the  depth  of  Tukhachevsky's 
strategy,  since  it  introduced  the  danger  that  there  would  be  insufficient  time  to  employ 
it.  122 
Therefore,  Kamenev  expressed  severe  doubts  over  Tukhachevsky's  tactics,  but 
eventually  gave  him  freedom  of  action,  as  he  had  done  in  the  past,  trusting  his 
commander  on-the-spot.  Kamenev  anticipated  correctly  where  the  Polish  counter- 
attack  would  be  made,  but  was  willing  to  trust  Tukhachevsky,  as  he  had  done  in  the 
past  with  great  success.  The  offensive  had  to  continue  swiftly  to  have  any  chance  of 
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success  and  on  7th  August  Lenin  urged  it  on,  commenting  that  peace  talks  continued 
in  London  and  a  Polish  delegation  was  travelling  to  Russia,  but  the  military  offensive 
was  the  key  factor.  He  noted  "Altogether,  much  depends  already  on  Warsaw  and  its 
fate".  123  Clearly  worried  however,  he  contacted  Smilga,  Dzierzyn'ski  and  Marchlewski 
on  9th  August  to  find  out  the  mood  of  the  Polish  peasantry  and  Warsaw  workers.  '  24 
To  influence  peace  negotiations  the  offensive  had  to  proceed  quickly,  but  the  Polish 
population  they  were  advancing  to  liberate  had  to  support  the  Red  Army.  The 
possibility  of  the  bourgeois  and  landowning  Poles  creating  nationalist  resistance 
concerned  the  Soviet  leadership,  as  did  possible  intervention  by  the  Entente.  The 
Baltic,  Black  and  Azov  Sea  Fleets  were  put  on  full  alert  on  8th  and  9th  August  in  case 
of  Entente  naval  intervention.  125 
Genuine  fears  existed  over  foreign  intervention  and  Kamenev  informed 
Tukhachevsky  that  the  Entente  were  reportedly  supporting  Poland,  with  British  ships 
en  route  to  Riga  to  intervene  through  Latvia  and  Lithuania;  France  by  rail  through 
Germany;  and  Italy  through  Austria,  Czechoslovakia  and  Rumania  .1 
26 
Therefore,  despite  mounting  problems,  the  need  to  seize  the  opportunity  offered 
demanded  the  offensive  continue  without  respite.  On  10th  August,  Tukhachevsky 
ordered  the  final  assault  on  Warsaw. 4th  Army,  holding  the  right  flank,  was  to  occupy 
lab  lonov-Graudents-Tom  area,  whilst  crossing  the  Wisla  with  the  main  part  of  its 
forces  no  later  than  15th  August  in  Vlotslavsk-Dobrzhin  area.  15th  and  3rd  Armies 
were  to  cross  the  Wisla  no  later  than  15th  August,  with  the  latter  advancing  from 
Zalubitse  area,  to  attack  Praga  area  and  push  the  Poles  from  Warsaw,  which  would  be 
retreating  before  16th  Army.  16th  Army  was  to  cross  the  River  Wisla  with  its  main 
forces  north  of  Warsaw  on  14th  August.  Mozyr'  Group  was  to  take  Kozenitsy- 
Ivangorod  area  on  14th  August.  Tukhachevsky  concluded  by  emphasising  that 
political  circumstances  demanded  the  immediate  rout  of  the  Polish  forces.  '  27 
On  Ist  August,  Western  Front  forces  numbered  117,280  frontline  troops,  although 
Tukhachevsky  estimated  active  troop  numbers  to  be  as  low  as  46,279  infantry  and 
6,484  cavalry  with  31,502  in  Northern  Group,  10,584  in  16th  Army  and  only  4,193  in 
123  L-Vp,  doc.  502,  p.  255;  DkJKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  288,  p.  247;  The  Polish  peace  delegation  passed 
through  the  Soviet  lines  on  I  Oth  August,  en  route  to  Minsk,  L-  Vp,  doc.  504,  p.  256. 
12'  L-  Vp,  doc.  503,  pp.  255-256;  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  85,  p.  78. 
125  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  docs.  84  &  29  1,  pp.  77-78  &  249. 
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Mozyr'  Group.  On  25th  August,  Polish  forces  numbered  123,320  infantry  and  18,830 
cavalry,  but  Tukhachevsky's  estimate  is  45,400  infantry  and  5,855  cavalry  with 
29,600  in  the  north  and  15,800  south  of  the  Bug.  Pilsudski  estimated  the  figures  to  be 
130,000-150,000  Soviets  and  120,000-180,000  Poles.  128  The  Soviet  and  Polish  figures 
are  fairly  comparable  and  probably  do  provide  a  good  indication  of  the  total  effectives 
of  both  sides.  Tukhachevsky  based  his  figures  on  troops  involved  in  the  actual 
frontline  battles,  with  those  too  far  away  to  influence  the  fighting,  ie.  reserves,  not 
included.  In  all  three  sets  of  figures  the  Soviets  and  Poles  are  quite  evenly  matched. 
The  crucial  factor  behind  the  numbers  was  where  the  troops  of  each  side  were 
concentrated.  Whilst  Tukhachevsky  had  concentrated  most  of  his  forces  in  the  right- 
wing  attack  group,  the  majority  of  Polish  troops  were  not  in  the  northern  sector  as  he 
had  thought,  but  behind  the  Bug,  south  of  Warsaw,  where  Kamenev  had  predicted  the 
counter-attack  would  come. 
By  I  Ith  August,  the  second  day  of  the  attack,  Kamenev  was  expressing  concern  at 
apparent  Polish  strength  in  the  southern  sector.  He  reported  that  12th  Army  and  Ist 
Cavalry  Army  were  heading  south  to  attack  Lwow,  but,  since  Tukhachevsky  had 
turned  his  forces  northwards,  12th  Army  and  Ist  Cavalry  Army  would  have  to  go 
northwards  to  prevent  a  thinning  of  forces  in  the  centre.  Intelligence  had  revealed  that 
the  Poles  were  not  generally  retreating  behind  the  Wisla,  therefore  Kamenev 
recommended  Tukhachevsky  take  the  whole  12th  Army  for  the  left  wing,  not  just 
58th  Division.  Tukhachevsky  agreed  it  was  essential  to  move  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and 
12th  Army  north,  as  the  Poles  were  resisting  between  the  Bug  and  Narew  and  daily 
launching  counter-attacks.  He  had  communications  with  12th  Army,  but  contact  was 
more  erratic  with  Ist  Cavalry  Army,  although  he  hoped  to  have  more  reliable  morse 
communication  by  12th  August.  In  the  north,  3rd  Kavkor  had  taken  Mlava  and 
Ciekanow  by  9th  August,  4th  Army  had  taken  Makov  and  3rd  and  15th  Armies  were 
fighting  on  the  railway  and  road  to  WyshkOw.  129 
Wyshkow  fell  on  12th  August  and  Western  Front  was  advancing  despite  stiff 
resistance,  but  with  12th  Army  and  Ist  Cavalry  Army  attacking  Lwow  and  not 
transferring  northwards,  the  left  wing  was  perilously  weak. 
128  DkJKA,  Tom  IV,  pp.  180-181  &  52  1;  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  150-15  1;  J. 
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Kamenev  directed  Egorov  on  I  lth  and  12th  August  to  break  off  the  Lwow  attack 
and  move  12th  Army  to  Lublin  area  to  aid  Mozyr'  Group,  which  was  attacking  from 
Kotsk  to  Ivangorod  on  14th  August.  Ist  Cavalry  Army  was  to  move  to  Zamos'c'- 
Tomashow-Grubeshow  area  to  aid  Tukhachevsky's  left  flank,  and  both  annies  were  to 
transfer  to  Tukhachevsky's  command  on  13th  and  15th  August  respectively.  '  30 
However,  when  Tukhachevsky  contacted  Kamenev  by  Hughes  Telegraph  at  00.25 
hours  on  13th  August,  Kamenev  reported  that  Egorov  had  ordered  12th  Army  to 
attack  Rava-Russkaia,  the  complete  opposite  of  Kamenev's  order.  He  thought  that  a 
misunderstanding  must  have  occurred,  but  this  complicated  the  transfer.  He  also 
related  a  request  by  Egorov  to  retain  6th  Cavalry  Division  of  Ist  Cavalry  Army  for 
use  against  Wrangel,  but  agreed  with  Tukhachevsky  that  I  st  Cavalry  Army  needed  to 
remain  intact  for  immediate  use  without  reorganisational  work.  Tukhachevsky  urged 
Kamenev  to  get  Egorov  to  fulfill  his  duty  to  the  Soviet  offensive,  saying  that  he  could 
send  Ermolin  down  to  oversee  it,  if  Petin  would  not  interfere,  and  demanded  that  Ist 
Cavalry  Army  and  12th  Army  be  transferred  immediately  and  intact  with 
equipment.  131 
It  appears  that  Tukhachevsky  felt  that  South-Western  Front  may  have  deliberately 
not  fulfilled  its  orders  and  the  request  to  retain  a  division  of  Ist  Cavalry  Army 
probably  increased  his  suspicion  that  they  did  not  want  to  transfer  it  and  were  stalling. 
On  13th  August,  Kamenev  again  directed  Egorov  to  transfer  12th  Army  and  Ist 
Cavalry  Army  fully-equipped  at  12.00  hours  on  14th  August.  132  However,  Egorov 
replied  the  same  day,  reporting  that  orders  No.  4738/op  1041/sh  and  No.  4752/op 
1044/sh  had  only  just  been  received  and  decoded,  and  stating  the  reasons  for  the 
lateness  had  been  discovered.  133  These  were  Kamenev's  directives  from  II  th  August 
to  redirect  and  transfer  12th  Army  and  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and  for  12th  Army  to  aid 
Mozyr'  Group.  The  delay  meant  that  Egorov  only  read  the  directives  on  the  day  he 
was  supposed  to  transfer  12th  Army.  Egorov  continued  in  his  report  that  he  had 
dispatched  12th  Army's  left  wing  to  help  Mozyr'  Group,  but  South-Western  Front 
130  DGkK,  4,  doc.  705  -706,  pp.  709-7  10. 
131  lbid,  doc.  645,  pp.  652-654,  Egorov  ordered  I  st  Cavalry  Army  to  attack  Rava-Russkaia  and 
requested  the  retention  of  6th  Cavalry  Division  on  12th  August.  Karnenev  turned  down  this  request 
one  hour  after  the  discussion  with  Tukhachevsky,  DkJKA,  Tom  III,  docs.  295-296,  pp.  251-252; 
DGkKA,  doc  708,  p.  711;  Fonner  Tsarist  Colonel  Nikolai  Nikolaevich  Petin  (1876-1937)  was  Chief- 
of-Staff  of  South-Western  Front. 
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forces  were  engaged  in  their  original  task  to  take  Lwow  and  he  thought  it  impossible 
to  stop  this  and  transfer  them.  However,  the  delay  only  partially  explains  why  Egorov 
ordered  South-Western  Front  to  attack  Lwow  instead  of  subordinating  it  to 
Tukhachevsky.  It  does  not  excuse  it  because  Kamenev  had  ordered  the  transfer  to 
happen  back  on  2nd  August.  It  was  a  costly  and  critical  error  for  Tukhachevsky's 
offensive  plan.  Although  Egorov  reported  that  he  knew  why  the  orders  had  arrived 
late,  this  is  not  expanded  upon.  Therefore,  what  caused  it?  Poor  communications? 
Telegraph  operators?  The  answer  to  this  is  unknown,  but  would  help  clear  up  the 
puzzle. 
Egorov  wrote  another  directive,  relaying  Kamenev's  instructions  to  12th  Army 
and  I  st  Cavalry  Army  to  transfer  to  Western  Front  at  12.00  hours  on  14th  August,  but 
it  was  not  counter-signed  by  his  political  commissar  R.  1.  Berzin  until  early  on  14th 
August  and  sent  at  04.00  hours,  giving  little  time  for  either  arrny  to  withdraw  and 
comp  Y. 
134 
It  emerged  in  a  Hughes  Telegraph  conversation  with  Kamenev  on  14th  August 
that  Stalin  had  refused  to  sign  the  order.  Berzin  had  also  refused,  explaining  that  he 
was  subordinate  to  Stalin  and  had  already  submitted  a  report  to  Trotsky  and  Sklianskii 
on  the  matter.  Kamenev  replied  in  some  disbelief  that  he  did  not  know  why  they 
could  not  fulfill  the  order,  as  it  had  been  decided  long  before  that  command  of  South- 
Western  Front  would  transfer  to  Tukhachevsky.  Egorov  then  read  a  note  from  Stalin 
to  Kamenev  in  which  Stalin  said  that  Kamenev's  order  could  have  been  fulfilled  on 
II  th  August,  when  I  st  Cavalry  Army  was  in  reserve,  but  it  was  now  involved  in  battle 
at  Lwow  and  could  not  conduct  another  regrouping  to  transfer  to  Western  Front,  so 
Stalin  had  refused  to  sign  the  order.  135 
Therefore,  Ist  Cavalry  Army  had  been  withdrawn  into  reserve  and  could  have 
moved  north,  but  the  delay  in  receiving  and  decoding  the  orders  saw  it  sent  back  to 
Lwow  and  made  a  transfer  virtually  impossible. 
Tukhachevsky  and  Kamenev  discussed  all  this  by  Hughes  Telegraph  on  15th 
August  and  the  former  agreed  to  reinforce  12th  Army,  which  had  been  pushed  behind 
the  Bug  and  lost  Grubeshow,  with  1,500-2,000  men  and  then  58th  Division. 
Tukhachevsky  then  directed  the  South-Western  Front  forces  on  their  tasks  for  shoring 
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up  Western  Front's  left  flank.  12th  Army  and  Mozyr'  Group  were  to  attack  the  Polish 
Group  at  Siedlce-Krasnostaw-Kholm  from  the  north  and  south  respectively.  He 
ordered  45th  and  47th  Divisions  to  swap  with  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  which  was  to  move 
to  Ustilug-Wladimir-Wolynski,  and  14th  Army  was  to  extend  its  right  flank  to  the 
demarcation  line  between  Western  and  South-Western  Fronts  at  Dubno-Toporow.  136 
However,  in  a  Hughes  Telegraph  conversation  on  the  night  of  17th  August, 
Kamenev  infon-ned  Tukhachevsky  that  these  directives  were  invalid  as  only  he  had 
signed  them,  without  an  RVS  member's  counter-  signature.  Tukhachevsky  disputed 
this,  but  Kamenev  countered  that  he  had  received  a  note  from  Minin  which  said  it  was 
only  signed  by  Tukhachevsky.  137  However,  Unszlicht  wrote  to  Lebedev,  explaining 
the  directives  had  been  signed  by  Tukhachevsky,  the  Chief-of-Staff  and  an  RVS 
member,  but  the  copy  sent  to  Ist  Cavalry  Army  by  automatic  telegraph  machine  had 
only  one  signature.  Therefore,  communications  had  broken  down  again,  which  further 
delayed  the  movement  of  I  st  Cavalry  Army  to  support  the  left  flank. 
12th  Army  and  Ist  Cavalry  Army  were  finally  subordinated  to  Tukhachevsky  at 
12.00  hours  on  17th  August  and  14th  Army  was  to  follow.  Tukhachevsky  was 
eventually  being  forced  to  transfer  two  of  his  own  infantry  divisions,  45th  and  47th,  to 
swap  with  Ist  Cavalry  Army  and  attack  Lwow.  138  However,  this  had  been  a  long  and 
protracted  affair  which  could  have  been  completed  earlier  by  the  original  plan.  A 
combination  of  confused  and  delayed  dispatches  and  possibly  disagreements  amongst 
the  Red  Army  frontline  hierarchy  over  how  the  war  should  be  fought,  combined  with 
stiff  resistance  from  the  small  Polish  force  remaining  before  Lwow,  to  prolong  the 
issue.  However,  as  was  constantly  stressed  by  Kamenev,  Tukhachevsky  and  Egorov 
in  their  orders,  speed  was  essential  for  the  Soviet  continuous  offensive,  as  political 
and  military  conditions  fluctuated,  but  turned  more  and  more  towards  Poland  as  time 
wore  on.  The  delay  in  completing  the  transfers  was  disastrous  for  the  Soviet 
offensive. 
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Pilsudski's  Counter-Offensive  and  Tukhachevsk-y's  Retreat 
Pilsudski  launched  a  massive  counter-offensive  on  the  night  of  16th-17th  August. 
Secretly  regrouping  five  divisions  into  an  attack  group  behind  the  Wisla,  south-east  of 
Warsaw,  he  struck  through  the  weak  Mozyr'  Group  sector,  sweeping  aside  the  few 
thousand  Soviet  troops  and  striking  northwards  behind  16th  Army  and  Northern 
Group,  to  attempt  an  encirclement  of  Western  Front.  Simultaneously,  a  Polish  attack 
was  launched  in  the  north,  driving  a  wedge  between  15th  and  4th  Armies.  The  attack 
was  a  complete  surprise  to  Tukhachevsky,  who  believed  the  Polish  forces  to  be 
crumbling  and  retreating  behind  the  Wisla,  with  their  main  forces  still  in  the  northern 
sector,  about  to  be  enveloped  by  Northern  Group.  139 
Kamenev  urged  Tukhachevsky  to  press  on  with  the  north  to  south  right  wing 
attack,  since  an  envelopment  of  the  Polish  left  flank  may  still  have  thrown  the  Polish 
forces  off  balance  and  saved  the  day.  However,  the  overstretched  Red 
communications  collapsed  under  Pilsudski's  northward  thrust.  16th  Army  had  been 
reorienting  its  position  southwards  to  cover  the  left  flank  when  the  attack  occurred 
and  Sollogub  lost  contact  with  his  frontline  troops.  No  report  came  from  the  swamped 
Mozyr'  Group.  Therefore,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  actually  learn  of  the  counter-attack 
until  18th  August,  by  which  time  the  Poles  were  advancing  across  the  front. 
Communications  were  also  lost  with  4th  Army  and  3rd  Kavkor.  West  of  Warsaw  and 
attempting  to  cross  the  River  Wkra,  they  were  completely  cut  off.  Tukhachevsky 
ordered  them  to  strike  southwards,  but  with  no  communications  established  until  19th 
August,  this  did  not  occur  and  by  this  date,  the  Polish  advance  prevented  their  retreat. 
Communications  were  also  lost  with  Ist  Cavalry  Army,  which  was  still  attacking 
Lwow  on  19th  August,  and  the  left  flank  received  no  help.  140 
On  20th  August,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  16th,  3rd,  4th  and  15th  Armies  to  retreat 
behind  the  Rivers  Bobr  and  Narew  to  stabilise  the  line  and  put  Kork  in  command  of 
coordinating  the  latter  three  armies  in  case  of  further  communications  loss.  However, 
4th  Army  and  3rd  Kavkor,  with  their  path  of  retreat  blocked  by  the  completed  Polish 
encirclement,  despite  fighting  their  way  back  to  Augustow  by  25th  August,  could  not 
cut  their  way  out,  and  were  forced  over  the  Prussian  border  into  internment.  3rd  and 
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15th  Armies,  fighting  fierce  rearguard  battles  to  buy  time  for  their  isolated  comrades, 
lost  half  their  number.  16th  Army,  overwhelmed  by  the  Polish  right-wing  attack,  also 
suffered  terrible  losses  and  Mozyr'  Group  ceased  to  exist  as  an  operational  formation. 
Its  remnants  were  combined  with  the  remnants  of  4th  Army  and  3rd  Kavkor  on  30th 
August.  141  Soviet  losses  are  evident  in  troop  numbers  recorded  for  22nd  August-15th 
September.  3rd,  4th,  15th  and  16th  Armies  in  total  numbered  72,402,  a  drop  of  some 
45,000  from  early  August,  the  majority  of  whom  must  be  considered  casualties.  On 
22nd  September,  Lenin  actually  said  100,000  troops  had  been  lost,  taken  prisoner  or 
were  interned  in  Prussia,  meaning  new  recruits  probably  comprised  the  majority  of 
Western  Front's  forces  by  mid-September.  The  Red  Army  suffered  staggering 
losses.  142 
Pilsudski's  counter-manoeuvre  bore  a  striking  resemblance  to  that  planned  and 
conducted  by  Kamenev,  Frunze  and  Tukhachevsky  at  Buguruslan  in  1919,  when  the 
Buzuluk  attack  group  had  struck  from  south  to  north  behind  Khanzhin's  Western 
Army.  However,  Pilsudski's  superior  numbers  ensured  his  manoeuvre  was  more 
successful,  completing  part  of  its  encirclement.  Tukhachevsky  in  hindsight  must  have 
admired  the  manoeuvre.  It  was  the  epitome  of  everything  he  had  been  practising  and 
preaching  for  the  previous  two  years. 
However,  the  Polish  operation  overall  is  more  comparable  to  Western  Army's 
Petropavlovsk  counter-offensive  in  September  1919.  The  Polish  attack  started  from 
the  Wisla,  as  Kolchak's  began  at  the  Ishim.  The  Poles  were  able  to  counter-attack  into 
Tukhachevsky's  weak  left  flank  because  South-Western  Front's  advance  had  not  kept 
pace  and  exposed  it,  just  as  I  st  Army  of  Turkestan  Front  had  not  matched  5th  Army's 
advance  to  Petropavlovsk,  exposing  5th  Army's  right  flank  to  the  Siberian  Cossack 
counter-attack.  However,  Tukhachevsky  had  made  the  very  mistake  for  which  he  had 
criticised  01'derogge.  Whilst  01'derogge  had  concentrated  5th  Army's  forces  on  the 
left  flank,  leaving  the  exposed  right  flank  undermanned  and  ripe  for  a  flanking 
counter-manoeuvre,  Tukhachevsky  massed  his  troops  on  the  right  flank  at  Warsaw 
and  left  the  exposed  left  flank  with  only  a  few  thousand  troops.  Finally,  the  most 
striking  resemblance  was  the  Polish  counter-attack  pushing  Western  Front  almost 
140  DGkKA,  doc.  653,  pp.  660-66  1;  DkfKA,  Tom  III,  doc.  100  &  308,  pp.  87-88  &  261-262;  A  N. 
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back  to  its  starting  positions  of  early  July  around  Minsk,  as  Kolchak  had  pushed  5th 
Army  back  to  the  Tobol. 
Kamenev  and  Tukhachevsky  tried  to  steady  the  retreat,  with  a  defensive  line 
envisaged  along  the  River  Nieman,  but  by  23rd  August,  the  retreat  was  in  danger  of 
turning  into  a  rout  and  Kamenev  ordered  Tukhachevsky  and  the  army  commanders  to 
get  it  under  control,  as  troops  fled  without  resisting.  143  It  seems  likely  blocking 
battalions  and  Cheka  would  have  been  over-employed  at  this  point,  trying  to  slow  the 
retreat. 
From  late  August  until  18th  October,  when  the  armistice  was  signed  between  the 
Soviet  Republic  and  Poland,  Tukhachevsky  returned  once  more  to  reorganisational 
work  under  fire,  attempting  to  form  defensive  lines  to  hold  the  Polish  advance,  whilst 
regrouping  for  a  renewed  offensive.  A  defensive  line  was  attempted  behind  the 
Nieman.  Reinforcements  eventually  arrived  through  the  ruined  transport  network,  as 
the  retreating  Soviet  frontline  moved  closer  to  its  bases.  Divisional  strength  was 
raised  to  around  6,000  by  15th  September  and  communists  drafted  in  to  restore  the 
hardcore  of  units,  stiffened  morale,  although  supply  shortages  almost  led  to 
mutinies.  144 
Whilst  trying  to  stabilise  and  reorganise  Western  Front,  Tukhachevsky  typically 
attempted  to  attack  with  12th  and  14th  Armies  and  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  to  relieve  the 
northern  situation.  Fighting  still  raged  around  Lwow  until  late  August  and  on  28th 
August,  Tukhachevsky  ordered  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  at  last  withdrawn  from  Lwow,  to 
attack  north-west  to  Zamos'c',  to  reach  Lublin  and  aid  the  retreating  northern  annies. 
This  was  the  manoeuvre  Tukhachevsky  had  envisaged  for  two  weeks  before,  but  now 
I  st  Cavalry  Army  marched  into  a  Polish  trap.  Engaging  vastly  numerically  superior 
Polish  forces  at  Zamos'c'  and  Komorowo  on  31  st  August,  Budennyi  was  forced  to  cut 
his  way  out  to  avoid  encirclement  by  a  Polish  concentric  offensive.  6th  Cavalry 
Division  alone  had  faced  13  Polish  divisions  and,  unsurprisingly,  the  losses  suffered 
in  these  engagements  forced  I  st  Cavalry  Army  into  retreat,  diminishing  its 
effectiveness  as  a  force.  145 
The  Poles  launched  a  general  offensive  in  the  southern  sector  after  this  and 
advanced  across  the  whole  of  Western  Front.  However,  on  2nd  September,  the  RVSR 
143  DkJY,  4,  Tom  III,  doc.  105,  p.  9  1;  DGkKA,  doc.  665,  p.  663. 
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instructed  Tukhachevsky  to  forrn  an  attack  group  to  renew  the  offensive  in  the 
northern  sector.  Conducting  reorganisation  and  regrouping,  Tukhachevsky  was 
planning  to  attack  in  late  September/early  October.  However,  it  was  Poland's  turn  to 
pre-empt  the  Soviet  attack  this  time.  With  peace  talks  beginning  in  Riga  on  21st 
September,  the  Poles  wished  to  increase  their  bargaining  position  and  launched  the 
Battle  of  the  Nieman,  pushing  the  Soviets  back  from  their  defensive  line  in  late 
September.  146 
Further  efforts  to  hold  the  Polish  advance  at  the  German  trench  lines  and  the  River 
Sczara  collapsed  when  the  Lithuanian  Army  fell  back  on  the  right  flank,  exposing 
Western  Front  to  a  flank  envelopment  once  more  and  forcing  retreat.  By  mid-October, 
with  the  armistice  about  to  be  signed,  Tukhachevsky  was  holding  a  line  before  the 
River  Beresina  after  abandoning  Minsk  on  15th  October.  147  The  town  was  regained 
with  the  armistice,  but  Tukhachevsky  had  been  almost  pushed  back  to  his  starting 
positions  for  the  July  Igumen-Minsk  Operation,  just  as  he  had  been  pushed  back 
behind  the  Tobol  from  Petropavlovsk.  However,  the  comparison  to  Civil  War 
operations  ended  here  as,  although  plans  for  a  renewed  offensive  were  made,  despite 
the  armistice,  Tukhachevsky  never  launched  another  offensive  towards  Warsaw  to 
retake  the  lost  territory.  He  had  been  able  to  learn  from  defeat  previously  to  turn  it 
into  attack,  but  not  on  this  occasion.  Therefore,  why  had  the  Polish  campaign  turned 
out  so  differently  from  previous  Civil  War  fronts? 
Causes  of  Defeat 
In  Pokhod  za  Vislu,  Tukhachevsky  made  several  criticisms  regarding  the  conduct 
of  the  Polish  campaign.  He  slammed  the  terrible  mobilisation.  and  training  of 
Vserosglavshtab,  which  necessitated  mobilisation  in  frontline  areas.  148  This  echoed 
the  criticism  he  made  of  the  recruitment  apparatus  in  his  May  1918  report.  The  central 
system  had  not  improved  and  it  has  been  shown  how  Tukhachevsky  had  to  constantly 
mobilise  men.  This  necessity  found  its  way  into  his  military  thinking  -  the  ability  of 
the  Red  Army  to  mobilise  on  the  move. 
145  Ibid.  docs.  112-113,115  &  311,  pp.  96-98,99-102  &  263. 
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He  also  criticised  the  general  staff  for  gathering  inaccurate  information  on  Polish 
troop  placements  before  Pilsudski's  counter-offensive.  The  general  staff  believed  that 
Polish  forces  were  still  positioned  against  South-Western  Front,  but  they  had  actually 
been  transferred  northwards.  However,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  have  too  much  cause 
for  complaint  here.  As  has  been  shown,  he  argued  with  Kamenev  over  the  Polish 
positions  and  was  also  mistaken  in  his  belief  that  most  of  the  Polish  forces  were 
facing  Northern  Group,  when  they  were  actually  before  the  Wisla,  waiting  to  sweep 
northwards  through  Mozyr'Group,  as  Kamenev  suggested. 
Tukhachevsky  also  highlighted  the  poor  state  of  communications,  which  did 
indeed  influence  the  battle  in  several  ways.  The  problems  with  the  telegraph  network 
and  loss  of  communications  with  several  of  the  annies  has  been  illustrated. 
Tukhachevsky  also  mentioned  a  lack  of  signalling  apparatus.  He  recalled  that  the  July 
offensive  was  the  first  occasion  the  Red  Army  attempted  the  use  of  operational 
centres  and  signalling  units  at  the  front  along  an  organised  plan,  but  the  shortages 
affected  the  operation's  success.  Similarly,  at  Warsaw,  communications  were  affected 
by  signalling  apparatus  shortages,  which  made  coordination  of  Western  and  South- 
Western  Fronts  impossible  at  the  crucial  point.  149  Interestingly,  when  retreating  in 
September,  Tukhachevsky  mentioned  radios,  suggesting  Western  Front  was 
experimenting  with  field  radio  usage.  '  50  Communications  were  a  major  problem  and 
the  stretching  of  operational  lines,  as  the  Soviets  advanced  further  from  their  bases, 
exacerbated  the  problems. 
Tukhachevsky  specifically  mentions  4th  Army  losing  communications,  but  is  also 
critical  of  4th  Army  Commander  for  not  acting  independently  to  attack  southwards, 
behind  the  northern  Polish  group.  Sergeev  was  replaced  by  Shuvaev  on  31  st  July  and 
it  is  the  latter  Tukhachevsky  criticised  for  inaction  and  poor  leadership  overall.  It  is 
unclear  why  Shuvaev  assumed  command  and  Sergeev  himself  did  not  mention  it  in 
his  book.  Shuvaev  was  an  ex-Tsarist  Lieutenant  Colonel,  and  being  an  older 
voenspetsy,  perhaps  did  not  come  up  to  Tukhachevsky's  standards  like  Gittis  et  al  .1 
51 
However,  the  major  reason  Tukhachevsky  saw  for  the  failure  at  Warsaw  was  the 
delay  by  South-Western  Front  to  despatch  Ist  Cavalry  Army  north-westwards  to 
148  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  122  &  126. 
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guard  his  left  flank.  He  criticised  South-Western  Front's  concentration  on  a  task  of 
"local  importance",  capturing  the  Galician  capital  of  Lwow,  and  compared  Egorov's 
and  Stalin's  actions  to  those  of  Rennenkampf  in  1914,  when  he  failed  to  assist 
Samsonov,  resulting  in  the  latter's  defeat  by  Ludendorff  152 
The  fact  that  Tukhachevsky  publicly  drew  this  conclusion  has  led  to  suggestions 
Stalin  purged  him  in  1937  because  he  had  a  long  memory,  bore  grudges  and 
eventually  repaid  Tukhachevsky's  allegation.  On  19th  August  1920,  after  discovering 
that  the  Polish  counter-offensive  had  cut  through  his  weak  left  flank,  Tukhachevsky 
had  immediately  criticised  Budennyi  for  his  lateness,  whilst  admitting  surprise  at  the 
direction  of  the  Polish  attack.  The  day  before,  Kamenev  informed  Egorov  that  his 
delay  in  fulfilling  the  I  Ith  and  12th  August  orders  had  proved  costly  for  Western 
Front.  1  53  Therefore,  anger  towards  South-Westem  Front's  actions  was  vented  as  the 
events  occurred,  but  perhaps  became  more  public  with  Tukhachevsky's  lectures.  I 
shall  talk  more  about  the  liklihood  of  this  being  connected  to  Tukhachevsky's 
execution  in  my  conclusion,  but  for  now  shall  examine  the  accuracy  of 
Tukhachevsky's  suggestion,  the  fact  he  accepted  no  blame  personally  and  the 
accuracy  of  other  accounts. 
As  the  sources  show,  I  st  Cavalry  Army  was  not  supporting  Mozyr'  Group  when 
the  Polish  counter-offensive  occurred.  Problems  with  communications  could  be 
blamed  for  this,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  the  case  that  all  the  problems,  where  orders 
concerning  the  transfers  were  concerned,  were  at  South-Western  Front's  end.  Egorov 
had  the  delay  in  decoding  the  II  th  and  12th  August  orders  and  Tukhachevsky's 
counter-signed  15th  August  order  managed  to  reach  Egorov  with  only 
Tukhachevsky's  signature  on  it.  Egorov  also  wanted  to  retain  at  least  part  of  Ist 
Cavalry  Army,  which  adds  fuel  to  the  possibility  he  stalled  on  the  transfer.  On  top  of 
this,  Stalin  refused  to  obey  a  direct  order  from  Kamenev,  taking  it  upon  himself  to 
decide  that  Ist  Cavalry  Army  should  not  be  transferred  because  it  was  fighting  at 
Lwow.  Trotsky  later  blamed  Stalin  for  his  part,  agreeing  with  Tukhachevsky  on  the 
former's  wish  to  gain  the  prize  of  Lwow.  Lenin's  assessment  of  South-Western  Front's 
actions  was,  "Ach,  who  would  go  to  Warsaw  via  Lwow?  ". 
152  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pokhod  za  Vislu",  pp.  153-154. 
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An  air  of  suspicion  does  hang  around  the  delayed  or  mis-signed  orders,  but  South- 
Western  Front  was  only  attacking  Lwow  because  Kamenev  had  previously  ordered  it 
on  23rd  July.  I  st  Cavalry  Army  and  14th  Army  were  to  capture  the  town  and  Rava- 
Russkaia  by  29th  July,  but  the  attack  became  bogged  down  because  of  stiff  Polish 
resistance.  This  led  South-Western  Front  to  be  two  weeks  behind  schedule  by  mid- 
August,  as  they  were  still  fighting  in  this  area  when  Tukhachevsky  had  reached 
Warsaw.  However,  if  obeying  orders  thus  far,  Egorov  seemed  to  do  little  to  comply 
with  Kamenev's  2nd  August  order  to  subordinate  his  command  to  Tukhachevsky  and 
transfer  his  forces  northwards.  If  measures  had  been  taken  from  this  date  to  swap 
infantry  divisions  for  I  st  Cavalry  Army,  the  latter  could  have  been  transferred  in  time. 
The  fact  that  this  did  not  occur,  even  for  ten  days  before  the  telegram  fiasco  began, 
suggests  a  reluctance  to  subordinate  command.  Perhaps  dislike  of  Tukhachevsky's 
superior  position  lay  at  the  root  of  South-Western  Front's  actions  rather  than  a  wish  to 
take  Lwow.  Either  way,  South-Western  Front  RVS  must  take  a  share  of  the  blame, 
although  Budennyi  and  his  fellow  army  commanders  may  be  exempt  from  it. 
In  Egorov's  defence,  he  did  also  have  to  direct  13th  Army  against  Wrangel  and 
screen  the  Bessarabian  border  against  possible  Rumanian  incursions.  The  severity  of 
the  Wrangel  Front  is  demonstrated  by  Moscow  prioritising  it  again  on  19th  August, 
even  whilst  Tukhachevsky  was  trying  to  extricate  his  forces  from  the  Polish 
encirclement.  154 
Hostilities  on  the  Wrangel  Front  also  affected  Tukhachevsky,  as  reinforcements 
intended  for  Western  Front  were  re-routed  to  the  Caucasus  in  August,  when  Wrangel 
attacked  at  the  height  of  the  Battle  of  Warsaw.  This  meant  that  Tukhachevsky  had  less 
men  than  he  could  otherwise  have  done  at  Warsaw  and  also  did  not  receive 
reinforcements  whilst  retreating,  necessitating  local  mobilisations  once  more. 
Tukhachevsky  did  not  criticise  Kamenev,  but  the  latter  has  been  criticised  for  his 
role  in  the  offensive,  with  Davies  claiming  that  he  was  "chiefly  responsible"  and  did 
not  lead  the  offensive  firmly  enough.  155  However,  the  offensive  had  progressed 
virtually  to  plan  until  early  August.  Criticism  of  the  Soviet  offensive  claims  Western 
and  South-Westem  Fronts  advanced  independently  of  each  other,  with  Tukhachevsky 
and  Egorov  even  being  able  to  wage  their  own  private  wars  in  their  respective 
154 
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theatres.  However,  the  sources  show  that  the  two  Fronts,  although  separated 
geographically  and  with  separate  objectives  within  their  own  areas,  were  coordinated 
by  Kamenev.  As  has  been  shown,  each  Front  alternately  attacked  to  ease  the  burden 
of  its  neighbour  and  Tukhachevsky  and  Egorov  both  made  the  importance  of  this 
point  clear  to  their  army  commanders  on  several  occasions.  Each  knew  the 
importance  of  ensuring  the  other  was  still  progressing. 
Kamenev  conducted  the  campaign  exactly  as  he  had  done  during  the  Civil  War. 
He  had  general  plans  for  actions  within  his  strategy,  but  whilst  giving  directives, 
would  readily  discuss  tactical  operations  with  his  front  commanders  to  get  the  input  of 
the  man  at  the  frontline,  who  had  knowledge  of  prevailing  local  conditions.  This  had 
previously  worked  effectively  and  there  was  nothing  unusual  in  it  now.  In  this  way, 
Kamenev  discussed  Tukhachevsky's  direction  of  attack  to  Warsaw  in  early  August, 
debating  the  wisdom  of  the  northern  envelopment.  However,  after  discussing  it  with 
Tukhachevsky  and  hearing  the  latter's  reasons,  he  was  happy  to  trust  Tukhachevsky's 
judgement.  He  had  done  this  before  and  the  results  had  proven  this  method  to  work. 
His  decision  to  allow  Tukhachevsky  to  decide  from  his  local  position  and  knowledge 
came  from  trust  of  the  latter  and  not,  as  Fiddick  suggests,  because  he  felt  he  needed  to 
keep  Tukhachevsky  sweet.  '  56 
This  is  why  an  examination  of  the  conduct  of  the  Polish  campaign  can  only  be 
accurately  made  alongside  the  other  Civil  War  campaigns.  Studying  the  Polish 
campaign  in  isolation  precludes  an  accurate  portrayal  and  understanding  of  the 
mechanisms  of  Red  Army  leadership.  Fiddick  and  Davies  selectively  use  documents 
from  DGkKA,  but  do  not  use  Dkjn  alongside  these  to  reflect  the  full  command 
picture.  A  study  of  these  ample  sources  and  other  collections  of  army  command 
documents  throughout  the  whole  Civil  War,  illustrates  the  style  of  command  of 
Kamenev,  Tukhachevsky  and  the  other  Red  Army  commanders  very  well  and  avoids 
theories  based  on  a  few  documents  selectively  translated.  In  Poland,  Kamenev  worked 
with  Tukhachevsky,  and  indeed  Egorov,  in  the  same  manner  he  had  during  the  whole 
conflict. 
Both  Davies  and  Fiddick  cite  notes  from  Lenin  to  Sklianskii,  although  Davies 
translates  them  differently  from  Fiddick  to  provide  a  different  nuance.  Davies 
suggests  that  they  show  Lenin  felt  Kamenev  to  be  weak,  whilst  Fiddick  suggests  a 
156 
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difference  existed  between  the  Red  Army  Command  and  Communist  Party  hierarchy 
over  policy  in  Poland.  The  notes  read, 
Supreme  Commander  does  not  dare  to  be  nervous.  If  the  military 
department  or  Supreme  Commander  does  not  give  up  taking  Warsaw,  it 
must  be  taken  (Are  there  any  extra  measures  for  this?  Tell  me?  ). 
To  speak  about  swiftening  an  armistice  when  the  enemy  is  retreating  is 
idiocy. 
If  the  Poles  have  launched  an  offensive  along  the  whole  line,  it  is 
necessary  to  not  whimper  (like  Danishevskii)  for  that  is  absurd. 
It  is  necessary  to  counter-manoeuvre:  military  measures  (evade,  delay 
all  negotiations  etc.  ).  157 
Fiddick  translates  the  document  roughly  as  above,  but  Davies  produces,  "The 
Supreme  Commander  does  not  dare  to  get  angry  with  anyone...  Warsaw  must  be 
taken...  To  talk  of  speeding  peace  talks  ...... 
This  selective  translation  with  an  extra 
phrase  in  the  first  sentence  gives  the  document  an  entirely  different  meaning.  In  fact, 
this  telegram  is  typical  of  those  sent  by  Lenin  in  tone,  style  and  content  -  brusque  and 
to  the  point.  To  suggest  that  this  displays  weakness  on  Kamenev's  part  is  inaccurate. 
If  anyone  is  being  criticised  for  weakness,  it  is  Danishevskii.  Kamenev  still  believed 
that  the  campaign  could  reach  Warsaw  and  beyond,  as  the  document  states.  Also,  if 
Kamenev  displayed  any  caution  at  this  point,  it  was  because  he  had  surmised  the 
Poles  were  strengthening  and  was  not  sure  about  Tukhachevsky's  direction  of  attack, 
when  South-Western  Front  could  not  move  up  to  protect  it.  In  the  end  he  was  proven 
correct  about  this  and  was  leading  the  attack  in  the  correct  manner,  taking  account  of 
all  details  and  reports. 
Fiddick  produces  this  telegram,  along  with  other  notes  exchanged  between  Lenin 
and  Sklianskii,  as  part  of  his  general  argument  that  a  dispute  existed  between  the 
Party  and  Red  Army  hierarchies,  with  the  former  more  cautious  about  attacking,  but 
being  led  along  by  Tukhachevsky.  However,  he  has  again  misinterpreted  events.  '  58 
He  believes  that  Lenin  was  "Operating,  albeit  unconsciously,  according  to  the 
Metternichian  maxim  -  "negotiate  only  when  advancing"".  However,  this  was  the 
policy  Lenin  had  conducted  consciously  from  the  beginning  of  the  conflict  and  it 
matched  Poland's  policy.  Negotiations  were  only  pursued  by  either  side  with  interest 
15  'DGkKA,  doc.  646,  p.  654;  An  accurate  translation  of  this  document  is  included  in  J.  Meijer,  ed.,  The 
Trotsky  Papers,  Volume  11,1920-1922,  pp.  254-257;  Karl  lulii  Khristanovich  Danishevskii  (1884- 
1938),  Communist  Party  member  since  1900  and  Deputy  Military  Commissar  of  the  Red  Army  Field 
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if  they  were  in  retreat.  Fiddick  further  states  the  notes  exchanged  referred 
"undoubtedly  to  Tukhachevsky's  desire  to  attain  Warsaw",  but  the  notes  actually 
appear  to  refer  to  Kamenev  and  the  decisions  he  wished  to  make.  Lenin  stated  to 
Sklianskii  "...  at  whatever  cost  Warsaw  must  be  taken  in  3-5  days",  which  Fiddick 
remarks  is  "usually  quoted  out  of  context",  but  the  context  of  it  was  that  Lenin  and  the 
Red  An-ny  Command  wanted  the  same  result  -a  victory  over  Poland  -  and  Lenin  was 
pushing  them  on  as  he  had  been  doing  from  the  start  of  the  campaign.  Fiddick's 
assertion  that  Tukhachevsky  independently  decided  to  attack  Warsaw  just  does  not 
stand  up  to  an  accurate  reading  of  the  battle  orders.  Tukhachevsky  only  acted  after 
directives  or  discussions  with  Kamenev,  who  was  in  constant  contact  with  Moscow. 
The  idea  that  Lenin  and  Trotsky  allowed  Tukhachevsky  to  dictate  policy  towards 
Poland  and  had  to  try  all  manner  of  measures  to  rein  him  in  (combining  Western  and 
South-Western  Fronts  under  his  command  to  overload  him  with  work  and  prevent  him 
attacking  Warsaw,  being  one)  is  just  pure  fancy.  The  Red  Army  did  not  work  that 
way.  If  Lenin  and  Trotsky  felt  that  Tukhachevsky  was  overstepping  the  mark,  they 
would  simply  have  ordered  him  to  stop  or  recalled  him.  This  had  happened  to  various 
personnel  during  the  Civil  War.  There  was  no  mechanism  whereby  Moscow  felt  the 
need  to  take  major  measures  such  as  combining  Western  and  South-Western  Fronts  to 
restrain  a  commander.  This  was  a  strategical  decision.  It  is  true  that  commanders,  as 
has  been  shown,  had  great  leeway  in  deciding  tactics  at  the  battlefield  level  according 
to  local  conditions,  but  they  were  not  able  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands  and 
determine  Moscow  policy  by  military  actions.  The  decision  to  attack  into  Poland 
came  from  Lenin  and  the  decisions  to  maintain  the  offensive  also  originated  from 
Moscow.  Peace  negotiations  were  conducted,  but  as  much  territory  as  possible  had  to 
be  seized  in  the  process  and  the  decisions  on  whether  to  maintain  attacks  came  from 
Moscow.  The  crucial  point  which  Fiddick  misses,  possibly  by  treating  the  Polish 
campaign  in  isolation  from  the  Civil  War,  is  that  the  Party  and  Red  Army  hierarchy 
did  work  very  closely  over  ma  or  military  decisions.  Tukhachevsky  was  well-  j 
respected  by  Lenin  and  Trotsky  by  this  point  and  his  opinions  were  sought.  Moreover, 
his  opinions  matched  those  of  the  majority  of  the  Communist  leadership.  Trotsky  had 
158  These  notes  are  translated  into  English  in  J.  Meijer,  ed.,  The  Trotsky  Papers,  Volume  II,  pp.  252- 
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reservations  over  the  decision  to  advance  into  Poland,  but  these  were  general  political 
ones,  not  directed  at  Tukhachevsky  personally  or  at  his  handling  of  the  campaign. 
Kamenev's  handling  of  the  campaign  went  reasonably  well  and  problems  arose 
only  with  the  delay  at  Lwow  and  South-Western  Front's  reluctance  to  comply. 
However,  he  was  firm  here  and  demanded  their  compliance.  It  was  not  Kamenev's 
weakness,  but  Stalin's  apparent  dominance  of  South-Western  Front  RVS  and  Egorov's 
reluctance  to  follow  Kamenev's  orders.  If  Kamenev  is  to  be  criticised,  then  perhaps  it 
could  be  over  his  trust  in  Tukhachevsky's  judgement,  if  he  indeed  did  have  other 
information  at  Smolensk  on  Polish  dispositions.  However,  the  two  men  had  already 
worked  well  together  and  trusted  each  other's  judgement  and  this  is  why  Kamenev 
allowed  Tukhachevsky  to  decide  on  the  troop  placements  and  direction  of  attack. 
Kamenev  and  South-Western  Front  RVS  can  perhaps  be  criticised  in  different 
ways  as  contributing  to  the  defeat  in  Poland,  but  Tukhachevsky  must  share  the  blame. 
He  was  personally  at  fault  for  turning  the  majority  of  his  troops  northwards,  despite 
warnings  from  Kamenev  on  8th  August  that  South-Western  Front  forces  would  not  be 
arriving.  Sollogub  seemed  to  realise  16th  Army's  left  flank  was  exposed,  but  moved  it 
too  late,  as  the  Polish  attack  began. 
Tukhachevsky,  as  has  been  shown,  was  a  firm  believer  in  the  principle  of 
manoeuvre  to  complete  flanking,  envelopment  and  encirclement  movements.  He  also 
firmly  believed  in  the  concentration  of  forces  in  the  vital  sector,  leaving  weak  screens 
elsewhere  to  facilitate  it,  and  explained  this  to  Kamenev  in  May  1920  before  the 
preemptive  attack  over  the  Beresina.  He  had  used  this  tactic  to  great  effect  in  the 
North  Caucasus  Operation  and  in  earlier  operations  against  the  Czechoslovaks  and 
Kolchak.  He  got  away  with  his  gambling  and  risk-taking  on  these  occasions,  but  in 
Poland,  came  up  against  a  better,  more  disciplined  foe,  led  by  an  experienced  leader 
in  Pilsudski,  who  also  understood  the  principles  and  advantages  of  manoeuvre. 
Pilsudski  beat  Tukhachevsky  at  his  own  game  and  perhaps  there  is  a  suggestion 
that  Tukhachevsky  had  become  over-confident  after  his  continued  successes  during 
the  Civil  War,  believing  that  he  was  the  master  of  manoeuvre  operations  and  noone 
would  beat  him  with  these.  He  had  risen  up  the  Red  Army  ladder  swiftly,  was  popular 
with  Lenin  and  Trotsky  and  was  appointed  to  the  general  staff  on  22nd  May,  as  he 
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I  would  suggest  that  Tukhachevsky  exuded  too  much  over-confidence  by  the  time 
of  the  Warsaw  battle.  He  had  never  been  defeated  and  any  time  he  ran  into 
difficulties,  he  blamed  it  on  his  superiors  for  not  understanding  class  warfare,  new 
concepts  he  personally  was  responsible  for  putting  into  print.  The  blame  he  attached 
to  I  st  Cavalry  Army  and  South-Western  Front  R  VS,  although  partially  justifiable,  was 
symptomatic  of  his  Civil  War  command  career.  He  never  fell  out  with  Kamenev  or 
Frunze,  who  agreed  with  his  ideas,  but  did  fall  out  with  Budennyi,  Egorov  and  Stalin. 
This  brings  us  back  to  the  underlying  principle  of  how  Tukhachevsky  fought 
against  Poland.  He  used  exactly  the  same  methods  as  during  the  Civil  War,  as 
studying  the  campaign  has  demonstrated.  He  believed  that  it  was  an  extension  of  the 
Civil  War,  whether  because  Poland  had  been  part  of  the  Russian  Empire,  was  working 
with  the  interventionary  Entente  or  because  this  Front  could  lead  into  Europe  and 
extend  the  Civil  War  internationally.  By  April  1920,  he  probably  looked  on  it  as  a 
mixture  of  all  three,  as  national  considerations  of  Poland  against  Russia  combined 
with  class  warfare  of  socialism  against  bourgeois  capital. 
However,  Tukhachevsky's  class  warfare  methods  were  not  suitable  for  fighting  in 
Poland  because  the  Poles  viewed  the  conflict  as  a  national  war.  The  major  flaw  in 
Tukhachevsky's  class  warfare  theory  was  that,  like  the  concept  of  communism  in 
general,  for  it  to  work,  everybody  else  had  to  believe  in  it  too.  This  had  led  him  into 
disagreements  with  superiors  during  the  Civil  War  who  did  not  hold  with  these  ideas 
and  so  planned  operations  differently.  However,  a  similar  problem  emerged  in 
Poland. 
The  Polish  workers  and  peasants  did  not  believe  that  the  Red  Army  was  attacking 
to  liberate  them,  but  saw  the  historic  Russian  oppressor  advancing  to  dominate  once 
again.  Many  of  those  fighting  in  the  Red  Army  felt  the  same  and  the  patriotic  ticket 
was  used  by  the  Communists  to  recruit  more  troops.  Many  voenspetsy  who  had  sat  out 
the  Civil  War  so  far,  joined  the  Red  Army  to  fight  a  national  war  against  Poland,  the 
most  striking  case  being  Russia's  best  Great  War  General,  A.  A.  Brusilov.  159 
Tukhachevsky  wrote  in  Revoliuaiia  izvne  that  a  protracted  war  would  benefit  the 
working-class  as  it  would  gradually  pull  away  from  the  bourgeoisie,  as  its  own 
159  Aleksei  Alekseevich  Brusilov  (1853-1926)  led  the  "Brusilov  Breakthrough"  in  1916,  punching  a 
hole  through  the  Austrian  frontline  and  advancing  some  60  miles  and  capturing  vast  numbers  of 
prisoners  and  materiel  before  his  offensive  momentum  dissipated  through  tardiness  by  the 
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interests  became  clearer,  but  time  may  have  to  be  spent  educating  the  working  classes 
in  bourgeois  nations  before  a  successful  class  war  could  be  mounted.  160  However,  he 
also  promoted  the  continuous  offensive  which  was  to  press  on  relentlessly,  allowing 
no  respite  for  the  enemy,  but  this  also  precluded  time  to  prepare  the  working-class.  In 
the  Polish  campaign  this  was  an  insurmountable  dialectic. 
Lenin  and  Kamenev  consistently  emphasised  that  political  and  military 
circumstances  determined  a  rapid  advance  and  this  was  the  case.  Poland  could  not  be 
allowed  to  reinforce  and  regroup  with  Entente  help.  However,  this  prevented  any 
preparation  of  the  Polish  working-class,  necessary  to  utilise  class  war  methods. 
Dropping  Polrevkom  leaflets  by  aircraft  was  a  useful  method  of  agitation,  but  did  not 
have  enough  time  to  make  an  impact.  The  Red  Army  was  fighting  the  wrong  war. 
However,  it  is  inaccurate  to  suggest  that  Tukhachevsky  infected  the  Party  leadership 
with  these  ideas.  Tukhachevsky's  ideas  fitted  hand-in-glove  with  those  of  Lenin  and 
the  international  revolutionists.  He  fought  the  Polish  Front  as  he  had  fought  every 
other  front,  by  the  methods  imposed  on  him  by  circumstance  and  urgency,  to 
complete  the  tasks  set  by  the  leadership.  This  led  to  the  decision  not  to  wait  at  the 
border  for  reinforcements  and  supply  lines  to  catch  up  and  the  frantic  advance  through 
Poland  which  resulted  in  only  50,000  weary  Western  Front  frontline  troops  facing 
almost  double  the  number  of  fresh  Polish  troops.  The  recruits  raised  in  Belorussia  and 
indeed  at  Bialystok  and  the  Prussian  border  were  not  trained,  fully-equipped  or  even 
all  participating  in  frontline  divisions  by  the  time  Tukhachevsky  reached  Warsaw. 
The  methods  of  mass  mobilisation,  whilst  marching  through  the  Russian 
countryside,  had  worked  well  because  peasants  wanted  to  fight  to  defend  their  home 
territories.  The  fact  that  they  deserted  again  once  the  fighting  had  passed  their  homes 
did  not  matter  greatly  because  new  peasants  would  be  mobilised  in  the  next  area.  This 
was  how  Tukhachevsky  had  advanced  from  the  Volga  to  Siberia,  to  the  Don  and  the 
Caucasus,  and  was  the  method  by  which  he  won  his  Civil  War  campaigns.  However, 
in  Poland,  he  encountered  a  "dying  centre",  with  Polish  workers  and  peasants  who 
had  not  been  oppressed  by  White  leaders,  but  were  gaining  land  and  freedom  to  live 
in  a  national  state,  led  by  a  heroic  national  leader  in  Pilsudski.  The  Red  Russian  Army 
marching  through  their  territory  was  not  a  force  they  wished  to  join.  The  complete 
opposite  was  the  case  and  scorched-earth  policies  and  the  destruction  of  the  transport 
160  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Revoliutsiia  izvne",  Voina  klassov,  pp.  55-58. 312 
infrastructure  resulted,  meaning  the  Red  Armies  could  not  feed  from  the  localities  as 
they  had  done  during  the  Civil  War,  and  could  not  travel  easily  and  quickly  enough  to 
catch  and  envelop  the  retreating  Polish  forces.  No  workers'  uprisings  or  widespread 
partisan  activity  occurred  in  the  Polish  rear  because  support  for  the  Red  Army  was 
absent.  Hostile  partisan  activity  would  undoubtedly  have  occurred  in  the  Red  rear, 
adding  to  the  chaos.  This  was  not  the  class  war  Tukhachevsky  and  Moscow 
envisaged,  but  a  national  conflict,  and  they  suffered  as  a  result. 
Conclusion:  Influence  on  Military  Thinkin2 
To  return  to  the  discussion  at  the  beginning  of  chapter  III  on  the  origins  of 
Tukhachevsky's  operational  "Deep  Battle"  ideas,  the  fundamental  cornerstone  of  this 
emerged  from  the  rubble  of  the  Polish  campaign.  Tukhachevsky's  belief  in  the 
efficacy  of  the  continuous  offensive  gave  way  to  the  conduct  of  successive  operations 
within  the  deep  strike  context.  He  saw  with  hindsight,  that  although  political  and 
military  considerations  in  July  1920  indicated  that  the  Red  Army  should  press  on 
without  pause  at  the  Polish  border,  if  they  had  in  fact  halted  to  organise  the  rear,  the 
defeat  at  Warsaw  may  have  been  avoidable. 
If  communications  had  been  properly  constructed  and  reinforcements  allowed  to 
catch  up,  Western  Front  would  not  have  faced  the  Poles  at  Warsaw  with  battle-weary 
troops  who  had  marched  some  600  kms  in  six  weeks  of  continuous  fighting  and 
pursuit  operations.  Tukhachevsky  had  commented  to  Kamenev  in  early  June  1920 
that  the  war  with  Poland  was  closer  to  regular  forms  of  warfare  with  mass  annies  than 
the  previous  Civil  War  fighting  had  been  and  after  the  defeat  he  saw  that  he  would 
have  to  adapt  his  theories  accordingly  and  did  so. 
Although  retaining  manoeuvre  and  concentration  as  the  basis  of  the  tactics  of  his 
class  warfare  theory  -  envelopment,  encirclement,  breakthrough  -  Tukhachevsky 
slowed  the  overall  attack  down  for  the  ultimate  strategic  objective.  In  this  way 
continuous  operations  became  successive  operations,  with  pauses  in  the  offensive 
necessary  to  allow  the  rear  to  remain  organised,  communications  retained  and 
reinforcements  to  catch  up,  before  targeting  the  next  objective  and  moving  on. 
However,  "Deep  Battle"  developed  to  compensate  for  this  necessity  to  pause. 
Attacking  to  the  depth  of  the  enemy  force,  taking  out  its  reserves  and  HQ 313 
simultaneously  to  the  frontline  attack,  meant  that  the  enemy  would  still  have 
insufficient  time  to  recover  from  the  initial  attack,  even  whilst  the  attacking  troops 
paused  to  regroup  and  reinforce,  before  launching  the  next  attack  and  so  on. 
Therefore,  although  the  continuous  offensive  had  slowed  down  to  successive 
operations,  it  still  would  be  a  relentless  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  giving  no  respite  for 
reorganisation  or  regrouping. 
The  necessary  pause  in  successive  operations  would  also  provide  the  extra  time 
necessary  for  agitation  amongst  the  working-classes  to  prepare  the  ground  for  the 
renewed  class  offensive  and  mobilise  recruits  on  the  move.  By  extending  the  war,  it 
would  allow  time  for  the  working-class  in  the  bourgeois  countries  to  realise  the  Red 
Army  was  fighting  for  their  liberation  and  interests.  This  would  allow  workers' 
uprisings  to  occur  in  the  enemy  rear  and  partisan  movements  to  appear.  As  mentioned 
earlier,  the  development  of  paratroopers  as  either  a  substitute  for  these  or  to  foment 
revolution  by  agitation,  along  with  their  military  tasks,  was  introduced  by 
Tukhachevsky  in  the  late  1920s. 
To  coordinate  the  international  class  war,  Tukhachevsky  envisaged  the  formation 
of  an  international  general  staff  via  the  Comintern  (Communist  International).  He 
wrote  to  Comintern  Chairman  Zinov'ev  in  July  1920  at  the  height  of  the  Polish-Soviet 
War,  suggesting  such  a  plan,  but  this  was  one  area  of  Tukhachevsky's  military 
thinking  which  was  not  taken  up  by  the  Communists.  161 
This  was  the  influence  of  the  Polish-Soviet  War  on  the  conclusions  Tukhachevsky 
had  drawn  from  the  Civil  War  and  on  his  future  operational  theory  in  "Deep  Battle". 
As  we  can  see  from  looking  back  to  the  statements  he  made  througout  the  1920s  and 
into  the  development  of  "Deep  Battle",  he  still  believed  in  the  same  principles  he  had 
fought  by  in  the  Civil  War,  but  had  modified  them  after  the  Polish  Front  experience. 
The  manoeuvre  warfare  of  the  Great  War  Eastern  Front  also  influenced  his  thought, 
as  did  the  reading  of  military  history,  casting  an  eye  back  to  Napoleon  and  Suvurov 
and  his  Tsarist  military  academy  education  to  find  the  roots  of  his  conduct  of  the  Civil 
War.  However,  the  conu-nand  experience  he  gained  in  the  latter  conflict,  including  the 
Polish-Soviet  War,  led  directly  to  the  operational  side  of  "Deep  Battle".  Adapting 
these  ideas  to  developments  in  weaponry  and  technology  was  typical  of 
161  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky,  "Pis'mo  k  tovarishchy  Zinov'evy",  Voina  klassov,  pp.  138-140;  A  translation 
is  provided  as  an  appendix  in  J.  Erickson,  The  Soviet  High  Command,  pp.  784-785. 314 
Tukhachevsky's  actions  during  his  frontline  command  years  and  the  ability  to 
innovate  and  match  his  military  theory  to  the  evolution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  saw  his 
rise  continue  after  the  Civil  War  years.  This  was  the  genesis  of  "Deep  Battle"  and  it 
had  evolved  over  two  and  a  half  years  combat  experience. 315 
Conclusion 
In  October  1917,  Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky  was  a  2nd  lieutenant  in  the 
Tsarist  Army.  He  had  just  returned  to  Russia  after  escaping  from  two  and  a  half  years 
imprisonment  in  German  POW  camps.  By  October  1920,  he  was  a  Front  Commander 
in  the  Red  Army  and  one  of  the  top  two  military  figures  in  the  Soviet  Republic. 
Tukhachevsky  had  gained  an  effective  promotion  in  October  1917,  when  he  was 
elected  a  company  commander  in  the  Semenovskii  Life-Guards  Regiment,  but  this 
was  soon  disbanded  and  he  was  demobilised  and  out  of  work  at  the  turn  of  the  year. 
However,  after  joining  the  Red  Army  in  early  1918,  his  rise  began  once  more  after  he 
showed  great  administrative  acumen  on  an  investigative  tour  of  frontline  provinces 
and  demonstrated  he  could  work  under  fire.  His  performance  and  the  ideas  he  put 
forward  for  Red  Army  reorganisation  led  his  department  bosses  to  bring  him  to  the 
attention  of  Lenin  and  Trotsky  and  he  was  despatched  eastwards  as  the  Civil  War 
broke  out  in  the  Volga.  Sent  out  to  conduct  the  organisational  work  in  practice,  that 
he  had  so  far  shown  himself  capable  of  in  theory,  by  a  measure  of  luck,  he  was 
appointed  Eastern  Front  lst  Army  Commander.  He  was  the  right  man  in  the  right 
place  at  the  right  time,  primarily  because  he  had  joined  the  Bolshevik  Party  in  April 
1918. 
Tukhachevsky  was  not  a  communist  at  this  stage.  He  had  joined  the  Red  Army  to 
rejoin  the  fight  against  Germany  in  the  Great  War  after  being  their  involuntary  guest 
for  so  long.  The  Red  Army  was  the  only  force  forming  in  Russia  in  early  1918  to  face 
Germany.  Also,  it  was  based  in  Moscow,  closer  geographically  than  the  alternatives, 
such  as  the  Whites,  forming  in  the  south.  If  Tukhachevsky  had  decided  to  travel  there, 
he  would  either  have  not  seen  his  family  again  or  they  would  had  to  uproot  to  go  with 
him.  Moreover,  he  believed  that  the  Bolsheviks  were  the  group  with  the  greatest 
vision  and  best  chance  of  pulling  Russia  out  of  the  chaos  into  which  it  had  fallen. 
Therefore,  he  joined  the  army  they  were  forming  to  defend  Russia. 
The  decision  to  join  the  Bolshevik  Party  was  completely  separate  and  was  only 
taken  after  his  friend  Kuliabko,  suggested  it.  Tukhachevsky  was  already  working  with 
the  CEC  Military  Department  at  the  hub  of  Red  Army  formation  and  saw  that  the  new 
army  was  to  be  politically-based.  Therefore,  to  advance  in  it,  he  would  have  to  be 
politically  reliable  as  well  as  good  at  his  job,  so  he  entered  the  Party.  This  provided 316 
him  with  the  necesary  background  and  qualification  to  become  I  st  Army  Commander. 
He  was  interviewed  by  Lenin  and  passed  muster  with  Trotsky  as  one  of  the  very  few 
"commander-communists"  in  the  country.  This  made  him  the  ideal  military  leader  for 
the  Simbirsk  Bolsheviks  in  their  power  struggle  with  the  SRs  in  the  Volga. 
On  Eastern  Front,  Tukhachevsky  showed  his  prowess  in  conducting  army 
reorganisational  work,  turning  scattered  partisan  formations  into  regular  army  units, 
based  on  the  regimental  structure  he  had  known  in  the  Tsarist  Army.  He  was  the  first 
person  in  the  Red  Army  to  conduct  frontline  mobilisations,  initially  of  voenspetsy,  to 
create  army  and  divisional  command  staffs,  and  then  of  regular  troops,  to  create  the 
regular  I  st  An-ny  in  less  than  two  months. 
However,  this  was  also  achieved  by  a  readiness  to  resort  to  strict  measures  of 
revolutionary  discipline.  Tukhachevsky  was  the  first  to  form  Revolutionary  Military 
Tribunals,  within  a  week  of  his  arrival  in  the  East,  and  he  was  very  likely  the  first  to 
employ  zagraditel'nye  otriady  (blocking  detachments).  He  was  willing  to  work 
closely  with  the  Cheka  to  retain  order  and  stressed  from  early  on  that  a  hardcore  of 
Communists  were  needed  to  instill  discipline  into  the  other  troops.  He  had  witnessed 
this  in  action  in  his  May  tour  of  the  provinces  and  realised  that  those  who  believed  in 
the  political  ideals  of  Bolshevism  had  something  to  fight  for  and  would  persuade  or 
force  the  disinterested  peasant  masses  to  do  the  same.  Political  agitation  accompanied 
by  force  -  this  was  the  way  the  Red  Army  worked  from  the  outset.  Tukhachevsky  saw 
this  and  saw  that  it  worked.  He  adopted  these  methods  for  the  duration  of  the  Civil 
War,  when  he  was  consistently  sent  to  take  charge  of  disorganised  or  routed  armies 
and  had  very  little  time  to  pull  them  together  before  counter-attacking. 
In  this  way,  Tukhachevsky  progressed  through  command  of  8th  and  5th  Armies, 
defeating  Kolchak  at  the  head  of  the  latter,  before  gaining  promotion  as  Acting 
Caucasian  Front  Commander  to  defeat  Denikin.  Promotion  to  full  Front  Command 
followed  as  he  led  the  Soviet  Western  Front  against  Poland.  Although  this  ended  in 
defeat,  Tukhachevsky  was  not  held  in  disgrace,  but  was  later  called  upon  to  suppress 
the  Kronstadt  and  Tambov  uprisings  in  1921.  These  lie  outwith  the  boundaries  of  this 
thesis,  but  another  post  Tukhachevsky  received,  in  August  1921,  sternmed  directly 317 
form  his  Civil  War  record.  '  He  was  appointed  Head  of  the  Red  Army  Military 
Academy?  Why  was  this  so? 
Tukhachevsky  had  pushed  from  the  very  beginning  of  Red  Army  organisation  for 
"unified  command".  He  wanted  Red  Commanders  to  lead  the  armed  forces  and  did 
not  appreciate  the  interference  of  political  commissars.  He  felt  that  professional 
soldiers  could  do  the  job,  but  that  they  also  had  to  be  politically  sound.  Tukhachevsky 
produced  a  plan  for  command  courses  for  Red  Commanders  in  June  1918  and  these 
were  running  by  the  end  of  the  year.  In  1919,  he  set  up  courses  himself  and  taught  on 
them,  whilst  5th  Army  Commander.  When  the  troops  were  not  attacking,  they  were 
being  educated  in  how  to  attack.  This  was  recognised  in  Moscow  and  Tukhachevsky 
was  recalled  to  lecture  to  the  Red  Army  Military  Academy  and  share  his  ideas  with 
the  Party  leadership.  Lenin  asked  him  for  a  report  on  the  likelihood  of  creating  a  Red 
command  staff  based  on  his  5th  Army  experiences.  In  1920,  Tukhachevsky  created 
the  Smolensk  State  Military  Polytechnical  Institute  of  Western  Front  to  educate 
kursanty  and  produce  young  Red  Commanders.  2  His  vision  of  youth  as  the  future  of 
the  communist  state  matched  that  of  Lenin  and  Trotsky.  Tukhachevsky  was  at  the 
forefront  of  this  process  and  in  May  1920  was  admitted  to  the  general  staff,  despite 
never  having  attended  the  Nikolaevskii  Academy,  as  he  was  too  young.  He  was  the 
prime  candidate  to  head  the  Red  An-ny  Military  Academy. 
But  why  did  Tukhachevsky  go  to  all  this  bother?  He  did  not  believe  in 
communism  when  he  joined  the  Party,  but  did  so  for  career  reasons.  Did  he  simply 
remain  a  careerist,  immune  to  the  ideals?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  no. 
During  the  Civil  War,  Tukhachevsky  saw  that  the  methods  by  which  he  was 
forced  to  fight  the  conflict  were  working.  Rapid  attacks  turned  into  continuous 
offensives  to  keep  the  enemy  on  the  backfoot  and  press  home  the  advantage  whilst  it 
lasted.  Such  tactics  required  a  continuous  supply  of  troops.  Therefore,  mobilisation  at 
the  front  was  required  and  this  had  to  be  conducted  quickly  as  the  attack  moved  on. 
This  proved  to  be  the  perfect  system  to  win  the  Civil  War  as  it  matched  conditions 
within  Russia  in  every  way.  The  infrastructure  was  ruined,  so  troops  could  not 
quickly  be  transferred  from  one  front  to  another  and  reinforcements  could  not  be 
rapidly  despatched.  Therefore,  frontline  mobilisation  was  needed.  However,  this 
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system  also  matched  the  socio-econornic  composition  of  Russia  and  the  wonts  of  the 
peasant  masses. 
Tukhachevsky  won  his  campaigns  by  marching  vast  distances  across  Russia  with  a 
hardcore  of  communists,  Cheka  and  trained  staff,  mobilising  peasants  as  they  went. 
Constant  mobilisation  was  needed  because  peasants  were  willing  to  fight  to  defend 
their  home  areas,  but  would  then  desert  when  the  fighting  moved  on.  However,  plenty 
of  peasants  existed  to  be  mobilised  and  so  the  process  worked.  As  thousands  deserted, 
thousands  more  were  mobilised.  But  why  did  the  peasants  want  to  fight  for  the  Red 
Army?  They  did  so  because  the  Reds  were  the  side  who  said  the  peasants  could  retain 
their  land.  The  Whites  redistributed  land  within  their  areas,  turning  the  clock  back  to 
pre-1917  Tsarist  times.  These  methods  worked  and  Tukhachevsky  fought  the  Civil 
War  by  them. 
This  methodology  also  matched  Moscow's  continuous  demands  for  rapid  action 
and  quick  advances  to  turn  military  situations  around.  However,  it  did  not  always 
work.  Tukhachevsky  failed  in  the  Don  in  early  1919,  when  he  was  forced  to  advance 
across  the  steppeland  populated  by  cossacks  supportive  of  the  Whites.  Why  did  this 
cause  the  offensive  to  fail?  The  secure  rear  which  had  been  supplied  on  other  fronts 
by  a  sympathetic  peasant  population  and  friendly  partisans  in  the  enemy  rear,  causing 
disruption  and  destroying  enemy  communications,  was  not  present  in  the  Don. 
However,  the  Siberian  partisan  movement  on  Eastern  Front  in  1919  reached  vast 
proportions  which  further  fuelled  Tukhachevsky's  belief  in  the  ability  to  mobilise 
constantly  on  the  move,  if  the  motivation  was  there.  He  saw  that  Marxism  and  the 
class  struggle  provided  this  motive  and  came  to  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  a  Marxist 
Revolutionary  doctrine.  This  was  how  he  fought  the  Civil  War  and  how  he  believed 
the  Reds  should  progress. 
However,  Tukhachevsky's  theory  came  unstuck  in  Poland,  the  first  attempt  to 
carry  revolution  abroad  on  the  point  of  bayonets.  Tukhachevsky,  like  Lenin  and  the 
majority  of  the  Communist  Party,  believed  that  the  Polish  masses  would  rise,  but 
when  they  did  not,  he  was  left  waging  a  stretched  campaign,  with  a  hostile  rear  and  no 
freshly-mobilised  reinforcements,  as  in  the  Don.  "Class"  war  tactics  had  not  worked 
in  a  "national"  war  context.  The  flaw  in  the  theory  was  that  everyone  had  to  believe  it 
for  it  to  work.  The  Polish  masses  did  not,  so  it  failed. 
2  Marshal  Tukhachevsky:  Vospominaniia  dru--ei  i  soratnikov,  (Moscow,  1965),  pp.  141-145. 319 
However,  Tukhachevsky  did  not  abandon  his  ideas.  He  was  a  true  believer  by  now 
and  advocated  political  measures  to  prepare  the  proletariat  and  allow  them  to  realise 
that  the  Red  Army  was  attacking  for  their  interests.  Poland  also  brought  a  change  of 
tack  to  Tukhachevsky's  offensive  theory  -  continuous  offensive  slowed  to  successive 
operations  to  allow  the  rear  to  catch  up  and  prevent  a  hostile  rear  and  broken 
communications  causing  the  offensive  to  collapse.  Tukhachevsky  retained  these  basic 
beliefs  in  his  tactics  and  overall  strategy  to  win  a  class  war  and  carried  this  through 
the  1920s  until  it  became  the  operational  side  of  "Deep  Battle". 
The  openness  to  idea  and  innovation  which  Tukhachevsky  displayed  in  the  Civil 
War  meant  that  he  was  willing  to  take  on  new  ideas  constantly.  In  this  way,  he 
developed  his  basic  premise  of  attacking  quickly  with  manoeuvre  for  encirclement  to 
wipe  out  the  enemy  force  and  proceed  onto  the  next  target,  to  include  modem 
developments.  He  also  developed  his  theory  again  to  suit  the  socio-economic  fabric  of 
the  Soviet  Union  which  emerged  in  the  late  1920s.  The  Five  Year  Plans,  with 
collectivisation  and  industrialisation,  led  to  heavy  industry  concentration  creating 
plants  which  could  convert  to  munitions  production,  tractor  works  for  building  tanks 
and  so  on.  It  was  Tukhachevsky's  open  mind  to  innovation  and  willingness  to  try  new 
ideas,  developed  during  the  Civil  War,  which  led  him  to  develop  his  theories  and  rise 
to  the  top  of  the  Red  Army  tree. 
This  ability  to  adapt  and  get  the  job  done  had  also  led  Tukhachevsky  to  become 
the  conu-nunist  "fireman"  or  "troubleshooter"  during  the  Civil  War.  He  had 
consistently  been  sent  to  fronts  prioritised  by  the  Red  leadership,  the  areas  in  most 
trouble  and  in  need  of  a  steady  hand,  to  reorganise  and  motivate  the  troops.  In  this  he 
used  sound  military  methods,  but  was  also  willing  to  resort  to  brutal  revolutionary 
discipline  via  the  Tribunals.  This  was  why  he  was  chosen  by  Lenin  and  Trotsky  to 
fight  on  the  prioritised  fronts. 
Whilst  rising  through  the  Red  Army  ranks  and  currying  favour  with  the  Bolshevik 
leadership,  Tukhachevsky  did  ruffle  a  few  feathers.  His  methods  were  alien  to  the 
hard-left  Bolsheviks,  but  also  to  older  voenspetsy,  whom  he  considered  outdated  and 
unwilling  to  adapt  to  his  new  methods  of  class  warfare.  This  could  be  put  down  to 
career  ambition  once  more,  wishing  to  get  ahead  by  getting  rid  of  the  senior  officers, 
but  it  was  not.  Instead  it  represented  Tukhachevsky's  conversion  to  a  belief  in  class 
warfare  principles  and  methods.  The  squabbles  he  had  with  superiors  occurred  over 320 
strategic  or  tactical  matters,  but  it  was  part  of  the  process  of  needing  to  educate  a  Red 
Command  Staff.  This  necessitated  the  removal  of  those  who  did  not  believe  in  the 
ideals  and  methods.  Tukhachevsky's  habit  of  complaining  to  Moscow  over  superiors' 
heads,  playing  the  communist  card,  must  have  rankled,  although  he  was  not  the  only 
one  to  do  so. 
However,  Tukhachevsky  also  developed  early  friendships  during  the  Civil  War. 
Relationships  with  those  with  whom  he  would  work  closely  throughout  his  life,  were 
formed  on  the  battlefields.  In  this  way  he  became  closest  to  Frunze  and  Kamenev,  the 
two  people  he  had  fought  most  closely  and  most  effectively  alongside.  Tukhachevsky 
met  Triandafillov,  the  theoretical  genius  involved  in  the  operational  side  of  "Deep 
Battle",  fittingly  at  a  conference  in  December  1919,  at  which  they  both  gave  papers 
on  the  nature  of  Civil  War  combat.  He  would  also  work  with  Uborevich,  his  closest 
collaborator  in  developing  mechanised  forces  in  the  1920s  and  1930s,  at  Tambov  in 
192  1.  Ordzhonikidze  became  a  close  friend  as  well  as  a  collaborator  in  the  formation 
of  the  military-industrial  complex.  Countless  others,  some  of  whom  have  been 
flagged  up  during  this  thesis,  and  many  further  down  the  command  chain,  fought 
alongside  Tukhachevsky  during  the  Civil  War  and  continued  to  work  with  him  in 
different  capacities.  Junior  officers  such  as  Rokossovskii,  Konev  and  Zhukov  all 
fought  under  Tukhachevsky  during  the  Civil  War  and  benefited  from  his  notion  of  a 
Red  Command  Staff  and  the  need  to  maintain  a  regular  Red  Army.  3 
The  seeds  of  Tukhachevsky's  ftiture  success  can  be  found  in  his  Civil  War  record. 
The  positions  of  Deputy  Peoples'  Commissar  for  Defence,  Chief  of  Armaments  and 
Chief-of-Staff,  all  originated  from  the  fact  that  he  had  shown  himself  to  be  a  good 
man-manager,  who  could  inspire  his  troops  to  do  well  and  carry  out  his  orders.  His 
military  theories  and  organisational  abilities  were  clear  to  see  and  he  produced  Red 
Army  Field  Regulations,  manuals  and  a  plethora  of  written  work  incorporating  his 
operational  ideas  and  his  views  on  Red  Army  organisation. 
But  can  the  roots  of  his  downfall  also  be  located  there?  Various  theories  are 
presented  surrounding  Tukhachevsky's  execution.  One  argument  is  that  Stalin  never 
forgave  Tukhachevsky  for  blaming  him  and  his  dominance  of  South-Western  Front 
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to  overthrow  Stalin  and  set  up  an  alternative  military  or  political  regime.  Another 
possibility  is  the  involvement  of  emigre's  who,  bitter  at  his  betrayal  of  his  aristocratic 
heritage,  fabricated  evidence  that  Tukhachevsky  was  involved  with  the  Nazis  and/or 
Trotsky.  Alternatives  on  this  theory  are  that  Stalin  had  him  removed  to  appease  Nazi 
Germany,  as  Tukhachevsky  was  the  most  vociferous  critic  of  Nazism  in  1930s  Russia, 
or  that  the  Gestapo  forged  the  coup  evidence  to  remove  him.  However,  I  would 
speculate  a  slightly  different  theory. 
As  has  been  shown,  Tukhachevsky  demonstrated  his  abilities  during  the  Civil 
War.  He  completed  the  hardest  tasks  by  taking  whatever  measures  were  necessary.  He 
matched  his  Civil  War  military  theories  to  the  needs  of  the  nation  and  they  worked 
because  of  this.  In  the  1920s,  the  theories  he  developed  for  mass,  mechanised  armies 
also  matched  the  needs  of  Russia.  The  Five  Year  Plans  created  the  possibility  to  build 
a  mass  army  and  Tukhachevsky  pressed  continually  for  this.  He  fell  out  of  favour  in 
the  late  1920s  for  suggesting  to  Stalin  that  vast  military  development  was  necessary, 
but  used  the  time  he  was  in  Leningrad  to  conduct  further  experiments,  adding 
paratroopers  to  his  ideas  and  beginning  research  which  led  to  the  Katiusha  rocket 
launcher.  4  However,  when  the  needs  of  the  Soviet  Union  again  turned  towards 
Tukhachevsky's  ideas  and  the  creation  of  a  new  vast  army  to  take  on  the  capitalist 
world,  Stalin  looked  to  Tukhachevsky  once  again.  The  "troubleshooter"  was  recalled 
to  carry  out  further  reorganisation  and  Tukhachevsky  was  still  engaged  in  this  task 
when  he  was  executed.  Why  then  did  Stalin  kill  him? 
The  way  the  Soviet  Union  developed  in  the  1920s  under  Stalin  was  apparently  the 
way  Tukhachevsky  had  hoped  and  envisaged  during  his  conversations  with  Fervacque 
in  1917.  The  Bolsheviks  had  indeed  pulled  Russia  out  of  the  fire  and  had  won  the 
Civil  War.  However,  under  Stalin,  the  mixture  of  Russian  nationalism  with 
communism  which  "Socialism  in  One  Country"  engendered,  was  exactly  that  which 
Tukhachevsky  sought.  The  Red  Army  became  one  of  the  main  lynchpins  in  the 
country  alongside  heavy  industry  and  the  Five  Year  Plans.  Tukhachevsky  achieved 
his  ambition  of  leading  the  army  and  hoped  to  lead  it  into  battle  using  his  theories  to 
win  a  mass,  mechanised  manoeuvre  war  with  the  capitalist  West.  By  1937, 
3  Konstantin  Konstantinovich  Rokossovskii  (1896-1968)  fought  with  5th  Army  in  1919,  Ivan 
Stepanovich  Konev  (1897-1973)  fought  at  Kronstadt,  whilst  Georgii  Konstantinovich  Zhukov  (1896- 
1974)  served  in  the  cavalry  on  Eastern  Front  in  1919  and  Southern  Front  in  1920. 322 
Tukhachevsky  was  the  picture  of  a  perfect  Stalinist.  He  was  willing  to  carry  out 
whatever  operations  were  required,  using  whatever  means  necessary.  In  this  way,  he 
was  no  different  to  any  of  the  others  who  pinned  their  sail  on  the  mast  of  the  Stalin 
regime.  By  the  time  of  the  "Great  Terror"  in  1937-38,  it  was  the  Stalinists  who  were 
removed,  as  the  leader  dealt  with  every  sector  of  society  in  turn.  Tukhachevsky  was 
the  most  prominent  military  figure  in  the  nation,  a  man  who  was  good  at  completing 
his  tasks  and  willing  to  take  whatever  measures  were  necessary  to  defend  his  country. 
He  was  the  one  most  likely  to  lead  a  coup  to  overthrow  Stalin,  either  to  end  the  purge 
process,  accelerate  it  further,  change  the  direction  of  the  economy  or  step  up  efforts 
against  Hitler.  However,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  Tukhachevsky  would  have  done 
this,  unless  perhaps  the  future  of  the  Red  Army  and  the  nation  depended  on  it.  I  would 
speculate  that  Stalin  removed  Tukhachevsky,  his  "Demon  of  the  Civil  War",  because 
he  saw  in  him  someone  very  much  like  himself  in  terms  of  method  and  ruthlessness, 
someone  ambitious  and  willing  to  resort  to  any  means  necessary  to  triumph  and 
progress.  Perhaps  Stalin  was  afraid  someone  would  once  again  hire  the  "fireman"  as 
troubleshooter. 
For  details  on  Tukhachevsky's  posting  to  Leningrad  see,  D.  R.  Stone,  "Tukhachevsky  in  Leningrad: 
Military  Politics  and  Exile,  1928-193  1  ",  Europe-Asia  Studies,  Vol.  48,  No.  8,1996,  pp.  1365-1386. 323 
APPENDIX  A 
Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Tukhachevsky  -3  (15).  2.1893-12.6.1937. 
3  (15).  2.1893  -  Born  on  Alexandrovskii  Estate,  Dorogobuzhskii  uezd,  Smolensk 
guberniia. 
1898  -  Tukhachevsky  family  moves  to  Grandmother's  estate  near  Vrazhskoe, 
Chembarsk  uezd,  Penza  guberniia. 
1904-09  -  Attended  I  st  Penza  gimnasiia.  Withdrawn  from  school  in  5th  Year  and 
moves  with  family  to  Moscow. 
1911  -  Completes  6th  Year  at  I  Oth  Moscow  gimnasiia. 
August  -  passes  entrance  exam  to  I  st  Moscow  Empress  Ekaterina  11  Cadet  Corps, 
graduating  top  of  year  in  June  1912. 
1912-1914  -  Attended  Aleksandrovskii  Military  Academy,  graduating  July  1914,  first 
in  his  year. 
Commissioned  as  2nd  Lieutenant. 
Chose  to  join  Semenovskii  Life-Guards  Regiment. 
Anust  1914-February  1915  -  Active  service  in  Great  War.  Decorated  six  times 
before  being  taken  prisoner  by  Germans. 
February  1915-Au2ust  1917  -  POW.  Transferred  to  increasingly  secure  camps  for 
repeated  escape  attempts,  ending  up  in  high-security  Bavarian  Castle  of  Fort  9 
Ingolstadt.  Fifth  escape  attempt  successful,  returning  to  Petrograd  just  before  October 
Revolution. 
1918  -  February-May  -  Employed  as  Inspector  of  Red  Army  Formations  in  Military 
Department  of  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee. 
4th  April  -  Joins  Bolshevik  Party. 
27th  May-22nd  June  -  Military  Commissar  of  Moscow  Region  of  Western  Screens. 
26th  June  1918-4th  January  1919  -I  st  Revolutionary  Army  Commander 
(komandarm-1)  of  Eastern  Front  against  Komuch  Government's  "People's  Army"  and 
Czechoslovak  Legion. 
26th  June-7th  September  -  Forms  and  organises  Ist  Army,  conducts  defensive 
actions  and  three  abortive  offensives,  one  on  Samara  and  two  on  Simbirsk 
8th-27th  September  -  Third  Simbirsk  Operation 324 
28th  September-8th  October  -  Syzran'-Samara  Operation 
14th-30th  October  -  Buguruslan,  Bugul'ma  and  Buzuluk  Operations 
31st  October-24th  November  -  Belebei  Operation 
25th  November-31st  December  -  Ufa  Operation 
1919  -  4th-20th  January  -  Acting  Southern  Front  Commander  (vremkomiuzhfront) 
20th  January-15th  March  -  8th  Army  Commander  (komandarm-8)  of  Southern 
Front  against  Krasnov. 
Late  January-Mid-February  -  Operations  against  Krasnov  and  Volunteer  Army, 
pressing  them  back  to  right  bank  of  Don  in  Kalitvenskaia-Glubokaia-Krasnovka- 
Inganskaia  area,  until  spring  thaw  ends  campaigning 
4th  April-25th  November  -  5th  Army  Commander  (komandarm-5)  of  Eastern  Front 
against  Kolchak. 
4th-28th  April  -  Conducts  defensive  actions  and  reorganisation  of  5th  Army 
28th  April-4th  May  -  Buguruslan  Operation 
4th-13th  May  -  Bugul'ma  Operation 
14th-17th  May  -  Belebei  Operation 
25th  May-9th  June  -  Ufa  Operation 
9th  June-7th  July  -  Pursuit  operations  crossing  Rivers  Ufa  and  Belaia 
7th-13th  July  -  Zlatoust  Operation 
16th  July-4th  August  -  Cheliabinsk-Troitsk  Operation 
7th  August  -  Awarded  Order  of  Red  Banner 
11  th-20th  August  -  Pursuit  operation  to  River  Tobol. 
20th  August-2nd  September  -  Petropavlovsk  Operation 
2nd  September-13th  October  -  White  counter-offensive  pushes  Eastern  Front  back 
behind  River  Tobol.  Tukhachevsky  conducts  reorganisational  and  reinforcement  work 
to  rebuild  shattered  5th  Army. 
14th-30th  October  -  Second  Petropavlovsk  Operation 
1st-14th  November  -  Omsk  Operation 
20th  November  -  Appointed  13th  Army  Commander  (komandarm-13)  of  Southern 
Front 
25th  November  -  Recalled  to  Moscow 
1920  -  4th  Februarv-22nd  April  -  Acting 
(vremkomkavkazfront)  against  Denikin. 
Caucasian  Front  Commander 325 
14th  February-29th  April  -  North  Caucasus  Operation 
21st  April  -  Orders  Baku  Operation  and  crossing  of  Azerbaijan,  border. 
29th  April  1920-6th  May  1921  -  Western  Front  Commander  (komzapadfront)  against 
Poland  in  Polish-Soviet  War. 
29th  April-13th  May  -  Conducts  reorganisation  of  Western  Front 
14th  May-2nd  June  -  Battle  of  Berezina  to  pre-empt  Polish  strike  and  relieve  South- 
Western  Front 
3rd-22nd  June  -  Conducts  reforination,  reinforcement  and  reorganisation  of  Western 
Front,  whilst  fighting  defensive  actions  and  launching  small  counter-attacks 
24th-30th  June  -  Mozyr'  Operation 
4th-12th  July  -  Igumen-Minsk  (Belorussia)  Operation 
13th-22nd  July  -  Pursuit  operations  taking  Molodechno,  Lida,  Vil'no  and  Grodno 
23rd  July-16th  August  -  Warsaw  Operation 
16th  August  -  Polish  counter-offensive  launched  from  behind  River  Wisla 
16th  August-18th  October  -  Conducts  rearguard  actions  in  gradual  retreat  until 
signing  of  armistice  in  Riga 
October-November  -  Operations  against  band  of  Bulak-Balakhovich 
1921  -  3rd-18th  March  -  Acting  7th  Army  Commander  (vremkomandarm-7),  led 
suppression  of  Kronstadt  Revolt. 
6th  May-25th  July  -  Commander  of  Soviet  forces  in  Tambov  Province.  Leads 
crushing  of  Antonov  peasant  uprising  in  Tambov  Province. 
25th  July  or  5th  August  -  Appointed  Head  and  Military  Commissar  of  Military 
Academy  of  Red  Army  (RKXA). 
24th  January  1922,  -  Appointed  Western  Front  Commander. 
1st  April  1924  -  Appointed  Deputy  Chief-of-Staff  of  RJM. 
13th  November  1925  -  Appointed  Chief-of-Staff  of  RJM. 
5th  May  1928-19th  June  1931  -  Commander  of  Leningrad  Military  District. 
19th  June  1931-11th  May  1937  -  Deputy  Chairman  of  RVS  SSSR  and  Head  of 
Armaments  of  Red  Army. 
February  1934  -  Elected  Candidate  Member  of  Russian  Communist  Party  Central 
Committee  at  17th  Congress  (Congress  of  Victors)  of  Communist  Party. 
20th  November  1935  -  Appointed  one  of  first  five  Marshals  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
highest  military  rank  in  the  country. 326 
11th  May  1937  -  Stripped  of  duties  as  Deputy  Peoples  Commissar  of  Defence  and 
appointed  Head  of  Volga  Military  okrug.  Arrested  en  route  to  take  up  new  command. 
11th  June  -  Tried  in  closed  military  court  along  with  seven  other  high-ranking 
colleagues  -  accused  of  treason  and  plotting  a  military  coup  -  shot  the  next  day. 
31st  January  1957  -  Military  Collegiate  of  Supreme  Court  of  USSR  declared 
Tukhachevsky  and  co-defendants  not  guilty  of  "Anti-Soviet  Trotskyist  Military 
Organisation"  charges. 
27th  February  1957  -  Readmitted  as  member  of  Communist  Party. 
27th  March  1988  -  Documents  relating  to  Tukhachevsky  case  released  under 
glasn  ost'  process. 327 
Appendix  B:  Maps. 
1.  German  Great  War  POW  camps  in  which  Tukhachevsky  was  imprisoned. 
2.  Tukhachevsky's  Great  War  frontline  service. 
Russia  in  summer  1918  and  Tukhachevsky's  frontline  tour  of  May  1918. 
4.  General  map  of  Volga  Region. 
5.  The  "fluid"  Eastern  Front:  June-August  1918. 
6.  Tukhachevsky  as  I  st  Army  Commander  of  Eastern  Front:  September  1918-January 
1919. 
7.  Tukhachevsky's  change  of  manoeuvre  on  Southern  Front:  February-March  1919. 
8.  The  drive  against  Kolchak.  Tukhachevsky  as  5th  Army  Commander  on  Eastern  Front: 
April-November  1919. 
9.  The  North  Caucasus  Operation.  Tukhachevsky  as  Acting  Caucasian  Front 
Commander:  February-April  1920. 
10.  The  Belorussian  Operation  and  Drive  for  Warsaw.  Tukhachevsky  as  Western  Front 
Commander:  April-August  1920. 328 
Maps  adapted  from  oriainals  by: 
1.  R.  B.  Speed,  Prisoners,  Diplomats  and  the  Great  War.  A  Study  ofDiplomacy  in 
Captivity,  (New  York,  1990). 
2.  J.  Keegan,  The  First  World  War,  (London,  1998). 
3.  E.  Mawdsley,  The  Russian  Civil  War,  (Boston,  1987). 
4.  K.  Baedeker,  Baedeker's  Russia,  1914,  (London,  1971). 
5.  D.  Footman,  Civil  War  in  Russia,  (London,  196  1). 
6.  N.  Croll,  2002. 
7.  P.  Kenez,  Civil  War  in  South  Russia,  1919-1920;  the  defeat  of  the  Whites,  (Berkeley, 
Calif.,  1977). 
8.  D.  Footman,  Civil  War  in  Russia,  (London,  1961). 
9.  Ibid. 
10.  http:  //www.  lib.  utexas.  edu/maps/ciaOl/poland-sm0l.  jpg; 
http:  //www.  lib.  utexas.  edu/maps/commonwealth/belarus-sm97gif 4 
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